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## FOREWORD

This volume contains the chief contributions of those who took part in the Fourth Congress of Philosophy held at Madras, in December, 1928. The success of the Madras meeting is due chiefly to the energy and enterprise of the local secretaries.

Dr. Saroj K. Das and his talented wife Mrs. Tatini Das, M.A. are responsible for the editing of this volume and the Congress Executive takes this opportunity of offering to them its deepest thanks for their labour of love. The University of Calcutta well-known for its interest in all progressive academic enterprises helped the Congress most substantially in the printing and publication of this volume and the Congress is greatly indebted to its authorities for their generous assistance.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

*7th September, 1930.*



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## OPENING ADDRESS

*(Hindu Philosophy and Life)*

BY

HIS HIGHNESS RAJAH SIR RAMA VARMAH, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

GENTLEMEN,

It gives me not a little pleasure to have been able to accept your kind invitation and to be present here to-day to participate, in however small a measure, in your deliberations; and, before I pass on to the main task which brings me here to-day, permit me to thank you for the honour you have done me in asking me to open the Fourth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. It has been my rare good fortune to have been able to devote my leisure to the study of Indian Philosophy, and my privilege to encourage, as far as it lay in my power, the study of our ancient, sacred and philosophical literature. If genuine interest in the study of Hindu thought were in itself a sufficient qualification for the office which you have conferred on me, I should have no misgivings in standing before you to-day to start the proceedings of your Congress; but, zeal, by itself, can hardly accomplish a task which necessarily requires long and patient research. And, indeed, I do not venture to do much more than invite your attention to one special contribution which Indian Philosophy makes to the sum-total of the world's philosophical literature, and indicate one line of activity in which you could render very valuable services to the present generation. By 'special contribution' I mean not so much the amount of philosophical literature that India has produced—although, even in this respect, no other country has anything near enough to show—as a special and inherent tendency of thought, a unique stand-point, which characterises every school of Indian Philosophy, orthodox as well as heterodox. I shall

not attempt anything more than this in the course of this brief Address.

Foreign students of Hindu culture have been struck by the extraordinary influence that Religion exercises on all sides of our national life. God is invoked at the beginning of every undertaking in life, and every stage in life is, at least in principle, dedicated to the pursuit of some spiritual ideal. Our critics have tried to trace this feature of the Hindu view of life to a variety of causes all of which may roughly be comprehended under the two categories of 'priestly rule' and superstition. I do not for a moment wish to deny that we have our share of these encumbrances; nevertheless, I think it will be wrong to ascribe to the influence of a priesthood or to superstition the profound religious sense which leavened and which still lingers in Hindu religious institutions. Long before the rest of the world came to realise the spiritual unity of every side of human life, our sages had recognised that religion is not a thing for special days or special occasions, but a "reality permeating the whole of life." With our ancients there was no 'giving unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's.' Even political allegiance was required because of the allegiance we owe to the supreme principle of perfection; and the 'Sovereign' of Hindu political theory is not the 'Oriental Despot' of Western imagination, but a constitutional ruler at once sanctioned and limited by a code of spiritual laws which he could only enforce but not infringe or even amend. This marvellous phenomenon or, at least this glorious picture cannot be explained in terms of priestcraft or superstition. It is to be traced to the Hindu view of life which is something unique in the history of civilisation.

In the course of his Address to the First Session of your Congress Lord Lytton incidentally refers to the point, on which I wish to dwell at some length to-day, when he says, "In the West which delights in definition, philosophy has been a study, in the East which loves infinity, it is a practice." This characteristic feature of Indian thought deeply stamps all the different schools of philosophy in India, and from the very outset it helped to set at rest most of the petty party quarrels which have marred the history and retarded the growth of philosophy in other countries.

I may perhaps best explain this point by the help of a contrast with which we are all familiar. In the West, the struggle between Religion on the one hand, and Philosophy and Science on the other, is, at least, as old as Socrates, and the conflict seems not completely resolved even to this day. Attempts at reconciliation have generally ended in rendering Religion an empty shibboleth, or, Science an extravagant fad. From the first the possibility of a reconciliation was precluded by the competitive nature of these rival disciplines. Our ancestors, on the other hand, never seems to have thought of even the possibility of such a conflict. With them the distinction was not between Religion and Philosophy, but, between a higher and a lower kind of knowledge; and even here the distinction led to no conflict, because it was based upon a rational foundation. The principle of distinction was simple; it was not unlike the distinction we all make between the mind of a child and that of the adult. God, or, if any one prefers it, Reality speaks differently to different minds in accordance with their power of comprehension :

“यथाभातस्वरूपेण सत्यत्वेन जगच्छ्रुतिः  
 अङ्गीकृत्य हितं नृणां कदाचित् वक्तिसादरं ।  
 अतीव पक्वचित्तस्य चित्तपाकमपेक्ष्य सा  
 सर्वं ब्रह्मेति कल्याणी श्रुतिर्वदति सादरं ॥”

Hindu tradition draws no line of distinction between what we to-day understand by the two terms ‘ Philosophy ’ and ‘ Religion.’ It was not because the ancients failed to discriminate between things which are really different, but because they refused to break up a spiritual process which is one at bottom. Indian philosophy certainly is aware that all knowledge is not of the same quality or possessed of the same value from the stand-point of man’s spiritual vocation. The Upanisads are never weary of distinguishing between the ‘ higher ’ and the ‘ lower ’ kinds of knowledge; but these do not affect the unity of the aims of Philosophy and Religion. Indeed, even in their genesis Philosophy and Religion are not different. It is a common belief that philosophic speculation is the product of leisure and as such the special possession of a privileged few, whereas Religion is the common

heritage of all. Whatever element of truth there may be in this distinction, it seems to me that it cannot be radical. All of us are not philosophers; but, are we all equally religious? No man is utterly destitute of some philosophy however unconscious he may be of it for the most part of his life.

It seems to me that both Philosophy and Religion generally are the outcome of the perceived stress and strain, the trials and suffering which human life even normally involves. No mind which is not alive to the contradictions and conflicts engendered by our life here possesses the proper apparatus, the appropriate perspective for both philosophic speculation and religious feeling. It is in some terrible crisis in life that we come to realise the deeper meaning of existence; and there is genuine psychological justification for the procedure adopted by the author of the Mahabharata when he places the expounding of the Geeta on the battlefield of Kurukshetra. Some critics have thought it altogether artificial and farfetched on the part of Vyasa to have represented Arjuna as coming to a sudden consciousness of the guilt underlying war, the futility of earthly power, and the utter vanity of all human aspirations. On the other hand, it appears to me that, given a reflective mind alive to the sorrows and suffering that cloud even the brightest of human careers, nothing is more probable or more natural than this searching questioning of the whole motive of human ambition. Psychologists assure us that such crises in life generally constitute the point of "conversions," of total reversals of character; and I fail to see how we could say that they are not provocative of philosophic speculation or religious fervour.

However that may be, no one at all conversant with Indian Philosophy will question that it is the problem of 'Samsara' that is the central theme at once of Hindu Philosophy and Hindu Religion. Whether the particular Darsana purports to inquire into the nature of Dharma or into the nature of Brahman, or into anything else for the matter of that, the philosophic motive is the same, namely, to reach the root of the miserable, self-contradictory, illusory tangle of life which we call Samsara—a motive which is also the main force behind all religions. Hence, in India, the object of both Religion and Philosophy has always been identical; and, however much this object might have come to be

personified, or humanised, or even degraded to meet the exigencies of common comprehension or popular devotion; or, however colourless and abstract it might have been rendered in order to satisfy the intellectual demands of an exacting logic; a conflict between religion and philosophy was from the very outset rendered impossible by the unity of their aims and the identity of their motives.

And this harmonious fusion of philosophy and religion in the service of the spiritual interests of man is what I call the special contribution which India makes to the philosophical lore of mankind. It is a gift which, no doubt, only the spiritually qualified can receive with advantage; for, indeed, this very excellence has been set down as a special failing by some Western Orientalists. Colonel Jacob, for instance, in his Preface to his edition of the 'Vedantasara,' observes, "The Vedanta Philosophy, of which this volume is an outline, is supposed to be the finest outcome of Indian thought; yet, it abolishes God, as an unreality, and substitutes an impersonal It with no consciousness, whilst its highest notion of bliss is the annihilation of personality! Yet, if any men could, by searching, find out the living and true God, they would assuredly have succeeded. Is it not clear, then, that God must give us a revelation of Himself, or we shall never know him? And I really think that any really earnest and candid mind will see that the Bible is just the revelation we need; etc." Without in the least implying the slightest disrespect for the Bible, or underrating the services rendered by Colonel Jacob and other Western Orientalists, I may be permitted to observe that our foreign friends have, with some notable exceptions, failed to grasp the significance of the highest flights of Indian thought. What our ancients sought—as will be amply evident from a perusal of the Upanishads—was not an Omniscient, Omnipotent, All-merciful 'Heavenly Father' who is just sufficient to quiet our emotions, allay our agonies, and hold out the promise of a Heaven, but a solution of the world-problem in all its complexity. It is a great error to suppose that the highest notion of a Personal Deity was unknown to the ancient sages of India. Many of the schools of Indian Philosophy were distinctly theistic. It would be a waste of your time if I were to parade before you passages from the Geeta, and Puranas, and the popular Stotras—passages of rare excellence



and profound piety, unsurpassed by the sacred literature of any other country. The common notion of a personal God—the God of the ordinary ethical religions—is superseded by the Idea of a superpersonal Divine Principle of which all of us are embodiments. The Hindu moral order is not a monarchy, but, a spiritual democracy of souls whose numerical distinctness is no doubt phenomenal and will ultimately be transcended in a higher Unity—in the absolute unity of God and man. If such a conception is unsatisfactory, as Colonel Jacob evidently seems to think, I confess I can find nothing more satisfying to our rational nature.

I should like to point out in this connection that Hindu Philosophy does not arrive at this notion of God as the result of a process of mere intellectual reasoning; it reaches this conclusion as the result of reasoning enlightened by intuitive perception—as the result of a revelation which, however, is within the reach of all. God reveals Himself in different ways, and to each man the revelation must come in his own way and according to the measure of his own inner light. No one can be spiritually uplifted or saved by the agency of intermediaries. This is a truth on which Indian Philosophy lays special stress. The revelation of God in each soul is partly a self-revelation, the revelation of the Divinity of *Ātman*, and the identity of God and the soul. If science has done one thing more than another, it is to shake our faith in the finality of solutions invented by human ingenuity; and, we shall be untrue to our light if we fail to re-think for ourselves what has been thought out even by better minds. In every age, nay, with every soul, there is the need for a fresh realisation of even the eternal truths of religion and philosophy; and no authority, philosophical or religious, can absolve you from this responsibility to live for yourself the truths you have been taught. “To see God is to see as God sees,” and this necessarily involves individual effort aided by the wealth of wisdom to which we are all alike legitimate heirs. The path is indeed difficult—difficult even to ascertain; but we are not altogether without some measure of guidance for where every other light fails, there is still at least the example of others who were themselves enlightened.

महाजगो येन गतस्सपत्न्याः ।

Closely allied to this notion of the divinity of man is the Hindu doctrine of *Moksha* which is not, on the one hand, the mere 'annihilation of personality,' not on the other the emigration to a better world. *Moksha* is a process of 'enlightenment' here and now, arrived at as the result of a conscientious and balanced life. It is in this connection that the Hindu doctrine of *Dharma* comes in. Every stage or estate in life has its appropriate cycle of duties to perform; and, it is only by the faithful performance of the duties of each station that a man can qualify himself for the enlightenment which is the foundation of liberation. We have often been charged with advocating a life of empty renunciation, of all indifference to earthly duties. This is the result of mere misunderstanding. The teaching of Hindu Philosophy—of even popular philosophy—is unequivocal. No doubt, *Śruti* says **ज्ञानेनैव हि संसारविनाशो नैव कर्मणा** but *Jñāna* itself cannot be obtained by a premature renouncing of the world with all its claims on you unfulfilled. The meaning of *Karma-yoga* is the consecration of life to the service of God and man; and he who tries to be a *Sannyasin* without performing his earthly duties builds without foundation. The Hindu ideal of renunciation is not negative, but positive. It demands the complete and faithful fulfilment of one's duties before one can be fit for *Jñāna* and *Moksha*.

*Dharma* widens the bounds of selfhood, enables man to transcend the limits of his own finitude, and gradually tends to the practical identification of the self with the world. This is a spiritual process in which every available help is to be sought out and enlisted in the shape of action or forbearance. Hindu Philosophy is really indifferent as to the means you employ towards this end, and it recommends the Yoga system simply as *one* sure means towards the desired result. Devotion (*Bhakti*) is equally a help, and is not to be neglected by the man who cares for the welfare of his soul. Even the state of renunciation is a means: it is the appropriate environment in which one can peacefully devote oneself to the highest spiritual needs. The external trappings of the ascetic have no special charm, and have little to do with *Moksha*. Indeed, to the man who has completely mastered the unruly passions and gained complete detachment from the

objects of sense there is no need for further spiritual exercises, and he need not wait till death for Moksha. The true ascetic, therefore, has no need for horse-hair or mortification of the flesh. He has fulfilled all the duties he owed the world, and in and through this process of conscientious living transcended his narrow self. Karma has no further meaning for him. He has left behind the sphere of Karma altogether, for

**विज्ञातब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य यथापूर्वं न संसृतिः ।**

Again our foreign critics have misunderstood the meaning of the doctrine of *Karma*. This doctrine, as you all know, has none of the horrible consequences with which our friends seem to invest it. Indeed, it boldly gets rid of the notion of an eternal hell, and substitutes for it a principle of spiritual development which in ordinary life, we accept and welcome as the ideal of earthly justice. And, as we already observed the Karmic cycle does not possess the inertia with which Science endows matter. It lies within the power of every man to transcend the sphere of *Karma* and obtain liberation. *Moksha* means just this transcendence of the 'Samsāric cycle,' and not the segregation of the soul in a specially localised Heaven.

If such a philosophy does not offer man the strength of spirit which he needs in times of trial and perplexity, I know not what does. And, perhaps, I have dwelt too long on this side of Hindu Philosophy, on the consolations it offers. To one at my time of life this is the aspect of philosophy which appeals most strongly. And, indeed, even if philosophy has nothing else to offer, it will still be the most valuable part of our culture, our most precious possession, in that it comes to conserve and strengthen the hopes and aspirations on which social and individual well-being depends.

And it is for you, gentlemen, to establish on a broader and more popular foundation the convictions which constitute the body of Hindu philosophical teaching, clothe them in modern garb, and place them within the reach of all. The fellowship of learning is the most cosmopolitan bond and it does "make the whole world kin" in a way in which no other institution does or can. Yet, your task must, at least in respect of details, differ from that of

similar conferences in other parts of the world And, I earnestly hope and fervently pray that your Congress may continue to prosper, carrying to the remotest corners of the country the light which we all alike need in times of trial and despondency, strengthening in every loyal heart the faith in the divinity of man, the unreality of evil and suffering, and in the certainty of liberation for all who will earnestly work for it.

Permit me now, gentlemen, to close this brief Address, and to open the Fourth Session of your Congress.

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## PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

BY

PRINCIPAL A. B. DHURVA, M.A., LL.B.,  
*Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Benares Hindu University.*

**“अध्यात्मविद्या विद्यानां**

**वादः प्रवदतामहम् ॥” भ. गो.**

“ I am the spiritual lore among lores; I am the discourse of the seeker of the Truth among those who discourse.”—Bh. Gītā.

BROTHER DELEGATES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

At the last Annual meeting of the British Institute of Philosophical Studies, Sir Martin Conway, rising to second the vote of thanks to the President said :

“ In venturing to address this audience to-day I am giving a greater example of courage—perhaps I should say anxiety—than I have ever done in my life, for I have not the faintest claim to number myself amongst the Philosophers. But it has been my habit in life, when I was asked to do anything, to try to do it, and I am this afternoon on that footing just to fulfil as far as I can the demand made upon me.” Although I have not been guilty of weaving a metaphysical cobweb myself, I confess I have felt interested in following the threads of some of the cobwebs of the world's great spiders, and still more in that greatest Spider Himself, Who has projected this world, and so far, in this minor sense, I cannot disown the label of a ‘ Philosopher ’ altogether. But I am sure I am not erring on the side of self-depreciation when I say that the mantle which you have thrown upon me could have more appropriately fallen upon some other shoulders. And yet, I am here before you at your bidding because, to use the words of Sir Martin once more, “ it has been my habit in life, when I was

asked to do anything, to try to do it, and fulfil as far as I can the demand made upon me."

I cannot begin my address without a word of sorrow for the death of Viscount Haldane, who whatever else he was or was not, was certainly first and foremost a philosopher of powerful intellect, who besides endeavouring to investigate and map out a pathway to Reality perceived the potentialities of Einstein's theory of Relativity and applied it to various problems of Philosophy with a breadth of vision all his own. Only recently his eagle eyes had turned towards the East, and he had begun to feel :

" Like some watcher of the skies

When a new planet swims into his ken."

But alas, before he could survey the new world in detail, he passed away, to the deepest grief of all those who feel interested in the future of Indian Philosophy. May his soul rest in peace!

Ordinarily, a President would be expected to review generally, without entering into minute details, the activities of the year in his subject, and to indicate their general tendency and significance, so as to keep his comrades wide awake to the problems of the day. But in the subject of Philosophy this task is rendered difficult by a number of causes. In the first place, in Philosophy every year is not marked by out-standing discoveries of truth, while indication of general tendencies is attended with difficulties which are peculiar to this subject. Fichte was not altogether wrong when he said that " the kind of Philosophy that a man chooses depends upon the kind of man he is;" and, as observed by Professor Muirhead, " Of the general trend of philosophy in our time each writer would probably give a different account and most would experience a certain satisfaction in discovering that it was in the direction of the establishment of his own particular views." Yet, inspite of these difficulties, one need not be chary about forming or expressing his views on the philosophy of his day, even though it may be impossible to eliminate the personal factor. For, in the march of philosophy, knowledge grows from more to more, in which every thought matters, no thought is perfect truth, and what Shelley said of Poetry is true of Philosophy that "it is not an unrelated collection of separate inventions,

but a vision of the eternal which all poets"—and we may add philosophers—"like the co-operating thoughts of one great mind, have built up since the beginning of the world." Among 'the co-operating thoughts' of this great Mind, the humblest of human thoughts has a place, and this is my apology for attempting a short notice of the main tendencies of contemporary philosophical thought. Owing to obvious limitations of time and space, I cannot undertake to review all the prominent figures of the age, nor a single one of them completely or even adequately. I shall have to select just a few influential writers by way of illustrating those tendencies and offer my remarks as I pass on. Moreover, much as I wish that it were possible to notice the tendencies in all the branches into which the work of our Congress is divided, I recognise that your time is too valuable to be used up in a preliminary discourse which, after all, is bound to be a cursory aeroplane eye-view.

## I

The first thing that strikes an observer as he casts his eye upon the philosophy of the new century is the growing share which Science is taking in the problems of Philosophy. To understand the full significance of this attitude, we have to trace the path—which we can do here only very briefly—through which the human mind has travelled in the matter of this eternal question. As is well-known, with the ancient Greeks Philosophy was the only science, from which special sciences gradually emerged. Later,

" Away, haunt not thou me  
 Thou vain Philosophy.  
 Little hast thou bestead  
 Save to perplex the head."

—these lines in Milton's *Comus* express the attitude of the average Christian towards Philosophy; and yet to the great glory and benefit both of the Christian religion and Greek philosophy, Pauline Christianity in its beginning as well as further development was philosophy brought to bear upon religion, so that Dean Inge is to-day perfectly justified in speaking of "Platonic



tradition in English religious thought." Paradoxical as it may appear, Bacon, the father of English empirical philosophy, was hardly a philosopher himself, and took little interest in what we now understand by Philosophy. However, with the practical common sense characteristic of the Englishman, he separated the provinces of Reason and Faith, Science and Religion. In the next two centuries Science was too much absorbed in its own activities to think of its relationship with Philosophy, and the latter went on in its own even tenour of speculation, unaware of the clouds of conflict that were gathering on the horizon. When Science awoke to its own potentialities and became self-conscious, it invaded the domain of Philosophy and snatched the reins of government from its hands, leaving little or nothing for Philosophy, its old master and latterly its neighbour. In the meantime Kant, with a sense of justice unsurpassed in the history of thought, vindicated the claim of Philosophy to settle not only its own boundaries but also those of Science. But his efforts to establish a perpetual peace between the two warring forces eventually failed, and in the latter half of the nineteenth century we witness a furious battle raging between Philosophy and Science, in which victory lies with Science in the earlier and with Philosophy in the latter part. The crude Materialism and Atheism of the eighteenth century were replaced by Naturalism and Agnosticism in the nineteenth. It is well-known how Darwin's science, though strictly speaking biological, trenched upon the problems of Philosophy very seriously. For, tracing the descent of man from lower life, and showing that he was only a link in the long chain of Evolution, governed by the laws of natural selection and survival of the fittest, Darwin's theory gave rise to doubts about the spiritual nature of Man, and dealt almost a death-blow to the design argument for the existence of God as then understood. The popularity of the new theory in the early years of the second half of the nineteenth century created a serious menace to Philosophy, which found two of its fundamental doctrines, the spiritual nature of Man and the existence of God, thus challenged. Luckily for the cause of Philosophy Green stemmed the tide of Naturalism. However much one may criticise the Neo-Hegelianism of Green and his followers, Philosophy owes an incalculable debt of gratitude

to this great school of British Idealism. Just as the mechanical concept of the eighteenth century was superseded by the biological concept of the third quarter of the nineteenth century, so was the biological replaced by the spiritual concept of the fourth. Thus, matter, life and spirit are the three ruling ideas which mark successive stages in the history of philosophical thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, more especially in France and Britain. During the period of the eclipse which overtook Philosophy in the third quarter of the last century what reigned supreme was General Science, or the Logic of Science, or a hierarchical classification of the particular sciences, and it was peremptorily advised 'not to speculate on origins and final ends, but to accept the actual and reduce all disordered and chaotic life and knowledge to orderly arrangement.' As Comte maintained, the age of Theology had been followed by that of Metaphysics, and now the age of Metaphysics was to be superseded by that of Science.

## II

But all this has changed. The old problems of Philosophy which divided thinkers into realists and idealists, theists, atheists, free-willists and determinists have come to new life, in this age, with just this difference that Philosophy and Science are not regarded as watertight compartments, but are permitted to influence each other as parts of one organic whole of knowledge. Thus among the eminent philosophers, or those who work in the field of Philosophy at the present day—such as Bergson, Alexander, and Russell, to mention only a few prominent names—have used their knowledge of Science for investigating the problems of Philosophy. 'Philosophy,' says Alexander, 'may be described as the experimental or empirical study of the non-empirical,' 'its spirit is one with the spirit of Science,' 'the two differing not so much in their method as in the nature of the subjects with which they deal.'

While the use of the empirical method of Science in the domain of Philosophy has given it a strong Realistic turn as against the Idealism of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the theory of Relativity, which is the most revolutionary discovery of

the present-day science, has played havoc with our common-sense ideals of Space and Time, and has thereby breathed new life into the schools of Idealism. Still, as was to be expected, the preponderance of the influence which Science has exercised on Philosophy must be pronounced to be in the direction of Realism. How far the new Realists are consistent in their position or have drawn right conclusions from their premises is, however, a different question. At least the lines of demarcation between Realism and Idealism at the present day have become very indistinct. The new Realism is far different from the old Naturalism which was inaugurated by Darwin's theory of Evolution. For example, in the Realism of Alexander, minds possess reality no less and no more than that which belongs to other 'things.' "Minds," in this view, in the words of Alexander, "are but the more gifted members known to us in a democracy of things. In respect of being or reality all existences are on equal footing. They vary in eminence; as in a democracy where talent has an open career the most gifted rise to influence and authority." This view, however, is not *toto carlo* opposed to the Idealism of Green, Bradley and Bosanquet, which it endeavours to supersede. In the inseparability of mind and things which this particular form of Idealism stands for, mind is not the individual mind of you and me, but the Universal Mind, that is the mind of God, or mind as such. To give a parallel from Indian Philosophy, the mind in which things live, move and have their being is *Paramātmān* and not *Jivātmān*, not the self but the Self.\* Realism, however, goes further: it admits that nothing can be *known* without a mind, but this does not mean, it argues, that nothing can *exist* except in relation to mind. "A table cannot be an object to my mind unless there is a mind to which it is an object. It cannot be known without a mind to know. But how much does it owe to that mind? Merely, that it is known, but neither its qualities nor its existence." "I wonder how this statement of Alexander's with respect to the independent objective reality of qualities he would reconcile with the modern doctrine of Relativity as regards what are called "primary qualities." Moreover, in regard to

\* *Vide* Brahma Sutras, IV, 19, with Śaṅkara's commentary.

the existence of the external world Alexander's argument fails to meet the thesis of the Idealistic school, which is not that the so-called external reality *owes* its existence to mind, but that it is *in* mind and is a part of its activity. That a part is in the whole, does not mean that it is caused by the whole. According to Alexander, mind has a neural basis. In place of the old doctrines of parallelism and interaction of mind and matter he substitutes one of continuity amounting to identity. "All psychoses," he says "are neuroses." They imply, however, the emergence of a new feature which he explains as a case of 'emergent evolution.' (I do not know how far this doctrine of "emergent evolution" can escape the horns of Śaṅkara's *anirvacaniyātārāda* or save itself without the help of the *anekānta-syādrāda* of the all-merciful Jaina.) His statement that a process with the distinctive quality of mind or consciousness in 'in the same place and time with a neural process' is a bit of dogmatic philosophy in which the problem of bridging the gulf between consciousness and physiological process is evidently shirked. Equally unsatisfactory is his account of the cognitive relation which he understands as a case of 'compresence' or 'togetherness' of a higher finite and lower finite, the mind and its object. To reduce the relation of the subject and the object, which is the whole problem of epistemology to the 'compresence' of co-ordinates, as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of Indian Philosophy is to miss the singularity of the cognitive relation in which the object is not cognized as co-ordinate with the subject but as antithetic to it. Moreover, he speaks of the minds as 'enjoying' itself, yet 'contemplating' its object. This distinction between 'enjoyment' and 'contemplation' is in truth grounded upon the familiar distinction between self-consciousness and other-consciousness—and it opens the door to idealism by placing mind in a unique position as against its objects. I think if the world of thought is to be made safe for Realism, as its advocates desire to do, all trace of distinction between subject and object should be destroyed, and reality should be conceived simply as a congeries of objects or things—a sub-human feat which the human mind can never perform. To some Alexander's identification of psychosis and neurosis might seem to border on materialism, but he himself would protest against this interpretation on the ground that in his

view both mind and matter are evolutes of space-time, being 'complexes of motion differentiated within the one all-containing and all-encompassing system of motion.' These empirical things or existents or groupings of events or point-instants as they are called, Alexander pictures as 'whirl-pools' within the ocean of Space-Time, 'crystals' which cannot be separated from but remain swimming in 'the ocean of Space-Time.' Here is, surely, an alluring picture for a Vedāntist to contemplate. I say alluring, because there is this vital difference between his view and Alexander's, that while according to Vedānta Brahman bifurcates into *bhoktr* and *bhogyā*, really or apparently, or *bhoktr* makes its own *bhogyā*, in Alexander's system the evolution takes place along a single line in which *bhogyā* precedes the *bhoktr*. Mind, according to Alexander, is an emergent from life, as life is an emergent from a lower physico-chemical level of existence. What saves this view from being ranked as crude materialism is the use of the word 'emergent' which only hides its real character.

Alexander says: "Out of certain physiological conditions nature has framed a new quality of mind which is therefore not itself physiological though it lives and moves and has its being in physiological conditions. ....mind is thus at once new and old." "Out of three sounds," like Browning's musician, "Nature frames not a fourth sound but a star." At the same time, says Alexander, mind is through its physiological character continuous with the neural processes, and yet not an epiphenomenon of the neural process, not "a kind of aura which surrounds that process but plays no effective part of its own." But he admits at the same time that there is no evidence to show that the particular neural process would possess its specific neural character if it were not also mental. This last is an important statement which if worked out to its logical conclusion should prove fatal to materialism. Moreover, the argument based on physiological conditions of mental activity fails to distinguish between cause and conditions of manifestation.

### III

Another thinker of the present day who illustrates the influence of Science on Philosophy is Bertrand Russell. Unlike

Alexander, a veteran metaphysician, Russell is a neophyte in the temple of Philosophy, having wandered into it from his original home of Mathematics and Physics. His adventure, however, has proved a gain to his new subject to which he has contributed much penetrating and scientific thought, though part of it seems to be still in the making, and a great deal misses the essential problems of Philosophy. I have called Bertrand Russell a neophyte in the temple of Philosophy, but I think I must hasten to correct the metaphor and say that this 'conscientious objector' during the last Great War is an imperialist of Science who is longing to conquer and annex his neighbour's territory. Thus in his latest book he writes: "all traditional philosophers have to be discarded and we have to start afresh with as little a respect as possible for the systems of the past. Our age has penetrated more deeply into the nature of things than any earlier age, and it would be a false modesty to overestimate what can still be learned from the metaphysicians of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries."

The logical consequence of this advice would be that we should amalgamate ourselves some day—the sooner the better—with the body which is shortly to hold its next session in this city. But I do not think the situation is quite so hopeless. In my humble opinion, the waves of Science—as they have done frequently in the past, so do they now—dash themselves against the rocks of Metaphysics and retire; they do not so much as even cover them as those other waves do the sands on your beautiful Beach.

Recently Science has influenced Philosophy in two mutually contradictory directions: while in the earlier years it led to discontent with Idealism, of late it has contributed largely—though unconsciously—towards resuscitating its old adversary. "To say that you see a star when you see the light that has come from it is," says Russell, "no more correct than to say that you see New-Zealand when you see a New-Zealander in London. Your perception when (as you say) you see a star is causally connected, in the first instance, with what happens in the brain, the optic nerve, and the eye, then with the light-wave which, according to Physics, can be traced back to the star as its source. Your sensation will be closely similar if the light comes from a lamp at the top of a mast. The physical space in which you believe the "real" star

to be is an elaborate inference; what is given is the private space in which the speck of light you see is situated. This illustrates what I mean by saying that what you see is not 'out there' in the sense of Physics." Now add to this scientific fact the truths revealed by the principle of Relativity which has abolished one cosmic time and one persistent space, and has laid stress on the subjective conditions of the observer's mind as a factor in perception, and the ruin of the commonsense faith in Realism would seem to be complete. Consequently, the so-called new Realism may, in truth, be called Scientific Idealism to distinguish it from Kant's Critical Idealism and Hegel's Absolute Idealism; or to take it at its word, it may be characterised as Sensationalism, which is only 'half-brother' to Idealism.

Let us cast a glance on Russell's theory of Reality and his theory of Perception, and see how far this characterization is—justified. "Everything in the world," says Russell in his latest book, "is composed of events." An "event" he understands, in view of the theory of Relativity, as something occupying a small finite amount of Space-Time. The word "event" has been intended to suggest that there is no such thing as matter in the sense of substance, or that ultimate and indivisible form of it which the old physicists and chemists called an "atom." Matter and motion, the ultimate realities of the bygone age, are "logical constructions" using events as their material. The true ultimate reality, therefore, is not material, neither is it mental. Adopting a suggestion of Dr. Sheffer Russell calls his theory "neutral monism,"—monism in the sense that it regards the world as composed of only one kind of stuff, namely events, though it is pluralism in so far as events are many of which each is a self-subsistent entity. This particularism (which may be compared with the Buddhist doctrine of *scalakṣaṇas*) which distinguishes Russell's philosophy from Alexander's is a serious flaw in the former, for neither science nor philosophy can evade the question—what makes the events *one kind* of stuff? Oneness of kind points to that further unity of principle which makes them one kind. Even assuming that Russell's thesis was modified so far as to make it agree with Alexander's, I wonder how this "neutral monism" can be distinguished essentially and philosophically from the doc-

trine of the "Unknowable" which was set forth by Herbert Spencer in the nineteenth century, or that of Spinoza in the seventeenth, except that in one case it does not confess to Agnosticism and has a theory of matter which scientifically (but not philosophically) differs from that of Spencer, and that, in the other case, Spinoza's ultimate reality is supposed to be static and not dynamic.

As regards the relation of matter and mind Russell's answer is plainly materialistic. "As yet we cannot deduce the magnetic properties of iron from what we know of the structure of the atom of iron, but no one doubts that they could be deduced by a person with sufficient knowledge and sufficient mathematical skill. Similarly we can deduce mind from matter." The argument that minds have peculiar characteristics he meets by saying that "this is quite consistent with emergent materialism." But, if matter and motion—the old stock-in-trade of materialism—are only "logical constructions" as Russell maintains, mind should be presupposed by matter, for logic is an activity of mind. Thus *buddhi* in the *Sāṃkhya*-system precedes *mahābhūta*s and not *vice versa*, while both of them are ultimately emergent from *aryakta* or *pradhāna*. Moreover, one would ask what has Science left of matter? It has deprived it of solidity and substantiality, making it "a mere ghost haunting the scenes of its former splendour." "Russell's theory of Perception has passed through several stages in which he has been gradually marching towards Sensationalism. In his latest book he emphasises the subjective element in perception, and declares that "the idea that perception in itself reveals the character of objects is a fond delusion." We have no direct knowledge of the external world, what knowledge we have of it being at the most inferential: as Russell puts it in his graphic way, "it is as if we could not see the sea, but could only see the people disembarking at Dover." Eventually he recognizes sensations and *sensa* as the only reality, the external reality which was at first posited to explain *sensa* being eliminated altogether. All these points of view might show that he was an idealistic sensationist, but he endeavours to range himself among materialists. And so he is, considering that the *sensa* according to him are physical occurrences in the brain, without any ulterior principle which



would transmute them into consciousness. In fact, the same neutral particulars, according to Russell, belong to two worlds—the two cross-sections of Reality—the mental and the physical. Since sense-organs play a part in the causation of *sensa*, and the *sensa* accordingly are private, it is argued that this position of Bertrand Russell must end in solipsism. But I think Russell would meet the criticism by regarding the *sensa* as private as viewed from within and public as viewed from without. The significance of this double aspect Russell has not cared to explore. He regards perception as a species of sensitivity. In truth, it involves sensitivity, but it is more than sensitivity. He sees no distinction between the case of a photographic plate sensitive to light and the mind in a living body except this that the living bodies are subject to the law of association or of the “conditional reflex.” But is there no difference between mind and wax because we speak of ‘impressions’ in both cases? Similarly, between the sensitivity of a photographic plate and that of the mind in a living body? The confusion arises from failure to distinguish between the literal and the metaphorical use of the word. If the law of association or of the “conditional reflex” were properly analysed it would point to a principle of synthesis and illumination which turns the sense-data into mental life. Thus Russell has prepared the case for Idealism, but has inconsequentially wandered into materialistic Realism.

The whole trouble of the scientists arises from their failure to appreciate the true nature of consciousness. No analysis of mind or matter can successfully reduce reality to a series of discrete particulars or dethrone consciousness from its central position. These *Akrūras* of scientists do not realise what confusion the *Gopis* will fall into when Krishna is removed from their midst. Reality is one eternal *Rāsa* of Krishna and *Gopis*—Krishna setting the tune from the centre, as well as appearing by the side of every one of the *Gopis* who occupy the points on the circumference. Consciousness has thus a double aspect—the noumenal and the phenomenal. The latter is the legitimate province of scientists, while the former falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of philosophers. If Alexander had analysed and not treated as ultimate the distinction between the ‘enjoyed’ and the ‘contemplated’

self, and Russell had explored the full import of the distinction which he has made between ' perception objectively regarded ' and ' self-observation,' they would have perhaps arrived at the point of view which makes Idealism inevitable.

### III

Now let us for a moment consider whether modern Science which has obviously failed to supersede Philosophy has fared better in the matter of Religion. The God of science in the latter half of the nineteenth century was the ' Unknown ' and ' Unknowable ' of Herbert Spencer, and its religion consisted of what is called ' cosmic emotion.' But Spencer's Unknown and Unknowable though vast in its sublimity was less than man, not more, impersonal without being superpersonal : hence, it could not evoke love or reverence, but could only strike the imagination with awe—which is very simply described as ' cosmic emotion.' But Alexander's Space-Time, unlike Saṅkara's Brahman, which is at once personal and super-personal, is not a principle before which the human soul could be expected to bend and exclaim :—

“सत्यपि भेदापगमे नाद्य तवाहं न मामकीनस्त्वम् ।  
समुद्रो हि तरङ्गः क्वचन समुद्रो न तारङ्गः ॥”\*

Alexander admits this. He asks : “ Since Space-Time is already a whole and one, why, it may be urged, should we seek to go beyond it? Why not identify God with Space-Time?” and answers “ Now no one could worship Space-Time. It may excite speculative or mathematical enthusiasm and fill our minds with intellectual admiration, but it lights no spark of religious emotion. Worship is not the response which Space-Time evokes in us, but intuition.” One may be tempted to accept this position on behalf of *Saṅkara Vedānta* on the ground that Saṅkara too makes a distinction between the Brahman of *Upāsana* (worship) and the Brahman of *Jñāna* (self-realisation), of which the latter

\* “ I have transcended all sense of distinctions. Still, O Lord, I am Thy expression, Thou not mine : a wave belongs to the ocean, the ocean does not belong to the wave.”

may well be identified with Space-Time. Again, the view that Time is the soul of Space-Time with Space for its body may be traced in the conception of 'Digambara'—Kāla, the Mahādeva, —who has Space for his garment. But the parallel cannot be pressed further : for, in the Indian imagery, the *Digambara* is also *Chidambara*. Further, it should be noted that Śaṅkara's *upāśya* Brahman is as real as ourselves : not a quality posited by the religious sentiment, as Alexander would have it, but a reality as good as ours, which commands our reverence as rightfully as our self excites our love naturally. Alexander defines God as the object of religious emotion. He is correlative to the emotion or sentiment, as food is correlative to appetite. "What we worship that is God," says Alexander. Such a view of God does away with all bigoted notions about true God and false gods, and substitutes the distinction of higher God and lower God based on the comparative values of the different kinds of religious thought. "ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम्" (भ.गो.) is a noble doctrine which makes for religious toleration. But the weakness of Alexander's religious philosophy lies in this, that food is a reality which exists independently of appetite, whereas God, according to Alexander, is only a correlative of religious sentiment. Alexander perceives the difficulty, but his attempted solution does not seem to meet the requirements of the case. God, he thinks, is only a name for "the world big with deity" ('हिरण्यगर्भ') —a quality next after mind towards which the Universe is tending, so that the religious sentiment is not directed towards what is, but towards what will be. Alexander does not see any incongruity in supposing that the quality which is not yet, but is only in the womb of the growing Universe, exercises influence upon the human mind; in fact, he thinks that "caught in this movement of the world towards deity we rise to a higher level of existence." If the deity were not regarded as a quality which is yet to emerge, but a reality which is already here and now, the position would be acceptable to Vedānta. But the two principles to which modern scientists and philosophers seem committed are : first, the dynamic conception of Reality; and second, the doctrine of 'emergent evolution.' The Śaṅkara Vedāntin considers both as truths, but as half-truths. The first, according to him, fails to do justice

to the static element which lies at the heart of the dynamic and makes the latter possible and intelligible. For, change is not mere succession : analysed carefully, it is the unity which discloses itself in succession. The second, namely, ' emergent evolution,' if it is to be adequately interpreted, should be read backwards as well as forwards. For, let us remember that evolution is not the same thing as creation in the sense of absolutely new existence. ' Becoming,' as the modern Heracliteans call it, is, in full truth, being as well as becoming. Let us try to understand and examine both these principles a little more closely, even at the risk of some repetition.

The dynamic conception of Reality is intended to supersede the static attributed to Spinoza. I am not concerned with the problem of the true interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy, but there is no doubt that he has been long regarded as the arch-offender who treated both God and the Universe as a dead block. As against him Hegel and his followers emphasised the dynamic character of idea or thought; and later, Bergson has substituted the concept of Life for those of matter and mind, not only as their original unity, but also as a dynamic principle which makes for Creative Evolution.

With all respect for the present-day European philosophy, I confess that I fail to understand the meaning of " dynamic " except in relation to " static," and submit that the substitution of the ultimate reality is in truth dynamic-*cum*-static,—the '*Sabala-brahma*,'\* which is the synthesis of the dynamic and static—a synthesis expressed in Art by the image of Nāṭarājan in that wonderful expression of movement and rest, which is the highest contribution of Dravidian India to philosophic Art, and in Meta-physics in the revelation of a contradiction or ontological antinomy within itself which the Sāṅkara Vedānta calls *anirvacanīyatā* or *Māya*.

\* It would be beside my purpose to go into the problem of the First Cause according to Sāṅkara Vedānta; nor does the doctrine of the *Sabala Brahma* represent my own interpretation of the Sāṅkara Vedānta without an explanatory and re-interpretative note, which I cannot very well add here. I can only refer the reader who feels interested in the problem to the pages of the *Siddhāntaleśa* of Appaya Dikṣita an<sup>d</sup> to the *Bhāmāti* and *Kalpataru* on Br. Sūtra II. 1. 27 and to Brahmayidyābhāṣaṇa on the Sūtra "वाक्यवृत्तिः परितोऽस्मात्"—I. 4. 26.

The second of these, *viz.*, ' emergent evolution ' is virtually an attempt to express the synthesis of the two conflicting elements in causation, *viz.*, the old and the new, and it comprises the following propositions :—

(1) The new is not simply the old, it is the old and something more.

(2) And yet there is no insertion *ab extra*.

Now in regard to this one may well ask : Where does " the something more " come from, if it is not to come *ab extra*? And since insertion *ab extra* is impossible, ' the something more ' of the new must be supposed to be originally latent in the old. So say the *Sāṃkhya*, and the *Parināmavādin Vedāntin*. Yet in so far as the old is not the new but something less, we are faced with the antinomy that the new is at once old and new. How is this antinomy to be resolved? It is to be recognized as such, says the *Vivartavādin*. The Jaina argues that the compresence of opposites is a fact, and consequently there is no antinomy. The *Vivartavādin* would answer : the resulting antinomy—the *anirvacanīyatā* or logical contradiction involved in the nature of the new—is also a fact, and requires to be similarly recognized. Applying this to the problem in hand, the Deity cannot be treated as a quality which is evolved out of Space-Time without being in Space-Time *ab initio*. Alexander's philosophy of God is a curious recast of the Play of Hamlet which opening with the ghost-scene of Space-Time has the entry of the Prince of Denmark—the Deity—postponed till the end of the last Act, or rather, thrown into the epilogue, and there too, to appear not as a person or super-person but as a quality ! In truth, if we are to understand rightly the principle of Evolution, the first letter should be read with the last, as in the *spḥoṭa* theory of Indian philosophy, that is to say, the whole creation should be interpreted in the light of the ' divine event ' to which it moves. The Divine Activity, of which emergent evolution is the expression, will then appear not as an " alien influx into nature " from without, but as omnipresent and manifested in every one of the multitudinous entities within the pyramid, or to use an Indian metaphor, in the everflowing Gangā of Evolution—which springs from the foot—just a single limb—of the Great Viṣṇu.

## IV

A third scientist philosopher who attracts our attention at the present day is Bergson. He represents the transition from Science to Philosophy. Unlike some of his British comrades who wish to carry Science into Philosophy, this French scientist has reversed the process, and has introduced fundamental changes both in the assumptions and in the details of Science. In modification of the Darwinian theory of Evolution, he points out that adaptation to environments does not explain all the facts of evolution; moreover, the Darwinian theory though partially successful in explaining the direction of evolution, fails altogether to explain the fact of evolution itself. He thus arrives at a metaphysical conception of life, whose forms science may investigate, but whose existence and nature are within the province of Philosophy. Bergson posits a kind of vital surge at the heart of Universe, not controlled or guided by any external mind or will, but free and undetermined. It is a force which is comparable in some respects to the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya which possesses *Kriyāśakti* but not *Dṛk-śakti*. This *élan vital* is Life itself.\* To the objection that the hypothesis of the 'vital principle' as distinguished from physical energy explains nothing, Bergson makes an ingenious reply: 'the vital principle' may indeed not explain much, he says, but it is at least a sort of label affixed to our ignorance, so as to remind us of this occasionally, while mechanism invites us to ignore the ignorance. Unlike the older vital principle, however, Bergson's *élan vital* is a concrete and not an abstract principle. The essential difference between the mechanistic and the vitalistic view of Reality, according to Bergson, consists in this that while the former is barren or reduplicative, the latter is creative. This doctrine of 'Creative

\* Bergson's "Life" is what is known as *ब्रह्मन्* in that peculiar sense in which the word is employed several times in the Bhagavadgītā, and which seems to have the sense in which it was understood even in the Upaniṣads by the Sāṃkhya. The origin of this sense lies in the fact that derived from the root *वृद्ध्* (a secondary root traceable to *वृध्* to grow.) *ब्रह्मन्* came to mean the immanent principle which made for the growth of the Universe.

Evolution,' which is the same as what is called by some ' emergent evolution,' is a fundamental contribution of Bergson's to modern philosophy.

\*Another doctrine of Bergson's which displays greater originality and hard thinking on the part of its author is his philosophy of Time, Change, and Duration. He distinguishes between mathematical Time (the ordinary meaning of the word) and the Time which is Duration. The latter is the *élan vital* or Life itself. Duration is no doubt persistence, but it is also change. We endure not inspite of change but owing to change. This doctrine of change is essentially connected with that of creative evolution. Bergson says : " The universe *endures*. The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new." It will be thus observed that Bergson's emphasis is more upon the dynamic than upon the static element in Reality.

Lastly, let us hear Bergson on the problem of man's relation with Life and the possibility of his progress. He says : " From our point of view life appears in its entirety as an immense wave, which starting from a centre, spreads outwards, and which on almost the whole of its circumference is stopped and converted into oscillation " (this is Bergson's explanation of the origin of Matter), " at one single point the obstacle has been forced, the impulsion has passed freely. It is this freedom that the human form registers. Everywhere but in man, consciousness has had to come to a stand; in man, alone it has kept on its way." Philosophy introduces us thus into the spiritual life. And it shows us at the same time the relation of the life of the spirit to that of the body." Then in pointing out the fundamental error of popular ideas of God and his Heaven, he continues : " The Great error of the doctrines on the spirit has been the idea that by isolating the spiritual life from all the rest, by suspending it in space as high as possible above the earth, they were placing it beyond attack, as if they are not thereby simply exposing it to be taken as an effect of a mirage."

What I have already said in connection with ' emergent evolution ' applies to Bergson's ' creative ' evolution also, since the

two are one. In my humble opinion, its logic is halting for no attempt is made to analyse the meanings of 'creative' and 'evolution,' and put them together, and thus disclose the antinomy of the causal relation which it involves. Another defect of Bergson's explanation of the origination of matter from life has been pointed out by an Italian critic and the criticism goes to the very root of Bergson's Philosophy. Matter according to Bergson, is an interruption of the vital current, a negation inserted into the continuity of evolution, a solidification of life. Here asks the critic :— " But how is this arrest of the vital current, this lapse into stagnation, explicable? Life, as Bergson conceives it, if left, so to speak, to itself, ought to progress eternally; if it bends back and is deflected, it does so because something obstructs it. Thus life, which in its movement ought to create matter, itself pre-supposes an obstacle in the shape of matter. This is the enormous vicious circle in which the Bergsonian metaphysic revolves." And as the ground of this vicious circle the critic points out : " It is because he regards life as nature, not as consciousness."

## V

The home of the Philosophy of consciousness as the only Reality is Italy at the present day, and the two of its leading lights are Croce and Gentile. By them the scientific approach to Philosophy is unhesitatingly, almost unceremoniously, discarded. Croce's philosophy which starts apparently as a criticism of Hegel is really its re-interpretation. The so-called ' bloodless categories' of the old idealism of Kant and Hegel did not satisfy the full-blooded European very long, and complaints soon began to be heard that Hegel's philosophy besides being false to facts was too abstract to serve as ' human nature's daily food.' This gave rise to attacks from within as well as from without, creating numerous forms of Idealism and Realism. Croce's work has covered many branches of Philosophy including Art, but the problem with which we are concerned in the present review is the problem of Knowledge and Reality. According to Croce, there are no objects



of sense and no independent sense-data outside the mind\* which thus becomes the all-inclusive and the only reality; in this sense the rational is real and the real rational: in the language of Vedānta सत् and चित् are one. A logical corollary of this proposition is the identity of Philosophy and History not in the sense that History is a revelation of the movement of Thought, but in a more startling sense that Philosophy creates History, that is thought creates its own data in the shape of intuitions and expression of intuition, viz., images. Similarly, conceptual thinking universalizes what is presented in intuition, so that experience consists of the unity of two distincts, viz., intuition and concept.

Now the criticism to which Croce's theory stands exposed is just the one which is often levelled against the Māyāvāda of Śāṅkara. "If it is a unity it cannot generate from within itself distinctions which are as real as the unity, while if the distinctions are not generated but given to begin with then mind is not and never was, a unity. This is the dilemma of *Sabala Brahma* and *Sūdaha Brahma* which the Śāṅkara Vedāntin is often called upon to meet. Gentile, Croce's disciple and *vārtikakāra* (sympathetic critic) starts with a mind which is a complete unity, retains the unity throughout, and from that unity extracts whatever multiplicity there is. "This corresponds to the position of *ajātivāda* in the body of Śāṅkara Vedānta, with one important difference that mind in Gentile's theory is not a fact but a pure act. Joad in subjecting the Neo-Idealism of the Italian school to criticism mentions two weak points. First, that in the Italian Neo-Idealism there is no passage from immediate experience to universal experi-

सा तत्र दृष्टं विभं जगत् स्यात्तु च खं दिशः

साद्रिहीपाब्धिभूगोलं सवायुघ्नीन्दुसारकम् ।

व्योतिश्चक्रं जलं तेजो नभस्वान् विषदेव च

देकारिकाणीन्द्रियाणि मनोमावा गुणाययः ॥

The reader of the Bhāgavat will remember how Balarāma complained to Mother Yaśoda that Kṛṣṇa had eaten clay—whereupon mother asked Kṛṣṇa if it was so. Kṛṣṇa denied the charge, and when asked to open his mouth, he opened it. And what did she see? The whole universe, animate and inanimate!

The suggestion is plain. This phenomenal world is not introduced into the noumenal—object into consciousness—as an element from without; it is already in the noumenal, the object is in the consciousness.

ence. The older Hegelian school regarded universal experience as immanent in each immediate, that is, individual experience. The Italian Neo-Idealist admits only immediate experience which according to him generates all that is: This is what is known as the school of **दृष्टिदृष्टिवाद** as distinguished from that of **सृष्टिदृष्टिवाद** in Śāṅkara Vedānta. It is possible to attempt a reconciliation of the two schools in the light of the fact that the **दृष्टि** in the former is understood to be the **दृष्टि** of **महाजीव**, the dreaming cosmic soul. But in the Italian Neo-Idealism the immediate experience is the immediate experience of the individual. The second objection to Neo-Idealism is thus expressed by Mr. Joad: "Diversity and plurality can only develop out of unity in virtue of some initial potentiality for diversity and plurality latent in the unity. But if the unity contains the possibility of developed difference, it is not really a unity. If, on the other hand, we attempt to write off the appearance of difference as mere *illusion* due to partial vision, the difficulty remains, for the task of making a real unity generate an *apparent* diversity is not less than that of accounting for its generation of a *real* diversity. Unity can in fact no more account for error than for diversity." The passage reads like a paragraph in translation of an old Indian work written to criticise the *Advaitavāda* of Śaṅkarāchāryya and I have quoted the very words of Mr. Joad to bring out the parallel effectively.

Again, Gentile holds that "when the mind is historicized it is changed into a natural entity, when its spiritual value only is kept in view it is withdrawn from history and stands before us in its eternal ideality." Let me reproduce from another writer a summary of Gentile's answer to the objection that his theory of the relation of thought to reality ends in solipsism:

"Am I then the creator of the universe? Is each of us the creator not merely of his world but of the universe? To answer this question we must discriminate between the mere subject, the empirical ego or self, which is just the ordinary individual with a body, clothes, names, friends, social relations, the man that is distinct from other men and begins and ends in time, on the one hand, and Spirit or the Subject or the Transcendental Ego on the other. Obviously the mere individual (myself as a mere ego among many others) is just only an object, a part of nature. But in so far as

I know myself as an individual among many others, I am already something deeper than the self I know myself to be. My deeper ego is not the one I can describe and define, but it is my very describing and defining activity, the subject which never can be object just because it is the very condition of my thinking of objects at all: it is just this my thinking of objects. I can distinguish myself from others only by transcending myself and others, thus embracing within my unity all the differentiating particularities, which consequently appear to be mere objects like all other things and events. Similarly I can only be aware of changes in myself and in others if I am already something outside such changes, beyond time and space, above all distinctions of here and there, before and after. Our empirical personalities are real only as rooted in and unified by the Transcendental Ego, the *Sytle* in the Person that knows no plural."

The distinction here drawn between Empirical ego and Transcendental ego has been long known in Europe, but in India it is much older still, being well known in the schools of Śāṅkara Vedānta as a distinction between Ātman as दृष्ट and Ātman as दृश्य, between the परिणामिन् अहम् and the कूटस्थ आत्मन्.

In the light of this distinction, the charge of solipsism which has been laid against Gentile's philosophy seems unjustified. I will quote one more passage even at the risk of wearing you with quotations, to show how Indian Philosophy would feel at home even in other lands. Discussing the problem of Immortality in that remarkable work of Italian Neo-Idealism, "the Theory of Mind as Pure Act," Gentile writes :

"The conclusion is that if we think of ourselves empirically as in time, we naturalize ourselves and imprison ourselves within definite limits, birth and death, outside of which our personality cannot but seem annihilated. But this personality through which we enter into the world of the manifold and of natural individuals, in the Aristotelian meaning, is rooted in a higher personality in which alone it is real. This higher personality contains the lower and all other empirical personalities, and as this higher personality is not unfolded in space and time we cannot say that it is before the birth and after the death of the lower, because "before" and "after" applied to it would cause it to fall from the one to the

many and by destroying it as the one we should thereby also destroy the manifold. But this personality is outside every 'before and after.' Its being is in the eternal, opposed to time, which it makes to be. This eternity, however, does not transcend time in the meaning that it stands outside time as one reality is outside another. It is not clear, then that the eternity of mind is the mortality of nature, because what is indefinite from the standpoint of the many is infinite from the standpoint of the one. Life, the mind's reality, is in experience (in nature, the experience of which is consciousness). But it lives within nature without being absorbed in it, and without ever itself becoming it; moreover, it always keeps its own infinity or unity, without which even nature with its multiplicity, that is, with space and time, would be dissolved." And his conclusion is "The part of us and of those dearest which dies is a materiality which has never lived."

How much of this is the Bhagavadgītā! One word about consciousness as "act." Unless the word "act" is used in a sense which makes it indistinguishable from "being," I wonder if "act" is not the empirical aspect of "being" which is the "transcendental;" or, perhaps, both of them are aspects of the same Reality, empirical and transcendental respectively.

The philosophy of Italy is not all Neo-Idealism. The human mind instinctively, may be rightly or wrongly or under a misapprehension of what is being done, refuses to be wiped out of reality or be made lonely, or be deprived of its dwelling-house and its furniture. As has been observed, Hegelianism has never lacked strenuous opponents even in the days of its triumph. And we have consequently some exponents and advocates of the claims of science of spiritual Realism, Pluralism and Theism such as Aliotta and Varisco. But unfortunately we have no space for reviewing them.

Let us now try to gather up our impressions of the present-day thought in regard to the problem of Reality and the connected problem of the theory of knowledge. They are that

1. Materialism in the old sense is dead.
2. So is the commonsense Realism of a former age.
3. Modern Realism is inclining towards Idealism and is sometimes passing into it almost unconsciously.

4. The concrete is preferred to the abstract and the dynamic to the static.

## VI

The scientific approach to philosophy which has been detailed in the preceding paragraphs has received many protests, checks, modifications and even complete reversal in certain other schools. In England is heard the voice of Humanism through such masters as Balfour, Haldane and Schiller in varying degrees and forms. "Behind all philosophy lies human nature, and in every philosopher there lurks a man."—is the keynote of this movement. It rejects the universalism and abstractions of Science whose highest ambition is to "depersonalise and dehumanise itself." It refuses to deify as well as to materialise man. To it, the Absolute is *mrgatrṣṇikā*. The greatest historical representative of this point of view in the ancient world who made man higher than gods and denounced all seeking after the Absolute, was Gautama Buddha. But his Humanism originated in the riddle of suffering, and ended in asceticism, while the modern Humanist prefers to enrich life with all goods, and no philosophy or religion would satisfy him "Which did not sustain in every essential part the full circle of human interests." He says :—

" Let us cry ' All good things  
Are ours ' nor soul helps flesh more now  
Than flesh helps soul."

Again to the ancient Humanist, Individuality just like the Absolute was an unreality and a snare, while to the modern it is the very breath of his existence. He believes in the Relative as against the Absolute, and whatever is individual and unique—in Art, Literature, Science and Philosophy—is the ultimate Truth and the ultimate Good of modern Humanism.

## VII

Another distinguishing feature of contemporary thought is the emphasis which it places upon the principle of Solidarity or

Wholeness—the ' Kṛtsna ' of the Bhagavadgīta. Although particularists or believers in discrete entities both in the world of Science and of Philosophy are not wanting—thus the doctrines of Leibnitzian monads has been revived in some circles and Pluralism is also receiving some countenance—the main body of opinion inclines towards the view that the world is one organic whole, in which the whole is prior to the parts. Among others, Bergson in France, Lossky in Russia, and General Smuts in South Africa have laid stress on this aspect. The idea cannot be said to be altogether new in philosophy, but its application to the problems of the day in Psychology, Ethics, Politics, Sociology and Economics is of comparatively recent date. The doctrine of " Group Mind " despite its criticism by distinguished psychologists owing to misapprehension of its true nature, holds the field. We have transcended the moral atomism of Kant and Mill's philosophy of ' the greatest number, ' and have learnt to base Ethics not entirely upon a study of the individual but also upon that of man in organic relation with society, state, world-state, and even the " Kingdom of God. ' It would seem as if the ancient doctrine of citizenship of the " Kingdom of God, " of the solidarity of all life in Nārāyaṇa or Puruṣa, was going to return as the ruling principle of ethics, sociology and politics. It should be borne in mind that this whole is not a blank negation without parts; the whole is in the parts, that is, one in many. It is this aspect of the social organism which was emphasised in the famous Puruṣa Sūkta which speaks of the four classes of society as limbs of the Puruṣa;\* similarly, the Bhagavadgītā uses the collective noun ' cātvarvarṇya ' (and not ' catvāro varṇāh ') to indicate the unity of society in the plurality of the classes. In Politics the rights of the whole have so completely overshadowed those of the individual composing it as to

\* The *locus classicus* of the four *Varṇas*—Brāhmaṇa, Rājanya, Vaiśya, and Sūdra—which occurs in the Puruṣa Sūkta is sometimes cited as the Vedic authority for the four castes. Interpreted according to the principles of Mīmāṃsā, the passage is not a *vidhi* but only an *anuvāda* of the four divisions, the *vidhi* being the unity of the four. A *vidhi* conveys something new; *anuvāda* reiterates what is already known from another source; and it is the *vidhi* that should count as an independent *pramāṇa*. The four *Varṇas* had arisen as a result of economic forces and is a fact of nature. *Śruti* just takes note of this fact, but the *new truth* which it declares is that they are parts of one stupendous whole—the social organism, the social expression of the Puruṣa who is the subject-matter (the *devatā*) of the *sūkta*.

amount to a veritable danger to civilization. In the same way, the old economics based upon the rights of individuals is becoming a dead letter and is steadily being replaced by socialism. Moreover, the very boundaries of these as well as of physical sciences are now running into one another, so that to-day we see a great many scientists doing their work of research on the frontiers of the different sciences.

## VIII

Another marked tendency of contemporary philosophy noticeable in some quarters is what may be called anti-intellectualism or anti-rationalism. While there is little real justification for regarding the teachings of the Upaniṣads, of Sāṅkara Vedānta, of Socrates, of Spinoza, of Hegel and the Neo-Hegelians as intellectualism in the narrow sense of the word, the use of the word *Jñāna* in the first, and of 'reason,' 'intellect,' and 'idea' in the rest, has given rise to this misapprehension. In the church history of Christianity anti-intellectualism has originated a movement well-known as Fundamentalism which places unquestioning faith in certain dogmas of the Christian Faith and refuses to rationalise them on the ground that it leads to intellectual confusion and takes Christianity off its moorings. In Philosophy the anti-intellectualist or alogistic attitude, as it may be comprehensively called, has expressed itself in two forms, Activism and Mysticism. Prominent representatives of anti-intellectualism are James, Bergson, Ollé Lapruné and Blondel. James made the 'will to believe' and to act the central principles of his philosophy. Bergson regarded life as the true reality, and intuition the true method of knowing it, intellect being relegated to a later and inferior stage in the order of evolution. "To phenomenalism," says Ollé Lapruné, "I oppose what? Not the idea, but that which every one in his inner consciousness and apperception can point to as the deepest, the most permanent, most continuous principle of all diversity; the act." Blondel, too, applying the principle to religious life says: "At the very moment in which we seem to be grasping God by a stroke of thought, He eludes us unless we embody Him in action—

Whenever we stand still, He is not; whenever we hasten ourselves, He exists." With a similar perception of man's religious needs and his true nature, and also of the nature of Reality, the ancient Mimāṃsakas regarded the mandates of the Brāhmaṇas (the second stage in the evolution of the Vedic religious literature known by that name) as the central teaching of the Vedic canon, and formulated their view in the doctrines of ' *Niyoga* ' and ' *Kriyārtha vāda*,' that is, Religion is Act and not Fact. The religion of the Bhagavadgītā is a marvellous synthesis of thought, will (act) and emotion, but at the centre of the three (neither as the root nor as the fruit) it places the will to act, since it is the common Man—the Nara-Arjuna of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas—to whom is addressed the great Sermon. The modern man, crushed beneath the burden of knowledge which is hourly growing, and with which his moral life finds it difficult to keep pace, exclaims :

" Knowledge we ask not—knowledge thou hast lent,  
But, Lord, the will—there lies our bitter need,  
Give us to build above the deep intent.  
    ❧The deed, the deed."

The philosophical justification for this cry lies in the truth which is expressed by Carlyle in his own quaint manner in a sublime passage of his prose epic of the French Revolution where he says : " the Universe is an infinite conjugation of the verb ' to do.' "

One more type of anti-intellectualism which particularly deserves to be noticed because of the Indian parallels which it suggests is that represented by Bergson in his doctrine of Intuition which he distinguishes from Intellect. For our ordinary business of life we rely upon Intellect, but for direct touch with Reality we have to look for Intuition. Our awareness of personal existence is intuition, but our study of the ego as an object of thought can be done only by intellect. " Thus there are two ways of knowing a thing," says Bergson : " in one we move round a thing, in the other we enter into it which is a kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object, in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible." The first provides symbols and points of view, but not the Reality itself, one is



what the Indian philosopher would call **सर्विकल्पक ज्ञान**, the other **निर्विकल्पक साक्षात्कार** or **अपरोक्षानुभूति**. How the former fails to grasp Reality Bergson shows by interesting analogies : " Were all the photographs of a town," he says, " taken from all possible points of view to go on indefinitely completing one another, they would never be equivalent to the solid town in which we walk about. Were all the translations of a poem into all possible languages to add together their various shades of meaning and, correcting each other by a kind of mutual retouching, to give a more and more faithful image of the poem they translate, they would yet never succeed in rendering the inner meaning of the origin." It is thus that the Upaniṣads describe Brahman or Ātman through its various expressions or aspects such as earth, water, fire, etc., and having first affirmed their identity with them they proceed to deny it by the formula of **नेति नेति**.

As to how this intuition can be communicated, Bergson uses language which is reminiscent of that of Śaṅkara's philosophy in regard to the duty of a guru : " Here the single aim of the philosopher," says Bergson, " should be to promote a certain effort, which in most men is usually fettered by habits of mind more useful to life. Now the image has at least this advantage, that it keeps us in the concrete. No image can replace the intuition of duration, but many diverse images, borrowed from very different orders of things, may, by the conveyance of their action direct consciousness to the precise point where there is a certain intuition to be seized."

Lastly, one more form of the alogistic attitude which is mysticism—although it is as old as the human mind—has of late been particularly fostered by the recent discoveries of Science. The new science has enlarged as well as deepened our conception of Reality. It has furnished scientific proofs of the limits of the human mind, and has purified religion by de-anthropomorphising its ideas of God. The closed circle in which Reality was confined by some philosophers and theologians of the West has been opened up on all sides, and to-day we almost literally realise scientific truth of the passage of the Bhāgavata which declares that innumerable solar systems fill each hair of the body of *Viṣṇu*—the all-pervading One. It may be mentioned in this connection that in India God

was never supposed to be co-extensive with Reality as conceived by the human mind, and in that sense—if that be the sense of the word—it has never deserved the name “Panthéism.” That “God transcends all Being after encompassing it all round,”\* that “All creatures are but a quarter of God, the other three quarters which are immortality being in heaven”† are old Vedic texts. The author of the Bhāgavata has clothed their truth in a figure of wonderful poetic beauty in the story of Dāmodaralīlā.‡ He relates how Yaśodā failed to tie Kṛṣṇa with a rope, every rope which she tried falling short by an inch, till at last she gave up the futile attempt and stood wondering before her child. To take off the metaphors : Philosophy begins in the attempt to limit the limitless, and ends in wonder. The human mind imagines that God is its creature§ whom it can subject to its discipline. With its little systems it tries to comprehend him, but all its attempts fail one after another, leaving behind just a state of reverential wonder and humble conclusion that

“—Thou, O Lord, art more than they ”

This is the ground and essence of mysticism.

\* स भूमिं विश्रुतो ब्रह्माऽत्यतिष्ठद्दृशाङ्गुलम् ।

† पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यास्य तं दिवि ।

‡ न चास्तर्नं बहिर्यस्य न पूर्वं नापि चापरम् ।

पूर्वापरं बहिस्तर्जगतो यो जगच्च यः ॥

तं मत्वात्मनमन्यतां मयं लिङ्गमधीश्वरम् ।

गोपिकोत्खली दान्ता वनश्च प्राकृतं यथा ॥

तद्दामं बध्यमानस्य स्वार्भकस्य कृताग्रसः ।

बाहुगुलोनमभूतेन संदधेऽन्यच्च गोपिका ॥

यदासी, तदपि न्त्वं तेनान्दपि संदधि ।

तदपि बाहुगुलं त्वूं यदादादन् वन्यनम् ॥

एवं स्वगोदत्तानि यशोदा संदधत्पि ।

गोपीनां जयन्तीनां जयन्ती विश्वितस्तमवन् ॥—भागवत

§ “God, since his deity is a part of the Universe, is in it—is in the strictest sense not a creator but a creature.”—*Alexander*.

It is beyond our purpose to review all the forms of this attitude, but two of these may be noted as furnishing an interesting contrast: Years ago Tennyson pictured the human soul as—

“ An infant crying in the night  
An infant crying for the light,  
And with no language but a cry.”

To-day, Drinkwater prays with divine content :

“ Lord, not for light in darkness do we pray,  
Not that the veil be lifted from our eyes,  
Not that the slow ascension of our day  
Be otherwise.

Not for a clearer vision of the things  
Whereof the fashioning shall make us great,  
Not for remission of the peril and stings  
Of time and fate.

Not for a fuller knowledge of the end  
Whereto we travel bruised yet unafraid,  
Not that the little healing that we lend  
Shall be repaid.

Not these, O Lord, we would not break the bars  
Thy wisdom sets about us; we shall climb  
Unfettered to the secrets of the stars  
In thy good time.”

## IX

But the general attitude of the modern mind, towards the great problems of Reality is neither one of impotent cry nor of patient resignation. It does not believe, as Comte believed, that Metaphysics is building castles in the air and then bombarding them; nor that Truth is thickly enveloped in impenetrable gloom, and all that is given to man is to cry for the light without any hope of finding it. Nor is it satisfied to sit at the gates of the castle and await the hour when the Lord of the castle will open the gates. It believes in its own effort and enjoys it. It is not crushed “ with

the weight of all this unintelligible world." "For better or for worse," says a modern writer, "we are caught in the grip of an immitigable will to know, a will to know which claims for its province the human soul and its limits, the entire range of its hitherto acquired experiences, the entire history of soul and its still unexhausted possibilities."

Even while contemplating the immensity of Time and Space a scientist like Bertrand Russell feels that "there is no need to think of ourselves as powerless and small in the grip of vast cosmic forces. All measurement is conventional, and it would be possible to devise a perfectly serviceable system of measurement according to which man would be larger than the sun." Has not such a system of measurement been devised or rather found already? Has not man secured a point of view which reverses their relative proportion altogether? "Love, beauty, knowledge, and joy of life: these things retain their lustre however wide our purview," says Russell. Will he inquire why? His own finding is: "Because they have value on their own account." It is significant and gratifying that the modern scientist acknowledges that there is a world of values as well as of scientific facts. But just as scientific facts would be a hopeless jumble in the absence of a principle of unity, so would be the world of values, without a single principle of value underlying and overlaying all. **Nothing has value on its own account, everything has value on account of Atman the Supreme Self, says the Upaniṣad.**

## X

Ladies and gentlemen, there are a few more movements which I should have liked to touch upon, namely, those of Behaviorism, Pragmatism, Modernism, and the theory of Valuation. But I feel that my notices of some of those which I have already dealt with have been very cursory, and I think, I should not make myself guilty of any more discourtesies. Similarly, much as I had wished to include some of the German and American figures in my review, I have had to omit them for want of room on my canvas.

In this arena of modern thought with its numberless "fighting Zones" and groups of co-operating minds, India has a great

part to play. She possesses a continuous history of more than three thousand years of deep philosophic thought and religious experience. This great inheritance has been often visualized as a rich treasure which requires to be fully unearthed and placed before the world. As an humble worker in the mine, I would be the last person to deny the value of this kind of service. But I realise that the duty of the Indian Professor does not end there. He has to be not only a miner, but what is not less, he has to be a trader to carry the goods to the world's markets. I would change this sordid metaphor, and go further and say that he has to transform dead matter into living thought in his own country before he takes it to other lands. When philosophic thought in India will become live, it will have features which will be definitely Indian. As Bosanquet said, agreeing with Wallace, "philosophy being, like language, art and poetry, a product of the whole man, is a thing which would forfeit some of its essence if it were to lose its national quality." Let me not be misunderstood. While stressing the necessity of making it Indian I would repeat what I said at Benares that it should not cease to be human. To think otherwise is not nationalism, but national solipsism.

ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ।

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## SECTION OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.



## THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH.

BY

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Knowing and Being are different. Knowledge pre-supposes the existence of that which is known. A thing may exist and may not be known by any consciousness. To know is to know Reality and the content of knowledge is what the Reality appears to us from our perspective and under particular conditions. Appearances are therefore dependent upon consciousness, but Reality is independent of the process of knowing it. "The Reality owes to mind its being known, but it would be what it is without being known. Not its *esse* is *percipi*, but merely its *percipi* is its *percipi*." (S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 259.) Appearances or the contents of knowledge though dependent upon the mind that knows them are the appearances of Reality, the "what" detached by the mind from the "that." Reality manifests or reveals itself to us in and through our consciousness. We know Reality and what we know are its appearances to us. As Husserl would say, "Our consciousness of real things is in sense a perception of what we are, but only of a Being which declares or manifests itself in and through our consciousness. We perceive Things only through their perspective manifestations" (*Mind*, July, 1925, p. 331). If to know is to know Reality then how comes what is called false knowledge or error? this is our problem. In other words, what is the test or criterion by which we can distinguish true knowledge from false knowledge?

In attempting to solve this problem it is necessary at the outset to point out that the distinction of truth and falsity refers only



to appearances, to what we think of Reality and not to Reality itself.

To know is to judge and only judgment can be true or false. That which is or exists is not amenable to the characterisation as true or as false and so we may dismiss at once the notion that truth and falsity are qualities of real entities.

Nor could we say that false knowledge is knowledge of the unreal. That which is unreal is nothing and no knowledge of it is therefore possible. To know the unreal world presupposes that the unreal is something which is therefore not unreal. The unreal as something is thus a contradiction in terms. Nothing is unreal. False knowledge too is real, though not a true knowledge of the real. It is a kind of knowledge which is false.

If all judgments are judgments about Reality then what is meant by the truth or falsity of a judgment? Various answers have been given to this question in the history of philosophy and in what follows I do not attempt to give a radically new answer to the problem, but only to examine critically the various solutions proposed hitherto. Such a critical review will unravel the elements of value hidden in each and thus it may be possible to work out a satisfactory answer. So my aim is not so much to point out the defects in the various theories of Truth as to understand their merits.

The "Intuitional" theory maintains that we intuit truths. It is true that in perception which may be called sensory intuition the perceiver does not doubt the truth of his percept at the moment of perception. In living thought or experience every judgment that is made is an affirmation of the Real. "Doubt as to the reality of what is seen, heard or touched (and let us add, introspected) can arise only by a second mental act, calling in question the truth of the cognition by which an object has primarily been accepted as real" (Strong, *Mind*, April, 1928, p. 184). So long as the belief is actually held it is believed to be true with intuitive certainty. But in the case of erroneous judgments or beliefs in the course of further experience doubt is cast on their validity by the self-same intuitive 'faculty.' Now what occasions this doubt, why this primitive attitude of "animal faith" is disturbed, is the

point left unanswered by the Intuitionists. At the moment at which the judgment is made it is regarded as true, but in order to be unchallenged it must satisfy certain conditions and what these are the Intuitionist is not able to say. As Mr. Dawes Hicks points out "our principle should be to accept the deliverances of experience (both perceptive and introspective) as to the nature of reality except when they contradict one another" but what we are to do in cases of contradiction the Intuitionist theory is not able to say (*Mind*, July, 1925, p. 179).

The "Correspondence" theory of Truth explains the truth of a judgment as consisting in the conformity of what we believe about Reality with its own nature. But the theory was first laid down in the history of Philosophy by thinkers who held what is known as the Representationist theory of Perception. According to them the mind only knows ideas and Reality falls outside knowledge. This initial presupposition makes it impossible to ascertain whether there is correspondence between knowledge and the nature of Reality. So their theory of Truth has been adversely criticised. But it seems to me that the theory is not intrinsically wrong, and it is because of the erroneous presuppositions with which it is held that it is found to be useless.

The charge of unascertainability of the correspondence between the nature of Reality and our thoughts about it is valid only if we subscribe to the Cartesian assumption that the mind knows only ideas. The Kantian phenomenalism is the natural corollary of such an assumption. I have already pointed out that though the contents of knowledge are appearances it is Reality that we know. So the nature of Reality does not transcend our experience and it is Reality, not ideas that are perceived. When the mind apprehends Reality, the contents of apprehension are not the objects of apprehension, and they become so only for retrospection when again the contents of retrospection are not the contents of primary apprehension. So the objection usually urged against the "Correspondence" theory will stand only if we hypostatise the appearance into an object of apprehension.

When therefore it is said that what we think should correspond to the nature of reality the meaning is that what we think of the real in a judgment should conform to what we are led to

think of the same real in other judgments. Whenever we judge we affirm some predicate of Reality and this affirmation should correspond to the nature of Reality disclosed in other judgments made with reference to the same point in Reality. The correspondence is between the " what " contained in one judgment and the " whats " contained in other relevant judgments. It is not a correspondence between the contents of knowledge and something beyond knowledge but between the nature of Reality revealed in one judgment and the nature of Reality revealed in other judgments. In other words, when an ordinary man says that what he thinks of a particular thing must correspond to its real nature what he means is that his judgment about it made here and now must agree with other judgments that he may be compelled to make about it hereafter. That judgment which exercises a more constraining element upon him is accepted by him as the nature of Reality and it is the standard by which he judges the truth of another judgment which he makes about the same object but with less constraint.

If from the stand-point of common sense such a conformity between one judgment and another judgment or other judgments is called correspondence between Knowledge and Reality it is because " for the naive knower—that is, in advance of epistemological criticism—there is no difference between what appears to him and what exists. He treats what appears to him as being the very existent itself; and in so far as his knowledge is veridical is right in doing so." (Strong, *Mind*, April, 1928, p. 184.) If it is contended that because of the subjective conditions that enter into the determination of the contents of experience, no knowledge can be regarded as revealing the nature of Reality then no knowledge is possible. For knowledge presupposes a subject, and what is known is an intellectual construction put upon what is given by reality to the subject. A knowledge that is not in relation to any mind is inconceivable. This truth which is so self-evident has been seized by the Idealist and interpreted to mean that there is no Reality apart from Consciousness.

Appearances are not psychologically the same as Reality, but logically they are so. Every judgment so long as it is not contradicted by experience is an affirmation of Reality, and even

when a judgment is rejected as false it is the nature of Reality as embodied in other judgments that does so. In every act of cognition there is "the animal faith"—that what we think is of the Real—and this faith is strengthened and verified by its coherence or consistency with other judgments. False propositions are rejected because they are incoherent with true propositions "but that rejection is determined by Reality itself, for it is by experience of Reality and experiment upon it that the propositions become sorted into groups." (Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, p. 253.) In spite of the subjective factor that plays an important part in our intellectual constructions we may regard an uncontradicted judgment in living thought as a revelation of the nature of Reality. Reality guides and controls our processes of judging. Truth is not an invention but a discovery. To know is not to create but to apprehend the nature of Reality under conditions peculiar to the subject that apprehends.

Thus the "Correspondence" theory is not absurd and meaningless if we do not take it as subsisting between knowledge on the one hand and Reality in itself on the other. If phenomenalism is true not only the theory of "Correspondence" breaks down, but also the very possibility of knowledge is undermined. One judgment is said to correspond to the nature of Reality when it is not contradicted by other judgments accepted as true. Sometimes it is true, one judgment may contradict another and neither of them may be regarded as true, *i.e.*, the mind may experience the same degree of constraint in both. Such a state where the mind may find its allegiance equally divided between two contradictory judgments is called doubt, and the mind refuses to acquiesce in one or the other. In other words there is a suspense of judgment. But further experience may lead the mind to accept one and reject the other. So the test of correspondence is non-contradiction which is a better term than consistency.

"Coherence" between judgments thus reveals correspondence. It seems better to adhere to the term "Correspondence"—with regard to judgments pertaining to the external world, because it has the advantage of suggesting the existence of the external world. "As our judgments about the external world have an 'intent,' a reference to a situation or context in the exter-

nal world, a judgment may be said to correspond in the sense that 'intent' is borne out by subsequent judgments. In perception we intuit the real, the content of the intuition though an appearance in the mind is regarded as of something outside." When a judgment is made of a real object in the external world "the element of intent has located it in a certain place, and the element of animal faith has posited it as real" (Strong, *ibid*, p. 182). The a sensory judgment which is not contradicted by experience reveals the nature of the real object is further supported by the fulfilment of the predictions that we derive from it. Assuming such a judgment to be true we may behave in a particular way expecting a particular result and if the expectation is fulfilled the "animal faith" is verified.

Thus the pragmatist's theory of Truth has some value. It has been well said that "practice is the parent of theory and realisation the surest verification." (Dawes Hicks.) Every conduct has its cognitive aspect and a practical behaviour based upon the assumption of the truth of a particular judgment tends to strengthen or correct the judgment in view of the practical consequences arising from it. "The work of the mind when its interest is cognitive has an experimental character. What is ordinarily called an experiment is a typical case of this mental attitude." (Stout, 'On Error,' *Personal Idealism*, p. 13.) The practical behaviour based on the assumption of the truth of a judgment is thus a process of verifying the truth. If the expectation that we have is fulfilled then the judgment may be said to be workable. But the pragmatist is content with this and does not want to go further in understanding the nature of Truth. Of course a true judgment is workable, but workability is merely a consequence of Truth, and does not constitute it. "Truth is indeed what works. But it works because truth is determined by the nature of reality" (Alexander, *ibid*, p. 265). Thus workability is an evidence of correspondence which consists as we saw in the conformity of the nature of Reality implied in a judgment with the nature of Reality as disclosed in other judgments accepted as true. The Pragmatic criterion of workability or usefulness is useful in verifying the correspondence between a judgment and the nature of Reality.

In testing the correspondence, another important factor also must be noticed. What the late Dr. Ward describes as 'intersubjective intercourse' plays a great part in ascertaining the truth of judgments. If an individual is shut up in a world uninhabited by any one else he may find it difficult to distinguish his erroneous perceptions from veridical ones. Man is social not only in his needs and inclinations, instincts and feelings but also in his effort to cognise the Reality in and around him. He understands his own self only through the understanding of other selves and the world around him is likewise understood by him only in collaboration with others. Man is social not only in his political and moral life, but also in his intellectual and spiritual life. "It is not curiosity alone which furnishes truth, but curiosity chastened by the curiosity of others." (Alexander, *ibid*, p. 264.) A man is not regarded as sane, *i.e.*, he is refused the status of a citizen of the intellectual republic if his judgments are utterly different from those of others. "Truth and error are therefore as much social products as moral good and evil." (Alexander, *ibid*.)

One might argue that the system of judgment we construct about Reality may be shown to be false in comparison with a system constructed upon materials furnished by certain supernormal avenues of perception. The waking consciousness which forms the medium of our experience may itself be a dream-consciousness. One might concede for the sake of argument the possibility of such a divergent system. But even those materials divulged by such supernormal powers have to be co-ordinated and systematised according to those categories which we ordinarily use and so the divergence of such a system will consist only in possessing greater details. But if the ways of thinking are also different then such a knowledge will have nothing in common with ours, and so for practical purposes in social life people who have such powers will cease to be sane. Further, our ordinary perceptions must be accounted for, just as we are able through the help of Psychology to explain dreams, illusions, etc. Besides, the materials of our dreams and illusions are drawn from our ordinary experience and so to establish that our waking consciousness itself is a dream, the materials of our ordinary perceptions must be shown to have been derived from supernormal experiences. But as we have not got

such experiences we cannot be said to have derived our materials from them. Those who condemn waking consciousness are abnormal to us in the same way as mad persons are and we cannot concede any superiority to their powers unless we ourselves share them and find them more convincing. So long as our judgments are not contradicted by our own experience, our expectations based on them are fulfilled, and our experience is confined by others' experiences, we may regard our knowledge as true and the possibility of all of us waking up from this waking consciousness as from a dream into a new state of awareness is a bare possibility, a dream. If we are transported into the company of angels and are led to a higher (not merely fuller) understanding of Reality then we may take it as true, but so long as we are in the company of men we have to accept what we know as true, subject to the corrections necessitated by our own further experience and the experiences of others.

So far I have upheld the doctrine of "Correspondence" though in explaining the ascertainability of the same I have resorted to the principle of non-contradiction. The advocates of the "Coherence" theory may say that the foregoing account is only a vindication of their own criterion. As already pointed out my preference for the term "Correspondence" is because of its implication of an objective Reality independent of consciousness, and I admit that the term as applied to judgments that are not concerned with facts of the world of space and time ceases to be appropriate. It would be helpful to distinguish two kinds of judgments: (1) those that are concerned with facts of the external world and are dependent upon sensory materials, and (2) those that issue out of ratiocination and are dependent upon certain fundamental axioms. The first group of judgments are dependent upon "Sensory intuitions" and are capable of "sensory verification" while the second are ultimately dependent upon a special kind of intuition which Husserl calls "essential or categorical intuition." The axioms or postulates are taken as true because of such intuitions and the judgments derived from these as rationally necessary are accepted as true. The terms "Correspondence" and "Workability" cease to be appropriate as applied to such abstract truths as opposed to concrete truths of the first kind. The

criterion in this connection may be better described as rational necessity rather than "coherence" as this latter term is apt to be confused with mere "formal consistency."

If the term "coherence" has a peculiar fascination for some they may well be allowed to use it. But at the same time one cannot subscribe to certain implications of the doctrine of "coherence" as held by some thinkers of the Idealistic school. Joachim identifies Truth with "systematic coherence" characteristic of a "significant whole" and he defines a "significant whole" as "an organised individual experience, self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled." He adds "there can be one and *only one* such experience.....For it is absolute self-fulfilment, absolutely self-contained significance that is postulated; and nothing short of absolute individuality—nothing short of the completely whole experience—can satisfy this postulate. Hence the truth is from the point of view of the human intelligence an Ideal and an Ideal which can never as such, or in its completeness be actual as human experience" (*The Nature of Truth*, pp. 78-79). Thus from the standpoint of an impossible Ideal of Truth every finite judgment is partially false and the doctrine of the degrees of truth is thus an important aspect of the theory of "Coherence." Truth is taken as the complete system of knowledge and anything that falls short of it is to that extent less true. But we saw that truth is the value that we put upon particular judgments with reference to their function of revealing the nature of Reality. It is true an elaborate system of judgments may give a more detailed description of the nature of Reality, than a single judgment. But we cannot say that it is more true. What Mr. Schiller says in this connection is worth quoting: "it is true enough, as Bradley contends, that no judgment is capable of expressing the totality of reality. Every judgment is partial, and affirms (or denies) of a part of reality, nay usually, of a part of what is before its maker's mind. But it does not follow from this that it is partly false. It is rather a condition of its being to the point" (*Mind*, April, 1925, p. 221). The judgment that  $2 + 2 = 4$  is true not partially but wholly though it does not give us a complete knowledge of mathematics.

Though Reality is the ultimate subject in every judgment, a given judgment deals with only a part of Reality and the predicate



reveals only a part of the nature of Reality. Judgment is the work of the mind, it is relative to the interest of the individual who makes it and so the question of its truth or error is essentially relative to the intent of the person who makes it. So to condemn a judgment because it is not a complete revelation of the nature of Reality is to overlook the nature of judgment. Every judgment has a subject in Reality and if the subject which is referred to by a demonstrative or defined by a concept has the predicated quality (in the case of affirmative judgments) and has not that quality (in the case of negative judgments) the judgment is true. Whether the predication in a given judgment is true or not is to be ascertained with reference to other judgments about the same subject. The identity of the subject is understood by means of space-time specification in the case of physical objects and identity of definition in other cases.

The doctrine of the degrees of truth not only is not consistent with the nature of judgment, it also obviates the distinction between human truth and human error. The ideal of Absolute Truth is unattainable by man and so every finite judgment is partly true and partly false. But it is necessary to distinguish between truth and error in human experience and it becomes impossible according to this theory to make such a distinction.

The way in which the partial nature of the truth contained in a judgment as illustrated by Joachim is indeed very amusing. He says that a boy who has learnt by rote the multiplication-table and states that  $3 \times 3 = 9$  is not stating the truth to the same extent as an arithmetician would do in enunciating the same proposition. To the boy, Joachim says, the proposition possesses only a minimum of meaning while to the arithmetician it is only a shorthand symbol of the whole science of arithmetic as known at the time. But the proposition taken by itself is true irrespective of the mental back-ground of the author of the statement. Of course the boy in question may not be able to prove the truth of the statement or bring out its implications. But the capacity to prove the truth of a judgment and to unfold its implications on the part of the author of it does not measure the extent of the truth contained in it. The doctrine of degrees of truth is, there-

fore, based on a confusion between the truth of a judgment and its proof.

If, as it is contended here, a particular judgment may be wholly true, Joachim asks "is the development of a science merely the addition of truth to truth? Is geometry neither more nor less than the aggregate of geometrical truths; and are single arithmetical truths merely collected into the science of arithmetic; itself the sum (or the class) of the mental judgments?" (*Ibid*, p. 100.) No, I admit. But the systematic character of geometry or arithmetic consists in the implications and mutual relations of several judgments and not in any metamorphosis of individual judgments. They are not picked up like pebbles, but one gives rise to another by suggestion and implication, and thus they are all connected into a system. We may well ask Mr. Joachim whether the system without being thus distinguished into separate judgments is an undifferentiated mass or stuff of geometry or arithmetic? The different judgments constitute an intelligible system called a particular science not by being all rolled up into one in which each one loses its shape, but by persisting as separate judgments connected together by mutual implications or reciprocal relations.

It is true, every judgment is liable to be contradicted by further experience and thus found to be false. "Unexplored conditions can affect the truth of a statement" but "only in so far as they are relevant, and the relevancy in each case depends on the nature of the question raised." "The way to truth lies through a continuous correction of errors, and the risk of error attends to all truth-seeking." (Schiller, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 402.) In practice, however, we are able to say of many judgments that they are absolutely free from error. Thus it is practically certain to us that  $3 \times 3 = 9$  or that every event must have a cause. Those propositions therefore that embody "Categorical characters" are recognised as true not only with reference to the range of facts open to us so far, but as true for all time and for all ranges of experience.

Truth-finding is an eternal quest as the pursuit of Goodness or Beauty is. But though our apprehension of Reality is never entirely accurate we are not wholly incapable of apprehending it.

It is an ideal that is progressively realised. So, as Dr. Alexander says, though we may not accept the doctrine of the degrees of truth we may admit that "there are all manner of degrees in the perfection or range of knowledge." (*Ibid*, p. 264.)

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# PHILOSOPHIC OUTLOOKS ON THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH

BY

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Notions of Truth and notions of Knowledge are intimately connected. The Monist interprets Truth monistically; the Pluralist, pluralistically. The Vedantist has a monistic outlook; the *Akhyātivādin* and the *Viparītakhyātivādin* interpret Truth piecemeal, pluralistically. Objective Idealists speak of Reality as an all-inclusive harmonious whole, the Absolute, and Truth and Reality are to them identical. Realists distinguish between Idea and Object, and regard Truth as a relation between the Object and the Idea. Rebelling against Idealism, Pragmatism regards Truth as some sort of human adjustment: "true ideas" says James "are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify."

Common sense conceives Truth to be a copy of Reality. A reflection is true when it is an exact counterpart of the original. Analogically, the True is that which is the copy of the Real. This type of Realism involves us in glaring absurdities. When we taste sugar and experience a sensation of sweetness, we shall on this realistic interpretation, have to say that sweetness is a copy of the sugar. Can anything be more absurd? Or again, if the idea is the copy of the thing, how can there be any such thing as error at all?

A modified form of Realism offers what may be called the Correspondence theory of Truth. This theory says, there are things and there are ideas, and Truth consists in the ideas corresponding to the things in a way so as not to make them copies of things. Thus there is a correspondence between the map of England and England, without the map being a copy of England. When the correspondence exists, we say that the map is true.

“ Thus, *e.g.*, to ‘ speak the truth ’ is to ‘ speak in accordance with ’ or ‘ in conformity to ’ the facts. A ‘ true ’ man or ‘ a true ’ friend is a person whose outward acts ‘ correspond to ’—faithfully reflect—his inner feelings. A narrative is true if it ‘ represents ’ in essentials and within its own sphere, the real order of events.” (Joachim, *The Nature of Truth*, p. 7.) Is Truth correspondence?

It is not so. How can we know whether an idea corresponds with a real object? To know this we must be able to compare thought with Reality; for example, the map with the country, a statue with the original, the judgment with the Reality which it tries to embody. We must be able to hold both the Thought and the Reality in the mind as two different things with a view to judge if correspondence is present. Now, comparison without the possibility of the apartness of the objects compared is inconceivable. But Thought and Reality cannot be got apart; the Real may exist independent of *my* thinking, but cannot exist independent of *all thinking*.

Therefore, though Truth is the knowledge of Reality this knowledge cannot be analysed as consisting in the correspondence of Thought with Reality.

If then Reality itself is ideal, Truth must be taken as consisting in the internal *coherence* of a system which constitutes Reality. The True is that which fits into a system, the False is that which is discrepant or does not so fit in. Truth is a coherent system of meanings; it is something which like Reality itself is organic, and an individual whole. This is the standpoint of Intellectualism, or of Absolute Idealism. It is characterised by the monistic outlook, and to the philosopher who accepts this outlook, all Truth is nothing short of that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant whole.

The Pragmatist protests, and asserts that Truth is a *value* we attach to ideas; it is dependent on biological, psychological and sociological influences. Truth is man-made. While the Intellectualist says that Truth is *found*, the Pragmatist says that it is *made*; Truth to him is verification.

But the Pragmatist distorts our deepest convictions. Truth is eternal. Truth is objective. What is once true is always true.

Do ideas work because they are true, or are they true because they work? And what is the function of ideas? Is it guidance or cognition? Does the truth of an idea lie in its immediate adjustability or are we to refer to the future? And as soon as this latter is made does not the Pragmatist enter on the very threshold of Idealism? The answers are clear.

Taking Objective Idealism as giving us the best outlook on the Problem of Truth, we may proceed further with Bradley as the guide. The world is an Appearance, which in its physical and spiritual manifestations realises by various stages the one Absolute principle. The Absolute has no degrees; it is perfect, and there can be no more and less in perfection. It is also timeless. To the Idealists and the Absolutists, Time is essentially Appearance. The more and the less perfect, the more and the less real are predicates which belong only to the world of Appearances. This world inasmuch as it realises more of perfection is more real and so has a greater degree of Reality in it, and our knowledge of it, a greater degree of Truth in it.

Wherein then lies the Perfection which is Reality? Bradley says, Perfection whether of Truth or of Reality consists in positive, self-subsisting individuality. That which has a greater harmony in it, and that which is more self-comprehensive is more real, for it approaches a single, all-containing individuality. Even in Morality, we esteem a life as worthier than another on the ground of better harmony in it or of superior comprehensiveness of its ideals.

This doctrine of the degrees of Reality is subversive of our ordinary notion which says that something either *is* or *is not* Real, and that there can be no degrees in it. Formal Logic says that a proposition and its contradictory cannot both be true and cannot both be false. And if we accept this logical point of view, evidently there can be no possibility of a more or a less of Truth or Error, that is, there can be no possibility of degrees of Truth and Reality. But Bradley cannot be disposed of like this. His main thesis is that we have no possible chance of being entirely right or entirely wrong. There is no pure Truth except Absolute Truth, the Truth which is true of the Universe or being as a whole. Reality and the Truth about it are indefinitely presupposed in all

ordinary judgments, so that even when we make a simple statement, this rose is red; the full meaning is: the Universe is such that this rose is red. Metaphysics hankers after the one Reality which is thus implied in all knowledge. All finite judgments are partially true as implicitly asserting these Truths; and so they must also be partially false.

It may make things clearer in this connection if, as is pointed out by different thinkers, we note that the Concept of Reality is ambiguous. The Real may be identified with (1) the True, (2) the Existent, (3) the Perfect, and (4) the Eternal.

Reality conceived as Truth can have degrees in it. Thus  $2+2=4$  is real in the system of numbers, but  $2+2=5$  is not, and in that objective system  $2+2=5$  is equally false with  $2+2=6$ . But, of course, subjectively  $2+2=5$  is less unreal than  $2+2=6$ . As belief, the one has less falsity in it than the other.

Reality conceived as Existence can have no degrees in it. Thus, whales are real, centaurs are not, and there can be no question of degrees in this.

Reality conceived as Perfection has a direct bearing in connection with the question of degrees of Reality. The Real is the systematic whole, and the different appearances are more or less real as they are more or less near the Perfect or the Absolute Whole. Thus the solar system is more real than a flash of light, a substance is more real than its attributes, a man is more real than an ape and scientific knowledge is more real than opinion and empirical knowledge.

Reality conceived as the Eternal leaves no scope for degrees; for the noumenal will be real and the phenomenal unreal.

It is only to the Idealist, the Absolutist or the Monist, then, that this problem of the degrees of Reality will have philosophic significance. To him, evidently the saint has a greater reality than the sinner, the philosophic mind a greater reality than the unphilosophic mind, man as an organism a greater reality than man as a mechanism, and so on. The Universe is the whole, the Real Absolute, in connection with which our truths, by reason of our imperfections, are but mixtures of truth and error.

Against this Idealistic interpretation of Truth, the case of Realism may be put in details and at its best, for that would well bring into relief the weakness of that school of thought. Russell may well represent this school. For him, Truth is characterised by the fact that it is a mixture of dependence upon mind and independence of mind. He subdivides the question of Truth and Falsehood as under :

“ A. Formal Theory.—Given the meanings of the component words, what decides whether a sentence is true or false?

B. Causal Theory.—Can we distinguish between Truth and Falsehood by (a) their cause, (b) their effects?

C. Individual and social elements.—A statement is a social occurrence, a belief is something individual. How can we define a belief, and what is it when not composed of words?

D. Consistency of Truth.—Can we get outside the circle of beliefs or statements to something which shows them true, not merely consistent? In other words what possible relation is there between propositions and facts?”

(Bertrand Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy*, p. 270.)

Each question here is entangled in each other question. A leads to D, which involves B and that leads to C. Without the formation of a belief, there will be no statement; and since the question whether the truth or falsity of a belief can be determined either by its causes or by its effects, can only be decided by reference to a certain fact, Russell concludes that a form of words is true when it has a certain relation to a certain fact. What relation, and to what fact? His reply is : “ I think the fundamental relation is this : a form of words is true if a person who knows the language is led to that form of words when he finds himself in that environment which contains features that are the meanings of these words, and these features produce reactions in him sufficiently strong for him to use words which mean them.....The environment causes words, and words directly caused by the environment (if they are statements) are ‘ true.’ ” (*Ibid*, p. 273.)

Despite the best effort to analyse the realistic interpretation of Truth, Russell is here almost mystical, and further on, he posits a Kantian *a priori* in language, and states that there is



something like an *a priori* relation between the structure of language and the structure of the world.

If it be questioned, what is a Fact, what is the Environment to which reference is involved in Truth, there will be a halt in this position. For even the Fact, and the Environment can only be explained idealistically, or at least semi-idealistically.

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# THE REALITY OF TIME

BY

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Since Bergson came to propound his theory of Creative Evolution and Einstein claimed for Time an important place in the constitution of the Universe, no other problem, for the last thirty years or so, seems to have attracted the attention of European thinkers so much, as the problem of Time has. By this statement I do not mean to suggest that the problem was not seriously tackled by previous thinkers; for, as a matter of fact, almost all important thinkers, both ancient and modern, recognised the necessity for its consideration and had something to say about it. But if we look to the manner of treatment, we will find it to have been different from what we find now. The angle of vision has completely changed; and the problem looms large before thinkers of the present day.

The problem appears to be so direct in a sense and is yet delicate that a careless handling of it is likely to undermine a whole system of thought. We must therefore tread the ground here with careful steps.

The first thing we must be clear about is, the expression 'Reality of Time.' Are we to put the problem as 'Is Time Real' or 'Is Time of the Real'? It is needless to say, the solution of every problem depends ultimately on how we experience it. And the question is, 'How do we experience Time'? Do we experience it as an object of Sensuous perception, as we would be said to do when we say, 'this is my body,' 'that is the tree' or even, 'there is space before us'? Or is it only an irremovable and indispensable character of our experience—something without which experience would be meaningless for us, or, would be logically impossible altogether? Again, if it is real, is it real *in* experience or real *for* experience or *both*? For example, to make

my point clear, the external world before me, for all that I may philosophically speculate about it, is something that is 'Real in experience'—it may not be as it appears to me or as I may care to think of it, yet it is something 'given' in my experience in spite of myself; and when I go to seek for an explanation for this 'given,' and find it in 'something not given' as such, I would call that 'something,' 'real for experience'; but when I go to ask myself—what is my self? I would find that it is not only real in experience or real for experience, but that it is *both*. In which of these three categories can we include Time? This, in my opinion, is how the problem should be stated. I say all this not only to indicate my point of view but also to venture a suggestion thereby.

I cannot however do justice to the problem of Time unless I take note of thinkers who have seriously thought of Time from different stand-points and see how far they have been able to clear up the problem for us. It will be the height of egotism on my part, unpardonable in the field of Truth, to ignore the contributions of Truth-seekers and spin out a theory all by myself.

It has been customary, as we all know, to distinguish between 'perceptual Time' and 'conceptual Time' and then to do away with both and with Time thereby, regarding it as purely a matter of subjective construction, as if this is all that we actually experience of Time. It is said, for example, that we perceive an event A : A disappearing, B : B disappearing, C : C disappearing, D : and so on; and thus in the momentariness of A, B, C, D, and in their successiveness we perceive Time—when Time for us is a filled content—(this is our perception of Time); and that, when we ideally take away all this content and think of the bare possibility of continuity we are said to have the conception of Time; and so, in as much as each of these is a matter of the Mind and for the Mind, Time as such can be said to have no reality of its own. This is how the subjectivist would speak of Time. But is *this* not altogether a misinterpretation of the character of Time? Let us first take up what is said with regard to the 'perception of Time'—that it involves 'momentariness' and 'successiveness.' Now both 'momentariness' and 'successiveness' are only synonyms for 'change' interpreted in terms of space—the former being visualised as a 'point' and the latter as 'a series of points.' But

in thus limiting the perception of Time to 'momentariness' and 'successiveness,' are we not imposing a character on Time which is not at all its own, and then, dressing it up in a garb that hides the true nature of Time?

Secondly, in the so-called conception of Time, the case is pretty much the same—with this difference only that while in the first case 'extension' is imaged along with the 'extended,' here it is imaged as a bare line produced both ways from an experience of the self as a point of reference, where the imaginary points could be conveniently arranged.

This spatial interpretation of Time is only due to our eagerness to explain every perception of ours in terms of the sensations of Touch and Sight. This error seems to have been for the first time noticed by Kant when he spoke of 'Time' as 'the form of Inner Sense' as distinguished from 'Space' which he called, 'the form of Outer Sense.' By pointing out this difference Kant brings out a peculiarity with regard to Time which he, again, emphasises in his doctrine of 'Schematism of the Understanding' in going to explain the possibility of 'sensuous percepts' being formed into 'pure concepts' as depending on the unique character of Time that he regards as both sensuous and pure. And when Kant further goes to explain how the Schemata of Time-content, Time-series, Time-order, and Time-comprehension contain in themselves the germs to be developed into the categories of Quality, Quantity, Relation and Modality, he throws out a suggestion to us with regard to Time, pregnant with possibilities that might be developed independently of the stand-point of Kant, throwing a flood of light on the Metaphysic of experience.

It is indeed a matter of surprise for me how in the whole field of literature on Kant, this has escaped the notice of thinkers. And it comes to me almost as a revelation to guide me along the Bergsonian doctrine of Time into newer regions of discovery in the field of Truth.

With Kant, Time, of course, is a subjective form of the understanding: but the place given to it in the three Critiques, the frequency of its introduction in connexion with the understanding, the Will and Immortality, the beauty and purposiveness of the world-order, are significant of the fact that the logical necessity

he felt for Time can only be likened to the logical necessity he felt for the 'self'; and if I were allowed to state my opinion of the picture he draws of experience with all its wealth of detail, I should say, it is 'Time' and 'self' put in bold relief on the canvas of his picture that convey to our minds all the meaning and beauty that we may be allowed to enjoy of it; and it remains only as a matter of curiosity, how, bringing these two together all the while, he let go the hold of one, and Time slipped out of his hands.

It slipped out of the hands of Kant but was taken up by Bergson with whom Time is a matter of greater importance than even the Self is. According to him, it is 'duration'—the first and simplest Truth that is directly revealed to us by Intuition with which we might approach the realms of the unknown. And this simplest Truth is also *the* Truth; it is the key to all that remain as mysteries for Philosophy—Life, Will, Energy, Matter, Spirit, Instinct, Intuition and what not—as expressions of the 'creative evolution' of Time. This 'duration' with Bergson is not a matter of 'succession' but of 'permeation.' The present is but the concentrated past growing into the future. As such, what is intuited in 'duration' is a 'quality' and not a 'quantity;' this is best illustrated in Life. Life expresses itself in what we call 'growth,' and 'growth' can only be understood as 'the past' concentrated and conserved in 'the present' for 'the future;' so that what is actually and directly perceived in 'duration' is a quality rather than a measurable quantity. Thus it is 'duration' which constitutes the basic principle of the Universe in its infinitely divergent lines of evolution. Here perhaps in Bergson for the first time we have, in the history of European speculation, such a bold assertion of the objective reality of Time. A reaction indeed!

But while we may agree with Bergson, in a way, with regard to the dynamic content of Time, I doubt whether we can subscribe to his hypostatisation of Time or 'duration' as the ultimate reality for us. Duration implies something that endures; how it can stand by itself passes comprehension. Besides 'duration' also implies transition from one state to another; it brings in change by implication; and the question is, what is it that endures or what is it that changes? Is that which endures also that which

changes? I do not think Bergson can offer a satisfactory solution to this problem if he holds to 'duration' *per se* as the Ultimate Reality.

Professor Alexander, one of the most brilliant and suggestive thinkers, also ascribes objective reality to Time and says "the Ultimate reality is 'Space-Time' the stuff out of which by various distributions all things arise." In explaining how it is so, he refers to what he calls 'the inherent restlessness of Time' and tells us—"time is the soul of space." Time is thus the essential factor in cosmic evolution.

But the question is—"why is this restlessness?" What is this restlessness of? Professor Alexander seems to suggest a solution by saying that "the Universe in its *nisus* and its dream is straining to the quality of 'deity.' " But this is rather an explication of the meaning of the word 'restlessness' than a real explanation for it. The '*nisus*' the 'dream' and the 'straining' are hardly explained in his philosophy of the Universe and remain as mysterious as ever.

Now, the reason why even such earnest thinkers on Time, as we find in Bergson and Alexander, are unable to give us a clue to the real nature of Time, can in my opinion be traced to the fact that both of them sunder it from experience and interpret it as a thing apart. And it is strange, indeed, that even Bergson with whom 'duration' stands for a felt 'quality' could have ignored the inseparable connexion of Time with Experience. The unfortunate over-cautiousness on the part of Kant in ascribing any reality to Time is here substituted by an eagerness to predicate *the* reality of it.

The thing is, a purely objective treatment of Time cannot but land us in perplexities. Even the greatest discovery of the present day by Einstein—the Law of Relativity—"which has made Mathematicians and Physicists refer things no longer to three axes of co-ordinates but to four, the fourth being the Time-axis," and has thus secured for time an important place and function in the world-order, has yet to decide how far Time is real. If, according to the Law of Relativity, we may describe 'Space-Time' as an order or system of relations that subsist between bodies and also agree with Einstein in conceiving that 'although immeasurab-

ly vast the Universe is definitely limited and capable of exact measurement,' then are we not to be pessimistic about the reality of Time also? It would be better for us, therefore, to look for the reality of Time with the spirit of Kant when he tells us that Time is a 'form of the Inner Sense,' and according to the suggestion of Bergson also, that Time is a 'quality' and not a 'quantity;' and then see whether we have time in any form as real in our experience. Let us therefore see if we can get help from such thinkers as have sought to find 'time' in this quarter.

The Neo-Idealists of Italy such as Croce and Gentile held up before us a view of the Universe as Eternal History. According to this school of thought the concrete form in which Reality is perceived is History. Our own reality, for example, is identical with our history. 'I am' means what 'I have been;' and this 'I have been' is a matter of History. Thus Universal History is to Reality what the history of each individual is to himself. Reality is a process, and this process is in time or rather is Time itself. This would have sounded very much like the Bergsonian doctrine of Time had it not also been said that the world is Mind in Activity, meaning thereby that the world is a gradual unfolding of Pure Mind.

I do not wish to go into the details of this idealistic theory of the Universe, except in so far as it concerns itself with Time. The most striking feature of this theory is its sincere effort to subvert the dualistic interpretation of the Universe as Mind and Matter; but the effort seems to me to hit beyond the mark in doing away with Mind also, and emphasising its activity as if it were something that stands by itself. For it is one thing to say that the Universe is history and quite another to say that it has a history. The one would go to identify Reality with Time, while the other would go to show that Time is a character of the Real. It is not exactly clear what the Neo-Idealists can possibly mean, for if the Universe is History, Time is all in all; and if this is so, why bring in Mind at all? But this theory points out one great truth in bringing out the historical aspect of the Universe and showing that it is the nature of the Mind to be history. And this is vital to our Understanding of the reality of Time.

A very suggestive explanation is offered by Professor Royce. He draws our attention to the true significance of Time "and tells us that it is not so much the consciousness of something coming first and then something next" that makes Time a matter of interest for us, as the consciousness of the whole succession as such in which the apparently unrelated events stand related to one another. The moment that is no more, has its meaning in the moment that is, which, again, has its fulfilment in the moment that is to be. The successions appear as one whole and give us the idea of Time proper. His further elucidation of the nature of Time-consciousness is more interesting for our purpose when he tells us that the peculiarity of the Time-series consists in the fact that it is "always found to have a determinate direction." "Succession passes from each event to its successor and not in a reverse direction; and herein the perceived Time-relations differ from what we view as space-relations." This direction of the Time-series he interprets as "an event aiming on towards its own fulfilment and extinction in the coming of its successor," and says 'our experience of Time is thus for us essentially as experience of longing, of pursuit, of restlessness.' It is 'a form of the Will.' This restlessness he accounts for as the restlessness of the individual for union with the Universal. He then goes on to add that "the world's Time is thus in all respects a generalised and extended image and correspondent of the observed Time of our Inner experience."

As to this idea of Time we can agree only in so far as our own inner experience is concerned; but the wider application of Time as longing for union with the nature of the Absolute is not satisfactorily explained and might even be said to be logically untenable. Besides, Time as 'longing for union' is only a hypothesis that remains to be established.

Among Indian thinkers we have to look to the Vaishnava school of thought for an objective consideration of Time. According to all Vaishnava thinkers 'the world' as such is not to be dispensed with as 'illusion.' It is grounded in the nature of the Absolute or Brahman. Brahman is dynamically conscious. Māyā is Prakriti. "It is the creative principle and not the principle of causing confusion, Manifestation or expression.



pertains to the very nature of Brahman. It is the *Nityavibhuti* of Brahman and includes *Kāla* and *Īswara*."

Both *Rāmānuja* and *Nimbārka* "accept Time and *Prikriti* to be eternal objective existences—as the *materia*, dynamic, basic reality of the cosmic order, the former having no limitation that is applicable to the latter."

According to *Nimbārka* "‘*Kāla*’ is the principle which pursues every thing to maturation. It is undivided and unchanging (*vide* Sircar’s *Comparative studies in Vedāntism*, pp. 204 & 208).

According to *Vallabhāchāryya* *Kāla* imbibes in it *Sattra* and is the *Sāttvik* manifestation of *Īswara*. It has three forms (1) *Ādhidaivika* (2) *Ādhibhautika* (3) *Ādhyātmika*. *Ādhidaivika* *Kāla* is time, undivided and eternal. *Īswara*, is in this *Kāla*. *Kāla* viewed and determined by succession of events especially of outer nature is *Ādhibhautika* *Kāla* and when viewed as having magnitude equal to that of *Ātmā* is *Ādhyātmika*."

The net result of the above mode of considering time is that Time must necessarily be brought into account for 'Change' or the world of things as an eternal principle in the bosom of the Absolute.

Thus the *Vaiṣṇava* thinkers throw some light on the problem of Time that enables us to look into the matter closely and form an estimate of the true nature of Time accordingly.

What then is the Time? Our fairly exhaustive review of the treatment of Time from different points of view does, in my opinion, bring home to us one important truth, that, Time is after all an indispensable factor of our experience. The world spread out in space before us is a world of things existing with us, but having, as it were, no direct concern with us unless we would choose to take them in our concern. But the world is also a world of events each of which is a curious admixture of 'is' and 'is not' and yet for the matter of that is linked with all the others, all together with myself making up a meaning for me that I call Time. Herein lies the distinctive nature of Time. The chair is here, the tree is there, and I might even say space is everywhere, and that I can say I have no direct concern with the chair or the tree or even with space (for however curious it may sound,

what I call ' myself ' in me, I do not find in it, though it and all else may be in me) and yet I am. But I cannot say this with regard to Time. The gathering of the clouds, the flashing of lightning, the roaring of the thunder, the rising of the storm and the coming on of rain are all events no doubt standing by themselves but none the less linked together, one passing into the other and existing in a whole and speaking to me of something which certainly is not before me even as space is; and in each of these severally and in all of them collectively ' I am ' Time is, therefore, real *in* experience; for it goes with all our experience. Let us now see whether it is also real *for* experience; whether, in other words, it goes to explain our experience.

In what does the reality of Time consist? With what special content does it appeal to my experience? What is it that makes me feel or think of Time at all? Time is commonly expressed as ' past ' ' present ' and ' future ' with ' the present ' as the point of reference; but what is it that draws my attention to the ' present ' and makes me look both ways? My answer is, it is the sudden leaping up of the ' present ' into my view, the creation of the ' present ' for me. The present will never be a matter for concern with me, it will not even exist, unless it brings the sense of creation with it. I shall have no thought of the ' present ' and thus none of the ' past ' or ' future ' either, unless suddenly something comes into being and opens my eyes to the fact of this ' coming into being. ' This ' coming into being ' is not however to be understood as meaning the positive existence of a material object of perception, for it may equally stand for the absence of one. It simply means, an event, a happening, a change. The bud which I saw there yesterday evening I find in bloom, in the morning; here the material object has remained the same but it would have been of no interest to me except for the ' budding ' ' the disappearance of budding ' and ' the blooming ' all appearing as ' creations ' to my mind. Thus both ' coming in sight ' and ' passing out of sight ' are to my mind ' facts of creation. ' Every change so far as I am concerned is a creation. It may be objected here that ' change ' is always relative to a position in space. My answer is : this is again a misrepresentation of the significance of change. It is certainly relative, but relative to a psychic interest.

Here again the *Vedāntin* might say, that, it is the 'psychic interest' that occasions a change for us and not *vice versa*; for a psychic interest presupposes a state of preparedness that can be traced to a set of instincts or ' *Sanskāras* ' without which a change will not be perceived as a change. To this I have to say that this is a mere hypothesis until the ' *Sanskāras* ' are established by reasoning; and that, as a matter of fact, such reasonings would go to involve the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum*. Besides change understood as ' change ' is logically born of the relation between Mind in a state of dormancy and Mind in a state of awakening; but ' change ' understood as ' change ' must be distinguished from ' change ' understood as ' happening ' or ' creation.' Thus it is change that quickens my sense of interest, or rather, brings it into being and makes me look beyond itself to the fact of creation, opens my inner eye to that on account of which this creation takes place, and this I call Time. You would perhaps ask me here to substitute ' in which ' for ' on account of which.' My reply would be that it is because activity has to be regarded as a process that you wrongly give it a spatial form and talk of it with ' in ' or ' on;' but a process need not be spatially construed at all, for it appears to our experience simply with a content as bringing forth or creation. Our unsophisticated Mind is nearer the truth here when we say ' Time will bring it about ' ' Time will bring its reward ' ' Time will heal ' ' Time will do its work. Yes, it is always Time that does the work and nothing else. The plant, we say, ' grown; ' but ' grows ' how? What is the essential condition of its growth? I should say, it is Time. Take away Time and there would be no growth; and why talk of growth?—it will even cease to exist. Similarly you take up a problem for solution; work at it for days and days; you find no solution; you give it up and forget it altogether; but then all on a sudden after years and years perhaps, the solution flashes up in your vision and you jump up with a creation before you. What has brought this joy for you? Certainly it is not yourself, for you had given it up, had almost completely erased it out of your mind; nor was it any one else that helped you to do it, for it was the business of none to enter into your secrets. It is Time—Time that was active when you enjoyed rest, Time that was awake when you were asleep. You would perhaps say that

the work was being done by your subconscious Mind. Yes; certainly it was 'being done' but not 'was done' and could never have been done unless Time as 'creative activity' had stepped in and got it done for you. Take away Time and it will be an impossibility for you. Yes, take away Time and the stars will cease to run in their courses, the sun will lose its glow, the moon will lose its delight, all creation would die the death of a static stagnation and a blank Absolute of 'nothingness' would stare at itself as a ghost.

Time creates. You would perhaps say "why talk of 'creation' alone" for creation means 'birth?' Do we always have births before us? Do we not also have deaths? Oh, yes, we have; but 'a birth' as a 'change' and not as a 'birth' is a creation for me; and 'death' is as much a 'change' as 'birth' is. Every change is a new-comer in my world of experience, be it 'a birth or a death.' It is the rhythm of birth and death that stands for creation. And the endless sea of incessant change brings me the vision of a creative activity that I call Time.

The time to which we generally give the determinations of past, present and future may be reduced to nothingness; for Time has past present, and future owes its origin to what we call 'the present,' and a little analysis would go to show that the present never exists. We never have a 'now' for us. Psychology has shown that the 'now' is always relative to a particular 'span of consciousness' and the present is always a 'specious present,' so the Time born of such a present must necessarily be false; for it owes its origin to falsity. It is this false notion of Time that is responsible for the anxiety on the part of thinkers to dispense with 'Time as an illusion.' But the Time whose reality is ever with us in the ceaseless flow of events can never be taken away from our experience. It gives meaning to our experience; experience would be unintelligible to us unless we saw creation in it. Time is thus also 'real *for* experience.'

Now this creative activity that we call Time does not stand by itself. It is the creative activity of God whom Spinoza understands by his 'Universal substance' in the necessity of whose existence lies the necessity of his manifestation. Spinoza is said to have declared Time to be unreal, May be. But we must

not forget that he also believed in the necessary manifestation of the Universal substance. I for myself cannot understand how in the face of this fact he could ever have believed in a *static* Substance. He might not have believed in the 'time' we have shown to be false, but he certainly believed in 'eternity' and 'eternal manifestation.' It would be better therefore to say that he believed in Time as Plato did when he said "Time begins with the creation of things and is the image of eternity." It is all very well to talk of 'substance' as 'absolute,' to divest it of all content and do away with every thing else as 'illusion' or 'appearance,' but can we really talk away the fact of change in so simple a manner as we pretend to do? Every thing changes and so nothing can be said to be real—this we can accept. But for the matter of that are we justified in ignoring 'change' as such? I think, not. We cannot ignore it. It is there but we do not understand it and that is all. It were far better on our part, therefore, to confess our ignorance than take pride in saying that we have discovered a blank static Absolute that can have no meaning for us and which we have never discovered at all. I cannot therefore understand the attitude of Bradley when he tells us "if Time is not unreal our doctrine of the Absolute is false." Nor can I understand the anxiety on the part of Mc Taggart to 'kill' Time when he says 'perhaps Time will be the last enemy to be killed.' Throw away Time if you can; but you cannot.

Reality does not stand for 'isness' but Being. Being implies activity but is not activity. Creative activity is grounded in the nature of 'Being,' and change is always before us; and it is 'change' that causes us to turn our eyes to Reality. And change stands for creation; that is all that we experience. Creation can only be due to a creative activity which we always feel but nowhere find except in the experience of Time. Time is thus the creative activity of God that knows no ending. Time pertains to the real. It is not as Bergson says 'duration'; for duration is only the form in which we picture to our imagination creative activity as a process. It is not concerned with 'evolution' either; for it creates for the sake of creation and knows no selectiveness or purpose. It may operate as 'longing' or 'restlessness' in us and in the heart of everything that it creates, but in itself it re-

mains calm in its own joy. To our limited consciousness it appears as having a 'before and after' but to God it is eternity. Being is the Great Light with its effulgence. To our mind it appears as 'becoming' but 'becoming' points to 'being.' Change takes us on to creative activity which, in its turn, points to Reality. For us to take away change would be to take away Reality just as to take away the 'luminosity of light' would be to take away 'light' itself. Those two beautifully suggestive lines of the Korān are well worth remembering in this connexion;—

‘ I was as a gem concealed,  
Me my burning ray revealed.’

Time, as infinite creative activity, reveals God in eternity. It is real for us although we may pretend to be blind to its reality.

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# ARE HYPOTHETICALS JUDGMENTS AT ALL?

BY

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The Hypothetical Judgment is generally represented by either of two Symbolic forms: (i) in the one form—‘If A is B, then C is D,’ the antecedent and the consequent contain four distinct terms; (ii) in the second form—‘If A is B, then A is C,’ the antecedent and the consequent contain three distinct terms; (iii) the form with two distinct terms—‘If A is, then B is,’ is usually ignored. Of course, if this form is regarded merely as an abbreviation in which the two letters—A and B, stand for two clauses, then, as Bosanquet says, (Vol. I; Book I, Ch. VI, p. 251), “it must be reducible to either the first or the second form.” But there is no need to look upon it as an abbreviation; the normal interpretation would be to take the two letters as standing for two concepts or terms and not for judgments or propositions; and then it must be regarded as an independent form. As we shall see, much of the present confusion of ideas regarding the Hypothetical, is due to the failure on the part of Logicians to realise the distinctness of this third form from the two others. Our contention in the present paper will be divided into two parts: (I) first, we shall try to show that the Hypotheticals of the first and second forms, *i.e.*, those with three or four distinct terms, are not forms of judgment at all; they are forms of inference,—of abridged Syllogistic inference. (II) Secondly, it will be our aim to show that the third (and the neglected) form of the Hypothetical, *i.e.*, the form with two terms, is the true form of the Hypothetical Judgment.

## I.

Before we attempt to prove our first position—that hypotheticals with more than two terms are not Judgments but abridged



inferences,—mention must be made of some Logicians who seem to have felt the inferential character of the relation expressed by the hypothetical. Mill, for example, explicitly characterises that relation as one of ‘inferribility’ (*Logic*, Bk. I, Ch. IV, Sec. 3); and Miss Constance Jones calls the Hypotheticals by the name of ‘inferential propositions!’ But the important fact remains that none of them could rise above the idea that these hypotheticals are propositions or have attempted to show that they are inferences.

(A). We shall first take up the hypothetical with three terms—‘If A is B, then A is C.’ This hypothetical form is really an Enthymeme, an abridged Mono-Syllogism, the omitted premise being ‘B is C.’ This omitted premise being supplied the Mono-syllogism would stand thus :

If A is B,—antecedent (*i.e.*, given premise)  
and     B is C,—suppressed premise  
then     A is C,—Consequent, *i.e.*, given conclusion.

It is by the omission of the premise ‘B is C’ that the above Syllogism, has been made into the hypothetical “If A is B, then A is C.” But the truth of the omitted premise is really necessary for the truth of the hypothetical; for if we suppose that premise as false, *i.e.*, if it be true instead that ‘B is not C,’ then this proposition “B is not C,” combined with ‘A is B’ the given antecedent, would form an argument in Celarent, giving us the conclusion ‘A is not C,’ exactly the opposite of what the given consequent is; thus :

If A is B, the antecedent, *i.e.*, given premise,  
and     B is not C, falsity of the omitted premise,  
then,     A is not C.

(B) The hypothetical with four terms, ‘If A is B, then C is D,’ is no favourite with our logicians. Bosanquet, for example, characterises this form as being “a broken-backed sequence in which no point of unity is formally recognised between the antecedent and the consequent.” (*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 251.) But this so-called “broken-backedness” of this form is really due to the fact that this hypothetical form, unlike the hypothetical with three terms, is not the form of an abridged Mono-syllogism, but that of a Sorites or abridged Poly-syllogism; this abridged Poly-syllogism

really consists of two Mono-syllogisms but in this abridged form only one premise of the Pro-syllogism and the conclusion of the Epi-syllogism are given and all the other necessary members stand suppressed. When restored to its full form, this abridged Poly-syllogism will assume one or other of the following forms of Sorites :

(a) *Goclenian Form* :

If B is D,—one suppressed premise,  
and A is B,—given antecedent,  
and C is A,—another suppressed premise,  
then C is D,—given consequent.

(b) *Aristotelian Form* :

If C is A (i)  
and A is B,  
and B is D (ii)  
then C is D.

It will be seen from either of the above two forms, that it is by the omission of the two premises, ' C is A ' and ' B is D,' that the Sorites has been transformed into the hypothetical, "if A is B, then C is D." But both these suppressed premises are absolutely necessary for the truth of the hypothetical; for if any one of these two be false, the truth of the hypothetical cannot be established. For example, if we suppose that ' B is not D ' and substitute this for ' B is D ' in the above Sorites, the conclusion that will follow is ' C is not D,' instead of ' C is D,' the given consequent. This can be exhibited by analysing the Sorites into its two constituent Syllogisms, thus :—

(i) B is not D	(ii) A is not D
A is B	C is A
therefore, A is not D.	therefore, C is not D.

We have attempted above to exhibit the hypotheticals with three and four terms as forms of abridged Syllogisms. But it may be objected *against* our conclusion that in these hypotheticals the so-called given premise, *viz.*, the antecedent, is not actually given as true, but only the possibility of being given as true, is suggested. Whereas in a real inference, the premise, rightly or wrongly, is accepted as true. The Premise of an inference asserts

that "A is B", while the hypothetical merely says "if A is B." But to raise this objection would really bespeak the forgetting of the "hypothetically necessary character" of inference. To assert (on whatever grounds) that the premise is true, is no part of the act of inference from that premise. To see that the conclusion "follows," if the premise be given as true, is what constitutes the essence of inference; and that exactly is what the hypothetical form ('If the antecedent, then the consequent') symbolises. The objection which we have tried to meet here, has actually been suggested by some. In a controversy with myself, Professor Krishna Ch. Bhattachārjee, M.A., P.R.S., suggests that "Even if a hypothetical like 'If A is B, then A is C' has its implications developed into 'If A is B, and B is C, then A is C,' there is still a difference from inference, the true form of which, I think, is 'As A is B, and B is C, therefore A is C.'" Similar seems to have been the idea of Bosanquet also; for, speaking of the hypothetical judgment he says "the ground *per se* is not affirmed of Reality, and so the consequent *per se* is not affirmed to be true. The moment that 'if' passes into 'because,' you can omit the ground and affirm the consequent *per se*. But retaining the 'if,' we cannot affirm the consequent. We cannot affirm upon mere supposition, nor can we infer without affirming." (Logic, Vol. II., p. 11.) It is in the implication of the last sentence,—that we cannot infer without affirming,—that Bosanquet's error lies. That the consequent or conclusion is affirmed is of course the outcome of two steps, viz., (i) *affirmation* of the ground, and (ii) cognising that between the suggested ground and the suggested conclusion there actually exists that "peculiar relation" in which the adequate premise in a valid inference stands to the conclusion thereof. But I submit that it is in the second step *i.e.*, in cognising the existence of this "peculiar relation" between the ground-content and the conclusion-content that the inferential activity consists. The hypothetical form 'if antecedent, then consequent' expresses the existence of this very relation between the two contents and as such it is the form of inference.

I have stated above that the usual hypothetical forms (with 3 or 4 terms) are the forms of abridged inferences; but that is be-

cause in these usual forms the antecedent which occupies the place of the ground, explicitly states but a part of that ground. If the full ground is to be stated in the antecedent, the hypothetical form would still be adequate to express the relation of ground and consequent; but in that case the ordinary symbolic representation of these forms, will have to be slightly modified; for example, instead of the usual form 'If A is B, then A is C' (wherein only part of the ground is stated in the antecedent) we shall have the form 'If A is B and B is C, then A is C.' This will give the full ground in the antecedent and yet would continue to be hypothetical in form.

In confirmation of our point—that the common hypotheticals are but inferences—we shall briefly refer to one useful result that would follow from the acceptance of our view. The question is being debated among living logicians: Whether the hypotheticals admit of negative quality. Those who advocate a negative hypothetical assert that "it is when the connection of the apodasis with the protasis is denied that the proposition is negative" (Welton's *Manual*, Vol. I, Sec. 78). But can that connexion be denied through the hypothetical form? The hypothetical form with a negative consequent clause ('If A is B, then A is not C') is adduced as the example of the negative Hypothetical; now, surely it is not a statement of the denial of connexion between 'A is B' and 'A is C,' but that of the affirmation of connexion between 'A is B' and 'A is not C.' Professor Krishnachandra Bhattāchārjee has urged a different consideration in support of the negative hypothetical. He admits "that the hypothetical proposition always expresses dependence: it never expresses non-dependence;" but contends that "the dispute here really turns on whether the quality of the dependence is affected by the quality of the consequent" and says that "the dependence changes in quality, i.e., fundamentally in meaning when the consequent is negative." (*Vide* his paper on "*the Place of the Indefinite in Logic*," read before Calcutta Phil. Society.)

But his whole point seems to us to be based on a misconception of the real function of the hypothetical. Even if we admit that "the dependence changes in quality when the consequent is negative" that will surely not affect the nature of the hypotheti-

cal; since the function of the hypothetical is to express the *fact* of dependence and not the kind or *quality* of dependence. Thus the hypothetical can in no sense be negative. But this does not establish that the hypotheticals are, therefore, affirmative; but rather disproves that also. For it is an easy argument from the conception of relativity that what does not admit of the possibility or capacity of being negative, cannot truly be described as affirmative even. The solution of this *impasse* will be found in the fact that distinctions of quality are not applicable to an act of inference, and the hypothetical form is a form of inference.

Remembering that one way of making one's view surer, is to be able to refute rival views, we shall here take up and examine some of the more important views regarding the nature of the hypothetical that are now current in the Logical world.

(a) It is a common enough definition of the hypothetical that it is a proposition in which a predication is made under a 'condition.' The first remark to be made on it is that in this description a confusion is being made between the hypothetical as a whole and the consequent which is but an element of it. It is the consequent, and not the hypothetical as a whole that may be said to be asserted under a 'condition.' In the hypothetical as a whole, consisting of the antecedent and the consequent taken together, "a peculiar relation" as Alfred Sidgwick puts it, "is categorically asserted between them" (*Elementary Logic*, Part I, Chap. III, Sec. 15). The second objection is that, even with regard to the consequent, the antecedent is not a 'condition' of it, in the usual sense of the term condition as a limitation, or restriction, or *sine qua non*. For it is not intended to assert that, for the consequent to be true, the antecedent must needs be true; as even a tyro in Logic knows, to say this is to commit the fallacy of 'denying the antecedent.' The antecedent part of the hypothetical is, therefore, unfortunately called the "conditional" clause. (If the word condition is to be retained at all in the definition of the hypothetical, it is the consequent which really should be looked upon as the 'condition' of the antecedent; for it is the antecedent that cannot be true unless the consequent is so). The view just criticised—first clearly propounded by Wolff—is the most widely ac-

cepted even now. But the obvious falsity of this view seems to be in strange contrast with so wide an acceptance of it.

(b) But there are some among our Logicians who have not accepted this common interpretation of the hypothetical. For example, both Sigwart and Bosanquet hold that "the hypothetical tells us that the antecedent and the consequent are related to each other as ground and consequence" (Sigwart, *Logic*, Vol. I, Sec. 36). That is, the antecedent, according to them, does not state a condition (as in the ordinary view) but a reason or a *cause cognoscendi* whose truth will justify our belief in the truth of the consequent. One seems to be justified in thinking that, by calling the antecedent the ground and the consequent the consequence, Sigwart and Bosanquet mean that the hypothetical states the relation between the reason and the conclusion in an act of inference. But they fail to arrive at this right conclusion by holding that the component parts of the hypothetical,—the antecedent and the consequent—are not at the moment intended as Judgments. As Sigwart puts it they are "mere hypothesis," "propositions which are merely assumed." (*Logic*, pp. 219-221.) Bosanquet's language is substantially the same: "its parts are not judgments," he explicitly says in his *Essentials of Logic* (p. 115). But Bosanquet is not consistent with himself; though he declares the parts of the hypothetical as "not judgments," yet, he says elsewhere, "you can only suppose an antecedent, you cannot suppose a consequent; the consequent must be judged, not supposed" (*Logic*, Vol. II, Bk. I, Ch. vi, p. 288). The truth is that the antecedent is not a supposition any more than the consequent is; they are both of them judgments though none of them is affirmed; and the hypothetical merely expresses the existence of a "peculiar relation" between the two judgments, viz., that the truth of one of them (*i.e.*, of the antecedent) is the ground of the inference of the truth of the other (*i.e.*, the consequent).

(c) Dr. Venn's view also deserves notice. Venn connects the hypotheticals with doubt or uncertainty. According to him, "the condition of things here referred to is that in which we know that two elements are connected together but are uncertain about the presence or occurrence at the time being, of the first

member of such connection '' (*Empirical Logic*, Ch. X, p. 249). But how would we express that relation between the two elements if there is no uncertainty? Venn has said " Were all known with certainty, we should say ' the wind will change to the south, *and* it will become milder ' '' (*Ibid*, p. 252). But this really misses the point : we may be certain of the truth of the antecedent and that of the consequent; but the question is how shall we state the relation between the two truths or certainties? The form " the wind will change to the south *and* it will become milder " may be adequate for expressing the two truths or certainties, but it surely does not state the connection or relation between them; and it is the function of the hypothetical form to express this relation.

## II.

Thus far we have dealt with hypotheticals consisting of 3 or 4 distinct terms and have tried to show that they are abridged syllogisms. The hypothetical with two terms, *i.e.*, " If A is, then B is," now remains to be examined. With our Logicians this presents no separate problem and, therefore, receive no separate treatment; and they come to this position through two steps : (i) first, they look upon this form as an abbreviation in which letters ' A ' and ' B ' stand for clauses; and (ii) secondly, they think that, since ' A ' stands for some proposition (like S is M) and ' B ' for another (like S is P or X is Y) this hypothetical form with two terms is simply reducible to one or other of the two more complex hypothetical forms previously dealt with. But, is it necessary to look upon this hypothetical form (If A is, then B is) as an abbreviation where ' A ' and ' B ' must always stand looked upon as symbols for judgments, can we say that this form for judgments? And, further, even when ' A ' and ' B ' are is nothing distinct from the other two forms?

The possibility of looking upon ' A ' and ' B ' as symbols for judgments must be admitted; for, as terms, they may stand for Judgments as much as for anything else. (i) This possibility, however, leaves it open to us to interpret the terms ' A ' and ' B ' differently also; that is, we may where necessary, take them as

standing for things or attributes, instead of Judgments. For instance, the hypothetical form 'If A is, B is' may be the symbolic representation for 'If smoke is, fire is,' where 'A' stands for smoke and 'B' for fire. (ii) But even when the terms 'A' and 'B' are interpreted as standing for judgments this form is not reducible to any of the other two forms; for in the form 'If A is, B is' a connexion is being asserted between the existence of 'A' and the *existence* of 'B'; so that the hypothetical form 'If A is, B is' means "the existence of 'A' is the ground of the existence of 'B.'" If 'A' and 'B' be taken to stand for judgments, the hypothetical will mean "the *existence* of the judgment 'A' (say S is M) is the ground of the *existence* of the judgment 'B' (say S is P)." But this is not the significance of any of the two complex forms; both of them express connexion between judgments no doubt; but they assert it as between the truth of the judgment 'A' and the *truth* of the judgment 'B,' and not between their *existences*. The complex hypothetical of either form means the *truth* of the antecedent judgment is the ground of the *truth* of the consequent judgment. Thus the difference between the meaning of the simple hypothetical, "If A is, B is" and that of either of the complex form is radical. Hence as conveying a distinct meaning, the form 'If A is, B is' must be recognised as distinct and not simply reduced to the other forms.

The importance of the recognition of this form as distinct from the other forms, presses on us indeed from different sides: (a) it is now a commonplace of Logic that universal judgments belong to two distinct groups, the empirically universal, *i.e.*, enumerative universal, and the unconditionally universal. Two distinctive forms of expression are required for these two kinds of universal judgments. Retaining the categorical form (like all S is P) for the empirically universal judgment only, Sigwart and others have proposed the hypothetical form in order to express the unconditional universal judgment. Now this hypothetical form which is required for the expression of the unconditionally universal, cannot surely be one of the more complex forms of the hypothetical; for the complex form, admittedly, is a compound of two categoricals; and it would be a self-defeating procedure to attempt to reduce a simple categorical judgment to a compound



of two categoricals. If, therefore, the unconditionally universal (like matter gravitates) is to be reduced, as it must, to the hypothetical form, we must recognise the simple hypothetical of the form 'If A is, B is,' as distinct and independent.

(b) Alfred Sidgwick is developing a new basis of distinction between the hypothetical and the categorical. "A proposition" he says, "is made hypothetical or categorical by its function in a syllogism; the major premise, as such, being hypothetical and the minor premise, as such, categorical" (*Elementary Logic*, Part I, Ch. III, Sec. 15). Now, although we do not agree with all that Mr. Sidgwick is here contending for, we do admit that the major of the so-called categorical syllogism is better expressed in the hypothetical form; for, in the typical categorical syllogism, the major must be a true or unconditionally universal proposition, and as we have seen above, an unconditionally universal proposition is best expressed through the hypothetical form. But our contention, here is that the hypothetical; which is thus to serve as the major, cannot be a complex hypothetical with 3 or 4 terms; for that is a form in which a connexion is expressed of one proposition to another, whereas, for the major premise, we require a hypothetical that would express a connexion between (major and middle) terms. The distinction that we want to draw will be understood if the difference be realised between (i) the relation that exists between the middle term and the major, and (ii) what exists between the premise and the conclusion thereof. "If the premise then the conclusion"—this is the form of inferential relation, symbolised by the complex hypothetical, like, "If A is B, then C is D;" "if the middle, then the major"—this is the form of the relation of ground and consequence or implication symbolised by the form 'If A is, B is.'

We have attempted to show above that the simple hypothetical form 'If A is, then B is' cannot be simply reduced to any of the complex forms but must be recognised as distinct. Dr. Keynes also felt the need of making a distinction among the hypotheticals. As he puts it, "Propositions commonly written in the form, 'If A is B, C is D' belong to two very different types" (*Formal Logic*, Part ii, Ch. IX, Sec. 173). One type he calls conditional and the other pure hypothetical. The distinction

that he draws between them is similar to the distinction that we have asserted as existing between the simple hypothetical 'If A is, B is' and the complex hypotheticals. In his own words, in the conditional, what is affirmed is "a connexion between phenomena," whereas in the case of the pure hypotheticals "a relation may be affirmed between the truth of two judgments as holding good once and for all." Such radically different types of hypotheticals require different symbolic forms for their expression. Dr. Keynes also felt this need; but he failed to supply them required different forms. "It is impossible," he says, "formally to distinguish between conditionals and hypotheticals, so long as we keep to the expression 'If A is B, C is D,' since this may be either the one or the other." But why we should keep to this one form 'If A is B, C is D,' alone, no reason is given. Indeed Keynes ought to have seen that this form with its two clauses, is fit to represent only a compound proposition, like his pure hypothetical; whereas, for the conditional, we require a form which would represent a simple judgment; and that form can only be the simple hypothetical, 'If A is, B is.'

We shall conclude by shortly summing up our positions: we tried to show that the complex hypothetical forms, *i.e.*, those with 3 or 4 terms are abridged Syllogisms, the one with 3 terms being an abridged Monosyllogism, and the other with 4 terms, an abridged Polysyllogism. But the simple hypothetical form with two terms, cannot be reduced to either of the complex forms, in as much as it expresses a connexion between *existences* and not between *truths*. As expressing the connexion between existences, it is unlike the complex forms, a form of judgment and not a form of abridged inference; and it is the form which supplies the best expression to the unconditionally universal judgments and serves as the major premise of the so-called categorical syllogisms.

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# THE STARTING-POINT OF LOGIC

BY

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I. It is often asked, and it ought to be asked just on the threshold of any logical enquiry, what is the starting-point of the science of Logic? Some Logicians begin with some axioms and postulates, on the strength of their universal acceptance. But dispute has ranged round these principles. A determinate principle, as Prof. K. C. Bhattachārjee maintains, is always disputable. Now quite in recent times Prof. Surendralal Kundu of M. C. College, Sylhet, seeks to controvert. Prof. Bhattachārjee's position by showing that it is not true that whatever is "determinate is necessarily disputable."\* He contends "There is at least one principle, which is determinate, and is yet not disputable; hence it is not necessary that the starting-point of Logic must be indeterminate."†

"There is a judgment, of which the content is no other than the existence of judgment, *i.e.*, if that judgment is that 'Judgment exists,' it is beyond dispute for the admitted existence of that judgment becomes itself the reality, with which its content, (*viz.*, existence of judgment) can agree and thereby become true."‡ So as we see Prof. Kundu suggests that the judgment "judgment exists," is determinate, and at the same time beyond dispute for it is made true by the very act of passing that judgment. "Judgment exist," then, is no axiom, or postulate; but is really the presuppositionless self-validating presupposition of Logic. But is it

\* *Place of the Indefinite in Logic*, by Prof. K. C. Bhattachārjee, read before the Calcutta Philosophical Society in the year 1915.

† The paper entitled "*The Presupposition of Logic*," read before the second Indian Philosophical Congress, 1926.

‡ *Ibid*,

really the case? Cannot one dispute the judgment, " Judgment exists?"

II. It cannot be asserted even with a semblance of truth that philosophical thinkers are unanimous with regard to the sense of judgment, as a sort of mental operation; and one who explains all the phases of our life, in terms of action, may dispute Prof. Kundu's seemingly irrefragable judgment, " Judgment exists " and may maintain that there is nothing like judgment but only modes of action. Here I am not considering the truth or otherwise of Prof. Kundu's position. I am simply pointing out that his position cannot be taken as being beyond dispute. To dispute something does not necessarily mean that something is false. But it is not so easy to rule out dispute from the domain of Philosophy. In a sense dispute will cling to us, so long as we cling to philosophical thinking. Philosophy is after all an individual product, and as such is the expression of a personality under the cumulative effect of the cultural atmosphere, he breathes in. As individuals are empirically diverse, their expressions must necessarily diverge. But disputation presupposes one common notion, the notion of self-conviction and the principle of contradiction. Every philosopher is convinced that his system of thought, is entitled to the full claim of truth, and dispute arises, when one system contradicts the other. But as there is dispute, so also there is affinity amongst philosophers; and that affinity depends on the affinity of culture and spirit. So as long as we are in the domain of speculation, we cannot get rid of dispute.

Further the judgment, " Judgment exists " is not so simple as Prof. Kundu takes it to be. It presupposes at least two things, *viz.*, the notion of judgment as a distinctive phase of our mental life and the notion of truth, as agreement with reality. " When we talk of the truth of a judgment," says Prof. Kundu " we really mean the truth of its content. Now truth means agreement with reality, and to dispute the truth of a judgment, is to deny or doubt the existence of a reality which is in agreement with the content of that judgment, the existence of that judgment, however being admitted."\* Now in the case of the judgment, " Judgment

\* *The Presupposition of Logic,*

exists," the reality with which the content is to agree does not fall apart from it. So the content and the reality, in the case of the judgment, "Judgment exists," are said to coalesce, thus precluding the possibility of the judgment being falsified,—which is made true by the very act of passing that judgment. Here we find that Prof. Kundu's position presupposes the concept of truth as agreement with reality. But the concept of truth is much debated amongst Logicians. So it cannot be taken in any of its forms, uncriticised, in order to support the said foundation-stone of the logical science. Further "Judgment exists" presupposes the notion of judgment, *i.e.*, an ideal content, meaning or referring to the act of judging, and when we judge "Judgment exists," there is at least the distinction between the act of judging and the content of judgment. In Dr. Lloyd Morgan's phraseology, there is the distinction between "minding" and "minded."\* What is 'minded' here is the notion of judgment, and 'minding' is the act of asserting "Judgment exists." So the content of the judgment is not merged in its existence; and the truth of the judgment is not so self-evident, on the contrary truth or otherwise of the judgment, hinges on the analysis of the notion of judgment. Without determining beforehand, what constitutes the quintessence of judgment, we cannot decide this way or that with regard to the judgment "Judgment exists." Above all the judgment "Judgment exists," owes its origin to abstraction in the Logician's mind from the common experience. Ordinary men are not conscious of their judging activity as a distinctive mental operation. It is brought to light only by the introspective analysis of our experience by a developed and cultured mind. So the judgment "Judgment exists" presupposes previous prolific fund of experience which involves judgments, for it is not credible that the notion of judgment descends from heaven along a "high priori" road to a Logician's brain. Hence the judgment "Judgment exists" cannot be true "by the very act of passing that judgment." The judgment in order to be true presupposes, as we have seen, more than one thing and as such, is not entitled to the paramount importance Prof. Kundu assigns to it.

\* *Emergent Evolution*, Chap. II, p. 39. Dr. Morgan uses "minding" in its wide import, but judging activity does not fall outside it,

III. Thus far we have not clarified the main issue with which we began. Let us now consider whether we can hit upon something far more primary and presuppositionless than Prof. Kundu's principle, *viz.*, "Judgment exists" which can be taken as the proper starting-point of Logic. It cannot be shown why the science of Logic should begin with this or that particular judgment. Logic must begin with something without which it cannot begin at all. But the question is, what is that thing without which it cannot begin? Whatever else may be said of our conscious life, this much we can safely assert that we are essentially knowing beings. Our conscious life begins, with some mode of knowing, however inchoate it may be. But that we are essentially knowing beings, may *prima facie*, sound as an assumption. But what is an assumption? An assumption is something which we begin with only to suit some purpose of ours. An assumption, as such, one may proceed with, and another may not only dispute, but also *dispense with*. Now let us see whether the "fact of our knowing" smacks of the nature of an assumption. Of course, I am not concerned, at this stage, with such questions as trouble the idealists and the realists. I am not to determine here, whether the things or objects which constitute the contents of knowledge, are merely ideas or images, or independent entities, existing without any regard to our consciousness or knowledge. I do not claim that 'the fact that we know,' is beyond dispute. One is at liberty to dispute this principle. A sceptic may argue that the much-vaunted "fact of our knowing" is a chimera. There exists nothing, nor is there the fact of our knowing. But it will sound paradoxical to assert that the dispute of the sceptic merely corroborates my contention. The sceptic disputes the fact of our knowing only by overlooking that he, in his dispute, asserts the very act of his disputation; for if he disputes, he at least, apprehends the fact of his disputation and that he disputes. So the "fact of knowing or knowledge," he may dispute, but he cannot dispense with. Still it may seem that I have not yet gained my point. One may argue that the starting-point I propose cannot be anything but an assumption; for I begin with it, without demonstrating it. But it must be remembered that the "fact of our knowing" does not require demonstration nor is it capable of any

demonstration. "It is impossible" as Aristotle puts it, "that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything; there would be infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration."\* If we are to demonstrate our conscious life and for the matter of that, the "fact of our knowing" we must fall back on something else outside our conscious life in order to demonstrate it. But it is far more difficult to outstep our conscious life than to dispense with one's shadow. One may still contend that we need not go beyond our consciousness; we must get something within it to demonstrate our starting-point. But in that case we must know the demonstrating principle, before we demonstrate the fact of our knowing; and this is really a vicious circle. Thus we find that the fact of our knowing is not capable of demonstration. It rather stands self-demonstrated. The fact that we know is given, and if we deny it we cannot begin at all. We are then led to out-and-out scepticism which stands on a *vacuum*. Hence the fact of our knowing or knowledge, which I propose as the proper starting-point of Logic, is the most primary, involving the least of presupposition.

IV. Every science presupposes its subject-matter. It is not that we get the conception of a particular science beforehand, and then seek out the object or objects of its enquiry. So we cannot have the conception of the science of Logic *a priori* and then tax our brain to find out its proper objective concern. The proper starting-point and for the matter of that the proper subject-matter of Logic is given. There is the fact of "our knowing." To deny or doubt it is to deny or doubt our conscious life—a position which we have examined and have found to be self-contradictory and suicidal. There is a peculiarity about the "fact of knowing" namely that it is self-validating. To deny it is to assert it. There is such a fact as knowledge, and the human mind seeks to study it systematically. The systematic study of this fact of knowing or knowledge constitutes the proper scope of the science of Logic. "The fact that we know" is a determinate principle with an indeterminate depth, to begin with. But the modes of our knowing are not revealed to us just in the

\* *Metaphysics*, Ed. by J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, Book V, Chap. IV, 1006 a.



beginning. It is, by a systematic reflection and analysis that they are brought to light. It is incumbent on the science of Logic to dig up the *prima facie* indeterminate depth of the fact of our knowing, and to discover the treasures, if there be any.

Logic is to study the forms and function of knowledge. It is traditionally held that Logic is concerned only with functions and not with the structures of knowledge. The analysis of the structure of knowledge is relegated to Psychology. But in the case of knowledge, we can hardly separate the structure from function, for knowledge is not like a dead bone, but like a living tissue. So the analysis of structure involves the analysis of function. Logical study will be a "dynamic analysis and no enumerative classification."\* "In the systematic activity of thought," says Dr. Bosanquet," contrast between bodily shape and vital process is non-existent.....The form of thought is a living function, and the phases and moments of the function are varieties and elements of this form. Therefore the Morphology of knowledge must be construed as not excluding the Physiology of thought. The science of intellectual forms includes the science of intellectual life."†

\* Dr. Bosanquet. Introduction, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 1.

† *Ibid.*

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# THE SOURCE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF VALIDITY

BY

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The object of this short paper is to discuss briefly the epistemological problem,—“ How the validity of a piece of knowledge is known.” There are three problems about knowledge which though very closely connected, should be critically distinguished. They are :—

- (1) How the content of a knowledge is obtained?
- (2) What constitutes the truth or validity of that content  
(or for the matter of that, the truth of the knowledge)?
- (3) How that truth or validity of the knowledge is again known?

In the present article we confine our enquiry only to the last problem.\*

It is best to begin with the common sense view on the matter, which seems to be most obvious.

The ordinary view is, that the validity of a knowledge—whether derived from a perception or inference or testimony—has to be known through an inference based on some foreign data. As for instance, I perceive a distant tree. In order to know that this perceptual knowledge is valid, I may go near the tree myself or consult a person coming from near the tree and from the data of the second perception, or the testimony of the other observer, I may infer the validity of my first knowledge *i.e.*, perception. Similarly, when I want to know whether a particular inference of mine is valid, I observe the data and examine the process of reasoning and finding that the data are correct and the reasoning does not

\* For a fuller discussion of the distinction between the first and the third problems reference may be made to an article of the writer, entitled “ *Testimony as a method of knowledge* ” published in the *Mind*, July, 1927.

violate the laws of correct thinking, I infer that my original inference is valid. In the case of testimony, there is a similar validating inference based on another testimony or perception. On all hands, therefore, the obvious conclusion seems to be, that the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge is obtained through another process of knowledge which is an inference based on some other data.

This solution of the problem is easy and direct, and it would have been a pleasure if our inquiry would have ended here. But a closer analysis of this solution reveals some puzzling difficulties which do not allow us to rest satisfied with it. Let us consider these difficulties.

According to the solution we have stated above, the validity of a knowledge, say, K, is to be ascertained through another knowledge, say, K'. If so, how do we know that K', on the strength of which I know K to be valid, is itself a valid piece of knowledge? Consistency with the solution offered above will demand that the validity of K' also has to be established through a third validating inference, say K" and the validity of that again by a fourth, K'" and so on *ad infinitum*. We are thus faced with an infinite regress and we have to turn back baffled in our quest for an undoubted ground—a *terra firma*—from which to start.

There is only one way out of this difficulty. The infinite regress can be avoided by saying that the validity of the validating knowledge, K', has not itself to be established separately by another knowledge K"; in other words, that the knowledge, K', may be self-certified, *i.e.*, its validity may be self-evident, being inherent in the knowledge itself. It is a welcome solution; but to admit it is to forsake the theory it wanted to save. For, if we grant self-evidence to the validity of K', we have no reason to deny it to the validity of K, as the validating knowledge has no claim to preferential treatment. If so, the truth of the original knowledge being also self-evident, the theory that validity of a knowledge has to be externally ascertained becomes quite useless.

It would appear thus that, when subjected to close scrutiny, the theory of the ascertainment of the validity of a knowledge through a foreign source does not stand. It has to make room for the theory that the validity of a knowledge is self-evident. But

has this latter view any other grounds for its acceptance? And is it also free from all difficulties? Unless we consider these two questions thoroughly, we cannot judge the strength of this view. For, till then we cannot say if, like the other theory, this theory also, while possessing certain advantages, does not contain difficulties which may ultimately necessitate its rejection.

Let us take up the first of these two questions. If we refer to the experience of our daily life, we find that we implicitly believe in the truth of our knowledge, whether it is derived from perception, inference or testimony, unless there are positive grounds for doubt or disbelief, in which case there is no knowledge at all. Scarcely in one out of a thousand cases do we take the help of a validating inference. Life itself would have been impossible if in every case of our knowledge, we had to pause for its external certification before we acted upon it. In reality however, as soon as we perceive a thing, form an inference or hear a person say something, we confidently act on the information obtained thereby. The verdict of our daily experience, then (barring the few cases of doubt or disbelief—which are no cases of knowledge at all)—goes to support the theory that the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge is inherent in the original knowledge itself, in other words that every knowledge certifies for its own truth; validity, therefore, is self-evident.

An objection, however, may be raised against this line of argument. It may be said, that we have been confusing here a mere psychological belief with logical certainty. Every knowledge carries, of course, an element of belief. But this belief does not amount to knowledge of validity, which has to be logically ascertained through an inference. If this objection be valid, then, the verdict of common experience cannot be construed to support the view of self-evidence. So, we have to consider the matter carefully. It is true that there is a valuable distinction between mere psychological belief and logical certainty, in so far as “psychological belief” is understood to mean merely subjective belief without any objective warrant and “logical certainty” means certainty based on some objective warrant. But this distinction does not affect the case under consideration. The belief that we find in our know-

ledge, as derived from perception, inference or testimony, is not merely subjective (like a belief in ghosts and goblins)—it comes to us under the constraint of objective conditions which make knowledge possible. Whenever the pressure of objective forces is relaxed, we are forthwith invaded with doubts or disbelief and neither belief nor knowledge is then to be found. To illustrate, when we perceive an object in the dark, make an inference from uncriticised data, listen to a story-teller—in short whenever there is some deviation from the normal conditions under which knowledge takes place—belief, as well as knowledge, is automatically suspended or forsaken and we have doubt or disbelief in its stead. So we find that the initial belief that is inherent in every knowledge, worth the name, is not merely subjective, it is objectively conditioned. But if by ‘logical certainty’ is meant ‘certainty’ inferentially arrived at, we must admit that such ‘certainty’ is absent in the initial belief, we have been speaking about. We must say, however, that it is not at all necessary that knowledge of validity must be inferentially obtained. There is no reason whatever, why we should make a fetish of inference seeing that it also has to depend in its turn on non-inferential data and is also as liable to error as any other method of knowledge.

But it may be asked, “Supposing that knowledge of validity is inherent in the original knowledge itself, does not an additional inference proving the validity, already known, enhance the feeling of certainty and is not the inference really valuable therefore?”

It has to be admitted, in reply, that a validating inference does surely increase the feeling of certainty, and belief in the truth of a knowledge is more strengthened. But there is no maximum limit to this subjective feeling of certainty, as adducement of confirmatory arguments, resulting in an ever-increasing firmness of belief, may go on for ever. The process of testing truth is never final, according to any of the theories of ‘correspondence,’ ‘coherence,’ and ‘consilience.’ And if we were to depend for the knowledge of validity on external confirmatory tests, it would be impossible for us to say at what stage of this never-ending process of confirmation we have got this knowledge. As the subjective feeling of certainty is present in some degree or other, from the very initial stage of knowledge onwards, we cannot make know-

ledge of validity peculiar to any particular stage, without arbitrarily specifying the degree of certainty that is required of this knowledge. If knowledge of validity is possible at any later stage it is possible also at the initial one, where belief in knowledge (or feeling of certainty) makes its first appearance. The position will be more clear if we look at the logical aspect of the thing. The judgment of validity based on the knowledge of validity of a knowledge is :—"This knowledge is true." This judgment is the same, whether based on the implicit belief of the initial stage or on the explicit and strengthened belief at any later stage. Though our mental attitude attending this judgment may undergo an ever-increasing process of certainty, the judgment remains the same, its predicate does not change to ' truer ' or ' truest.'

Moreover as the feeling of certainty can only be increased and never made complete by adducing as many confirmatory arguments as we like and consequently as the liability to error also can only be decreased and never altogether removed, the only way in which we can characterise our knowledge, even after it has passed through the confirmatory ordeals, will be to say that it is *not yet* contradicted. But this characteristic of non-contradiction is present even at the initial stage of knowledge, before it is externally corroborated.

It should be noted in this connection that the initial belief attending a knowledge is not always consciously split up in the form of an explicit judgment of the form :—"This knowledge is true," just as a knowledge, say of a perception, is not always attended with the corresponding perceptual judgment. But the meaning of the belief, when analysed, is known to be nothing but belief in the truth of the knowledge. And had it not been some form of the knowledge of validity, our confident actions immediately following our knowledge in daily life would have been impossible. A judgment of validity *can* therefore always express the initial belief though it *does* not always do so.

Still one more objection has yet to be answered regarding the source of the belief. It may be asked " According to your own confession, the belief that is initially present in a knowledge is not merely subjective, as it is objectively conditioned. When for instance you perceive a tree, your belief in the perception is forced

on you by the existence of conditions like unobstructed medium, good eye-sight, sufficient light etc., which make the knowledge possible and the absence of which gives rise to doubt or disbelief. Can we not say, therefore, that this initial belief itself is the result of an inference from the existence of these conditions?"

In reply to this important objection we may say that knowledge (as distinct from a mere subjective freak) is surely caused by some objective conditions; and the belief that is inherent in such a knowledge is also not merely subjective, being caused by the very same conditions that cause the knowledge and not by any other additional or external conditions. If, we are to think that belief here is the result of an inference from these conditions, then we shall have to admit also that the knowledge itself is obtained through an inference from its originating conditions, as, knowledge and belief emerge together and knowledge minus belief cannot stand. We hope nobody will be prepared to go to that absurd length. But even apart from that, if the belief were the result of an inference we would have been directly aware of such an inference taking place. But such evidence of consciousness is absent. We do not also see any reason which would compel us indirectly to infer the existence of an unconscious inference responsible for belief, neither have we any data which would make such inference possible. So we do not find any reason for thinking that the initial belief is caused by inference; on the contrary there is strong evidence to show that this belief is immediate and direct.

The foregoing arguments go to uphold, then, the theory that every act of knowledge stands self-certified; that the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge, therefore, is immediately given in the original knowledge itself. But this theory has got two important difficulties which must be satisfactorily answered before we can finally accept it.

The first difficulty is :—If validity is self-evident, how do you explain the desire for further corroboration of a knowledge? To this we may say, that the desire for corroboration is not necessarily a desire for the knowledge of validity, it may only be an indication of an attempt to secure greater subjective certainty by removing all possible doubts, that may obstruct knowledge itself. What is attained by external corroboration, is not the knowledge of validity

which is already obtained but the removal of possible sources of doubts.

The answer to the first question raises the second difficulty which may be stated thus :—“ Is the possibility of doubt or error compatible with the theory of self-evidence, as stated above?”

The reply is :—“ If the theory is rightly understood no such difficulty should arise. The theory of self-evidence does not make knowledge impervious to doubt or disbelief. It only states that so long as knowledge *remains as such*, its truth also is immediately known from it. But when that knowledge ceases to be, the quality of truth inherent in it must necessarily go also for want of a locus, without any harm to the theory of self-evidence. In ordinary cases there is an absence of the knowledge of conditions, that give rise to doubt or contradiction. But when such conditions come to our view, our knowledge necessarily ceases to be and makes room for doubt or disbelief. With the cessation of knowledge, the question of its validity becomes meaningless and illegitimate.”

It may be asked however—Is not doubt or disbelief a form of knowledge? Doubt is the knowledge that our knowledge is uncertain and disbelief is the knowledge that our knowledge is untrue. How can it be said, then, that doubt or disbelief puts an end to knowledge and therewith the question regarding the knowledge of its validity?

In reply we may say that even if we accept these equations, which are at once forced and doubtful, our position remains quite unaffected. Because, according to the statement, doubt is another knowledge ( $K''$ ) of which the original knowledge ( $K'$ ) is an object. So of disbelief. Consequently, the knowledge  $K''$  which represents doubt or disbelief replaces the original knowledge of validity, being asked with regard to the destroyed knowledge  $K'$ , (which is therefore gone). The question of the knowledge  $K'$ , remains meaningless as before.

We have thus answered the two objections raised against the immediacy of the knowledge of validity. But it is important to lay bare the fundamental misconception which lies at the root of all objections against this theory. It is the wrong notion that knowledge can stand independently of the question of validity; so that knowledge may first come to exist and its validity can after-



wards be ascertained from external sources or that knowledge may survive the disproof of its validity. As we have already shown, belief is an essential element of knowledge. The two emerge together, and if need be, they also disappear together. Belief implies nothing but the knowledge of the truth of a knowledge. It follows therefore that a knowledge must contain some awareness of its validity. The moment this awareness vanishes, knowledge also vanishes into doubt or disbelief. Without the awareness of its validity, knowledge would have lost the causal efficiency also which is so important a feature of its practical worth. The ordinary distinction of knowledge into true knowledge and false knowledge is a slipshod way of thinking. False knowledge is only a name for falsified knowledge which is no knowledge at all.

In conclusion we may sum up the results of this short enquiry. Every act of knowledge is attended with a belief. When this belief is absent or is withdrawn, we have a mental state which can no longer be called knowledge. The belief inherent in a knowledge is caused by the very same conditions which cause the knowledge itself. Now this belief is nothing but the awareness of the truth or validity of the knowledge. If so, knowledge of validity is not necessarily obtained through another act of knowledge, *i.e.*, an inference based on some external data. It is intrinsic to the knowledge itself. The knowledge of the validity of a knowledge, (K), need not necessarily be accompanied with or expressed in an explicit judgment like "This knowledge is true or valid"—any more than the original knowledge (K) need be accompanied with a corresponding self-conscious judgment like "I know" or "The object is known." On the contrary in the vast majority of cases in our daily life, we have no such conscious, explicit judgment expressing either a simple knowledge or the knowledge of the validity of that knowledge.

The ordinary view that the validity of a knowledge is known through some inference has to face, when logically pursued, an infinite regress, as the validity of the validating inference also has to be known, according to such a view, through a third knowledge and so on *ad infinitum*.

It is true that a corroborative inference is sometimes employed. That is done only when some cause for doubt or disbelief

comes to view. But it will be inaccurate in such cases, to say that the validity of one knowledge  $K'$ , is known through another knowledge  $K''$  (the validating inference). For as soon as  $K'$  is anyway doubted, it ceases to be a knowledge, it turns into a doubt. So in such cases, we do not know the validity of one knowledge through a second knowledge : we really replace a doubt by a knowledge. A so-called validating inference then does not lead to the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge ; it only removes the doubt which undermines a knowledge. When that doubt is removed, knowledge comes into existence under the force of the objective conditions which were formerly prevented by doubt from causing knowledge. The same conditions that cause knowledge, cause the belief in that knowledge, as well. In other words, the knowledge of validity, even in such cases, where the so-called validating inference is employed, is not caused by the inference ; it is caused by the conditions of the original knowledge itself and is ; therefore, inherent in it. We could think that the corroborative inference gives the knowledge of validity, only if removal of doubt (which is effected by the inference) were identical with the knowledge of validity, or if the non-existence of doubt were identical with knowledge. Though such an equation is often loosely made in common parlance, it does not stand scrutiny. The mere negative fact of the non-existence of doubt is not knowledge or knowledge of the truth of a knowledge. In such vacant states of the mind as deep sleep, there is the absence of doubts though there is no knowledge. Knowledge as well as the belief in that knowledge, requires some positive conditions to produce them.

From all these considerations, it is reasonable to conclude, then that the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge ( $K$ ) is inherent in that very knowledge ( $K$ ). This theory can successfully explain some of the most vital criticisms to which the alternative theory (namely, that validity is known through another knowledge, i.e., an inference) has to succumb.

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**SECTION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.**



# THE RÔLE OF FAITH IN VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY.

BY

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Philosophy in the West is known to have been under the yoke of authority during the middle ages. It was supposed that no one had a right to believe even his own senses and reason if these pointed to conclusions against the statements of the scriptures or the doctrines of Aristotle. When a certain scholastic philosopher heard a man speaking of some spots on the sun that he had seen, he is reported to have advised the man to clean his glasses and assured him that if he still saw the spots, they were in his eyes. They could not be on the sun as no reference to them was to be found in Aristotle. The atrocities committed by the Inquisition on persons who dared to hold opinions different from those of the Catholic Church are too well-known to need mention. Descartes in the sixteenth century led the revolt against this oppressive rule of authority in the world of thought and pressed the claims of private judgment and reasoning. He was succeeded by a long line of brilliant thinkers who tried to unravel the mystery of the universe by their own intellect, independently of any authority. But as late as the eighteenth century the German philosopher Kant was compelled by the State to suppress one of his books as it was supposed to be in conflict with the doctrines of the established religion. Even to-day there are voices of protest raised against the theory of evolution in America and England.

In India philosophers worked in a freer atmosphere. The Lokāyata, Jain and Buddhistic schools of philosophy could flourish and carry on their propaganda vigorously though their teachings were in conflict with those of the Vedic religion on many important points. Even within the fold of Hinduism there were schools like the Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Yoga which conformed to the dictates of

the Vedas in point of ritual but constructed their philosophies on the strength of their own experience and intellect. The Purva Mimāṃsā school considered its main business to bring together and reduce to consistency the dictates of the Vedas regarding the various sacrifices and professed to be a school of mere interpreters ; but the philosophical basis which they provided for these rites, *viz.*, their teachings about the nature of the Self and the constitution of the universe, came from their own reasonings. It is only the Vedānta or Uttara Mimāṃsā schools that profess to derive their philosophical doctrines wholly from the Upanishads and assign to their own intellect the humble rôle of interpreting and justifying the eternal and infallible utterances. They maintain that the ultimate reality which lies behind the phenomenal subjects and objects is beyond the reach of the senses (including mind) and hence also outside the province of inference ; for only things that have been perceived along with others can be inferred from them. The only source of information as regards the ultimate reality is the Śruti. Human utterances may be held untrustworthy on the ground that their authors may be deceiving, or else, themselves deceived ; but no sensuous or mental experience of ours can be allowed to contradict or even throw doubt on the words of the Vedas which are supremely authoritative in their own sphere (*viz.*, ritual and ultimate reality), being eternal and not composed either by God or Man. God is the first teacher in every Kalpa but not the author ; for He too only reproduces the words as He knew them in the previous Kalpa. We cannot ask what happened in the beginning of the first Kalpa ; for the cycle of Creation and Absorption can have no beginning and there must always have been a previous Kalpa. All our experiences and inferences which are inconsistent with the sacred doctrine are illusions. We must be prepared to part even with the belief that the sun, moon, stars, houses, even our bodies really exist if on a thorough and sound interpretation of the Upanishads it appears that they deny the existence of these things. Such unquestioning faith in the infallibility of these books is considered by the Vedāntists to be one of the necessary qualifications of the seeker after the ultimate truth. It may be said that it is in our hands to interpret these words and we may so interpret

them that they will not appear to be in contradiction with our experiences and as a matter of fact different interpretations have led to the formation of various Vedānta schools. But each of these claims to have ascertained the meaning of the Upanishads in the only legitimate way and according to the rule formulated by the Mimāṃsākas in the verse **उपक्रमोपसंहारा** etc., so that the words of the Upanishads interpreted by this rule may very well conflict with our ordinary beliefs. True that the Vedāntist makes an extensive use of reasoning also ; but he avows that in this sphere Reason is only the handmaid of Revelation, its business being simply to interpret and justify, not to criticise. Thus the procedure of the Vedāntic philosopher appears to be open to the same charge as is brought against the scholastic philosophers in the West, *viz.*, uncritical devotion to Authority and disparagement of Reason. It is proposed here to examine the justice of this charge and to see how far the method of Vedānta philosophy conforms to the requirements of modern logic.

For this purpose we shall begin with a short review of the process by which the human mind seeks to obtain the explanation of the universe. We have to see here what is involved in man's nature as a knowing being. It is now a commonplace of logic (as the theory of knowledge) that the mind in the beginning is not a *tabula rasa* or a blank tablet. If it began as a blank tablet, it would remain so for ever. Here as elsewhere,—“to him that hath, more shall be given.” As a matter of fact, the mind from the first has various capacities and tendencies, in particular, the capacity and the tendency to obtain knowledge. But in seeking we are required to have an idea of what we are seeking. So, while entering upon the quest after knowledge we must be knowing what knowledge is. While trying to explain anything, if we do not know what explanation means, we shall never be able to say whether any proposed explanation is satisfactory or not. It is true that the pursuit of a goal does not require us to have a clear and distinct idea of it ; but at least an implicit idea is necessary. When the teacher is imparting knowledge (as we say) the pupil cannot feel satisfied unless he knew what he was in need of. We may, of course, think that we have understood when we have not really done so ; but when we dis-



cover our mistake afterwards or when it is pointed out to us and we admit it, it is because we have with us the standard of truth that we do so. All progress in knowledge can be measured only in terms of this standard, for progress consists in going nearer to our destination and, in feeling that we have made an advance in knowledge, we must be appreciating the results of our labours by applying to them the standard of knowledge.

Hence in order to discover this standard we have only to observe the course which the pursuit of knowledge has already taken. The first thing that strikes us here is the arrangement of the innumerable individual things into classes. When the child sees something new and asks "What is this?" it wants to know the class to which the thing belongs. What is involved in the formation of classes? Individual things differ from one another in many respects but they also resemble one another in certain points. When the points of resemblance noted are considered to be more important than the points of difference, they lead us to put those things into one class. Thus we reduce the bewildering variety of individual things by bringing them together under kinds. The same process is carried forward by the various sciences. Chemistry, for instance, reduces the number of classes by showing that all the things in the universe are composed of about seventy elements variously combined. Though this is admittedly a great advance over commonsense knowledge, the scientist feels that he must prove the elements to be fewer still and if possible, show that there is only one element throughout the universe. The electron theory is the outcome of this effort and whether established or not, it points clearly to the direction in which the human mind looks for progress. The great value attached to the principle of Conservation of Energy in physics is certainly due to its enabling us to escape the absurd belief that anything that exists at any moment did not exist or will cease to exist at another; but it also proceeds from the fact that it enables us to unify the different forces in nature. The discovery of the Law of Gravitation was felt to be a gigantic stride forward because it proved so many apparently diverse motions in the universe to be particular cases of one and the same law. The charm exercised by the theory of Evolution over our minds in spite

of the fact that it has not been satisfactorily proved even in the biological field, can be explained only by the fact that it relieves us from the burden of maintaining so many irreducible species of animals and of other things. The researches of Sir J. C. Bose promise to achieve further progress along the same line by showing the continuity of life and feeling among the mineral, plant and animal kingdoms. The same ideal of unity leads certain metaphysicians to say that there is nothing in the universe except Matter and others that there is nothing in the universe except Spirit. There are thinkers, of course, who find it necessary to believe both in Matter and Spirit and even in a plurality of spirits but the course taken by human thinking leaves no doubt that human intellect is always pressing forward towards unity and would, if it could, believe in one Substance, one Cause, one Law. Even the duality of Substance and Energy is sought to be removed by the Vedāntists who hold that God is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe and by the upholders of the electron theory according to which the ultimate constituents of matter are mere centres of electrical energy. Thus we see that progress of knowledge has always been held to consist in a closer approach to the ideal of unity.

What is the nature of the process by which man tries to realise this ideal? All are now agreed that it is only by experience that we can obtain a true knowledge of nature. But we must see exactly how experience helps us. Is it mere observation of facts that discloses the essential natures of things and the laws that connect them with one another? The affirmative answer to this question was given by Francis Bacon who thought that mere observation of different kinds of instances was sufficient to discover the essential forms of things and exhorted men to interrogate, not to anticipate, Nature. Though Bacon deserves the credit of having entered a wholesome protest against the Scholastic indifference to facts, yet the procedure laid down by himself could not be followed by the scientists as it erred in the other direction. It is not possible to interrogate Nature without anticipating her. The only way to discover any law of nature is by forming some reasonable conjecture and then seeing if it agrees with facts. Indeed, no observation of

facts is possible unless we have in mind some hypothesis which is either favoured or contradicted by those facts. An hypothesis is the offspring of scientific imagination working on the basis of previous knowledge in the light of the ideal of unity. One may say that the scientist is fighting against Nature with the firm determination of bringing to light the unity which is hidden behind her varied appearances. It is true that the scientist's imagination is subject to the effective control of facts and that an hypothesis is formed only for being verified by reference to facts. Before it can become an established theory, it must be shown not only that its consequences agree with all the facts but also that it is the only hypothesis whose consequences do so. But this must not make us lose sight of the indispensable function performed by hypothesis in the pursuit of knowledge. Without an hypothesis there is nothing to be verified. When we form it, we go beyond what is strictly warranted by the facts, as known, so far. Though we make an assumption which appears to us at the time to be likely to prove true, we are conscious that we are going on insufficient evidence and that on further experience we may have to modify or even reject our assumption altogether. But it is through this process of trial and error that we hope to be able to form better hypotheses and ultimately the true one. The true explanation is that which will reduce all facts to consistency and if all the relevant facts were before us we should have much less difficulty in knowing the truth ; but as all observation is guided by interest, we can observe facts only in the light of some theory which they may either strengthen or contradict. This compels us to form some working hypothesis which may be shown to be false by the very facts which it enables us to observe. But we have the assurance that if we are erring, we shall not remain in error permanently. It will be discovered, giving place to something which is more likely to be true and thus in the end we shall be led to truth. As the test of consistency with facts is always with us, we need not be afraid of being led away by wrong hypothesis.

But though the scientific spirit involves a readiness to give up any cherished hypothesis when it is found to be in disagreement with facts, the scientist is never in a hurry to abandon an idea

simply because some facts seem to contradict it. He will first try to prove that the exceptions are only apparent, being due to the working of more than one cause and only when this attempt fails, will he be prepared to modify or, if necessary, to reject his hypothesis. He clings to it in all faith till he meets with a real exception. With the readiness to sacrifice any favourite hypothesis on the altar of truth (as represented by facts of experience), he thus combines a tenacity or faithfulness to his hypothesis which is also remarkable. In fact it is this faith that makes it possible for him to work out his idea into its detailed consequences.

There are, of course, conditions which must be satisfied before even this provisional faith in the hypothesis can be justified. It must be consistent in itself; it must be in accord with the received laws of nature (these may be modified if necessary); above all, it must be verifiable or capable of being proved either true or false by reference to experience. If the assumed cause is unlike anything that we already know, we cannot deduce any consequences from it that can be compared with facts. Even between two verifiable hypotheses the scientist will choose that which appears to him to be the most likely to prove true. But whether any suggested explanation is plausible to a man or not depends, to a considerable extent, on his previous knowledge. What appears to be highly probable to one man may seem absurd to another. The Copernican theory, for instance, appears absurd to illiterate men who think they actually see the sun, moon and stars moving across the sky. The conception of the antipodes is altogether unacceptable to ordinary men who wonder how there could be men walking feet upwards and head downwards. Though imagination can transcend experience to some extent, yet the latter supplies the limits within which it must work. Hence it is only from a mind well stored with facts of various kinds that we can expect a good reliable hypothesis regarding the explanation of natural phenomena. There are other qualifications also needed, like keenness of observation (for very few men can observe all their experiences) and an eye for resemblances between things which are apparently most removed from each other (compare Darwin's passing from the selection of animals made by breeders to the idea of Natural Selection). Even then we

cannot fully explain why the hypothesis of gravitation occurred to Newton and to no one else. We are almost induced to say that it pleased God to put it into his head and nobody else's.

The importance of these qualifications naturally increases with the difficulty and complexity of the problem to be solved. It is in the highest degree necessary that a man who sits down to determine the nature of ultimate reality or the destiny of the universe should be gifted with devotion to truth, long and leisured life, subtle and comprehensive observation, and quick perception of unity amidst diversity. Unaided ordinary intellect can never hope to think out the solutions of these problems. But these are so intimately related to our success in life that we cannot shelve them as being beyond our ken. The only course open to us is to take the views of the wisest representatives of the human race and to see how far they agree with our own experience. Even in this process our attitude must be one of great reverence and patience. We must not reject what appears on a hasty view to conflict with our limited experience. Our first concern, on the other hand, should be to seek for experiences and arguments which will justify those views to us. There will be time enough for criticism later on. This process of justification is the only way to understand propositions which embody the synoptic views (in Plato's phrase) of life and the universe, taken by the gifted seers of the past. The fact that different great men have arrived at different conclusions need not bewilder us inasmuch as the Upanishads which have all along traditionally represented the highest wisdom in the land have the first claim upon our faith. In the interpretation of these works we are helped by the Vedānta Darshana (as contained in the Brahma-sūtras) and the various commentaries. The difficulty experienced in understanding the Sūtras can be got over by consulting the famous commentaries on them and, where there are differences of opinion, by using our own reason for deciding upon the correct one.

The faith in the Upanishads which is demanded of the seeker after truth by the Vedāntic philosophy is very similar to the faith of the scientist in the hypothesis which he has formed with all possible care. The difference between them is only one of degree.

It may be objected that the scientist holds his hypothesis to be only probably true while the Vedāntist claims the Śruti to be infallible and not something requiring confirmation from other sources of knowledge. A student of modern logic is likely to be scared away by the words which are used by the Vedāntist to describe his attitude towards the Śruti, but a careful interpretation of them will dispel his fears. The Vedāntist makes a difference between listening to the Śruti **श्रवणं** and Realisation **साक्षात्कारः**; and between the two he puts reasoning **मननं** and constant dwelling **निदिध्यासः**. The function allotted to **श्रवणं** is that of convincing us that the conclusions of Vedāntic philosophy form the purport of the Upanishads as logically ascertained and as such deserve our most reverent consideration. This prepares us for the next stage, *viz.*, **मननं** by which we are asked to get rid of the doubts which arise from these conclusions being in seeming contradiction with our ordinary experience. A patient consideration of experience as a whole including the waking, dreaming and deep sleep states will, we are told, remove all doubts. Still this newly acquired knowledge is not strong enough to withstand the force of the deep impressions left behind by the old beliefs. These impressions, being of a very long standing, persist in producing the corresponding wrong beliefs unless we are on our guard. In order to wipe out these subtle enemies a constant dwelling on the new truths is necessary. This **निदिध्यासः** helped by our natural predilection for truth serves to efface the unwanted impressions. When **मननं** and **निदिध्यासः** have done their work then only we reach perfect conviction and are said to have a direct view of Reality (**साक्षात्कारः**). This account of the process shows that in the method of Vedānta philosophy **श्रवणं** corresponds to the stage of hypothesis in the scientific method and **मननं** to that of verification. The account of the nature of Reality which the student derives from the authoritative books is put to the full test of experience. Though at first he is warned against raising objections and is asked rather to look for arguments that will justify this account, this is because the objections (as the teacher knows from personal experience) are founded on a narrow and superficial view of life and the world, and disappear when a more comprehensive and

deeper outlook is acquired. He has thus nothing to lose by employing at first what is called **श्रुत्यनुगृहीततर्क** (reasoning guided by the Śruti) as the process is to end only with Realisation which involves the removal (not the suppression) of all doubts. Faith is intended only to lead to, and make possible, that sound reasoning and minute examination of experience by means of which the final Realisation is to be attained. The Vedānta philosopher cannot therefore be accused of putting Faith before Reasoning and Experience in point of logical value. When he says that the Śruti is the only source of the knowledge of Brahman he means that the true nature of the ultimate reality is so subtle and so different from what it ordinarily appears that we shall never be able to form an idea of it if we are left to our own resources. Even a wavering faith will not serve the purpose inasmuch as it will not suffice to keep up our patience in the long and difficult process of verification. Whatever logical forces may be considered to be possessed by the argument by which the Śruti is shown to be **अपौरुषेय** (not composed by God or Man), the possibility of its going wrong is not thought of by the Vedāntist in view of the declarations of great men, past and present, to the effect that they have verified the sacred words by their own experience and found them fully justified. So he asks the aspirant who does not see eye to eye with the Śruti to have patience and to wait for light in hopes that though he has not seen the truth of the words so far he will do so in future. This is the attitude implied in calling the Śruti self-cogent (**स्वतःप्रमाणं**). "Don't entertain the slightest misgiving about the truth of the Śruti but see to it that you realise the truth fully in your own experience. Don't be satisfied with anything short of that." This is, in short, the advice given to the disciple by his Master. Experience is therefore, the final test and faith, only a provisional stage leading up to it. Whatever psychological difficulty is experienced in adopting this attitude of unwavering faith, we can see that there are effective logical safeguards provided in **मननं** and **साक्षात्कारः**.

It may be said that this Realisation **साक्षात्कारः** coming after **निदिध्यासः** may be an illusion, for constant dwelling on any idea sometimes makes it so vivid as to be mistaken for the reality. In reply we may point out, first, that **निदिध्यासः** is employed here only

in favour of those conclusions which have stood the test of logical reasoning and secondly, that man's intellectual nature will not allow him to remain permanently under an illusion. This is sure to be discovered sometime or other. Man as an intellectual being is in pursuit of a fixed goal and cannot find rest till the goal is reached. In fact, it is reflection upon this essential nature of man that foreshadows to us the final triumph of Truth over Falsehood in the life of man, and makes us join the Upanishadic seer in saying **सत्यमेव जयते नानृतम्** (Truth alone shall win, not falsehood).

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## THE JAINA THEORY OF SPACE (" ĀKĀŚA.")

BY

HARISATYA BHATTACHARYYA, M.A., B.L.

" Ākāśa " is generally translated as Space. In Greece, it was implied in the Eleatic theory that Space was no reality. The Protagorean empiric school and the Sceptics also denied the existence of any real Space. In modern times, Berkeley is famous for his theory that Space is no real substance at all. According to him, our conception of Space is due to the peculiar impressions of sight and touch and as such, purely subjective. Kant contends that Space does not inhere in the nature of things *per se* but is purely a subjective condition of sensibility. It may, however, be pointed out that all the arguments which are put forward to prove the subjectivity of Space are unable to bar out the possibility that it may be objectively real as well.

Trendelenberg, for example, contends that even the Kantian theory is not in-consistent with the position that Space may be an objective reality, *i.e.*, subjective and objective both.

In India, the Vedānta school of philosophers stoutly opposed the doctrine of real Space. As will be noticed presently the thinkers of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools of orthodox philosophy upheld the doctrine of the reality of Space and the Vedāntins criticised their position. A real Space, the Vedāntins pointed out, must be possessed of both general and special characteristics. But as Ākāśa is one, it cannot have any general characteristics,—characteristics which are called *general*, being found to be common to a group of individuals. You cannot define Space as that which gives Space (Avakāśa), for such a definition is purely verbal. Nor, can you point to Sound as the special characteristic of Ākāśa. Sound (Śabda) according to the Vedāntins, is no

quality, as it is perceived to be great, etc. The theory that Ākāśa is *Vibhu* or all-pervasive, is also untenable.

Space is said to be connected with all things having forms (*Mūrta*). But how is it possible? To be connected with a thing having a form, Space itself must have a form and if Space has a form, it cannot be all-pervasive. The Nyāya doctrine is that Space is something formless, the reality of which is always established by inference (*Anumāna*). The Vēdāntins controvert this position and point out that Space is an object of our visual perception; where the eyes are inoperative, it is the soul which intuitively Space. Space, according to the Vēdāntins, is not eternal and self-existent; it is a *Kārya* or product. In this way, the Vēdāntists reject the doctrine of real Space.

The Vēdāntins are opposed to any doctrine admitting the reality of anything beside the Brahman. As observed already, the theory of the reality of Space appears to be quite reasonable to many philosophers. In Greece, for example, the Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, all admitted the real existence of Space. In modern times, Newton is famous for his doctrine of real Space and he is followed by a school of physicists. In India, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina philosophers upheld the theory that Ākāśa is a real substance. The Sāṅkhya thinkers also may be said to have looked upon Ākāśa as real, though it is an indirect and secondary evolute of Prakṛiti, according to them.

What, then, is Space, as a real substance? The word 'Ākāśa' derivatively means 'that which reveals itself' or 'that in which substances are revealed.' The author of the *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, however, says that Ākāśa is that substance which is "capable of giving space (*Avakāśa*) to Jīva, etc." Space, according to the Jains, is thus characterised by 'penetrability' by other things, '*Aragāha*' and '*Anupravēśa*,' as Umā-svāmī and Akalanka-dēva call it respectively.

The Jaina writers explain *Avakāśa*, *Aragāha*, and *Anupravēśa* in the following way. It is said that a thing penetrates Space "just as a swan enters into the water" of a pond. Brahma-dēva points out that other substances occupy Space,—“just as many

other lights penetrate the light (of a particular lamp in a room).'' It would be seen that the Jaina doctrine of spatial *Ākāśa* is somewhat similar to the theory of Plato,—according to which Space is like “*the mother*,” a substance which “receives” all things which are likened by Plato to “children.” As regards the characteristics of *Ākāśa*, the author of the *Tattvārtha-sāra* says, “Space is eternal, all-pervasive—and all things are located in it.” Of course, it has no form; it is an ‘*Amūrta*’ or formless substance.

*Ākāśa* is infinite, according to the Jainas. It is however, divided by them into two parts. One part is obviously finite, called the *Lokākāśa*, “the filled” or “occupied” Space in which the Souls, the Material substances, Time, the principles of Motion and Rest are located. Beyond it, is the infinite Space which is absolutely void of all substances—the *Aloka* or the *Anantākāśa*. It would be seen that even according to some of the earliest Greek thinkers, *e.g.*, Anaximander, Anaximenes and the Pythagoreans, Space was “*the unlimited*.” Aristotle, however, thought that Space was a relation between bodies; accordingly, he denied the existence of any empty or ‘*void Space*,’—encompassing the “filled space.” With him, Space, like the world, was finite. The Epicureans, on the other hand, admitted the existence of Void Space both within and outside the world. Strato, however, maintained the curious doctrine that there was no Void Space, outside the world but that inside the world there was Empty Space which accounted for the interpenetration of bodies by light and warmth. If we leave out of account the last two theories (*viz.*, of the Epicureans and of Strato), as of minor importance, we have two prominent theories of Space, *viz.*, the one of Aristotle, denying the existence of Void Space outside the world-limit and the other, of the Stoics, which denied its existence within the world but admitted its infinite expansion beyond. The Jaina theory is apparently similar to that of the Stoics and is opposed to the Aristotelian doctrine of finite Space.

*Ākāśa* is thus a real substance, according to the Jainas. It is not a relation between bodies, as Aristotle thought. Can we, however, identify it with the Principle of Motion? The atomists of early Greece believed that Space was necessary to explain the

motions of bodies. It seems that in ancient India also there was a class of thinkers who contended that motions and movements of bodies, as well as their stoppage were accounted for by *Ākāśa*. Kaṇāda seems to point in 2-1-20 of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* to the position of such philosophers :—“(They maintain), *Ākāśa* is proved by the movements, etc., of bodies.” The author of the *Panchāstikāya-samaya-sāra* refutes their position by pointing out that if Space were the condition of Motion and Rest, the Siddhas or the Perfect Ones, would have run into the *Aloka*. The Liberated Souls have a natural tendency to move upwards and if Space were the condition of Motion and Rest, there would have been nothing to check their progress in the Void Space and prevent their passage there. But the Jaina scriptures maintain that the Siddhas stop at the summit of the *Lokākāśa* and can go no further. This shows that Space is not the condition of Motion and Rest. There is rather another principle (*Dharma*) which accounts for the motions of bodies and which being absent in the *Anantākāśa*, the progress of the Siddhas beyond the *Siddha-Śilā* or the topmost place in the *Lokākāśa* is retarded. The real significance of the Jaina criticism is that if Space were the Principle of Motion and Rest, substances would have moved into the *Aloka* and stayed there and the result would have been that there would not be the two divisions of the *Lokākāśa* and the *Aloka*. Space is purely what accommodates the substances. The Principles of *Dharma* and *Adharma* determine movement and stoppage of things thus holding them together and thereby making a *Lokākāśa* or systematised world possible. The *Aloka* is possible because the above two Principles not being operative there, there can be no substance there.

Space is thus distinct from the Principles of Motion and Rest, —the functions of the three realities being different. Yet it is not to be supposed that *Dharma* and *Adharma* cannot function where *Ākāśa* as a reality is existent. As observed already, *Ākāśa* is all-pervasive ; there is no place in the *Lokākāśa* or the *Aloka* where Space is not. So far as the *Lokākāśa* is concerned, *Dharma* and *Adharma* also are pervasive principles. Accordingly, if we confine our attention to the *Lokākāśa* only, we may say that *Ākāśa*, *Dharma* and *Adharma* are one with reference to their location or

sphere of existence and functioning. They pervade the whole of the *Lokākāśa* and may be said to be of the same extent. They do not exist separated from each other. In a sense, they form an inseparable unity and this is the reason why some philosophers are tempted to identify Space with the Principles of Motion and Rest. But if we look to their respective functioning, we shall see that the three realities are essentially different from each other.

*Ākāśa* is essentially different from *Kāla* or the Principle of Time also. There were some philosophers in India who identified the two principles. It is to be noticed, however, that since *Kāla* is characterised by *Vartanā* or 'continuity in successive changes' and *Ākāśa* is what accommodates substances, they are two essentially different realities. The Jaina writers urge that Time has '*Ūrddhva-prachaya*,' i.e., it is a mono-dimensional or unilateral series and cannot be identified with anything having multi-dimensional extension.

As an *Ajīva*, *Ākāśa* is different from *Jīva*; and then, as we have seen above, it is distinct from the two principles of Motion and Rest and the Principle of Mutation. Can we look upon it as a sort of *material substance*, i.e., a substratum of any material quality? The Jainas maintain that *Ākāśa*, as a mode of *Ajīva*, is distinct from *Pudgala* or Matter. With the Pythagoreans, however, the infinite Space was the *infinite Stuff*, an unlimited expanse of pure or primordial Matter. In modern times, Descartes is famous for his theory that extension (Space) was the *essence* (not the *attribute*, as contended by Spinoza) of corporeal substance. In India, the philosophers of the *Sāṅkhya*, the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools agreed with the Jainas that *Ākāśa* is infinite, one, all-pervasive and inactive. But the former included *Ākāśa* in the class of the *Mahābhūtas*. It was according to them, a sort of material substance like Earth, Water and the other *material Elements*. The *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophers maintained that Space is the substratum of *Sabda*, i.e., that Sound is the attribute of Space. The *Sāṅkhya* thinkers, on the contrary, contended that *Sabda* is a *Tanmātrā*, a noumenal Subtle Element, out of which *Ākāśa* is evolved. Sound is thus either an attribute or a

substance, differentiating Space from all other non-psychical realities.

The Jaina philosophers are opposed to the doctrine that Space is a material substance, explaining or explained by the material phenomena of Sound. On the one hand, they reject the Nyāya theory that Sound is an *attribute* and on the other, the *Sāṅkhya* contention that it is a *subtle noumenal substance*. Against the *Naiyāyikas*, the Jainas maintain that Sound is ' *Pondgalika*, i.e., material substance, modified in a peculiar way and not an attribute of *Ākāśa* or Etheric Matter. Just as our sensation of smell is caused by small particles of a smelling substance, carried to our noses by air, so is our sensation of sound due to matter, peculiarly modified. Sound is no attribute inherent in any matter; it is rather a mode of matter. Then again, why should we admit the supersensuous *Ākāśa* or Ether, as the substratum of Sound? Or, rather, why should we suppose *Ākāśa* which is even imperceptible to explain Sound? Sound is something perceptible just like Form, Colour, etc.; and it is but reasonable to explain it in reference to substances which are perceptible. Thus it is that Sound is no attribute and that it has nothing to do with an imperceptible substance like Ether. *Ākāśa* is not a material substance of the nature of Ether and it is not the substratum of Sound.

If then, Sound has nothing to do with Ether and if it is better explained with reference to material substances which are perceptible, there is no reason why we should subscribe to the curious *Sāṅkhya* doctrine that Sound is the noumenal *Tanmātrā* out of which *Ākāśa*, i.e., Etheric Matter is evolved. There being thus no necessity nor consistency in explaining Sound with reference to Ether, the Jaina view seems to be finally vindicated that *Ākāśa* or Space is what accommodates substances.

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## SECTION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY





## PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

### *The March of the History of Philosophy.*

BY

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My first duty is to thank the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress for the honour they have conferred upon me in electing me President of this section. I only wish their choice had fallen upon a worthier person.

This is the fourth time the Indian Philosophical Congress holds its annual sitting. It has already stimulated philosophical research as is evidenced by the large number of papers that are received every year and the large number of persons that take part in its discussions. It is quite in the fitness of things that the southern presidency has been chosen as the place of meeting of the Congress. For it is South India which has produced the greatest thinkers of India. The great Adwaita philosopher, Śaṅkarāchāryya, hailed from this province. His great opponent and founder of the Visishtādvaita school, Rāmānujāchāryya, also belonged to this province. South India also produced the great founder of the dualistic school, Madhvāchāryya. As if to show that the province has not lost its virility in philosophical reflection, it has in recent years given birth to a philosopher of world-wide reputation. I refer to my friend and the Chairman of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Prof. Radhakrishnan.

The history of philosophy is the history of what is vital in humanity and is therefore very different from any mechanical evolution. It shares in the first place with history its essential

dynamic character and, in the second place, it emphasises that the historical process here is the process of what is most vital in man, namely, thought. History has to record not only the movements where man's freedom is quite evident, but also where it is less obvious. But it is the privilege of the historian of philosophy to record only the movements of the freest aspects of human nature. And that is why the essential dynamism of history is present in a specially marked form in the history of philosophy. That is why a static conception of it, a derivation of it from the lifeless forms of logic, is absolutely out of place.

This brings me to the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy. Hegel believed that the history of philosophy is itself philosophy. This is no doubt a very grand conception. But unfortunately, he weakened the force of this conception very considerably when he asserted that the movements of the history of philosophy are identical with the processes of thought as described in his logic. Just at the moment when we expected from him a vindication of the dynamism of the history of philosophy, we were treated to a narrow, and partly even a static, conception of it. For the development of the processes of thought, as described in his logic, suffers much from excessive rigidity. The stiff framework of his logic is certainly most inadequate for the vital processes with which the history of philosophy deals. The dance of life, the play of colour, refuses to come into the grooves of a ready-made logic.

The shortcomings of the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy, as following the lines of his logical scheme, have indeed become a matter of common knowledge. Even Schwegler, a thoroughgoing Hegelian, had to admit the limitations of his master's conception of the history of philosophy. Indeed, Hegel had to twist the facts of history in order to make them fit into the grooves of his logic.

I do not want to press the charge, because, as I have already said, it is admitted by the Hegelians themselves. But what I want to say is that if the Hegelian conception is not adequate to express the movement of thought, it is because of the essential dynamism of thought. The question may, how-

ever, be asked : Is it possible to express in terms of thought at all the process of development of philosophy?

The question seems paradoxical, for the development of philosophy is really the development of thought and we appear to be uttering nonsense when we cast doubts upon the possibility of expressing the process of thought in terms of thought. But really the question is not so nonsensical as it appears at first sight. For the development of thought can quite conceivably be due to factors other than thought. To show that it is not due to them, we have to show that thought possesses in itself the elasticity which is needed to make it a fit receptacle for the dynamic forces that move history. Until we can do this, we have to admit that, if not wholly incapable of being expressed in terms of thought, it is at any rate not possible to express with anything like completeness the dynamic process of the development of thought with the help of the logical forms known to us.

I think, therefore, in the present imperfect stage of development of the logic of the real, it is advisable to choose a more cautious line of procedure than Hegel did. Instead of launching an ambitious scheme of developing the whole of the history of philosophy out of the logical categories, we should rather content ourselves with discovering certain broad lines of development, recognising the impossibility of reducing them to any uni-linear course. This procedure may fall short of the ideal of logical completeness, but at any rate it will not do violence to reality. For, as Schwegler says, "reduce as we may the individual under the influence of the universal, in the form of his time, his circumstances, his nationality, etc., to the value of a mere cipher, no free-will can be reduced."

The course of the history of philosophy, therefore, cannot be summed up in a formula. We have to distinctly recognise the essential complexity of the movement of history. The development of history is not uni-linear but multi-linear.

It will again not do to reduce all philosophical speculation to a number of type-phenomena, as Höffding has done. There are no doubt certain fundamental directions along which human thought proceeds. These directions no doubt serve as regula-

tive principles, but to say that they are not merely the guideposts but the ultimate destinations of the process of human thought is to misconceive their true import. The destination cannot be regarded as fixed. To do so is to commit the same mistake which the philosophers of the type of Höffding want to avoid. For the main charge of the philosophy of values against rationalism is that it is a rigid system, fixed completely in the framework of the logical categories. If, then, the philosopher of values ends by postulating the same kind of fixity of destination for thought as the rationalist does, his philosophy does not differ essentially from that of the rationalist and suffers from the same defect. It really matters very little if the value-philosopher's ultimates are not one but many, for the important thing is not the number of principles but their character.

I do not, therefore, think that the reduction of the course of metaphysical speculation to the discovery of certain type-phenomena really solves the difficulty we notice in the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy. For the difficulty is to maintain the dynamic character of history and this difficulty is not made a whit less by Höffding's conception of the type-phenomena as the ultimate goals of philosophical speculation. Höffding may go on crying, "Wide is the world and narrow the brain," but a real complexity his universe can never have so long as he does not shake himself free from the belief that the entire world of philosophical speculation is capable of being reduced to a few type-phenomena.

The course of development of philosophy in the West has been from a purely external to a gradually increasing internal view of the universe. The beginnings of European philosophy in Greece coincide with the dawn of a purely external view of the universe. This external view, however, represented an advance upon the pre-philosophical period, as it at any rate showed that the mind had been purged of the traditional mythological conceptions.

In the East from the earliest times we find philosophy freed from the external bias. Man and his problems had already from the remotest times absorbed the attention of the philosophical mind, to the comparative neglect of the external

world. The Hegelian categories of Being, Becoming and Definite Being cannot be applied to the understanding of the thought of the East, for it was definite Being from the very beginning, and the progress of thought rather tended to take up various aspects of definite Being, or rather to conceive the definiteness from different angles of vision. Practical considerations, again, had their influence upon the development of thought in the East, and the practical idea of Moksha shaped to a considerable extent the course of philosophy in India.

When philosophy is understood comprehensively as involving the whole of life, as it was done in India, then the logical categories become merged in the higher categories of life. When this occurs, the hopelessness of a logical scheme becomes all the more apparent.

That the Hegelian scheme could find so many adherents and was accepted for a considerable time as a fairly correct representation of the actual course of the history of philosophy, was partly due to the fact that in the West the scope of philosophy was somewhat limited and it did not absorb the whole of life in the manner in which it did in the East. Thus, although warnings were often given and the dangers of one-sidedness in philosophy were frequently pointed out, philosophy was generally confined to abstract thinking. Logic, in fact, has been the guiding principle of philosophy practically throughout the course of its development in the West. In the short periods when this was not the case, as in the period which marked the decadence of Greek culture, when practical considerations ruled supreme, philosophy practically ceased to exist. One result of this feature in the development of thought in the West has been the sharp antagonism between Philosophy and Religion.

The antagonism between the two is so pronounced in Western culture as to seem almost to be its chief characteristic. The conflict between Religion and Philosophy was particularly acute in the West in the Middle Ages. It grew with the growth of Christianity and its summit was reached in the palmy days of the Church Fathers. It steadily weakened after the Renaissance when the natural light of reason

replaced the supernatural light of revelation which was the sole reliance of the Church in the Middle Ages.

This conflict is something strange to the Indian mind. Philosophy was always in closest alliance with Religion in India. There never was any opposition between them. The Indian idea of *Dharma* was very comprehensive. It not only embraced that part of our life which we associate with religious dogmas and religious practices but included the whole of philosophy. The philosophical problems, again, were never presented in their isolation but always shown as woven in the fabric of the complex spiritual life. It was on a realization of the totality of life that Indian culture was based and not on a piecemeal view of it.

If we are to describe in one word the characteristic of Indian thought it is Comprehension, and if, similarly, we want to express the main feature of Western thought, we should say it is Concentration. The West always concentrates itself upon some one feature of our complex life, to the exclusion of others. If it is the religious aspect of life that happens to occupy the focus of its attention then woe betide the advocates of the other aspects of life. If, again, philosophical speculation occupies its thought then it develops it so very one-sidedly and abstractly as to isolate it altogether from the rest of the cultural activity. In the Middle Ages the two great mutually exclusive culture-zones were religion and philosophy. After the Middle Ages they were science and philosophy. In this way the conflict always persists.

It is a happy feature of recent times that this perennial conflict in Western culture, this eternal presence of strife, is showing signs of disappearing. There is gradually dawning upon the Western mind the necessity of abandoning a one-sided view of the universe and replacing it by a more comprehensive outlook. The evils of too much isolation and exclusion are gaining general recognition, and the need is daily growing more and more acute of a comprehensive view of life.

Pragmatism, Bergsonism and value-philosophy are the different ways in which this new recognition of the need of a com-

prehensive outlook expresses itself. Philosophical catchwords are very much in vogue at present and if we follow the tendency, we may sum up the direction of present-day thought by the single word, Life. The present age is pre-eminently a vindication of Life against the rigidity of mechanical as well as logical systems. The nineteenth century set up two equally, although mutually opposed, rigid systems, namely, mechanism and logicism.

The idealistic movement also is at present considerably shorn of its former logicism. Bradley's Absolute is not the logician's Absolute but rather the mystic's Absolute. Bradley, in fact, declares emphatically that logical thought can never take us to the ultimate reality. Thought, he says, is relational and discursive, and if it is so, how can it contain immediate presentation? "To make it include immediate experience its character must be transformed. It must cease to predicate, it must get beyond mere relations, it must reach something other than truth. Thought, in a word, must have been absorbed into fuller experience. Now such an experience may be called thought, if you choose to use that word. But if any one else prefers another term, such as feeling or will, he would be equally justified.....For when thought begins to be more than relational, it ceases to be mere thinking."\* In another place Bradley says that thought consummates itself in something other than thought. He gives as illustrations—the river running into the sea and the self losing itself in love. Thought demands for its completeness an Absolute, where mere thought would certainly perish. The completion of thought is thus always in a reality which remains for ever an "Other" for thought.

For these reasons Bradley seeks his Absolute in an immediate Experience. His philosophy is a curious mixture of rationalism and mysticism. With the rationalists he accepts the ideal of coherence, but with the mystics he believes that this ideal can only be realised in immediate experience. This imme-

\* Appearance and Reality, p. 171.



mediate experience, however, is not feeling, that is to say, sub-rational consciousness, but supra-rational consciousness. It is immediacy at a level higher than that of thought. It is an immediacy which is above, not below, the level of reflexion.

As I have said elsewhere, the *Advaita* philosophy of Śaṅkara also ultimately leads to the recognition of some form of supra-rational consciousness as the ultimate reality. The *turiya* condition which, according to Śaṅkara is the highest stage of consciousness, is supra-rational consciousness. Reflective consciousness, on the other hand, occupies the lowest rung in the conscious life. The characteristic of the *turiya* or *samādhi* state is that here there is no object but only the subject. As Professor K. C. Bhattachāryya puts it, in this state the self is conscious, but conscious of a blank only. "It has then the cognition of the absence of specific cognition, the consciousness of a positive nothing, and hence it flashes back on itself."\* He beautifully expresses it as "swooning into the knowledge of noumena." There are two forms of this ecstatic consciousness recognised by *Advaita* philosophy, namely, *savikalpa-* and *nirvikalpa-samādhi*. Both *savikalpa-samādhi* and *nirvikalpa-samādhi* are forms of undifferentenced consciousness, but the difference between them is, as Prof. K. C. Bhattachāryya points out, that *nirvikalpa-samādhi* is "undifferentenced, not only in the sense that the consciousness of quality is absent, as it is even in *su-shupti* not only in the sense that the unconscious ring of the unknown constituting the limitation of all noumena lower than God is removed, as it may be in *savikalpa-samādhi*, but also in the sense that even the consciousness of this removal is absent." In other words, *nirvikalpa-samādhi* is indeterminate in a still higher degree. In *savikalpa-samādhi* the subject-object distinction is overcome by making the subject expand till it embraces the whole region of objects, that is to say, by making it one with God. But in *nirvikalpa-samādhi*, there is not even the consciousness of this expansion; there is only the consciousness of a unity which has never been anything but a unity. In *savikalpa-samādhi* the self shines by outshining the

\* K. C. Bhattachāryya. *Studies in Vedantism*, p. 14,

object; in *nirvikalpa-samādhi* it shines because it knows nothing but shining.

We see thus that the rationalists themselves feel the need of going beyond the limits of reason and having recourse to some form of supra-rational consciousness. As I have pointed out in my book, "The Neo-romantic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy," this is due to the recognition on the part of rationalism that truth is a very complex whole and that it is not possible to express it fully by means of Reason. In other words, the basic principle of romanticism is the perception of the complexity of the real. The real is the total, it is not an isolated fragment which we can identify with Reason.

But the defect of this romantic upheaval against rationalism is that it itself commits the same mistakes for which it blames rationalism. For is not the romanticist's principle, whether it is feeling or will, quite as one-sided as the rationalist's Reason? The rationalist has at any rate this merit that he wants to see things in as clear a light as possible, whereas the romanticist by his predilection for the obscure makes things all the more hazy. For my purpose here it is not necessary to make the distinction which I have made in my book already referred to, between romanticism and mysticism, and what I say here of the romanticist applies equally to the mystic.

The recent development of idealism in Italy, especially in the form in which it presents itself in Croce and Gentile, is also a plea for the recognition of extra-logical considerations. Croce's vindication of spiritualism, as opposed to mere logicism is a sign of the times. It is a march from the narrow world of logical forms to the wider world of life. Spirit is undoubtedly greater than logic and the sooner the world understands it, the better—this, in brief, is the message of Croce.

The rapid growth of Pragmatism and the philosophy of values is also a sign of the increasing recognition of extra-rational factors for the understanding of the universe. I am sorry that the time at my disposal does not allow me to deal fully with these movements of modern thought. They are the inevitable reaction of a one-sided assertion, and if they do not always make for a comprehension of the totality of the universe,

they at any rate draw our attention to some palpable defects in the rationalistic edifice. The chief error of pragmatism lies, as I have pointed out elsewhere, in its having recourse to a feature of life which is far more narrow than the feature which rationalism emphasises. If Reason is to be discarded on the ground that it is too narrow, there is surely no point in holding fast to the principle of utility. Of course, there are some forms of pragmatism, notably those of Schiller and Le Roy, where wider purposiveness is put forward, but here the lines that divide them from rationalism are very faint.

The philosophy of values represents another protest against excessive rationalism. Reason, according to it, is only one among a number of values. There are values of feeling and willing which cannot be reduced to the values of reason. It is therefore impossible to look upon Reason as the sole monarch. The philosophy of values wants to dethrone Reason and treat it as co-ordinate in rank with a number of other values.

When, however, we ask : what is a value, what constitutes the essence of value?—the value-philosophers are at their wit's end. Münsterberg defines value as an over-personal satisfaction of the self. Over-personal satisfaction of the self, as has been pointed out by Münsterberg's critics, is a contradiction in terms; for it means 'over-personal personal satisfaction.' Moreover, in what sense does an over-personal self-satisfaction differ from the 'self-realisation' of the rationalist?

To avoid the difficulty of stating what value is, it has been said by Moore and others that value is indefinable. "My point," Moore says, "is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is."\* "what value in itself is," as Rickert also says, can not be defined but this only means that we have to do here with the final and most fundamental concept with which we think the world."†

\* *Principia Ethica*, p. 7.

† *System der Philosophie*, p. 113.

An attempt has been made to define value in terms of interest. The merit of this term, it is claimed,\* is "that it is a term which may be used to indicate what is characteristic of the strain in life and mind, which shall be sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all its varieties, and whose meaning we may define as we proceed." But interest, I think, requires to be defined as much as value itself. A better example of '*obscurum per obscurius*' it is difficult to conceive than this attempt to define value in terms of interest.

But the worst mistake that the value-philosophers make is in setting up a contrast between the world of values and the world of reality. Both Rickert and Husserl commit this mistake. Husserl takes pleasure in contrasting the world of Essence which he fondly calls the world of "Irrealitäten" with the world of reality. Similarly, Rickert says that the world of values is outside the real world. Rickert, however, gives up his case for a dualism of reality and value by subsuming both of these under a World-whole. This monistic solution is, I think, rationalism's revenge upon the philosophy of values. Apart from this, however, there is no meaning in the contrast between reality and value. It is possible to contrast reality as value with reality as thought or feeling. But there is no meaning in opposing value to reality. In fact, what Rickert opposes to value is not reality but existence or *Dasein*. This is clear from his statement, "A great painting is, on its real side, nothing but canvas and colour. Its value-side makes it a painting."

The philosophy of Bergson sums up in itself all the various protests that have been made against rationalism. It is the strongest assertion in modern times of the irrational and the allogical. It takes Reason to be merely a practical faculty, designed to make our lives happy and comfortable. Access to reality is only possible through intuition. Reason always moves in a concentric circle round reality: it is never in a position to hit reality. The conceptual world is an artificial world; it is static and lacks the essential dynamism of reality. The

\* Vide Perry, *General Theory of Value*, p. 27.

real is movement, change; it is very different from the spatial representation of it, which is the work of the intellect.

As I have said elsewhere, there is something peculiarly unsatisfying in this picture of continuous movement. Movement we always understand as movement towards a goal. Where there is no goal, the movement becomes more or less a chase after a phantom.

If Bergson's object was to demolish mechanism, we must say that he has failed. A flow that is not a flow towards anything, a movement that is not a movement towards a goal, is unrelieved mechanism. In fact, it is a mechanism of time. Escape from mechanism is only possible through the notion of purpose.

It is, in fact, one of the strangest ironies of fate that Bergson after demolishing the whole structure of mechanical evolution, should have himself fallen a victim to time-mechanism. The characteristic of a creative evolution is movement guided by a purpose, change regulated by an end. Purposeless activity, whatever else it may be, is certainly not creative.

Bergson's view of Matter, moreover, is not consistent with the rest of his philosophy. Bergson thinks that when the flow of life is checked or retarded, then Matter arises. But why should the flow of life suffer a retardation at all? If reality is nothing but a flow, how can there be anything to check it? Does not the very idea of a check to the flow of reality introduce a dualistic conception, just as the recognition of the two faculties, intuition and intellect, does?

The real value of Bergson's philosophy lies in its assertion of the *alogical*, rather than in any positive construction of its own. Bergson has shown the hopelessness of rationalism as we find it to-day. As I have pointed out elsewhere, unless rationalism thoroughly recasts its logic, there is no possibility of meeting Bergson's charges. Happily, rationalism seems to be aware of this and has already done a good deal to remove its original rigidity. But a good deal of up-hill work still remains ahead.

Whilst Bergson attacks the citadel of rationalism with new weapons, the schools of neo-realism of the present day assail it with the old rusty weapons. But rationalism is more than able

to hold its own against this new attack. There may be valiant fighters in the realistic army, like Bertrand Russell and Moore in England and Perry in America, but unless the neo-realists change their methods of attack, they do not seem to have much chance of success.

How long, I ask, will the realists believe that they have refuted idealism by demolishing the proposition, '*Esse est percipi*?' Which idealist of importance in modern times accepts the Berkeleyan dictum, '*Esse est percipi*?' Yet we find Moore in his celebrated 'Refutation of Idealism' saying, "That wherever you can truly predicate *esse* you can truly predicate *percipi*, in some sense or other, is, I take it, a necessary step in all arguments, properly to be called Idealistic." As Prof. S. C. Chatterjee said in his paper, "Is Idealism refuted?" which he read before the second session of this Congress, "what is urged here is that modern idealists commit the same mistake as Berkeley..... But a levelling statement like this cannot be accepted as true in any possible sense. It rests on a radical misunderstanding of the position of modern Idealism." Poor idealism! The fate of idealism in the hands of the neo-realists reminds one of that of the poor man in Molière's play, "*Le Médecin malgré lui*," who, in spite of his protesting that he was not a doctor, would still be hailed as a doctor. However much the modern idealists may protest that they do not accept the Berkeleyan dictum the realists would go on thrusting it upon them.

Leaving aside such occasional attacks, the philosophical atmosphere of the present day must be pronounced to be extremely calm, nay even oppressively calm. As Perry remarks, "there is to-day in all quarters a declining disposition to insist on the exclusive truth of any doctrine, or to argue its negative implications."

Does this spirit of peace and mutual goodwill among philosophers help the progress of philosophy? In one way it certainly does. It produces a mental attitude very favourable to the comprehension of the complexity of the philosophical problems. There is perhaps some truth in the suggestion that it does this to some extent at the cost of that virility of thought

out of which all great systems have arisen. It is, however, far from true to say that the present age is merely an age of eclecticism and not of new constructions. There is a good deal of true philosophical activity manifest in all quarters, and if it has not so far succeeded in producing a gigantic system, like that of Kant or Hegel, it has at least prepared the ground for a re-thinking of the problems of philosophy from a newer and wider standpoint.

A new orientation in philosophy may also, I think, be confidently looked for in the new interest that has been created in philosophical speculation in India. Hitherto our attitude towards the philosophical movements in the West was that of a passive spectator, but now it has changed to that of an active participator. This happy change leads one to hope that it will be possible for India again to obtain the leadership in philosophical thought which she held for so many ages.

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# THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND THE UPANISHADS.

BY .

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The ontological argument is the real basis of all theories of truth. Truth implies perfect correspondence or identity of thought and being, and the ontological argument is an attempt at healing up the inherent and apparent division of idea and existence, thought and being. The defects of the theories of truth intellectually are insuperable, and the masterly criticism of Kant pointing out the unbridgeable gulf between idea and existence, and hence also the impossibility of attaining truth, can hardly be satisfactorily answered. The correspondence theory is hopelessly inadequate to show us the way to the 'fact' as distinct from the 'idea.' We can never discover extra-mental facts with which we can compare our ideas and find out their correctness. The idealistic theory of coherence also falls short of supplying the adequate criterion of truth. The coherent and the consistent are only 'possible' which may or may not be 'actual.' The 'actual' is no doubt 'possible,' but is not merely 'the possible.' There is a gap between possibility and actuality and unless the possible which alone idealistic philosophy can claim to have proved, is also shown to be actual, truth is not attained, and Kant's criticism will remain unanswered. As Prof. Rādhākrishnan puts it: "Admitting that the conceptual plan of reality revealed to thought is true, still, it is sometimes urged, thought is not identical with reality. By compressing all concepts into one we do not get beyond concepts."

Kant analyses the problem critically and declares that an idea can never lead us to its existence *a priori*. He asks "Whether the proposition that this or that thing exists is an analytic or a synthetic proposition"\* and argues that if it be analytic, nothing is added unto the thought of a thing by predicating existence of

\* *Transcendental Dialectic*, p. 207.



it, i.e., all distinction between a mere concept and reality is obliterated. On the other hand, if it be a synthetic proposition, the predicate of existence can never be added unto a thought or an idea without further knowledge on the point. This criticism not only is directed against Descartes and Leibnitz but it anticipates and directs its force against the Hegelian Identity of Thought and Being. Kant has proved that it is the Ontological argument seeking to justify the passage from Thought to Being, that is really the basis of the Physico-Theological and the Cosmological arguments. In fact, all theories of truth ultimately have to fall back upon this problem, and the answer that these can give to this difficulty really determines their value.

Kant frankly admits that the intellect cannot bridge over the gulf between idea and reality and hence cannot attain truth. The Supreme Being and noumenal reality are all Ideas of Reason, the truth of which cannot be tested and demonstrated (cf. Sāṅkhya and Mimāṃsā). As the Mimāṃsā refutes the Nyāya arguments for the existence of God, so also Kant refutes the Cosmological and Teleological arguments. According to Hegel, the gap between spirit and matter, thought and existence, Reason and Reality, is an artificial creation and does not really exist. 'All that is rational is real, and all that is real is rational' and there is no distinction between Logic and Metaphysics. Reason alone can reveal the real, and non-contradiction is the sole criterion of truth. The subject and the object are bifurcations of the Absolute, and the Absolute as subject can recognise Itself in the object, and thus there is an identity of thought and being. But this does not satisfy the Vedānta. Like Kant, Śaṅkara perceives that the slightest interval (*vyabadhāna*) or gap between the subject and the object is detrimental to the cause of truth. The idea in the subject may or may not correspond to anything in the object. That there is something *given* which comes to us with a touch of *foreignness* cannot be ignored. To say that Reason is the whole Real is a dogmatic assertion so long as the Absolute Reason is not found to be identical with the Individual Reason. That there is something external to and beyond the scope of individual Reason which comes to it as *given* is undeniable, and it is this distinction between the presented and the given on the one hand, forming the object, and

the subject on the other, as the witness of the object, and the source of some other ideas, that is the basis of the bifurcation of subject and object essential to all cognition. So long as the *given* outside, the *jada* of the *Vedānta*, the object, the *Dṛśya*, cannot be reduced wholly to the *Drasṭā* or to the *Ātman*, the Eternal subject or more correctly, the self-luminous luminosity or *chit*, there cannot be any Idealism in the highest significance of the term. To say that the object appears, though only as the cognised presentation of the cognising subject, and yet to hold that there is identity of thought and being and to deny the gap between idea and existence, is to confuse the real merit of the ontological argument, and Hegel's position is fully open to the criticism of Kant. Mere thought or reason always moves within its own sphere and so long as there is division of subject and object, the necessary bifurcation of intellect, it cannot bridge over the gulf between idea and existence. The appeal to *anubhava* or experience (not sense-experience, according to Śaṅkara-Vedānta, but subtle *anubhava* of the very fine intuitive reason) can alone transform the possible into the actual, the ideal into the real. Bradley recognises the inadequacy of the intellect to reach truth. The 'that' exceeds the 'what.' For the apprehension of truth, 'another element in addition to thought' seems to be required and "this is suggested by the term 'darśana.'"

Sense-experience (*pratyaksha*) cannot identify the ideal and the real;—there are illusions and hallucinations, and knowledge comes to us as a given percept, and so this cannot be regarded as the ideal of knowledge. Inference or argumentation cannot go beyond the realm of reason, and thus join together the two elements of sense and reason, which seemed to Kant to be quite irreconcilable from the point of view of pure reason. Hegel could only reconcile the two by rather ignoring the factor which comes to the individual as given and thus confusing between the Absolute and Individual Reason. The Vedāntin is not an idealist of the Berkeleyan and Hegelian type. He is therefore as much a realist in the modern sense of the term as an idealist. He does not deny that from the stand-point of the individual (*laukika vyavahāra*) things are *given* as real, and knowledge is *vastuparatāntara*, i.e., dependent on the nature of the things themselves. But there is such an *anubhava*

or experience where all gap (*vyavadhāna*) between idea and reality disappears, where everything becomes *Ātman*, where the subject and the object resolve themselves into the *svayamprakāśa jñāna*, and this *anubhava* or *Brahman* is alone truth, simply because it is itself its own criterion. Nothing can prove a thing to be true once the question of truth is raised. All truths which are dependent on other things are merely hypothetical truths;—they are true provided the things which prove them are true, and a hypothetical or conditional truth is no truth. The one categorical and unconditional truth is *Brahman* or such *anubhava* where all interval between self and not-self disappears.

The Upanishads recognise that to assert the existence of an idea merely by referring to the value and contents of the same and appealing to argumentations, involves the fallacious procedure of begging the question. *Brahman* or the Absolute is not merely an *idea* that is supplied by reason, and as such is not like Hegel's Absolute Idea. It is '*vastu*' which is *anubhavagamyā* (realisable and realised in experience). As it is very subtle in its nature and is of the nature of *chit*, it can only be apprehended in the deepest recess of one's consciousness. It is *svayamprakāśa* and *svasamvedya*, self-evident and is not revealed or proved by anything else. Here the ontological argument takes a different turn. It is not *manana* or reason that reveals the existence of *Brahman*,—it is hopelessly inadequate for the purpose. It is *nididhyāsana* or *dhyāna* (meditation) that gradually enlivens up the idea and introduces force and freshness into the same, and elevates it to the rank of a *vastu*—thus bridging over the gulf between the ideal and the real, on the one hand, and the subject and the object on the other. The idea attains reality not as separate from the subject, on the one hand, nor from the object as real, on the other, but the idea is transformed into the real through the resolving of the subject and the object into the oneness of an all-inclusive experience. Unless the ideal ceases to appear as an idea as related to a subject and also as the image of some object which is taken to be real, it has very little value. In sense-experience, *e.g.*, the idea that is received can never be taken to be real in the highest sense of the term. It is real only in the sense that it appears. But all appearances are not real. Illusions and hallucinations

are familiar experiences. Unless we hold with the *Bhāṭṭa* school of *Mīmāṃsakas* that all cognitions as such are valid, we must seek a criterion of truth. The sense-impression comes to us as something forced upon us and with the marked characteristics of givenness and foreignness. The outside reference is so very prominent that although the sensation is something mental, it is taken by commonsense to belong to the outside object. A thought-idea seems nearer to us and belongs more intimately to ourselves, as the subject. The externality is reduced to a certain extent in this relation of subject to its ideas than in that of subject to the sense-impressions received from the outside. The sensation seems only externally related to the subject receiving it and that also not permanently but occasionally. The thought-idea on the other hand seems to belong to the subject more intimately and also more permanently. Here the not-self is not something altogether foreign to the self, but is an intimate possession of the self, over which it has control and which is more or less permanently connected with it. It is thus one step in advance of the former position. But although the not-self is drawn a little nearer to the self in this relation, and the not-self relaxes a little of its element of foreignness, still here also the division between the subject and the idea, the thinker and the thought, raises the problem of the criterion of truth. The idea is still an unresolved element of the subject and makes its appearance before the subject, although as an integral element of the same. The *svagata bheda* (internal division) between the subject and its ideas, the inherent division between the subject and the object persists as the residuum and thus becomes an obstacle to the way of perfect knowledge which is identical with truth. The ideal of knowledge implies a position where the ideal and the real coincide, where thought and reality coalesce together, where all gap between idea and existence is completely bridged over. This can only happen where the experience is not one of a bifurcated dual relation of subject and object, whether the latter appears in the shape of sense-impression of the external object, or as a thought-idea owing its origin to the subject itself.

The Vedānta speaks to us of an experience where the not-self is wholly resolved into the self, where the *given* completely disap-

pears. The self or Ātman or Brahman of the Vedānta is not to be taken as the subject, but is something which transcends the distinction between the subject and the object, which is beyond all relational consciousness. The internal division between the subject and its ideas forming the object also disappears, and the experience is one of a higher type of immediacy transcending relational thought. The question of the criterion of truth cannot arise here at all, simply because there is no idea of which we have to determine truth or error. Truth or error is ordinarily determined by referring to the relation of agreement or disagreement between the subject's 'idea' and some 'other' taken as the 'fact.' Here the subject cannot distinguish itself from its idea and as such all interval between the subject and the idea which alone can raise the question of truth and error, is bridged over. The idea is resolved into the subject, and the subject remains not as a barren abstraction apart from the object (as is sometimes supposed), but the relational consciousness of the bifurcating discursive intellect is elevated to the higher immediacy of intuitional apprehension. Where the self as subject knows the not-self appearing as the object, it is an instance of the one receiving or knowing an 'other.' This 'other-ness' may gradually thin away as the object approaches nearer and nearer the subject appearing first as the external object, next as ideas within, next as ideas belonging to the subject itself; but it is only when the idea is completely merged in the subject or rather when subject as the knower and the object as known resolve themselves into the non-relational consciousness, then only the 'other-ness' becomes completely extinct. At any stage short of this, knowledge implies the grasping or acquiring by the subject of something which is (at least partially) other than itself, and as such implying a *process*, a *movement*, depending upon some conditions. The unconditionality of knowledge, which alone can supply its own criterion or more strictly which is above the requirement of any criterion, involves the complete annihilation of this 'other-ness' of the object, and as such the very distinction of the subject and the object. This is what Sankara is at great pains to explain to us as the *svayam-prakāśatva* and *nityatva* of *jñāna*. Knowledge must be at the last step unconditional,—depending upon no conditions and no

process, must be eternal and absolute, must depend on nothing else as its further criterion. To ask always for a criterion of knowledge and truth and not to reach the goal is to declare the impossibility of knowledge and the bankruptcy of the human reason. Sankara clearly explains the difference between this *jñāna* where the Ātman alone shines unhampered and unresisted by any not-self and all other forms of knowledge implying the not-self as an object. As Sankara puts it :—

तस्माज् ज्ञानमेवात्मनो लाभः । न अनात्मलाभवदप्राप्तिलक्षण आत्मलाभः ।  
लब्धलब्धव्ययोर्भेदाभावात्, यत्र हि आत्मनोऽनात्मा लब्धव्यो भवति, तच्चात्मा  
लब्धा, लब्धव्योऽनात्मा । स च उ त्पाद्यादिक्रियाव्यवहितः कारकविशेषो-  
त्पादनेन क्रियाविशेषमुत्पाद्य लब्धव्यः । स तु अप्राप्तप्राप्तिलक्षणोऽनित्यः ।

(Therefore *jñāna* alone is all that the self acquires. The acquisition of the self is not like the acquisition of the not-self, an acquisition of something new—getting of something which was not—because here there is no distinction between the gainer and the gained.)

Knowledge which is knowledge of an object depends upon the latter and also upon some factors conditioning the process. The truth of this knowledge depends upon the truth of the object and the veracity of the process, and the testing of truth through an 'other' leads to infinite regress. Moreover, such conditional knowledge can never be eternal as it depends upon non-permanent conditions, and as such can never be ultimate.

Only *svayamprakāśa jñāna* is self-evident; it is the ideal of knowledge and it is the ultimate goal of all philosophy and religion. Here there is complete identity of thought and being. This is the real basis of the ontological argument. The *svayamprakāśa* or unconditional revelation is not only real,—that is, not as an idea that alone is real—but in its...presence all discussions about the distinction between the ideal and the real, between thought and reality, become an absurdity. Searching through the dim rays of light which lighted all objects when one arrives at the source of

all light and which is all-light, need he prove that that is light and how can he prove it? 'The ideal and the real become one, the subject and the object become the same in the *svayamprakāśa jñāna* which is their fountain-head. Here it is free from all object-relation. It does not reveal any object—there is no *drśya* or *jaḍa*. It is *vishayaśūnya* and *vritti-śūnya* and as such it is not also the subject which exists only as related to an object. It is not the support (*āśraya*) of *jñāna* but is *jñāna* itself. This *jñāna* is real not because it is the clearest and distinctest of all our ideas as Descartes had supposed, but because it is no idea at all having a subject which has it or an object which is other than it. God as an *idea* always remains an *idea*, and the transition from idea to existence always involves a fallacious procedure, and the arguments of Kant hold good against this step. But the real ontological argument, regarding the Absolute as the *experience* which is the *prius* of subject and object, thought and reality, the source and fountain-head of all dualistic thought-relation, which being not merely an idea as distinguished from the subject, but being an *experience* in which the subject is resolved, asserts its own existence by its very presence, is free from, and above all, criticisms from the level of the dividing intellect. The ontological argument is open to criticism so long as the distinction between the ideal and the real is retained by the everdividing intellect and the transition from thought to existence is certainly a bold fallacious step at this stage, but in an experience where the distinction between the subject and the object is transcended, the argument appears not only to be true but almost seems to be a truism.

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# THE UPANISHADS IN RELATION TO PRACTICAL LIFE.

BY

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The human intellect has started contradictions which it finds hard to reconcile. Just as the prism breaks up the white light into many colours, the intellect also analyses and breaks up the synthetic unity of knowledge into contradictory couples, such as mind and matter, absolute and relative, finite and infinite, right and wrong, etc. In doing so the parcelled universe of thought and reality loses its undivided wholeness and is split up into abstract notions, devoid of the fulness of life and its meaning as an organic unity. This capacity for analysis which is the peculiar excellence of the intellect is also its greatest drawback. Though Science undoubtedly adds to the clarity of thought by analysis, the process leads to the substitution of abstract unrealities severed from their proper settings. The silk-worm elaborately spins out a silken house into which it retires. But in the silence and darkness of its cell undergoes a marvellous transformation and builds itself up entirely anew, breaks through its self-made prison and comes out into the sunshine and breeze of the outer world in its gorgeous uniform a wonderful creature in form, colour, and function. We have woven for ourselves an abode which is bright and beautiful but which has at the same time its distracting conundrums. Kant's antinomies are the logical outcome of human thought and defeat intellectual solution. In vain do we seek a way of escape from these perplexities which are our own creation. There are departments of life where the solution of contradictions becomes an imperative necessity. In moral life, in Religion, in the practical views of life as set up by commonsense, the problems attain



special importance and have to be faced and tackled. In this paper I will draw attention to the solutions afforded by the Upanishads.

## I

### THE PRAGMATIC APPEAL.

The Upanishads arose out of a practical need. The query had its origin in a deep dissatisfaction with the accepted views and ideas of life. The pursuit of the ends of life as they were understood ultimately destroyed themselves. Life in this world or in similar worlds after death could be conceived only as a cycle, a repetition of the same process again and again. It was always birth, growth, decay, death, either under earthly or more favourable conditions. It was an inevitable go-round in which one had to come back to the same point over and over again. It was a whirlpool out of which there was no escape, a spinning which commenced again immediately after it was over. It was not a life of progress evenly and continuously maintained. The caterpillar passes into the pupa stage, from pupa it becomes a butterfly, lives in that life for a while, and, when mature, immediately transfers itself into the concentrated life of its eggs and dies. The eggs mature and produce caterpillars and the same round of varied existence is faithfully reproduced. It is a waste of energy in endless gyrations. There was therefore a sigh for something better, a gnawing hunger for a better and higher end which would offer an escape from the perpetual rotations of mundane existence, from *samsāra*. Both in the Upanishads and in Buddhism, the practical necessity out of which the rational and ethical systems arose was the same, though the technique and the goal aimed at were somewhat different. The painful pessimism in both these quests was but a throe which led to a new birth and a new orientation of life-activity a fresh vision of reality. The earnest student seeks his teacher and works a hundred years practising self-discipline and growing in self-knowledge in order that he may get that knowledge and that practical attitude towards reality which would take him

beyond sorrow and death, which would enable him to escape from the whirl of rebirths inevitably culminating in death and repeated births.

## II

### THE NEW ORIENTATION.

The change in the outlook was both a denial and an affirmation, a denial of existence-values and a rehabilitation of life on a firmer and securer conception of reality. The passion for negation which interpenetrates the Upanishads and Buddhism is well-known. In one case it was the pursuit of truth which would free one from error, in the other case it was the pursuit of truth which would free one from bondage. There is a tone of sadness which pervades the Upanishads with regard to everything finite and ephemeral in Knowledge, in the conception of reality and in the practical pursuits of life. With an intense earnestness the *rishi* cries for the unveiling of Truth which is concealed under the cover of this bright and beautiful world; there is no uncertain warning about the end of the man who dies ignorant of the true meaning of life and the universe; and sadly the ancient teachers sigh over the aberrations of men who follow others who, themselves, are steeped in error pretending to be teachers and guides. The traditional sources of knowledge such as the Vedas and the allied studies are repeatedly and forcibly assigned a place which is inferior to true Knowledge, the Knowledge of the True Real. The Upanishads demand a deeper knowledge and a higher interpretation of experience in the light of which alone a new adaptation to practical life is possible. The paramount quest in the Upanishads is an idealism which does not deny but gives a new meaning to the pluralism of common sense, and seeks a truer adaptation to reality. The ordinary outlook is that of a plural universe, everything being separate and individualistic. The synthetic vision does not destroy but gathers up the plural universe into an all-embracing unity. It is only a higher apperception in which the many lose their disparateness and find a new meaning and an abiding place in the

One. In order to get a collective and unified outlook of a valley we have to climb the steep sides and get to a higher elevation from which the whole valley is seen not in parts but as a whole. The Botanist cuts up a plant and makes minute sections of the tissues. But all this labour is undertaken in order to have a higher and deeper view of the plant as a whole. The new interpretation does not abolish the details but imparts to them a meaning which is new and reveals a new purpose. The Upanishads have no delusions about the hard and sustained labour which brings about the consummation. The highest knowledge is not for the man who is timid and weak. Just as the caterpillar buries itself in its cocoon and creates itself anew through intense concentration and unwavering endeavour in the silence and loneliness of its silken refuge, the New Man of the Upanishads has to create himself anew before he can emerge out of his imprisonment, and like the resplendent butterfly, enjoy the blissful sunshine and the pure breezes of a new world born out of the old world which stands transformed and transfigured in the light of the new vision he has gained.

We find the keynote of the new organon of life in the opening slokas of the *Īsopanishad*. Whatever may be the interpretation of the verses according to the contending schools, one thing is clear, *viz.*, the stress which is laid upon the immanence of the Universal Principle. It is this immanence that knits the whole universe in the relation of Kinship and abolishes the differences of "mine" and "thine," and leaves no occasion for selfish isolation. Once we are convinced that we are parts of one organic unity constituting the universe, the limiting sense of individuality is overwhelmed and submerged by the tide of universality which flows over and outspreads all existence. Our individual lives overflow their boundaries and we become sharers of the vaster life in us and around us. This is looking at life from a new point of view. It is the vision of the New Man of the Upanishads, reborn and baptised in a new creed of enlightenment. Life still retains all its multifarious realities, its duties and enjoyments, its labours and its achievements, but it has undergone a subtle and revolutionary change. Knowledge breaks the chains which holds the ordinary man in bondage, and it makes him free. He continues

to live and breathe as other men do, but it is not the detached, separate, individual life which ordinary men live. The knowledge has made him *jīvana-mukta*. His life is a moment in the life of the universe, it thrills and throbs with the universal heart. It is not exclusive, it is all-inclusive. The sense of this oneness fills him with a new energy which grows and expands and makes for eternity. Reborn in the new life, he has gone beyond sorrow and bereavement, decay and death. He has become immortal.

“ Oh Gargi,” says Jājñavalkya, “ the man, who ignorant of the imperishable *Parabrahma*, tends the fire, performs sacrifices, practises penance for thousands of years, gains something which is perishable; the man who goes out of this world without knowing the Imperishable, is an object of pity; but the man who leaves this world after knowing the Imperishable is the true Brāhmaṇa.”

The new Knowledge is different from the traditional and produces a revolutionary effect on the meaning and out-look of life and of that which is beyond life.

“ The knower of Brahman,” says the *Taittirīya*, “ gains Him.” And again, “ One who knows the true, the intelligent, the eternal Brahman as the indwelling spirit, enjoys all that is desirable attuned to the Brahman.”

The true knowledge does not lead to a life of ascetic abstraction. It is a full-orbed existence filled with Brahman and rich in all details which attain a new meaning through Him.

### III

#### EXISTENTIAL VALUES AND ORDERS OF REALITY.

The orientation is completed by the changed attitude towards reality. The fundamental note in the symphony of the new knowledge is struck by the famous passages which explain the relation between the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute: “ *Nālpe sukhamasti, yo vai Bhūmā tat sukham* ” (the Finite brings no joy, the Infinite alone is bliss). The pursuits which lead to the attainment of limited things such as “ *hasti-*

hiranyam '' (elephants and gold), '' dāsabhāryyam '' (slaves and wives), '' Kshetrāṇyāyatanāni '' (fields and homesteads) do not bring satisfaction, it is only in the attainment of Brahman who dwells in His own glory that our consummation consists. Though the finite and the plural are thus assigned a lower place in the orders of reality, they are not abolished. The plural and the One are two points of view, two angles of vision. But both are real. When things are looked at separately and out of a relation to the whole, the universe appears as pluralistic; when they are caught up and viewed in the unity of the All, the pluralistic world becomes an organic whole. The Infinite interpenetrates and transcends the finite and supplies the life, the energy, the integrating principle which realises itself in and through the multiple universe inside and outside of us. '' *Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma tajjalānīti* '' (all this is Brahman,—proceeding from it, inseparable from it, and energised by it). This is the fundamental idea which pervades the Upanishadic literature. The universe is a dependent existence which cannot be severed from the central principle, the Brahman, and is energised and vitalised by it. It is conditional and relative but at the same time gives colour and concreteness to the Absolute in which it is imbedded and from which it derives its existence and function. It is in the light of this interpretation that the relation between ourselves and Brahman and that between the outer universe and Brahman are to be understood. '' *So'ham* '' and '' *Tattvamasi* '' present no difficulties when thus understood and accepted. If you resolve the Infinite into a blank, you negate and lose it. If you convert the Absolute into a colourless and relationless existence, you destroy its very life and reality. Brahman is a full-orbed reality scintillating with life in every part and giving life and reality to the dependent plural existence.

#### IV.

##### THE RESULTING CONATIVE AND ÆSTHETIC ATTITUDE.

The new knowledge and the new life are to be *attained*; they are not given. Just as in sense-experience, recognition comes in

flashes and completes the depth and meaning of apperception, and is an attainment and not a merely congenital psychophysical endowment whose history begins millions of years before man takes his place in the arena of life, so the higher apperception and synthetic vision of Reality has to be attained by striving. The great citadel of ignorance has to be stormed and taken and demolished. The Upanishadic life is not a subjective dream, a phantasy of lotus-eaters. It is not a studied detachment from real life and a falling asleep by rendering the mind blank and emptying it of all its contents. It is not a life of quietude, a negation of all activity, of thought and action alike. The new illumination brings with it a new technique of living. That technique is internal, not external, in the discipline of thought, in the purification of character, not in the performance of sacrificial rites and in the vain hope of going into an external heaven. The great instrument of the new illumination is the discipline of the mind, in its intellectual as well as in its practical aspects, it is *mananam*, *nididhyāsanam* and purification of inner life.

The Upanishads do not speak to us in an uncertain language about the new æsthetic attitude. Brahman is described as *Ānandam*. It is from *Ānandam* that all this existence has come, it is *Ānandam* which sustains it, it is *Ānandam* into which everything is absorbed when things cease to function in time and space. Brahman is "*Prāṇārāmam*" "*Mana-Ānandam*," is dearer than sons, dearer than riches, dearer than everything that exists. It is through Brahman and for the sake of Brahman that things have their value and attract and interest us. The husband, we are told, is drawn to his spouse, not because *she* draws him but because the indwelling Spirit animates her and makes her lovable. All objects of joy thrill us because it is the indwelling Spirit which touches our heart-strings through them. The Brahman is the "*madhu*," the joy of the world and the world is the joy of the Brahman. It is with a startling thrill of joy that the idea comes home to our mind that consciously or unconsciously, we have imbibed Him through the joys which we have experienced in the simple innocent pleasures of sense-experience or the purer bliss of higher and maturer life. Two birds of beautiful plumage (*Jīvātmā* and

Paramātmā) dwell in love on the same tree, one enjoys the sweet-tasting fruits, the other looks on in abstinence. Our relation with Brahman is one of pure love and He delights in filling our lives with bliss.

## V

### A CHEERFUL OUTLOOK ON LIFE AND AN EMINENTLY PRACTICAL TECHNIQUE OF LIVING.

Though the origin of the enquiry in the Upanishads bears the stamp of the "pale cast of thought," the new light which it brings reveals a world the dominant note of which is one of joy and a triumphant joy. In fact one of the Upanishads finishes with a song of victory. What more inspiring message can there be than the message of our essentially divine nature, a phase of the realisation of the divine essence which permeates and blooms forth in everything that exists; what can be more illuminating than the creed which gives the deepest interpretation of life, what can be more charming and musical than the existence which is perfectly attuned to the Infinite? A beautiful simile in the texts gives a lucid vision of the transition from a dual to a monistic consciousness, from a pluralistic to a unified view of existence, the simile of the arrow and its target. The arrow is separate from the target so long as it does not penetrate it. The human soul is the arrow and supplies the driving power and with intense concentration aims at the Paramātmā which is the target and filled with the thought of Brahman speeds out and penetrates it and becomes one with it. We begin with a separatist conception but proceed towards a goal where individual consciousness merges in the cosmic and loses itself in the burst of light into which it sinks.

## VI

### CONCLUSION.

We thus see that the Upanishads supply us with an entirely new view of life, quite different from the early Vedic standpoint.

The Pluralism of the Vedas gives way to a unique unification of knowledge and reality which can stand the challenge of modern thought and criticism. As an organon of living the Upanishads supply us with an illumination and a practical plan of active existence which are eminently satisfactory. The strange theories which even now prevail among the learned and the unlearned are but like the big waves thrown up by a huge ocean liner and the long trail which it leaves behind in its course. While the Upanishads preach the Oneness of the universe bound together by a single fundamental principle, it does not abolish the infinite variety and multiplicity of the world of Mind or Nature. The great pantheon of Vedic deities which played such an important part in building up the Indo-Aryan civilisation in its earlier stages are gathered up in the conception of the one universal principle, the Om or Brahman. The Upanishads do full justice to the phenomenal as well as the noumenal aspects of reality and interpret in their own unparalleled way the intimate relationship between them. The search of the Upanishads had always a practical aim, *viz.*, the creation of the New Man of the deeper illumination which they produce and his adaptation to a new world in thought, action and emotional attitude which inevitably results from advanced enlightenment. At the same time the approach to knowledge is not limited by any barrier, and it is freely admitted that human progress is from Untruth to Truth, from Darkness to Light, from Death to Immortality. Truly does the sage declare that the man who boasts of knowing everything really knows very little and the man who is humble, sincere, and modest is far forward on the way to Truth. It is really a true scientific attitude, *viz.*, that we know and yet do not know, that though the limits of knowledge are being extended there is no finality which closes them. The man of illumination conscious of his essential divinity conquers Fear and defeats Death. Implanted in the bosom of the Eternal and the undying, his existence is ever progressive and never ending.

I was once sitting on the beach at Colombo watching the waves of the sea which came in vast heavings from the far outstretched horizon and the blue sky whose clear transparent depths



my eyes could neither penetrate nor fathom. I felt a sort of attunement to a Presence and a Power deeper than the utmost depths of the sea, more unfathomable than the unseen reaches of the blue sky. Just at that moment a Buddhist monk arrived, and I told him that whatever his great religion might teach us it does not proclaim to us the reality of the Infinite and Eternal and the necessity of attuning ourselves to the music of the universe.

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# IS SATKĀRYYAVĀDA IN VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA AN IMPROVEMENT ON THAT IN SĀṆKHYA?

BY

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Both Sāṅkhya and Viśiṣṭādvaita describe the theory of product (*Kāryya*) as *Satkāryyavāda*. The term *Satkāryyavāda* may be translated in the etymological sense as “ The theory that holds product (*Kāryya*) is real.” Though the same term is employed in both the systems its meaning widely differs in each. So it is better to interpret the terms consistently with the respective positions only after having a brief review of them.

I divide the following paper into four divisions. In the first division I give a brief summary of the *Satkāryyavāda* in Sāṅkhya ; in the second criticism of this view ; in the third a short sketch of the *Satkāryyavāda* in Viśiṣṭādvaita ; and in the fourth I try to show how the Viśiṣṭādvaita theory is an improvement on the Sāṅkhya. I represent the Sāṅkhya view on the basis of the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* and Viśiṣṭādvaita view on that of the *Tattva-Muktākalāpa* with its commentary *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

## I. A brief summary of the *Satkāryyavāda* in Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

The fundamental principle of Sāṅkhya is that either a thing is always real or it is always unreal. Consistently with this principle it holds that a product is real even before its production. This is proved by the very fact that it is a product. If it were not real, it would never be produced. As for instance we may take a sky-lotus. It is unreal and so it can never be produced.

From this it follows that the things that are produced are always real.

It is well known that the appearance of a product is the result of the causal operation. If the causal operation is to help the appearance of a product then it must actually be in contact with the product. Otherwise the appearance of the product would be impossible. This implies that the product is real even before its production.

All causes do not give rise to all products. Only particular causes produce particular products. It is only oil seeds that produce oil, and not sand. This is because the product is already contained in the cause (material cause). Oil seeds give rise to oil, because the latter is already contained in the former. Sand does not produce oil because it does not contain the latter. And to say that a product is contained in the material cause before its production is to say that it is existent then.

It may be asked : how is it that a product, which is supposed to be always real, does not appear before the operation of the causes? In answering this question we have to note that the causal operation does not really give rise to the product, but it only helps its appearance. If it is to give rise to products, then all causes ought to give rise to all products, and even sand ought to give rise to oil. This is not the case at all. So causes only help the appearance of products. From this we have to understand that a product before its production is in the form of its material cause, *i.e.*, it is latent in the material cause. But this does not mean that it is unreal. It is latent because it is existent.

The function of the causal operation consists in removing the obstruction that stands in the way of the appearance of the product which is latent in the cause. This may be illustrated by taking the case of a ryot who only removes obstruction in making the water in the channel flow into a field of lower level. In the same way a carver carves a statue in a marble by removing a certain portion of the marble which stands in the way of the appearance of the statue, and an oil-maker removes that portion of the oil seed which stands in the way of the appearance of the oil. The flowing

nature of water, the statue or the oil is not produced by the ryot, the carver or the oil-man. They are there even before their appearance. So products and their material causes are not different things. Products are always real and it is in this sense that the theory of the products is called Satkāryavāda—*existent product theory* by which we have to understand that the product is always real as product, though it is latent for some time and patent at other times.

## II. Criticism of the Satkāryavāda in Sāṅkhya.

It is well known that products are produced from proper materials. The Sāṅkhya theory of product is quite inconsistent with this fact. The fact that a product is produced refutes the position that it is always existent and the fact that it is produced from proper materials explains how causal operation would have any meaning only when the products are regarded as produced and not already existent. So the experience that products are produced from proper materials gives a clue as to their nature. If products are always existent why should they be found only at a particular time, and why should there be any necessity for the operation of the respective causes? They are found because they were not existent before production and there is the necessity for the causal operation because they are to be produced.

The Sāṅkhya also with all its affirmation that product is the same as the material cause implicitly holds that the former is different from the latter. Otherwise its division of *Tatvas* into *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* would be meaningless. Here *prakṛti* means material cause and *vikṛti* product.

The Sāṅkhya view that the causal operation does not bring about the product but it only manifests it, is not sound. According to Sāṅkhya the so-called cause really stands for the manifesting agent. Cause and the manifesting agent are not identical. A cause brings about a particular product and it has nothing to do with other products. But a manifesting agent is not so. It is a revealer. It does not reveal only a particular product where

there are others. It reveals all. As for instance we may take a jar. This is a product. Clay, etc., are its cause and light is a revealer. Clay, etc., are concerned only with the production of the jar, but light is not so. It has nothing to do with the production of the jar. It only manifests the jar that is existing. When it reveals the jar, it not only reveals the particular jar but other products also that accompany it. So it is wrong to call the revealer cause. For the same reason Sāṅkhya cannot regard clay, etc., as the causes of jar, etc. Such a position as this is inconsistent with experience. It is experienced by us all that clay, etc., are the causes of jar, etc. Jar, etc., are products because they are caused by clay, etc. So the Sāṅkhya position that the so-called production is only manifestation is incorrect.

It is stated that the causal operation must be in relation to the effect. This is not necessary. No such relation is given by experience. Simply we know that particular causes produce particular effects. From this it never follows that the effect is already existent in the cause.

So to say that a product is in its material cause in a subtle form is baseless. There is no necessity to hold any such view. In fact the opposite would be correct. It is quite certain that the efficient causes of a certain product do not contain the product in any form. In the same way the material cause also need not contain it in any form.

Further in the interest of its theory, Sāṅkhya cannot disregard experience. If its theory is pushed further, it ought to admit that just as the produced is contained in the producer, the destroyed also ought to be contained in the destroyer. If this is true it will be impossible to hold anything as a destroyer, as it itself contains the destroyed. Light is a destroyer of darkness. If it is viewed as containing darkness, then it is impossible to account for the fact that it removes darkness. Consistently with the Sāṅkhya position nothing ought to be opposed to anything.

Further Sāṅkhya does not gain anything by holding that a product is not produced but only manifested. For even according

to Sāṅkhya, the manifestation of a product must either be produced or be manifested. In the former case the existent product theory is partly given up, and in the latter case the manifestation of manifestation also ought to be manifested and this involves a vicious regress *ad infinitum*.

Thus the Sātkāryyavāda of Sāṅkhya does not stand criticism. The reason for this may be found in that Sāṅkhya is not consistent with experience.

### III. *The Sātkāryyavāda in Viśiṣṭādvaita.*

Consistently with experience we have to hold that the production of a product is caused by causal operation. This shows how a product is fresh and not already existent in the material cause. But from this we must not conclude that it is different from its material cause. For to hold that a product is different from its material cause is not supported by experience. Threads form the material cause of a cloth. If the cloth is different from the threads, then the weight of the cloth ought to be more than the weight of the threads. For there are threads in the cloth and the cloth is different from the thread. This means that there are or ought to be reckoned both the weight of the threads and that of the cloth. But experience tells us that the weight of the cloth is the same as that of the threads, and this points to the identity of them.

So according to experience we have to conclude that a product and its material cause are not different substances. The product may be named differently from its material cause, its number may vary, its use may be different and its apprehension may be of a different form, its force may be different and it may exist at a different time; but yet we have no reason to believe that they are different. Such differences may be explained as those that are due to the difference of the states of an identical thing. This may be illustrated by the case of a leaf, which as a leaf is called a leaf, and, as folded, a folded leaf. The same leaf having two states—the state of a leaf and that of a folded leaf—is differently regarded under different conditions. The same is the case with a jar which

as mere clay is regarded as the material cause, and, as jar, as a product. Similar is the explanation regarding other products.

Thus the so-called cause and product are mere states of an identical substance. The states are different but the substance is the same. If they are not regarded as states, but as different substances, then it is to deny their existence altogether. For it is well known that a substance that has touch does not give room for another substance that has touch. A jar, for instance does not give room for a cloth in its place. In the same way cause and product which are regarded as different things have both of them touch. So cause ought not to have given rise to product. So there ought not to have been anything as cause or product.

So from these considerations it follows that cause and product are different phases of the same thing. Now a particular thing, say cotton, has a phase and is called thread and then owing to some circumstance has another phase and is called cloth.

The same position may further be substantiated by a permanent character of things. Let us take for instance a quantity of cotton. If it is pressed it becomes smaller in size; if not, it is of a bigger size. Though the sizes, in other words, the states, are different, recognition (*Pratyabhijnā*) proves that the cotton is identical. Similarly we may recognise the identity of clay in whatever state it is thrown. This points to the fact that cause and product are not different things but only different states. If this is denied then even the slightest change in a thing ought to make it entirely different. Such a position as this makes experience quite impossible.

This theory that cause and product are different states of an identical substance is also called *Satkāryavāda* in the sense that the substance is identical. Now we may interpret the "Existent Product Theory" as meaning that the product as substance exists always. But here we must not forget that the same substance is called product because of a change that has occurred to it accidentally.

*IV. An answer to the question : is Satkāryavāda in Viśiṣṭādvaita an improvement on that in Sāṅkhya?*

We know that in Sāṅkhya product as product is regarded as identical with the material cause and we also know how such a position is opposed to experience. Sāṅkhya lost sight of the fact that the same thing may undergo changes, and consequently arrived at the position that product as product is contained in the cause.

On the other hand Viśiṣṭādvaita, as it has been already shown deduces every step as a necessary implication of experience, and consequently is thoroughly consistent with it. By holding that cause and product are mere phases of the same substance it has solved all the difficulties that Sāṅkhya felt in accepting the position that cause and product are different things. To say that a product is produced is not to say that the unreal becomes real. The product, as the substance, is real always. So far the Sāṅkhya principle that the real is always real holds good. But we must not forget that the same substance from the point of view of a particular phase is called product, and that this phase in the substance is caused by accidental circumstances. Since the conditions are accidental the phase is also accidental. This is supported by experience. So the consideration that it also must always be real is baseless. Further we have to note that the appearance of a phase is always relevant both to the nature of the thing of which it is a phase, and the nature of the conditions. It is the nature of the 'oil seeds' to give rise to 'oil' under suitable conditions. Under no circumstance does 'sand' give rise to 'oil.' For not to give rise to 'oil' is the nature of 'sand.' Thus particular things have particular natures and consistently with them they exhibit particular capacities. Further the causal conditions need not be in actual relation with the product if it is to be produced, because the product is the result of the causal conditions.

Thus the Satkāryavāda in Viśiṣṭādvaita is an implication of experience; whereas that in Sāṅkhya is merely an assumption, though at the first appearance it seems to be supported by experience. Sāṅkhya ignored certain features of experience in the interest of refuting Asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika which



holds that cause and product are different things, and as opposed to the latter tried to establish that cause and product are identical. But Viśiṣṭādvaita makes use of both these theories and consistently with experience improves upon them by way of establishing its Satkāryavāda which stands for the idea, as already observed, that cause and product are different phases of an identical substance.

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## SAMKARA'S CONCEPTION OF THE ABSOLUTE.

BY

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*Samkara* uses both the terms *Ātman* and *Brahman* as synonyms to designate the Absolute. The *Ātman* is the *Brahman*. The innermost principle in man is the innermost principle of the world outside. Still the term *Brahman* necessarily suggests reality reached objectively, through a consideration of the cause of the world and the term *Ātman* suggests reality reached subjectively, through an analysis of experience. In *Samkara*, as in the *Upaniṣads* before him, we find that there is objective as well as subjective approach to the Absolute. It is necessary here to raise the question, *viz.*, What, according to *Samkara*, is the guiding principle in the search of truth? or in other words, What is the criterion of the Real? What is precisely the mark which the Real should possess and the Unreal should lack? *Samkara's* answer to his question would be that the criterion of Reality is permanence. Reality, if anything at all, must be permanent. That which exists to-day and ceases to exist to-morrow can hardly deserve the name of reality. It is but a travesty of reality. He tells us in his commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.1 : " That is real which does not allow its ascertained nature to be contradicted; contrariwise, that is unreal which suffers a change or contradiction in its nature." The nature of a thing may be contradicted by growth or decay, by alteration or destruction. In the commentary on the *Gītā*, II. 16, he defines reality as " that, the cognition whereof, is never contradicted." The cognition (*buddhī*) with regard to a pot or a jar is sure to be contradicted at one time or other but the being as such, 'isness,' *sattā* is never to be contradicted. He remarks in this connection that the Reality has the character of a substan-

tive while the particular things are merely adjectival. Judged by this criterion of permanence, *i.e.*, absence of negation or contradiction, everything that exists in the realm of nature or that happens in the realm of mind is found to be unreal as being subject to change. But mere change as such is unthinkable unless there is some ground in which the change occurs. This leads *Samkara* to the conception of the Absolute as the world-ground, *Brahman* as the *Adhiṣṭhāna* of the world. It is to be noted, here, that the *Brahman* is not the permanent that changes; it is the permanent that makes change possible, itself remaining changeless. *Samkara's* Absolute has not the character of that which retains its identity of form amidst continuous alterations of matter. It is absolutely static. The *Brahman* is not *Parināmīnitya*, but it is *Kūṭastha-nitya*. *Samkara* would warn us against attributing that permanence to *Brahman*, which only means existence in all time, for that conception is relatively derived from the empirical notion of change. *Brahman* transcends duration and does not fill all time in the sense that it is nothing above time. (Cf. *Praśna* 4.1.) In the same way when it is said that *Brahman* is infinite, it does not show that it fills all space; it only demonstrates that the true character of the Absolute is non-spatial.

This brings us to the question: What is the essential nature of Reality? Is it material or spiritual, granting that is permanent? *Samkara's* answer is that it is spiritual. Numerous passages in the Śruti such as *Vijñānamānandam-Brahma*, *Satyam-Jñānam-Anantam Brahma*, etc., declare that reality must be spiritual in nature. Reality is pure knowledge or consciousness as such. Apart from the evidence of authority, the reasons, which *Samkara* adduces to prove that the ultimate reality must be spiritual, may be gathered from his refutation of the *Sāmkhya* metaphysics. His main contention against the *Sāmkhyas* is to the effect that whatever is material in nature cannot in the last resort, be conceived as being self-determined. The material cannot possess the power which creation and wise governance of the world show that the underlying principle should possess. It should be remembered that this argument is only intended to disprove the claims of a materialist who is a *Parināmavādin* and believes

realistically in an evolutionary process of creation, and is not vital to his own position as a *vivartavādin*.

But in another and a more important respect the material betrays its lack of self-determination. That which is material (*jaḍa*) depends upon the spiritual (*chit*) for its being known. Whatever has the character of materiality is an object (*dṛśya*). Whatever is an object lacks self-sufficiency of existence and necessarily refers itself to the Subject (*draṣṭā*). The object is dependent on the Subject. The distinction of the Subject from the object is a point which is central in *Samkara's* system and the nature of the Subject as such, gives, according to *Samkara*, a clue to the nature of the Absolute. It is perhaps for this reason that *Samkara* opens his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* with this topic of the contrast between the Subject and the object, *Viṣayī* and *Viśaya*. He states that the "Subject and the object are as much opposed in nature as light and darkness." The Subject is *chit*, pure consciousness, and the object is *jaḍa*. The Subject being *chit* is self-luminous, known through itself and the object is known as an 'other' by the subject. The *Adhyāsa* which is a crucial point in his system he defines as the indiscriminate identification of the Subject and object, *Ātmā* and *Anātmā*.

It is evident from this that *Samkara* does not use the terms Subject and object in an epistemological sense. The Subject, that is *Draṣṭā* or *Sākṣī*, is different from the knower, *Pramātā* (Com. on *Ait. Up.* 3). The *knower* is only a particular mode of *Buddhi*, a state of consciousness, whereas the Subject is pure, unmodified consciousness. Epistemologically speaking, the knower is as much dependent on the known as the known is on the knower. The relativity between the two is complete and the one is inseparable from the other. Metaphysically speaking, the knower has the character of object (*Dṛśya*). According to *Samkara*, the external things, the body, the sense-organs and the mind together with all its particular modes such as cognitions, feelings, hopes, desires, etc., are objects. Only the innermost self, which never becomes the object but to which all objects are presented, is the Subject.

But do we know the innermost self, the Subject that never becomes the object? *Samkara* answer this question in the affirmative. He expressly says that the Subject (*Viṣayī*) is experienced in the awareness of the self (*Asmat-pratyayagochara*). The self's awareness of itself is the only clue which is supplied to us towards our understanding of the nature of the Absolute. But we must make sure as regards the precise nature of the awareness of ourselves. It should be clearly recognised that the awareness of the self is quite different from the awareness of objects. In the phrase 'awareness of self' the 'of' is not the 'of' of reference but it is the 'of' of apposition, as it is sometimes called. The self and awareness are not two things but one; the self is awareness. It is in the self that being and knowledge meet in a manner which is unique being incomparable to any other experience. The self is self-evident, indubitably certain and unassailable by any species of scepticism. It is prior to all proofs; all proofs presuppose but cannot establish the self. The self which is awareness is prior to the distinction between subject and object. It, therefore, follows that the self which is subject cannot be brought before the mind and known as an object in a particular mental mode or a state of consciousness (*vṛtti*). And yet, at no point of time is it found missing. The self or the subject is known but it is not known as an object. We may say that the subject is 'experienced' and the object is 'known.' It might have been noticed that the self-awareness to which *Samkara* attaches so much importance is different from the notion of self-consciousness with which we are familiar in Western philosophy. Western thinkers regard that the experience in which the self is dichotomised, so that an aspect of the self stands over against itself as not-self, is the highest experience available to us. *Samkara* holds that it is by no means the highest experience, nor is this state essential or foundational. It is but a passing and momentary manifestation, which is relative to what is external and extraneous. The nature of the self or the subject as such is above all duality, difference or division. The *Ātman* has not the character of identity-in-difference, it is the unity pure and simple, the unity that excludes difference.

To those who maintain, like Hegel, that the Absolute is one in the many, that is, the one manifested or differentiated in the many, *Samkara* would say that so far as phenomenal things are concerned, such a combination of contradictory aspects is admissible; but the mixture of opposites is inconceivable so far as the ultimate Reality is concerned. (See Com. on *Bṛh. Up.* v. 1.) The contradictories are not reconciled simply by the fact of their being referred to the Absolute. This is exactly the point on which he lays great stress in his criticism of the doctrine of *Dvaitādvaitavāda*. (See Com. on *Bṛh. Sūtras* II. 1. xiv.) Unity as well as plurality cannot be true in the ultimate sense. As long as the experience of plurality is there, the view of unity is beyond reach; and when once the knowledge of unity dawns, there is an end to all plurality. The Reality cannot be one and many. It is one, only it appears as many.

If once it is rightly apprehended that self-awareness is foundational in all our experience, and that it is prior to the distinction of subject and object, there will be no difficulty in understanding the unique homogeneity of *Samkara's* Absolute; this will also help one in resolving the seeming contradiction in *Samkara's* view. He once says that the *Ātman* is pure subject (*viśayi*) and is quite different from the object; but, again, pressed by an objector who urges that if it be so, no *adhyāsa* on the *ātman* is possible, as *adhyāsa* occurs only with regard to that which is an object presented from without, *Samkara* concedes that the *Ātman* is not altogether a non-object, but it is the object in self-awareness (Introduction, *Brahma Sūtras* I. 1. i; I. 1. iv). The truth is that the self is never an object, if the term object is strictly taken to mean as that which 'stands before' the mind, so to say, and is caught in a momentary cognition. But it does not follow from this that the self is altogether unknown and a foreign entity. It is rather with the self that we can be said to be most directly and intimately acquainted. The immediacy of self-knowledge is unique and therefore it is no contradiction but a statement of fact to say that the self is never 'known as an object' and yet in a sense it is always 'known or rather experienced as subject.' This emphasis which *Samkara* lays on the intimacy of self-knowledge

is a strong consideration against the tendency, which is visible in some quarters, to interpret *Samkara's* Absolute as being one that is known only through an extraordinary faculty of knowledge! The Absolutism of *Samkara* is mysticism only so far as the question of the 'realisation' of the *Ātman* is concerned, but so far as simply the establishment of truth within the domain of a philosophical system goes, *Samkara* does not seem to go beyond the facts and presuppositions of experience. The intimacy (*aparokṣatā*) of the innermost self is, for *Samkara*, both the proof of the existence of the Absolute and also the guarantee of our identity with it (*Aparokṣatrāt cha pratyagātmā prasiddheḥ*, Com. on *B.S.* I. 1. i; *Sarvasyātmatrachcha Brahmāstitvaprasiddhiḥ*). If it is urged that if all are acquainted with the *Ātman*, then there is no need of philosophical teaching, *Samkara* would say in reply that though all are familiar with the innermost self, they fail to understand the exact nature of it, hence also the divergence of views about the nature of the self.

In order to prove the permanence of the immanent principle in our experience as the ground of its unity and continuity, *Samkara* following the *Upaniṣads*, makes use of the argument of the different states of the soul, *viz.*, the waking, dream, sleep, and *Turiya*. But it is necessary to recognise that in his view, the different states are not the successive stages of the 'transformation' of the *Ātman*. They are rather the media through which we look at the *Ātman*, so to say, and as it is the case with all media, they do not show the reality as it is, but rather in a more or less perverted form. To the question: What is the relation of the states to the *Ātman*? *Samkara* replies that there is no relation as such (Com. on *Māṇḍūkya Up.* 7). The reality is above all relations. If there appears to be any relation between the *Ātman* and the states and contents of experience, *viz.*, the one between that which unites and that which is united, it is due to *adhyāsa*, that is, indiscriminate unification or identification of the real and the unreal. *Samkara* refers us to the example of the proverbial 'rope,' if we are to know how one and the same real thing gives rise to many false appearances. Just as the illusory appearances of a 'snake,' 'streak of water,' etc., are exclusive of

each other in the sense that when one is there, the other cannot be, in the same way, he tells us, the different states are exclusive of each other so that when waking or sleep is there, dream or *Turiya* cannot be experienced. The *Ātman* in its unity is the only reality, the manifold states are appearances, and between the Reality and the appearances there cannot be any real relation.

The position of *Samkara* appears to be unique so far as the question of the relation of Reality and unreality, between the Absolute and the appearances, is concerned. He is quite particular about the homogenous character of the Real. He does not admit any admixture of unreality in Reality. The Brahman is, according to him, '*ekarasa*.' When once *Samkara* reaches reality, whether it be by *tarka*, or by the guidance of the authority of *Śruti*, he is not ready to relate in any way the Absolute with the appearances. It is necessary to remember that *Samkara* never makes any attempt to deduce the world of experience from the Absolute. In him there is no anxiety to 'save the appearance'? Saving the appearances is a demand of empirical consciousness. The metaphysical truth of the identity of the cause and the effect, of the Brahman and the world, when rightly understood and logically followed, puts an end to all talk of the world being caused by *Brahman* and its perpetual existence. To say with *Samkara*, that the *Brahman* is the ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the world-appearance as the 'rope' is of the 'snake'-appearance or the 'shell' is of the 'silver'-appearance, is to hold that the world apart from the Brahman is nothing at all, and there is only the one, non-dual Brahman. *Samkara's* answer to the question of the relation of the Absolute to the world consists in showing that the question itself is illegitimate after the right conception of the nature of the Absolute. The Absolute is the only reality and the world is unreal and nothing apart from the Absolute and therefore there can be no relation at all between them, for a relation requires two terms, each of which is different from the other, existing side by side with the other and here in the situation concerned there are not two terms but only one (*na hi sadasatoḥ sambandhaḥ*) (Com. on *Māṇḍ. Up.* II. 7).

It will be easily seen, from what has been said, that this



uncompromising attitude of *Samkara* lends no support to any realistic interpretation of his thought. Such interpretation draws its plausibility from statements like "Just as the substratum *Brahman* does not lose its existence or reality at any time past, present or future, exactly so does the world not lose its existence at any of the three divisions of time (Com. on *B. Sûtra* II. 1. xvi). Here the topic is concerning the identity of effect with cause. The emphasis is on the identity of the two and not the difference. When it is said that the world will never cease to exist, it only means that the possibility of the world appearing in *Brahman* will never be exhausted, and it is true because the cycle of creation and dissolution of the world is endless. But this is a doctrine of empirical science and not of metaphysical speculation. What *Samkara* insists on is the complete contrariety in the nature of the Real and the Unreal and when that is grasped the Unreal no longer exists apart from, and over against the Real. That the world will ever remain should not be taken to mean that there would be two entities side by side, the *Brahman* and the world both being equally real. This would go against the fundamental position of *Samkara* as an *Advaitavādin* and a *Vivartavādin*. To prevent any possible misrepresentation, he has not failed to add, immediately after the passage quoted above, that "Reality as such is only one and hence the identity of effect with cause." Thus our conclusion is that *Samkara's* conception of the Absolute is unique in the sense that he neither admits the appearances in the Absolute nor posits any relation between the Absolute and the appearances. The appearances exist only empirically, metaphysically they are non-existent. Self-luminous and self-satisfied, *Samkara's* Absolute 'stands in solid, static singleness!'

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# THE MEETING OF THE EAST AND THE WEST IN REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

BY

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The most prominent feature of Modern Realism is that it is not a body of systematic doctrines, but a methodological attempt at finding out what can be asserted as the ultimate truth regarding the world of our every-day experience. Realism starts with the view of common sense that the material objects of our perception have real existence outside of us. It regards the world as an aggregate of the many objects found in it. Realism, as the philosophy of the aggregate, furnishes only a catalogue of ultimate constitutive factors of the world. It is not, therefore, a systematic doctrine deducible from any single philosophical principle. It is content to deal with problems as they arise, in their isolation, and ascertain the truth in each of them separately.

The Realistic schools of the West arose as a protest against Idealism whose belief in the unreality of the world was a challenge to the progress of civilization. The rapid advance of the Natural Science, leading to new discoveries, catered to the comfort of mankind and as a consequence bred a sceptical faith in the doctrines inculcated by Idealism. Even so, the prominent school of Oriental Realism, *viz.*, Jainism, is believed to be the revolt of the robust commonsense of the Kshatriya against the philosophical rigmarole of the Brahmin.

The outstanding characteristics of the Realistic Schools of the West may be summarised as consisting in the protest that they have launched against the different schools of Idealism in the West, by which philosophy has been rescued from the arid, profitless abstractions of the Idealist and in the enunciation of a new theory

of Perception by which the material world of our existence, has been made safe for humanity and civilization.

In these features, we may observe a remarkable parallel to the Realistic systems of the East. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika, as in the Realism of the Jaina Philosophy, the problems discussed are almost the same and the views propounded, though different in certain particulars, are generally similar.

I propose to deal briefly with the refutation of Idealism. It is the common ground of all the Western schools of Modern Realism. Idealism regards the world as an organic whole of facts and their meanings. If a student for example, should be deeply studying in his room and if at the same time the sound of a marriage procession should be heard by him, he will at once interpret it as the music of the talented local piper. The fact and its interpretation constitute a single reference. The world of our experience is the world of our meanings. The philosophical search for the ultimate reality is the entire universe organised into a world of self-consistent meanings. Matter as brute material existence is unreal as an ultimate reality.

This position of the Idealist is assailed by the Realist. The Realist says that the Idealist draws an unwarranted conclusion from the premises. The premises are true but the conclusion of the Idealist does not follow. What follows logically is not the phenomenality of the world of things but their ontological necessity.

The Realist argues that the Idealist confuses the issue in perception by failing to distinguish between the object of perception and the act of perception. An act of perception takes place when the perceiving mind confronts objects existing outside of us. When facts are present before our sense organs, an act of perception results. Perception is the culmination of the process of discovery. In any act of discovery, the qualities and the characteristics discovered cannot totally exhaust their objects. They are more than their qualities or characteristics. Is an orange more than the sensations of yellowness, roundness, sweetness, etc? What constitutes the object as an object on the other hand, is the unity of the object—the state of togetherness that characterises the thing and its qualities. The Objects of perception are, therefore, that-

what complexes. If the 'that' should also be perceived, it will lose its character of the that and become another 'what.' Therefore the 'that' is mental, for what is not perceivable is only mental.

This is an unwarranted conclusion, says the Realist. The most prominent modern Realist, Bertrand Russell, argues in his book "Analysis of Mind" published in 1921 that the fundamental stuff of the world is neither mental nor material but consists of what he calls "neutral particulars." He relies on both physics and psychology to support his position. The Behaviorist school in psychology contends that mind is not a matter of direct observation but only an inference from the individual's behaviour. Though mind is not denied, it is at best only an inference. Matter, on the other hand, under the influence of physics has been growing steadily less material. The ultimates of matter are ether-stresses which are immaterial in their constitution. Mind and Matter grow out of this fundamental constitution of the world. They are, therefore, rightly regarded as inferences both by psychology and physics.

Taken in one context and arranged in a certain way, these neutral particulars give us mind; taken in another context, and arranged in another way, they give us matter. Space, world, matter, etc., are such constructions of these neutral particulars. These neutral particulars are not totally repellent. They exert mutual attraction and always exist in combination. In this way, matter has been saved and assigned an independent status equally with mind. This signalises the revolt of Realism against Idealism.

Realism has not furnished us with any systematic account of the universe. Its philosophy is commonsense philosophy. Its claim to recognition is that it is supported by the postulates of science. Its great merit lies in the penetrating analysis of the theories held by the other schools of philosophy.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina schools of Indian philosophy offer remarkable parallels on this subject of the ultimate constitution of the world. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there are nine fundamentally ultimate substances, out of which the world of our everyday experience has evolved. Of these, five are atomic and four are all-pervading. These are called *padārthas*.

The atomic padārthas are (1) Prithivī, (2) Āpah, (3) Tejas, (4) Vāyu, (5) Manas. The all-pervading padārthas are (1) Ākāśa, (2) Kāla, (3) Dig, (4) Ātman. Here we might observe a difference between the Greek and the Hindu conceptions of Primordial atoms which are the ultimate constituents of the world. We find Democritus, the Greek Philosopher, supporting the atomic hypothesis that atoms have no qualitative differences and that they are in a state of constant flux. But the atomic ultimates of Vaiśeṣhika are in a state of rest without quantitative but qualitative difference only. They possess mutual attraction. The world of our everyday experience is the result of their combinations in various ways. In such combinations they do not lose their identical existence. They retain their distinctness. The relations in which the padārthas stand to one another do not alter their character. This is the doctrine of the external relation advocated in modern times by the Modern Realist in an exactly similar strain.

Idealism holds that relations are parts or states, of the terms related. Every object in the Universe has certain relations to every other object. Let us take Madura. We know it is situated at a particular distance from Madras or Colombo. It is a town of historical antiquity, the headquarters of the Pandiyan Kings of old, and the present capital of the District. Unless it had all these relations, Madura will not be the Town that it is. Relations enter into the very essence of the object. Every object is closely related to every other object in the Universe. All things are inter-related and we are once more on the high road to the notion of system and Idealist Philosophy.

If the relations between any two things are external, they cannot alter the character of the things related. Nothing can be inferred from their being together. In the proposition 'Heat expands bodies,' if the relation between 'heat' and 'expansion' is only external, the connection is casual but not causal. On the other hand, wherever there is heat, there is expansion. The relation is grounded in the essence of the terms related, *viz.*, Heat and Expansion. Inference is possible between objects that are closely related. Inference implies system and system means internal relations. While the Idealist subscribes to the view that relations

are internal, he also leaves their nature whether external or internal to be empirically determined.

The Realistic objection to this view is that there are no such relations as internal at all. All relations are only external. Every relation is dependent on the relater, and the related. The fundamental defect of Idealism according to Russell is that it overlooks the distinction between quality and relation. The qualities possessed by objects are confused with the relations which they possess. Changes in relation do not alter the nature of the object while changes in quality do. Alter the colour of milk, it becomes different. Alter its relations to other objects, its nature is not changed. To say that relations are indispensable to the terms related is therefore to confound relations with qualities. Idealism makes such a convenient confusion and maintains that the relations are also internal.

The next move of the Realist is to prove that once when relations are understood to be purely external, they cannot alter the terms related. Water for example is a compound of Oxygen and Hydrogen. This combination of the two gases yields the liquid water. No doubt the two gases disappear as gases and produce a liquid. In such a disappearance oxygen and hydrogen retain their primordial or primitive nature as neutral particulars. But according to Russell, these gases are combinations of primeval neutral particulars. These neutral particulars taken in one context and arranged in a certain way have yielded oxygen, and similar is the case with hydrogen. Thus in all their combinations, physical or chemical what remains unaltered is the fundamental stuff, *viz.*, the neutral particulars. You cannot ask why these neutral particulars in a particular combination give us oxygen, and so on. The fact is that they are there in nature, and that is all.

To Russell therefore nature provides both terms and relations. They are out there in the world and our consciousness simply registers them. When we say A causes B it is wrong to think that it is in the nature of A to cause B. But what is true, says Russell, is that A and B are out there together. There is no such thing as necessity in A and B to bind themselves together as cause and effect. Nor can we ask why the terms get related at all. The truth is that they exist in combinations. The absolutely

independent neutral particulars which exist in combinations give us this empirical world. In such a combination they do not surrender their independence. These entities do come together but at the same time remain absolutely independent of one another. The relations between these neutral particulars are therefore external. External relation means that there is relating while the relata are left absolutely independent. This is the doctrine of external relations according to Russell.

The Realistic position comes to this, (1) The reality of the object is not to be sought for in our knowledge of it, (2) the nature of the object is independent of the perceiver and therefore non-mental.

A further coincidence may also be noticed in the doctrine of creation advocated by the Vaiśeṣhika by which this world of material objects comes into existence. This world is created out of atoms. This doctrine of creation goes by the name of *Asatkāryavāda*. It means that the cause is different from the effect, and by cause is meant material cause. The effect does not exist prior to its production. Therefore it must be different altogether from its cause. It defines cause as that which is different from non-essential circumstances and at the same time must immediately and invariably precede the effect in question. It then enters into a determination of non-essential circumstances *Anyathāsiddhi*. They are of five kinds. None of these constitutes the true cause. The potter's father is not the cause of the pot. Therefore he is an *anyathāsiddhi*. The Cause is further defined as *Niyatapūrvavṛtti*. The effect is the world and its causes are the *padārthas* or the ultimates of matter. This is the case also with relation, between neutral particulars or the character-complexes and this world of our existence according to the Modern Realists. We must observe a difference here,—the character-complexes are many even as the *padārthas* are as many as nine. While the latter are qualitatively different, the former are not. A multiplicity without either qualitative or quantitative differences is logically untenable. It is here that the Vaiśeṣhika marks an improvement.

But the system which has the closest affinity with Modern Realism is Jainism. It joins issue with Realism in denying the existence of an intelligent first cause. Jainism may

be regarded as a logical conclusion of Vaiśeṣhika rigorously worked out. Rājā Rām Bodas in *Tarkasangraha* remarks "There is evidence to show that the Vaiśeṣhika not only preceded Buddhism and Jainism but directly contributed to the rise of these sects, many of their peculiar dogmas being closely allied to Vaiśeṣhika theory. The Buddhist doctrine of total annihilation is only a further and an inevitable development of the Vaiśeṣhika doctrine of Asatkāryavāda. While the categories or the padārthas of the latter find their counterpart in the five Astikāyas or the essences of the Jainism. The atomic theory is largely adopted by the Jainas and even entered into their legendary mythology. The epithet Ardhavaināśikas or semi-Buddhists contemptuously bestowed by Śaṅkarācāryya conceals an historical truth, viz., that the Vaiśeṣhikas by their materialistic speculations were half-hearted precursors of Gautama Buddha. The Vaiśeṣhika School is specifically named in the Sacred Texts of the Jainas."

The most prominent feature of the Jainistic Cosmos is its atomic constitution. This world of our existence is a huge aggregate of indestructible atoms or *paramāṇus*. They are the ultimates of matter. They have neither qualitative nor quantitative differences. They are neither created nor destroyed. They are unalterable. They have weight but not form. They are amūrta. They have an element of mutual attraction and repulsion. By virtue of this character they combine and assume any form, produce any quality. Every perceivable object is thus an aggregate of atoms called *Skandha*. The world as a whole is a Mahāskandha or the great aggregate. These primary atoms constitute a homogeneous continuum, called Pudgala, which is according to Jainism the physical basis of the world.

What are the neutral particulars of Russell but Pudgala which is the fundamental stuff of the world? The most prominent feature of Jainism is its Realistic classification of being.

If we sketch the Realistic theory of perception we shall discover a close resemblance to the philosophy of the East. We can broadly distinguish three schools of Realism, each with a theory of perception of its own. They may be distinguished according to the number of elements involved in the perceptual act. The view of perception advocated by the Austrian philosopher Meinong



may be considered. When we perceive a cow or a horse the act of perception is the same in each case but during each perception our mind has different mental contents. During the first perception our minds have a cow content, and in the second a horse content. These contents are mental and are therefore different from their physical counterparts. We can now distinguish according to this view three elements in perception: (1) the object that is believed to have caused the perceptive act, (2) the content of perception which is in our minds, (3) our minds that perceive.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view the spiritual act of perceiving is performed by two agencies: (1) the manas and (2) the individual's self. The manas is regarded as a sense-organ and may be treated as an internal sense just like any other sense such as sight. Without its function the individual's soul, the perceiving agent, cannot be roused to activity. Except for this distinction of the activity of perceiving mind and the recognising individual soul the theory of perception advocated by the Modern Realist and that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the same.

According to Meinong the object perceived and contents of perception are two different things, without any relation whatever. This is unsatisfactory. It is like saying that the sweetness of the sugar is not of the object sugar but of my mouth that tastes it. No doubt I have sweetness and my mouth is necessary in the act of sensing a sweet taste. But it cannot be denied that there is something in the sugar, which causes the sweet sensation in my mouth. The object of perception and my content of perception cannot therefore be unrelated. For an object without relations is as unthinkable as relations without an object to be related. This discrepancy led most Realists to identify the two and regard perception as a two-term process. This is the view of Professor Alexander.

*Alexander's theory of Perception.*—He regards perception as a process taking place between the knowing mind on the one hand and matter on the other. He regards the content of perception as determined by the external object and is at the same time a characteristic of the object. Every act of perception gives only a certain aspect of the object that is determined by the purpose of the perceiver. Different acts of perception do not give us differ-

ent contents of perception as maintained by Prof. Meinong, but give us different aspects of the Reality. The cow-content and horse-content are not different contents but different aspects of the world. The world is a world of objects and relations.

This view furnishes no satisfactory solution regarding the problem of error. My mind has sometimes true ideas and sometimes false ideas. If the ideas in my mind are caused by the world and as such truly represent the world how can there be false ideas? A rope is easily mistaken for a snake. Where does the mistake lie? Is it in the act of perception, or in the object perceived or in the perceiving mind? This is then a great difficulty for the Realist.

But the great service that this view has done is to emphasise the idea that truth is always relative to our standpoints. This is exactly the position taken by the Jaina philosophy. No philosophy insists with greater emphasis on the relativity of knowledge than Jainism. The doctrines of *Syādvāda* and *Saptabhaṅgi* which are peculiar to Jainism lay particular emphasis on relativity of knowledge. Jainism says that there are seven-fold ways of predicating about a single object. Each predication is true from its own standpoint. A thing is and is not at the same time, for example a tree moves and does not move at the same time. Its branches move but the trunk does not move. This is the meaning of contradictory predicates co-existing in an object. Each predication is true relative to its standpoint. We might be reminded of the Jaina doctrine of the six blind men each exploring a part of an elephant and declaring the whole truth about it, as consisting only of his individual experience. Perception is of this nature. Each act of perception, says Jainism, gives only a partial view of the universe.

*Perception according to the Critical Realist.*—The third school of Realism that goes by the name of critical Realism is propounded by seven American Philosophers. They say that the object of perception is not this physical world of our strife and struggle but what lies at the basis of it, which they call character-complex. This character-complex constitutes the essence of the world and the physical world that we experience is an appearance in the sense that it is an interpretation of the character-complex

The physical objects are not, therefore, the data of perception. They argue, for instance, that the star that is now seen overhead is one that went out of existence several thousands of years ago. Under the circumstances we cannot say that we see a star. The star sent out a message, as it were, which is interpreted and identified as the star. The datum of perception is a message but not the physical object 'star.' These messages constitute the character-essence.

Thus the position has gravitated back to the notion of a three-term process in perception involving: (1) Character-complex, (2) the world of objects which are interpretations of the character-complex, and (3) the perceiving mind.

The character-complex is of the nature of a homogeneous medium. It corresponds exactly to the notion of Pudgala which according to Jainism, is the fundamental stuff of the world.

Perception according to Jainism is a three-term process involving an object perceived, the perceiver, and the mental idea which is a representation of the object. This analysis discloses the mediate character of perception. There is a reality existing independently of the mind during perception. The attributes that we find in the objects of the world and the relations in which they stand to one another are discovered by us as existing independently of us even when we are not aware of them. Thus the knowing process does not affect the objects in any way. This is exactly the view held by Meinong and the Critical Realist.

We have outlined the resemblance between the schools of Jainism and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Modern Realistic schools of the West. Reflective thinking works uniformly throughout, and although the modern philosophical problems discussed are nearly the same as of old, there is a newness in this presentation. The point of view of stating them is modern and this makes all the difference.

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## THE PROBLEM OF ERROR IN AMERICAN NEO-REALISM.

BY

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“To err is human.” The problem of error has therefore received more or less attention from all thinkers about knowledge and reality in all ages and in all countries. The problem is thus as old as human thinking. But in recent neo-realistic philosophy, especially in America, it has attained a special significance for two reasons : firstly, it has been said that the fact of error undoubtedly suggests the existence of the subjective or the mental, whereas it has been the aim of neo-realism in America to offer an entirely objective theory of mind and consciousness, defining it, as Prof. Holt has done, as “ a cross-section of the universe specifically responded to by the organism.” Again, with regard to the theory of knowledge neo-realism maintains the position of ‘ epistemological monism,’ that is, the object directly becomes the content of consciousness under certain circumstances and thereby becomes immediately known. This is called the doctrine of *Immanence* in contrast with the old view of *Transcendence* of the traditional representationist school. If these be so, knowledge ought to be true always and there would hardly be any room for error. And yet error is an undeniable fact of our experience. The problem of error is thus the very crux of neo-realism.

Now, new realism, offering, as it does, a theory of the universe in terms of the logical or neutral entities, “ meets the problem of error by borrowing from logic and mathematics the well-authenticated distinction between reality and being. The universe is not all *real*, but the universe all *is*.” Being is thus more comprehensive than the *real* and obviously covers within its sweep the unreal as well. Let us now see how the neo-realists attempt to solve the

problem by this distinction. Of the six American neo-realists it is Profs. Montague and Holt who have handled the problem in a somewhat elaborate manner. We propose therefore to discuss their solutions one after another.

According to Mr. Montague the realist's universe consists of all actual and possible objects of our thought. These constitute what is called the *subsistent*, which is the absolute *sumum genus* and thus admits of no negative. Now only one part of this subsistent is our real world in actual space-time system. This is the 'existent' while the rest of the universe is designated as 'merely subsistent.' The 'existent' and the 'merely subsistent' thus constitute the realistic universe. Again, every 'subsistent' stands always in an 'is' relation to another 'subsistent' and as such always involves a proposition. Now Montague holds that truth consists in our belief in the *real* and error in our belief in the *unreal*. And "by the *real* is meant the totality of propositions comprising the spatio-temporal system of interrelated events or elemental particulars together with what is presupposed or implied in that system" (i.e., the sphere of what is called the 'existent'); and by the *unreal* or false is meant the totality of propositions which are contradictions of the above and which comprise all the actual and possible objects of thought, that have neither any place in the spatio-temporal system nor are implied by it." And the term 'belief' is not to be understood in the subjective sense of a mental process but rather in an objective sense, viz., as an object believed in, which becomes the content or object of belief only under this specific relation. The confusion between these two senses has been, Montague points out, the source of what he calls the fallacy of "psycho-physical metonymy." The truth of this, he says, would be apparent if we remember that when we make a mistake in Mathematics we appeal to a mathematician who knows the subject to correct it and not to a psychologist. If falsity were a quality of belief in the subjective sense the psychologist would have been the best person to set matters right. / According to Montague, then, the *truth* is the same as or identical with the *real* and *falsity* the same as or identical with the *unreal* only under some specific conditions, i.e., as actual and possible objects of our belief

and judgment. There is the same difference between them as between George Washington and the President George Washington. Now in order to throw light on this view Montague takes us into an ontological excursus into the nature of consciousness and defines it in terms of causality. In a sense he identifies consciousness with causality: in the space-time system every elemental particular or 'event' stands related to another in such a manner that each event implies or has got the self-transcending implications of its preceding one, its succeeding one and also its contemporaneous ones externally continuous with it in tridimensional space and in reciprocal interaction with it and so on; and this is what is involved in causality. Now when we take a natural event in our brain-system and consider its "self-transcending implication" then we come across the level of human consciousness. This is how Montague appears to identify consciousness with causality. He arrives at this conclusion by an examination of the extreme views of *Panhylism* that everything is physical and *Panpsychism* that everything is mental, and finding both of them unsatisfactory promulgates his own view by a synthesis of the two and calls it *Hylo-psychism*, the theory, that is, that "all matter is instinct with something of the cognitive function; that every objective event has that self-transcending implication of other events which when it occurs on the scale that it does in our brain process we call consciousness." Consciousness thus consists in "the self-transcending implications" of other events by the brain states.

Now on the basis of such a theory of consciousness Montague proceeds to explain how truth and error arise. Here he resorts to a simile, *viz.*, that of what he calls 'the epistemological triangle.' There are three things interrelated with one another in such a way as to constitute the knowledge-situation and these represent the three corners, as it were, of the so-called 'epistemological triangle.' There are (1) the physical object (oe) causing through some physical and physiological processes (2) a complex cerebral state (oc), which thus (3) *implies* again the object which in this way becomes perceived or apprehended (op). In the simplest case 'oe' will be the cause of 'oc' and in every case 'op' will be the implicate of 'oc.' Now according to the principle of Plurality of causes any such event might be caused by a number of ante-

cedent events each of which is a possible cause of that event. " It follows from this that the implicate or conscious object of any brain state may be, but need not be, an event which actually exists. ✓ When the implied possible cause actually exists then there will be a consciousness of reality, which, as we have seen, constitutes true knowledge or *truth*. When, on the other hand, the simplest or most natural of the possible causes happens not to have been the actual cause, or happens not to exist, then we shall have apprehension of what is unreal, which is *false* knowledge or *error*. The brain state is the *knower* and what it implies is the *known*." And with regard to the two kinds of error, perceptual and inferential, Montague further maintains that they both result from the *distortion* of the real object in producing its effect on the brain. This distortion may be of two kinds: (1) physical or peripherally physiological, in which case we have the so-called sensory illusions; and (2) central, due to the central apperception mass, in which case we have error of inference. We can have both kinds of error together, and as a matter of fact there is no hard and fast distinction between the two. This, in short, is Prof. Montague's account of the genesis of truth and error.

Now, we in fact appreciate very much Prof. Montague in his very zealous and enthusiastic advocacy of the claims of the subjective as against some type of monistic panhylism. " Thus he very eloquently says, " Obviously there is a difference between my consciousness of objects and the mere objects, for my consciousness of them comes and goes according to conditions in my brain. But they do not depend upon my brain processes. Moreover, if the consciousness of objects is just objects, how shall I deal with a case in which you perceive one thing occupying a given place in the spatio-temporal series and I perceive another and contradictory group of qualities in that same place and time? If two contradictory sets of qualities could occupy the same place at the same time we should have no legitimate way of distinguishing between the real and the unreal. In the effort to get rid of the subjective we should have got rid of the objective. And if you introduce the ' confused and vicious concepts ' of ' true for me ' and ' true for you ' to avoid the above difficulty, you would simply " fill your now thoroughly Protagorean world with ' round squares ' and

'noisy silences' and in that world these concepts would not avail as there would be no 'me' nor 'you' for things to appear to, nor any meaning to the word 'appear.' There would exist nothing but a 'stew and welter of contradictions.' It is indeed futile to deny the reality of the psychical." I quote this observation of Prof. Montague at some length not only because it is an eloquent defence of the subjective, but also because it would equally apply to the view of his own colleague Prof. Holt, which we shall just review. But we find difficulty in following Montague when we consider his specific definition of consciousness. It is indeed true that consciousness in us is *conditioned* by some cerebral states and processes and these again are *caused* by some physical stimulation from the objects; but that is not an adequate reason for regarding it as identical with the *causal relation* or for defining it in terms of that relation. Consciousness, it has been said, consists in self-transcending implication of the brain state. The brain state as the effect *implies* or *means* the cause, the physical object, or in other words, *knows* it: the brain state is the *knower* and the physical reality is the *object* known. There is much no doubt in this conception of *meaning*; but this meaning when it occurs with reference to our brain then we get human consciousness; and it is ubiquitous in some degree or other everywhere as his theory of *Hylopsychism* asserts. But can we say that consciousness consists of this implication or meaning merely? It is indeed true that it involves meaning but is it not also more? Is it not a quality '*sui generis*' which baffles all attempt at definition by resolving it into physical elements or logical terms? Further, can we say that the brain state is the knower? Is it not because neo-realism always fights shy of the subjective that it readily identifies the subject with the brain and the organism? And we are painfully shocked to find even Montague in spite of his strong advocacy of the psychical, forced to this position.

Hence, when we come to Montague's definition and explanation of error, we are equally disappointed. Is his account of the identity of the true and the real on the one hand and that of the false and the unreal on the other a sound one? Truth and falsity belong to our knowledge no doubt on account of its peculiar relation to its objects, but that does not mean that they could be



identified. Had there been no knowledge situation, these terms would hardly convey any meaning. It is only when the objects become the contents of our beliefs and judgments that truth and error come to be characteristic features of them. It is indeed more true to say that they belong to the knowledge situation more on account of the subjective factor than on account of the objective, for the reality or fact as such has no true-false qualification. But when Montague explains the genesis of truth and error in terms of the self-transcending implicates of the brain states, his view has the merit of referring to a very important point. When the implicate of a cerebral state is a real existent object in the space-time system then it is true knowledge, if on the other hand it is the unreal contradictory, then it is false knowledge. But how can the unreal contradictory be the implicate of a cerebral state of which a real existent might have been also the implicate? Montague here refers to the doctrine of plurality of causes and obviously means to say that the same type of cerebral state might be caused by a number of circumstances. Thus in the case of a straight stick, appearing bent, when immersed in water, the same kind of cerebral state is produced by the circumstance of the stick being immersed in water as would ordinarily be produced by a normal bent stick, owing to the law of refraction of light. Montague here thus speaks of the *distorting* function of some kind of medium which must indeed be taken into consideration in any attempt to explain error. This of course explains the appearance of a straight stick as bent through the distorting influence of the medium. And, as Montague conceives it, since the bent stick does not exist in this particular case, it must be the contradictory-unreal of the actually existing straight stick. I shall discuss later on how far the term 'contradictory' is an apt expression in such cases. But even supposing this relation to be contradictory, my point is, does it itself constitute error? The mere appearance of a bent stick is not error, but when it is *taken for* a straight one, *i.e.*, when the judgment is made that the stick is really bent, then it is error. If a critical scientist who knows the law of refraction of light asserts that the stick which is really straight now under the circumstances appears bent, he is surely not in error. Thus it is not the mere implicate of a bent stick

that will make it error, but something more is necessary, *viz.*, the distorting (and in this case not the correcting) function of the mind, and this Montague from the peculiar standpoint of his theory of mind and consciousness is debarred from referring to. Again, if the contradictory as such, belonging, as it does, to the realm of the merely subsistent, has no efficient power or causal efficiency, how is it that erroneous judgments and beliefs often lead to definite lines of action, as if they were true judgments? Montague's solution of the problem of error therefore does not appear to be adequate.

But it is Mr. Edwin B. Holt who among the American group of neo-realists has dealt with the problem in a thoroughly neo-realistic spirit. We have found Prof. Montague rather eloquently advocating the cause of the psychical, whatever might be his view about its specific character. But here in Mr. Holt we come across what one may call an 'ultra-neo-realist,' who cannot bear the least touch of subjectivity and finds delight in attempting to deface it outright in season and out of season. While discussing the problem of error, therefore, he does not aim at explaining it away or simply to discover its genesis, but attempts positively to find for it "a place in the realistic universe." He therefore makes a very laborious attempt to repudiate the view that the empirical facts of error establish beyond doubt the existence of the subjective; and also endeavours to show that they, on the other hand, involve the existence of contradictions and contraries which form a part of the realistic universe. This he does by examining the cases of (1) illusions of space, (2) illusions of time, (3) illusions of secondary qualities and (4) illusions of thought, and pointing out that there are physical parallels of them in each case; and these, though some of them are undoubtedly cases of 'reproduction,' are hardly regarded as indicating the existence of the subjective or mental as such. Into the details of his very learned examinations we have no space to enter here. Suffice it to say that after pointing out their parallel cases in the physical world, he argues from them that as no one would regard them as mental, so is the case with these errors. They do not indicate the existence of the subjective at all, and yet they are undoubtedly facts of our experience. Hence the real problem of error, Holt thinks, is

to find 'a place for these illusory experiences in a realistic universe.' Holt writes, "Now it may be admitted that errors are all of knowledge or are in experience; but the important point is another: that all errors are cases of contradiction or contrariety. One has met error who has experienced that A is B and that the same A is not B. But the experiencing is not the significant fact and that all errors are of knowledge is true only by definition, since contrariety and contradiction is called error only when it occurs in some person's field of consciousness. The actual problem is the contradiction or contrariety itself: what is the significance of the universe that holds such things?" Here it must be borne in mind that the field of consciousness spoken of above is no subjective realm according to Holt but, as he defines it entirely in objective terms, is constituted of the "cross-section of the universe specifically responded to by the organism." Hence the contradictions and the contraries which exist in the world as opposing forces, become the content of erroneous experience when specifically responded to by the organism. It is not true, Holt says, that errors are due to the distorting influence of the physical and physiological media as suggested by Mr. Montague, but the "extra-mental world is teeming with contradictions and unrealities and that these can come to consciousness by virtue of a psychical process which presents no elements of distortion." And by the "psychical" Holt obviously means the "specific response by the organism." And be it noted that the contradictions referred to are found to exist firstly in the sphere of what have been called "the *merely propositional contents*" which of course cannot generate what are again called "the *terms in relation*" (a distinction which modern Symbolic Logic and Mathematics make) and hence are *thinkable*, though *not imaginable*. "The thought of the *round-square* is a propositional content about a strictly *unthinkable IT*: that it is to be square and it is to be round and so forth." Hence would be understood the significance of Holt's observation quoted above that Realism meets the problem of error by borrowing from Logic and Mathematics the well-authenticated distinction between reality and being. The universe is not all *real* but the universe *all is*; and further that "*being* is to be distinguished not merely from being *real*, but

from being *true*, from being perceived or thought." But not only in a realm of such propositional contents would contradictions be found but even amongst the natural laws and hence in the physical extramental world would they be met with, though in more disguised forms, *e.g.*, in collision, interference, acceleration and retardation, growth and decay, equilibrium, etc. Holt thus concludes his very learned discourse: "The gist of the whole is that the impossible-unthinkable never happens anywhere, but that every variety of contradiction, contrariety, repugnance, opposition and negation which logic itself recognises is quite as plentifully manifested in the objective physical world as it is in the subjective sphere of mind. A thought then which negates another thought is neither more nor less significant than a physical law which negates another law. The problem of error, as that of reality is in no way involved in the problem of knowledge."

But is that so? Is not error really a property of knowledge? Of course from the point of view of neo-realism knowing is a matter of accident, a sort of external relation, which leaves unaffected the terms of the relation. Even supposing for argument's sake the validity of this contention, can we maintain it with reference to truth and error? To say that reality is truth and unreality is error conveys no meaning *unless they are known*. Even neo-realists of the type of Holt and Montague have, in a way, had to admit this, when for instance Holt says that it is contradictions which become the content of erroneous experience. Bosanquet has indeed rightly observed that truth is reality when ideally determined and error is inadequate determination of it. Hence it will not do to ignore the subjective, as equally it is impossible to neglect the objective. In order to avoid the bugbear of subjectivism the neo-realists of America have gone over to the extreme position of over-objectivism. But knowledge situation is something which requires the intercourse between the subjective and the objective and truth and error arise as characteristic properties of this situation according to specific conditions.

Now contradiction no doubt is the condition of error. But it will have to be carefully seen in what sense contradictions belong to the objective world. It has been contended, on the other hand, that contradictions are *merely subjective*. In order to do

full justice to this controversy one has to thoroughly appreciate the spirit of the Logic of Negation. But into that difficult matter we have no space here to enter at some length. Yet this much must be said, as Bradley has rightly pointed out, that contradiction as *bare* negation, would be equivalent to nothing, having no content of its own, a mere formal distinction and in this sense is *merely subjective*. But contradiction implying *significant negation* has undoubtedly a basis in the real universe. But by denying A if we simply assert Not-A, formally we are in order but really we *lose* by such a contradictory form, for to say it is Not-A is equivalent to saying nothing, as thereby we remain in the region of the vague and the indefinite, and judgment is an affirmation, a determination of reality. Hence to make it significant we implicitly make a positive assertion. When we say P is Not-A, we really mean P is X which excludes or is incompatible with A, so that X and A are *discrepant*s and *contrary*,—they cannot go together and be *conjoined* but must be disjoined. Herein would be found the significance of logical conjunction and disjunction, of 'and' and 'either-or.' Contradiction, then, is based on the *contrary* and may be said to be the generalised form of it, since it will include *any contrary* and, as such, aim not only at exclusion but exhaustiveness. This will be the distinction between contrary and contradictory. Interpreted in this way, contradiction will really have an objective basis and real foundation in the structure of reality. And that foundation is the fact of *incompatibles* which every one must admit as an undeniable fact, so long at least as we look at things from a *lower* plane of metaphysical speculation. I say from a *lower* plane, for a *higher* is possible: we remember in this connection the controversy as to the claims of Contradiction and Dialectic as the right way to ontology. "The reality of negation" and "the identity of opposites" will have to be reconciled; and Bradley has attempted it in this way: "Incompatibles exist, and no one denies this fact. And so far as they exist the law of contradiction holds. The real question is as to the limits within which and the conditions under which, incompatibles are found and can be justified. How far, in other words, is the truth of contradiction, as such only relative and more or less of an appearance? What the Dialectical method is

concerned to deny is merely the *absolute, utter and final* truth of *fixed* incompatibles.' Hence it is a question of the plane you are occupying from which the claim of contradiction as ultimately holding of reality should have to be decided. But even supposing that it is based upon the fact of incompatibles with reference to the phenomenal world, is it not true, as hinted above by Bradley, that it holds good about incompatibles which are *fixed* in character? Hence it has been said that the law of contradiction is a *statical* law merely, hardly applicable to the real *dynamic* order of reality. Hence it is a law which will apply only to a *logical theory* of the universe—of terms and propositions in a logical universe and hardly to the real existence, *viz.*, the space-time system. Logical thinking is conceptual thinking and concepts are *fixed universals*, hardly sufficient to adequately deal with the facts of change, motion and becoming—the dynamic movement of the space-time continuum. But still if you do want to deal with reality *adequately*, you will have to give up the standpoint of the logic of contradiction which naturally labours under the above limitations, and try some such thing as Hegel's *Dialectic* which admitting 'the reality of negation' in a relative sense involves the principle of 'the identity of opposites.'

But modern realistic tendency is reluctant to rise to that height and approaches the problems of philosophy from the scientific and empirical viewpoints. Hence both Holt and Montague deal with the problem of error as involving contradiction only and attempt to show that contradictions have a place in a realistic universe, Holt going further than Montague in maintaining that they are also found within the realm of the existent physical order, and not merely in the sphere of the mere subsistent. But in the light of the above discussion about the nature of contradiction we are not in a position always to see eye to eye with Holt in his enumeration of the instances of contradiction in the physical world. For example in the law of acceleration and progress, growth and decay, there is hardly any contradiction if we remember that it ultimately is based upon incompatibles which are *fixed* and no one would find in them the least trace of error. Then, again, with regard to the position that contradictions are unreal in the realm of the merely subsistent and as such fall within the realis-

tic universe, we take serious exception to the inclusion of contradictions in that extended conception of being that anything we can think of has a *being* of its own, though not in the physical world but in the realistic universe. It may be true that being is wider than the existent real, but to find for *any nonsense*, which the mind may indulge in thinking, a place within it and that simply to avoid the subjective is more than what we can see. But even supposing that there is the place of contradictions in a realistic universe, the most important point remains that they do not themselves constitute error. But they become error when a pair of them are both asserted by a knowing mind. Hence contradiction interpreted in the objective sense will be the condition of error but not error itself. And error will arise when the knowing mind somehow or other will take one reality for another or in a sense *distort* the reality as given to us.

Hence neither the solution of Montague nor that of Holt can be regarded as satisfactory. It will not do to ignore the subjective. Truth and error arise out of the intercourse between the subjective and the objective. And error consists in 'distortion' of reality by the mind. As Prof. Alexander remarks, "Illusion arises in perception through the mind's interfering with the objects and *distorting* them. Error in the same sphere is the assertion or judgment that the distorted perspective holds good of the relevant bit of reality. To be in error is to *squint* at reality and to take the squinting view for the undistorted real." It is therefore very rightly said that "to err is human."

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# THE SĀMĀKHYA THEORY OF REALITY AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

BY

SAMBHU NATH RAY, PATNA.

An attempt has been made in the following pages to find out glimpses of recent metaphysical ideas in the Sāmkhya system. It is not our intention to give here a critical estimate of the Sāmkhya philosophy or to explain its tenets with a view to their systematisation. We shall attempt to show how some of the most important ideas of reality current now in the West are contained in the Sāmkhya metaphysics.

The Sāmkhya starts with a duality of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Puruṣa is conscious, intelligent and eternal. It is *sāḍāprakāś-svarupa*, the eternal light which illuminates everything else. Prakṛti has two aspects, *avyakta*, the un-manifested and the *vyakta*, the manifested. In its un-manifested state Prakṛti is pure potentiality. It cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent. It is called *avyaktam*, *alingam*, *pradhānam*. It may be said to be *mūla-prakṛti*, the primal source out of which everything springs. On the other hand, Prakṛti is manifested when its *sāmyāvasthā* or state of equilibrium is destroyed and it begins to manifest itself in various forms.

Now, Puruṣa is opposed to Prakṛti as self to not-self, knower to the known. While Puruṣa is *saçetanam*, Prakṛti is *açetanam*, the former is a passive spectator, the latter is ever-evolving. Puruṣa neither causes nor is caused, whereas Prakṛti is un-caused, but is the cause of all things. Both are eternal and un-caused, but Prakṛti exists for Puruṣa, although the latter is not in any real way connected with the former.

This duality reminds us of Descartes' dualism between Spirit and Nature, but, properly understood, it reveals the opposition be-



tween Form and Matter, because Prakṛti is changing whereas Puruṣa is constant and the whole evolution of Prakṛti is intelligible only when we think of it as realising the purpose of Puruṣa. This dualism has a striking resemblance with Prof. Alexander's theory of Consciousness and Reality as independent principles and their relation as one of 'enjoyment.'

In spite of the opposition between the two there is, according to Sāṃkhya, *anādisaṃyoga*—there is relation between the two from all eternity. This connection, however, is due to *avidyā* and will go off the moment *avidyā* is removed. It is held that Prakṛti begins to manifest itself on account of the nearness (*sānnidhya*) of Puruṣa. From this it is evident that Puruṣa is regarded as the motive force of all creation. For, a non-intelligent and un-conscious Prakṛti cannot create this well-ordered universe unaided by Puruṣa.

But there is no direct influence of Puruṣa on Prakṛti. Prakṛti is destined to serve the purpose of Puruṣa. Thus purpose is inherent in Prakṛti and this makes it necessary for Prakṛti to evolve and become differentiated till it lapses into its original state (*pralaya*) in order to evolve again. This clearly indicates an unconscious teleology very much akin to that propounded by Hartmann according to whom there is an unconscious intelligent principle very like *Mahat* which evolves into a system of minds and bodies.

The world is the *pariṇāma* of Prakṛti. It is a continuity of changes from the lowest to the highest. It shows a hierarchy of forms varying in different degrees of the preponderance of one *Guṇa* over the other two. Prakṛti is *triguṇātmikā* or qualified by the three *Guṇas*, *Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*. It is a unity of the three *Guṇas* which are its constituent elements. Thus everything which evolves out of Prakṛti is qualified by the three *Guṇas* which are therefore known from their effects and are never perceived as they are in themselves—*guṇānām paramam rūpaḥ na dṛṣṭipathamṛcchati*. These *guṇas* combine, separate, and recombine in many ways giving rise to the manifold of things in the universe. Thus everything is a unity of *rajas* or energy, *tamas* or inertia, and *sattva* or manifestation to consciousness.

It is to be noticed that this idea of the nature of reality as a unity of element which are both physical and mental suggests the modern realistic view which holds that reality appears in different relations as thoughts and objects, but is never dependent upon mind which is but one sort of correlation in which things appear. This is the same as the Sāṃkhya theory of mind as a product of Prakṛti, that is, as a special instrument of adaptation.

Now, creation according to Sāṃkhya means evolution or *āvirbhāva* and therefore implies that all that is being created or produced is but a gradual transformation of Prakṛti. Everything is included in Prakṛti and comes out of it by gradual differentiation. Evolution consists in *tattvāntaraparīṇāma*, that is, the transformation of the homogeneity into heterogeneity, or change from *aviśeṣa* to *viśeṣa* as Spencer has explained.

It is to be noticed that in the original *sāmyāvasthā* of Prakṛti the three *guṇas* are held in check and there arises a kind of tension which is relieved by the influence of Puruṣa and creation begins. Now evolution goes on in a definite order *parīṇāmakramanīyama*. There first arises *Mahat* which is the cosmic aspect of *Buddhi* or intelligent principle. *Buddhi* is *niśçayātmikā* or the principle of ascertainment. Thus *Buddhi* as the intelligent principle is different from *Mahat* as the cosmic principle which is the immediate cause of *ahamkāra*. This *Mahat* contains within it the *samskāras* of all *Puruṣas* and *avidya* inherent in them from all eternity.

This doctrine of evolution is not mechanical only nor teleological only, but it shows evidence of emergent evolution inasmuch as it points out how at each step in the evolution new qualities appear which are not to be found in the preceding stages, *e.g.*, when the *tanmātras* arise from *bhūtādi* we get new qualities in the *tanmātras* and when again the *tanmātras* give rise to the gross elements we again meet with newer qualities which are absent from the *tanmātras*. But Sāṃkhya does not teach that the emergence of new qualities is accidental, but it is guided by a cosmic control.

From *mahat-tattva* proceeds *ahamkāra* or self-sense which manifests itself in three ways, according to the preponderance of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. *Sāttvika ahamkāra* gives rise to the ego-consciousness. The function of the ego is called *abhimāna* or

self-assertion. It gives rise to the *manas*, the five cognitive senses, the five active senses and *prāṇas*. From the *tāmasika ahaṁkāra* proceed the five *tanmātras* and from the *tanmātras* the five gross elements arise by the preponderance of *tamas*. *Rājasika ahaṁkāra* acts as a *sahakāri* in *sattva* and *tamas* manifestations.

It is evident from what we have said that *Prakṛti* in its original state of equilibrium is neither real nor unreal but its reality manifests itself in change or becoming. Change, therefore, is the very heart of reality which is essentially a process in time. Further we are to know that all change is due to *rajas* or energy the total amount of which remains constant in the universe. But the first cause of all change is the influence of *Puruṣa* or pure Consciousness which is the *élan vital* of all reality as Bergson holds—with this difference only that, according to Bergson, consciousness is essentially active, according to Sāṁkhya, *Puruṣa* is inactive. It is also to be noted that Sāṁkhya holds that the essence of each thing is *sattva* or potential consciousness. Thus manifestation to consciousness is the very core of reality. It is no doubt held that everything has besides *sattva* *rajas* and *tamas*. *Tamas* is that which retards manifestation and covers the real nature of an object. It is just what Bergson says of matter, namely, that it is passive, inert, and resists all change. Again, *Buddhi* which evolves categories out of itself is not able to give the knowledge of the Life of the universe, that is Soul or *Puruṣa*, and this well accords with Bergson's view that intelligence is incompetent to enter into the heart of reality.

We are to note that *ahaṁkāra* is the principle of individuation and through it spirits become aware of their separateness from each other. Each individual *Buddhi* is associated with a special *ahaṁkāra* and sense-evolutes. Thus there arises a differentiation of the *Buddhi* principle although all individual *Buddhis* are included in one *buddhi-tattva*. Herein we find the Sāṁkhya doctrine of a plurality of *Puruṣas* or empirical selves. There are many selves because each self differs from each other in respect of physical, moral and intellectual attainments. They are the different observers or points of reference in the world. This very well sounds the key-note of the modern theory of Relativity, according to which all things are what they are in their relation to the ob-

servers. Sound or colour as an entity or a fixed mode of energy is inconceivable, because wave-lengths are themselves relative and a sound or colour appears different to different observers on account of the change in their position and motion relative to the earth.

We may here do well to turn our attention to what Mr. Russell says regarding the different perspectives of the world. He says that the world seen through different perspectives appear differently to different persons. But the entire world is a system of such perspectives, perceived or un-perceived, just as Prakṛti is a unity of its different manifestations to the Puruṣas or empirical selves which are mere observers (*draṣṭāraḥ*).

According to Sāṃkhya space and time are eternal, being the specific modifications of Prakṛti, which is the root cause of *ākāśa*. There are two kinds of *ākāśa* :—*kāraṇ-ākāśa* and *kāryy-ākāśa*. The *kāraṇ-ākāśa* which is non-atomic and all-pervasive is not mere vacuum or *āvaraṇābhāva* and is akin to the modern ether. The atomic *ākāśa* or *kāryya-ākāśa* arises from the union of the original mass units of *bhūtādi* with *śabda-tanmātra*. Again on the other hand time and space are limited so far as they are produced from *ākāśa* by this or that *upādhi* (limiting adjunct).

Change is constantly taking place everywhere. When any change is manifest we call it present, when it is potential it is called future and it is said to be past when it becomes sublatent. Thus time is a construction of the intellect (*buddhinirmāṇa*) and not an independent reality. This is the same as the view of Kant according to whom time and space are forms of intuition and are therefore not real things. Space and time are now scientifically defined as relations and never as things. Things are understood as complexes of space and time, as Prof. Alexander points out, for space and time apart from things are mere abstractions. Sāṃkhya also holds that events stand in relations of space and time which are not things (*kṣaṇastu vastu patita-kramāvalamvi*).

Both the mental and the physical worlds are undergoing changes. In the mind the thoughts, feelings and wishes are but the non-intelligent transformations of *buddhi* and through the reflection of Puruṣa in *buddhi* they seem to be intelligent. The *buddhi* becomes superimposed on Puruṣa, which, therefore, fails

to distinguish it from the modifications of the *buddhi* and this non-distinction is *avidyā*, which is the root cause of all trouble.

When *buddhi* comes into touch with external objects through the senses, at first there arises *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* or indeterminate perception in which there is no differentiation of the particulars of experience. But later through the *saṁkalpa* and *vikalpa* of *manas* the things are perceived in their determinate character. This is very like the theory of Bradley who holds that there is a lower kind of intuition or 'feeling,' which at first gives us the thing as a whole, which is later differentiated into parts by intellect or understanding.

True knowledge is attained when *buddhi* reaches the stage of pure *sāttva* which gives us *yathārthajñān*. Puruṣa is simply the *sākṣin* of *buddhi*—a direct witness and it is the *draṣṭā* of the other states through *buddhi*. The free Puruṣa becomes involved in bondage only when it is conjoined to *buddhi* through reflection and release is possible only when this seeming *saṁyoga* disappears by a real knowledge of the difference of Puruṣa from *buddhi* or *Prakṛti*. This is to be attained as the *Yoga* teaches by *çitta-vṛttinirodhaḥ* and returning to the state of pure consciousness which is the real nature of Puruṣa (*Sāttva Puruṣayoḥ śuddhi-sāmyam kaivalyam*).

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**SECTION OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION**



## PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS

BY

ENOLA ENO

I have not prepared a presidential "address" for this meeting of our section. I take it, rather, that we need our time for the fuller discussion of the papers prepared for the section. I wish only to make a few introductory remarks by way of guiding our discussion and suggesting the methods, purpose and possible values of such a group as this in our study together of some specific expressions of Philosophy of Religion. As I have glanced through our programme I have been struck by the variety of subjects undertaken. This very variety suggests the fundamental attitude and approach of our study. As Philosophers of Religion we must, primarily, give a hearing to every voice.

Such a hearing of the vast multitude of experiences and formulations of thought which have been for many various groups and individuals, their religious expressions, I take to be the very data for a scientific study of religious phenomena. And surely, as philosophers of Religion, we want to build our systems or explanations of religious thought and values on an actual and scientific study of expressions which are the facts of religions. This is the method of observation and explanation in scientific study. A thorough and sympathetic study of many historic religious expressions,—to see out of what vital situations and needs they arose, what human-religious values they conserved, and to what philosophical formulation and guidance they led,—should help us to observe and explain effectively the religious situation and expressions of our day, to evaluate them, to guide religious thought in vital keeping with the needs and aspirations of the day, and to project ideals of universal religious values and attainments.



For I take it that we agree that our task is not only intellectual understanding and stating of religious philosophies, but also an intense attempt at building, ourselves, a modern scientific philosophy of religion, which will help develop lasting and growing concepts of religious thinkers, guide religious practices and expressions, conserve all human values, suggest methods of solution of great problems and needs of to-day, and project the ideals and realization of the "Beloved Community" and good life which has always been the religious quest. Toward such a task our gathering here can barely take the first steps, but if we catch again something of the method and spirit of the task, so that as individuals or in other groups we can continue our studies and deepen and vitalise our interests, we will be contributing a growing bit to a vital Philosophy of Religion.

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# ŚAṆḌILYA'S PHILOSOPHY OF DEVOTION

BY

SATIPRASAD BANERJI, AMALNER

Almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy start with a denunciation of the afflictions of mundane existence, and try to seek a way out of it. So long as we are in Samsāra, there is no end to trouble. Sorrow is the badge of all that is mortal. The seers in their compassion, have discovered for the suffering humanity the several ways of escape. Of these ways, the path of Jñāna, Karma and Bhakti are the most ancient, but doubts often arise as to which one we should apply ourselves to, for the final emancipation from the coil of mortality. Bādarāyaṇa gives us a detailed discussion of the nature of Jñāna in the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā and shows the potency of knowledge in bringing about salvation. He thinks that on the cessation of Nescience, the Jīva attains Brahma-hood and gets over sorrow. We have also a long discussion about the nature of Karma in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini. He shows how far the fulfilment of work and Vedic injunctions obtain for the weary Jīva earthly and paradisaal exaltation.

The sage Śaṇḍilya gives us a similar Mīmāṃsā on Bhakti in his classical work known to us ' Sata-Sūtrī ' or as the ' Hundred Aphorisms ' which afford a pleasant perusal. According to Cowell, " They are the work of some anonymous teacher who ascribed his doctrine to the ancient Ṛṣi Śaṇḍilya, partly because he wished to conceal its modern origin under a name belonging to the Vedic times and also because the Śaṇḍilya-Vidyā, supplied a convenient vantage-ground for his main doctrine of the necessity of Faith." The orthodox pandits think this view to be erroneous. We also get a mention of the name ' Śaṇḍilya ' in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (iii. 14) which recurs with a few verbal difference in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa (X. vi, 3). The sage is there seen to preach the monistic doctrine of the identity of soul and Brahman.

“ This doctrine is called Sāṇḍilya-Vidyā in Vedānta-Sāra and is shown to be consisting of devotional meditation towards Saguṇa-Brahman rather than towards Nirguṇa-Brahman. The Ṛṣi of the Sūtras seems to me to agree partly with the teaching of the Upaniṣad. Though we do not know much about Sāṇḍilya's ‘ Satasūtrī ’ and the date of its composition, the hundred aphorisms are beneficial reading. The treatment of devotion is highly more philosophical, than that in Nārada's Bhakti Sūtra, which should be read as a companion to it.

Sāṇḍilya defends the path of exclusive Bhakti, showing that it is the only way to escape. A discussion of Bhakti, according to him, is absolutely necessary, since we may deviate from this most blessed path by false argumentations and suspicions ( यतः कृतकनिरासोऽपेक्षयोश्चतस्तज्जिज्ञासेति । ) Prahlād prays to Kṛṣṇa for unflinching devotion through eternity.

नाथ ! योनि सहस्रेषु येषु येषु ब्रजाम्यहम् ।

तेषु तेष्वचला भक्तिरच्यतासु सदा त्वयीति ॥

Devotion alone can destroy the Manas which is the cause of Samsāra and its accompanying miseries. He maintains that the ( अन्नःकरणोपाधि ) is not natural to Jīva. The connection of the Jīva with the Manas is a transient one, lasting so long the supreme love for God is not awakened. As the crystal coming in contact with a red flower assumes a red hue, so does the Ātman wear the unsubstantial Upādhi, when it is brought in proximity with Manas. This Upādhi does not belong to the essence of the Self, but it cannot be removed by any other means than that of intense devotion. Knowledge is impotent to remove it, as the illusion of Samsāra does not cease, even when we have got a knowledge about it. The illusion will continue to have its effect and will capture us unawares. Until there is a total abolition of mind there is no way out. Devotion to Supreme Lord, however, is the most sanctifying remedy, as it removes the darkness of Samsāra by expelling the intervening Manas. We should cultivate knowledge to purify ourselves, so that we may be fit to be devotees of the Lord. Moreover, we should understand by knowledge quite a different thing. Rāmānuja admits in his ‘ Śrī-Bhāṣya ’ that

Mukti follows on the cessation of ignorance (Ajñāna), and Jñāna is able to do away with it, but he asks what we should understand by Jñāna which has the power of expelling Avidyā. Is it the Jñāna of mere sentences or is it the Jñāna as Upāsanā? Distinguishing between the two kinds of Jñāna, he insists that the Vedānta texts inculcate the Upāsanā and the Dhyāna of Brahman which is of the nature of steady remembrance like the uninterrupted flow of oil.

The object of this steady remembrance is the supreme Lord. The Jīva is completely to surrender himself to God. Such single-hearted devotion is supremely pure. We cannot bring forward the objection that this devotion should be abandoned, since it is of the nature of Rāga, because its object is highly laudable.

“रागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशा इति एवं चेदुच्यते नैव वाच्यम् । उत्तमास्यदत्त्वा  
द भक्तेः परमेश्वरविषयत्वादिति यावत् । नहि रागमात्रेण द्वैतत्वम् किन्तु  
संसारानुबन्धि रागत्वेनैव यथा संगतामात्रेण न त्याज्यता किन्तु असत्संगत्वेन  
तद्वत् ।

All desires as such are not to be avoided. What is meant is a strong dispassion towards all worldly objects. We are only to run away from the low and ugly things of the world and take repose in the eternal God. We are not to condemn a sentiment, simply because it seems to be a kind of desire. Desire is lofty or low, praised or condemned only in reference to its locus. When we desire our contact with flesh, we are adulterers, when we admire things of beauty we are artists, but loving God we become saints. We are not to weed out high sentiment and make our heart a barren waste.

Devotion is of the nature of sweetness—by attaining a single-hearted love for God, the transmigrating Jīva becomes what the Upaniṣad says **सत्त्वानन्दी** on the attainment of Divine Bliss, the limiting adjuncts which bind the Jīva naturally drop away. Kāśyapa believes that when the Jīva realises the glory of God, he attains to Bliss. Bādarāyaṇa teaches that when the knowledge of oneness dawns, the miseries of the Soul vanish. Sāṇḍilya teaches that when the Jīva feels the glory of God, as well as his union with Him, he attains the Supreme felicity. The Jīva and the Brahman are distinct on the phenomenal plane, but the distinction may be said to be apparent like the ‘modes’ in

Spinoza's doctrine of 'Substance.' From the standpoint of *Brahma-Bhāva* the infinite Jīvas merge in one supreme Soul. As the one Sun appears many when reflected in various receptacles, so does the one Brahman appear manifold being reflected in finite intellects. If the reflecting receptacles be taken away, then the one alone shines in its own glory. But a doubt arises when we see some Jīvas in bondage, and some in freedom. We think then that the Jīvas must be distinct and dissimilar to each other, each possessing an independent principle of Individuality, but in that case we miss the relation which exists between Brahman and Jīva as the seer and the seen.

प्रकाशात्मनां परेण परमेश्वरेण सह दृष्टत्वलक्षणसंबन्धाभावात् तेषां स्वप्रकाशतयाऽदित्येनैव प्रदीपानां प्रकाशनात् । तथा चेश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं ज्ञेयत्वं च ब्रह्मणः स्यात् ।

The Soul is ever free. The pains and the pleasures that we feel are due to the senses. When the Jīva fervently yearns after the lotus-feet of Govinda through *Parā-Bhakti*, his sense of personality dissolves and his *Buddhi* merges in the one *Sat-Cit-Ānand Brahman*. The Lord *Kṛṣṇa* says in the *Bhagavadgītā* that the Supreme Person cannot be obtained by any other means than that of exclusive devotion. *Sāṅḍilya* defines *Mukti* as परमभक्तिमात्रेण बुद्धेरन्तर्गतये सति ब्रह्मानन्दव्याप्तिलक्षणा..... आनन्दं ब्रह्मणोरुपं तस्य मोक्षे प्रतिष्ठितमिच्छागमादपि तथात्वमध्यवसेयमिति ।

When the supreme felicity is obtained as the prize of intense devotion, there is no further fall for the Jīva from that high position as the *Sūtra* आयुष्विरपितरेषाम् proves that due to the dissolution of *Ahamkāra*, which is the mother of all modification, there cannot be any decrease of *Parā-Bhakti*. A man can be even free in this life if his *Buddhi* is established in Brahman. Moreover *Bhakti* does not originate from an effort of Will. It is therefore not of the nature of work. The merits earned by devotion are destined to decay, but devotion being a gift of God, its reward is permanent. *Nārada* says that *Bhakti* is its own reward. Therefore a man should strive after it with all his heart. *Svapneśvara* rightly remarks यतः सा भक्तिः न क्रियात्मिका अतएव तत्फलस्य निःश्रेयससंज्ञा-नन्तत्वमुपपद्यते ।

As it is the only effective means of our union with God, let us enquire into the nature of devotion spoken of in Sāṇḍilya's 'Sata-Sūtri.' The ancient seers have described Bhakti in various ways. It is interesting to quote the principal definitions given by the seers, and examine, in their light, the definition given by the seer Sāṇḍilya. According to the disciples of Parāśara, ardour in his worship and like performances are the mark of devotion. Garga thinks that the devotee always rejoices to talk of God. Nārada, the heavenly minstrel, gives us a very beautiful notion of Bhakti. He says that the lover of God dedicates all his actions and knowledge at the feet of God and feels the extreme uneasiness in losing God. The Vaiṣṇava literature is replete with the sentiment of separation ( **विरहः** ). We see that even when the soul of the devotee is in the embrace of God, she is weeping saying ' where is my Kṛṣṇa gone?' **नारदस्तु तदर्पिताखिलाचारता तद्विस्मरणे परम व्याकुलेति** (S. 21). Nārada gives us the example of the milk-maids of Brṇḍāban who were so much in love with Kṛṣṇa that they felt death-pangs in his absence. Sāṇḍilya agrees with Nārada and defines Bhakti as **सा परानुरक्तिरौखरे**. It is absolute and highest attachment. The devotee is so much enamoured of God, that he becomes mad to surrender all the belongings he has including himself at the feet of God. He becomes disinterested in all his actions and thinks only of the pleasure of his love. Love has its highest expressions in such a consciousness. That state is described as perfect love and is termed in Vaiṣṇava literature as **तत्पर्यवर्तः**. It reveals the pure nature of love and its true import. In the lowest form love is ego-centric. The lover has the motive of self-gratification, and yearns for the company of the beloved, for the delight it bestows on self, but when the devotee enjoys the **समर्थरति**, the delight of the beloved is the supreme delight it shares. The ego-centric love is replaced by God-centric love. Bhakti expresses as **आनुकूलैर्लक्ष्यानुशीलनम्**. We find the sentiment well expressed in the life of the great devotees of Godlike Caitanya, Rāmakṛṣṇa, etc. The famous author of the ' Caitanya-Caritāmṛta ' illustrates the sentiment in inimitable verse in his another famous work called, ' Bhakta-māl.'

কৃষ্ণ যাতে রত কৃষ্ণ স্নেহের বিলাস ।

অতএব দেহের সৌন্দর্য্যে অভিলাষ ॥

কৃষ্ণ স্তম্বে স্তম্ভী গোপী কামগন্ধহীন ।

শুদ্ধ প্রেমভাবময় কহয়ে প্রবীণ ॥ ( ভক্তমাল )

(The Gopī longed for the beauty of her body, since the body was the seat of sport for Kṛṣṇa. The learned say, that the pure love of the Gopī, who was happy at the pleasure of Kṛṣṇa was free from all the stains of lust.)

Besides this principal form of devotion, Sāṇḍilya has also spoken of other subsidiary forms of devotion. The subsidiary means are variously expressed. The learned call them the limbs of Bhakti and there are as many as sixty-eight of such expressions of which nine are the most important. These attitudes have effects in internal and external nature of man. Meditation (Dhyāna), constant remembrance (Smṛti), and resignation (Ātma-nivedana) illustrate the first, obeisance (Namaskāra), singing in praise, reciting mentally or in loud voice the name of God, and worship (Arcanā) illustrate the second. The devotional consciousness in the first case affects the internal being, then gradually it sheds its benign influence on the whole nature of the man, external and internal. They destroy the vices that stand as obstacles on the path to higher devotion. Knowledge (*Jñāna*) is said to be the chief internal means, promoting higher devotion (*Parā-Bhakti*) by purifying the mind.

In the passage of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (vii. 24) which opens with the words **यो वै भूमा त्वं सुखम् ।** it is revealed that the self is all this. He who sees thus, thinks thus, knows thus, gets affection for the self, sports with the self, is mated to the self, rejoices in the self ; he becomes his own ruler. Here ' the seeing ' alluded to, becomes an accessory to the higher devotion expressed as affection for the self, by refuting all opposite notions. We see also, says Sāṇḍilya, that in ordinary life, knowledge is subsidiary to, as well as the cause of, devotion and not *vice versa*. The knowledge of beauty, mercy, learning, becomes the cause of a young maiden's love for a young man. It is also found when we know Nature to be unlovely, cruel and worthless we cannot love her. whereas having known the self to be all-merciful, of infinite energy and beauty, our impurity of mind dies away, and the plenitude of love invades our heart. Knowledge (*Jñāna*) plays a subsidiary

part, but devotion to God is so strong by itself, that without even depending on knowledge it secures the liberation. Knowledge is only a dependent means employed to remove the foulness of heart. As an example he gives us a *Sūtra* यथा ब्रजमोपकान्ताः (S. 14) the innocent maidens of Br̥ṇḍā were blessed with the happy vision of Kṛṣṇa, though many a learned and self-mortifying *yogī* had to wait for years. The reason is that, the maidens, though not at all learned, were bound to Kṛṣṇa in sincere love and affection.

By establishing knowledge (*Jñāna*) to be subsidiary, Sāṇḍilya rejects the view that it can be independently or conjointly with *yoga* be a means of Mukti, since the principal and the subsidiary cannot be mutually alternative in regard to one and the same end. Like knowledge, *yoga* also is subsidiary to Bhakti. Assuming the objection, as to how *yoga* which is subsidiary to devotion can be said to be a subsidiary of the subsidiary that is *jñāna*, the author replies, 'as is the case with *Prayāja* ceremony. As the *Prayāja* ceremony is a subsidiary of the *Vājapeya* and other sacrifices, so it is here. Devotion is thus established to be superior to knowledge (*jñāna*), *yoga* and karma.' There is also the authority of the Gītā on this point when Kṛṣṇa asserts:—

तपस्विभ्योऽधिको योगी ज्ञानिभ्योऽपि मतोऽधिकः ।

कर्म्मिभ्यश्चाधिको योगी तस्माद्योगी भवार्जुन ॥

योगीनामपि सर्वेषां मङ्गतेनान्तरात्मना ।

श्रद्धावान् भजते यो मां स मे युक्ततमो मतः ॥

These lines indicate the superiority of Bhakti. It is again not of the nature of belief, since belief is ever-shifting. If devotion is identified with belief, we are involved in the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum* (*Anavasthā*). Devotion to God is by its nature ever fixed and stable.

The external subsidiary means are also to be resorted to. There is no hard-and-fast rule as to their observance, but, according to Sāṇḍilya, they are useful in so far as they gradually produce an affection for Brahman.

Sāṇḍilya advocates the worship of *Saguna-Brahman* and teaches that devotion to the incarnations of God can also afford immortality. The inner essence of God is expressed in the world



and in his incarnations. His birth is depicted as a divine event in the ' Bhagabat Gītā ' (although I am the unborn and of immutable essence and the Lord of created beings, I enter into my Prakṛti and take birth from age to age).

अजोऽपि सत्त्वय्यात्मा ज्ञानानामोद्भरोऽपि सन् ।

प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय संभवाम्यात्ममायया ॥

There is also an additional Sloka in the Gītā to show that he incarnates himself out of compassion for mankind " I create myself, O Bhārata, whenever there is a decline of Dharma and survival of its opposite.....I come into existence from age to age. Incarnations are strictly speaking the expression of Viṣṇu from the transcendental order into the Prākṛitic order. The main purpose is to establish the kingdom of righteousness, by abolishing the evils of a narrow and distorted life. It shows the necessity of the divine rule over the disturbed flow of nature's life. Incarnations, however, should be taken apart from the glories (*bibhāti's*) of God. The Jīva cannot attain Mukti by worshipping the *bibhāti's* like king, etc. (नराणां च नराधिपम्) because they are endowed with finite *Upādhi* ( प्राप्तिव्याज विभूतिषु but this objection cannot hold good in case of Vāsudeva, because Kṛṣṇa, himself took that form. Sāṇḍilya, therefore, concludes, that devotion to Kṛṣṇa; leads to final release. Devotion to the other incarnations also brings forth the same reward.

The path of devotion is broad and all-inclusive. By strict adherence to this path, even the most lowly-born are capable of attaining the highest bliss.

अपि चेत् प्राजाचारो भजते मां समन्वभाक् ।

साधुरेव स मन्त्रयो सम्यग् व्यवसितो हि सः ॥

We have numerous examples in history, showing the love of God towards his *Sūdra* and *Caṇḍāla* devotee. We have the example of *Gāhaka*, whom God addressed as his friend out of his devout love for Him. We find also how Rāma accepted the invitation of *Savarī*, a *Caṇḍāla* girl, and enjoyed with relish the dry leaves and berries which she gathered out of pure affection. The desire

for release (मुमुक्षुत्वम्) is the least qualification that entitles a man to follow this path. With an ever-shining spirit of reconciliation, it admits that knowledge and actions are not useless, but without faith in God, they fail to bring any fruit. Complete resignation, steadfast adherence, and an insatiable hankering—these alone can make one attain *Bhagavān*. The advanced devotee does not care for any merit whatsoever. God alone is his only concern. He prays like Caitanya—

न धनं न जनं न सुन्दरीं कवितां वा जगदीश कामये ।

मम जन्मनि जन्मनोन्मारे भवताद् भक्तिरहैतुकीत्वयि ॥

“ I crave not for money, nor man, nor for a beautiful woman, O Lord of the World; in every birth of mine may (*ahaituki Bhakti*), disinterested or self-less devotion grow in me towards thee, O Lord.”

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## VEDĀNTISM AND THEISM

BY

RASAVIHARI DAS, AMALNER.

In this short paper I shall try to determine whether Vedāntism can be reconciled with any form of genuine theism ; and if it is not found to be theistic in its tendency, I shall try to indicate what modifications should be made in its theory of reality in order to make it consistent with theistic beliefs.

By Vedāntism I shall mean here only the doctrine of non-dualism (*advaitism*) which is associated with the names of Śaṅkara and his followers. Even within the school of Śaṅkara, different views are held on many important points and it is not always possible to be sure as to what were or would be the views of Śaṅkara himself on those points. But still there is a sufficient consensus of opinion on certain major questions which leaves us no doubt as to the main tendency of the Vedāntic doctrine as advocated in this school.

By theism we understand a doctrine of reality which guarantees the existence of God. Without the reality of God there cannot be any theism in the real sense of the term. But the meaning of the term God is not always taken as fixed. If one takes it to mean reality as such, then, since reality cannot be denied, one has to admit that any theory of reality cannot but be theistic. But that is not our meaning of theism. The very possibility of there being other theories of reality, which are not theistic, implies that the meaning of theism cannot be so widened as to make it identical with any theory of reality. Whatever difference there may be among theists themselves with regard to their meaning of God, they do not certainly think that mere reality can be

a sufficient description of godhead. They can never suppose that anything can be God by merely being real. God is for them a Supreme Being (and not being as such), on whom all other beings depend. One may even equate God with the absolute; but the absolute can justly retain the name of God only so long as its reality does not prove hostile to the reality of individuals who love and worship him. If we conceive the absolute in such a way that it alone is real and there is no room for the reality of anything else within it, then our absolutism cannot be a form of theism. Absolutism is consistent with theism if it regards both God and men as constituent parts of the absolute. Even when it equates God with the absolute, it may still be theistic, if it grants distinct reality to individuals who, however dependent upon God, must, according to theism, enjoy a reality which is not the reality of God or the absolute. There is an element of dualism in all forms of theism. There must be some distinction between men or the world on the one hand and God or the absolute on the other. The relation between God and men may be conceived as that of whole and parts, or of substance and attributes or simply as quite unique; but the distinction between them (God and men), which is necessary for the assertion of any relation, must not be done away with. This distinction is clearly suggested by the word '*Īśvara*' which is a name for God in Sanskrit. The word '*Īśvara*' means lord or master, and for the being of the lord or master, it is absolutely necessary that there should be a world of men of whom he is the lord or master.

We are not going to consider here whether in theism we have got a satisfactory theory of the universe nor are we anxious to see whether Vedāntism is logically consistent or true to the facts of experience. But having understood theism in the sense we have just explained, we propose to consider whether Vedāntism is or can be made conformable to it.

At the very first sight it seems clear that Vedāntism is not compatible with any form of theism. For according to Vedāntism there is absolutely no distinction in the ultimate reality, the world is not real and the individual is the absolute itself. It thus

denies all the requirements of theism which we have indicated above. But still the idea of a limited absolute (*Saguṇa-Brahma*) or God is not foreign to Vedāntism. Although the world is not real, it is not supposed to be altogether unreal. The individual becomes one with the absolute only by acquiring knowledge of the absolute. So long as this knowledge is not obtained he remains identified with a mass of material things which is different from the absolute. It is true that there is no distinction in the ultimate reality from the absolute point of view; but the distinction between men and God is accepted for all practical purposes. Far from denying the existence of God, Vedāntism says that God is at least as real as the world we see. The object, which the Vedāntic knowledge is supposed to accomplish, is the emancipation of men from the bondage of the world. This presupposes that there should be men, bondage and the world, at least for a time, so that such a thing as the emancipation of men from the bondage of the world may be possible. So it is apparent that Vedāntism cannot altogether deny the existence of men and the world. Though it believes in the absolute unity of the ultimate reality, yet on the basis of that reality it seeks to offer us an explanation of God, man and the world. These are not denied but are only shown to have a dependent existence. Each of these entities has got a place in the Vedāntic scheme, although none of them has ultimate reality from the highest point of view. So in a sense it may be said that Vedāntism does not deny theism but goes beyond it. But is it really so? Let us see how Vedāntism explains God, man and the world.

If the absolute, which is conceived as pure intelligence or consciousness (*Śuddha-cit*) without subject and object, were alone there, the philosophy of Vedāntism itself would not arise. The very fact that we as subjects and the world-appearance as the object are there shows that there must be something, beside the absolute, at the root of our experience. This something is conceived as *ajñāna* or ignorance (literally, non-knowledge).\* The

\* *Ajñāna* is a technical term. Its other equivalents are *māyā* and *avidyā*. A distinction is sometimes drawn between *māyā* and *avidyā*. *Ajñāna* associated with God is called *māyā* and when it is associated with the individual, it is called *avidyā*.

whole world of appearance has arisen, along with God and man because of this *ajñāna* being in a particular relation to the absolute. The relation of *ajñāna* to the absolute is a peculiar relation. It is such that it does not affect the nature of the absolute in the least. It is likened to the relation of proximity of a red flower to a transparent pillar of glass which appears red on account of the reflection of the flower upon it, although the pillar itself does not thereby undergo any change whatever. What is understood by God is the absolute in association with *ajñāna*. The absolute itself is not God; it appears as God only when it is supposed to be in union with its limiting adjunct *ajñāna*. The world itself is nothing but *ajñāna* assuming different forms.

The different things of the world are the different modes of the being of *ajñāna*. One such mode is the physical organism which we call the human body. When the absolute is taken as associated with this mode, it appears as man. We shall not enter here into the intricate details of the different Vedāntic theories in this connexion. It is sufficient for our purpose to know that without *ajñāna* we cannot get either man or God. In this all these theories agree. So in order to understand what God and man are, it is necessary to understand what *ajñāna* is. What we are to understand by man and God will depend upon what we should understand by *ajñāna*. The idea of *ajñāna* otherwise called *māyā* or *avidyā* is, however, the most confusing conception in the whole system of Vedānta, and it seems that the Vedāntic writers themselves are not very clear with regard to their understanding of it. They are not certainly unanimous about the status of *ajñāna*. We shall now try to ascertain what should be the meaning of this term in Vedānta in the light of some other undisputed tenets of the system.

Vedāntists are convinced by their own reasons as well as by the sayings of the *Upaniṣads* that the self alone is real, that it is infinite and immutable. But when in ordinary experience they do not find or take it to be so, they have to admit that the so-called experience is nothing but a mistake (*Bhrānti*). And this mistake can be due only to an illusion which they call *ajñāna*. I am persuaded that illusion is the only meaning that can reasonably be given to

the term *ajñāna* in Vedāntism. When the ultimate reality is one undifferented absolute with no distinction of subject and object in it, the only way of accounting for the appearance of the world with its plurality and difference is to suppose that it is entirely due to illusion. This fact of illusion is expressed by saying that *ajñāna* is the cause of the world. It is the cause of the world in the sense in which an illusion is the cause of the illusory object. Its causality is epistemonomic and not constitutive.

Sometimes it is said that *ajñāna* is an indeterminate entity. because in Vedāntic literature it is spoken of as positive (*Bhāva-rūpa*). But the positive character of *ajñāna* need not make it an indeterminate entity. Even an illusion is positive; it is not a mere absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*). In illusion we are not met with a blank non-knowledge, but something positive is given to us. Thus we see that illusion may very well be positive but it need not thereby receive an entitative character. If *ajñāna* were really an entity besides *Brahma* (the absolute), the unqualified non-duality of the ultimate reality will be hard to maintain.

Moreover, *ajñāna* is supposed to require a seat or locus (*āśraya*) and also to refer to an object (*viṣaya*). Now a positive entity may be in need of some locus, but if it is to be capable of having an object it must surely be of the order of knowledge. If we take *ajñāna* as illusion we can very well understand that it should have a locus and an object, because if there is to be an illusion there must be someone to have this illusion and the illusion must be about something.

Further *ajñāna* is supposed to be cancelled or destroyed by knowledge (*jñānanivarttīya*). It is only an illusion or wrong knowledge that can be removed by right knowledge. A positive entity cannot be destroyed by mere knowledge. If an entity is there, it cannot be removed by us merely by knowing it or something else, no matter however accurate, penetrating or comprehensive our knowledge may be. Thus when Vācaspati says that *māyā* has the individual for its seat (*Jīvāśrayā*) and the absolute for its object (*Brahmapadā*), all that he seems to mean is that there is an illusion about the absolute and it is the individual who has this illusion.



Now, if it is right to regard *ajñāna* as nothing else than illusion, then the existential status of God in Vedāntism cannot be higher than that of an illusory object. We have already seen that without *ajñāna* there cannot be any God. The absolute itself, which is pure intelligence, is never regarded as God. The absolute appears as God only when it is joined to or limited by its adjunct *ajñāna*. This statement, when interpreted in terms of knowledge, comes to mean that the absolute misunderstood or viewed under the influence of illusion is God. God along with everything else in the universe owes his origin and being to *ajñāna* or illusion. There is no real God side by side with the absolute which alone is real. Just as the world is only seen to be there without in fact being there, so is God only imagined to be there (*Kalpita*) although in fact there is no such thing as God. This is the meaning and consequence of 'the theory of individual creation by perception' (*dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda*) according to which the individual creates the world when he sees it and which is supposed to give us the ultimate teaching of the Vedānta philosophy (*Mukhya Vedānta Siddhānta*) (cf. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Siddhānta-Bindu*). We therefore come to the conclusion that Vedāntism cannot seriously maintain the reality of God which is essential to all forms of theism. It gives us a God but only an illusory one; and no sincere theist can be content with an illusory God. Vedāntism does not, it is true, deny the existence of God. But it does not also deny existence even to illusory objects. Mere existence, in the language of Vedānta, means almost nothing, unless we know whether it is real (*pāramārthika*) or illusory (*prātibhāsika*). Since Vedāntism cannot give real existence to God, we cannot but conclude that Vedāntism does not believe in a real God. When it is said that Vedāntism explains our ideas of God, man and the world we are not to understand that it vindicates the validity of these our ideas. By showing how they have arisen only under the influence of an all-pervading illusion, Vedāntism only proves that they cannot claim any ultimate validity. It is not true, therefore, to say merely that Vedāntism goes beyond theism; it should be clearly recognised that Vedāntism is antagonistic to all forms of theism.

But if it is really so anti-theistic, how is it that so many

people still hold fast to it, not as a mere intellectual theory but as a religious creed? Theism seems to be largely ingrained in human nature, and a community of atheists has yet to be found anywhere in the world. But this seems to be belied by the adherence of so many well-meaning people in India to the creed of Vedānta. The apparent contradiction is resolved when we remember that Vedāntism is not so atheistic in appearance, although it is undoubtedly so in fact. The atheistic implications of its fundamental tenets are rarely drawn out in clear light by the popular mind. By inculcating belief in a higher reality in the form of *Brahma* or the absolute, Vedāntism seems to offer us a more or less suitable substitute for God; and when further it enjoins upon all aspirants after right knowledge and salvation the duty of worshipping God in any suitable form, and of performing other religious functions, it seems to make itself immune from all charge of atheism. It does not always seem to be clearly realised that the highest goal of life, according to Vedānta, is an ever accomplished fact and is not something that has yet to be achieved, that the individual being identical with the absolute, there is no higher reality which can be in a position of God to him. Since the absolute alone is there, we cannot even say that there has been actually any illusion. For the absolute is not of course susceptible of any illusion and nothing else is there to be misled by an illusion. The illusion not being there, there cannot actually be any God, man or world. So it is said :—“ There is no cessation, no origin, no one is in bondage and no one is working for salvation; there is no one who is desirous of salvation and no one is there who has attained it; this is the highest truth.”

*Na nirodho na cotpattirna bandho naca sādhaḥ  
Na mumukṣurna-vai mukta ityeṣā paramārthatā.*

Māṇḍukya Kārikā, Chap. 2, Verse 32.

The quintessence of Vedāntism, which is so boldly declared in the above couplet, is scarcely realised by the popular mind, be-

cause it is singularly free from all passion for logical consistency. The fact is that the ordinary man never believes in Vedāntism in this extreme form. The ordinary Vedāntist thinks that in his present empirical existence (*Vyāvahārikāvasthā*), there is a real distinction between God and him, although he regards God as his highest self (*Paramātmā*). He prays to God to help him to achieve the end of his life, even though this end consists in his realising his identity with God which is an accomplished fact. He thinks that the troubles of his worldly life are due to *ajñāna*. But he never seriously takes *ajñāna* to be a mere defect in his perception. He believes in *ajñāna* either as a constitutive principle of the world or as a playful energy of the lord. To escape from the influence of *ajñāna*, the ordinary man, who believes in Vedāntism, knows that he should have recourse to the knowledge of the absolute; but he also knows that the knowledge of the absolute (*Brahma-jñāna*) can dawn upon him only when he has completely purified his mind and heart by undergoing a long and arduous course of spiritual discipline. The performance of ordinary religious duties, enjoined by the *Vedas* forms part of this discipline. Even devotion to some deity in the form of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa or Śiva, does not fall outside this course. So the life of an ordinary Vedāntist remains indistinguishable from that of a theist.

We have already seen that a genuinely theistic attitude cannot be sincerely maintained on the strict non-dualistic basis of Vedānta. So if the beliefs and practices of ordinary Vedāntists, which are, to all intents and purposes, theistic, are to be justified, certain changes are absolutely necessary in the Vedāntic scheme of things. In the first place, the absolute non-duality of the ultimate principle will have to be given up. *Ajñāna* will have to be taken in all seriousness as a constitutive principle of the world or at least as the creative energy of God or the absolute. It will have to be recognised that *ajñāna* cannot be cancelled by mere knowledge. This will follow as a consequence from the reality of *ajñāna* as a constitutive principle of the world. No real entity can ever be cancelled by mere knowledge. If salvation consists in getting rid of the influence of the world, it will have to be seen that mere knowledge is not sufficient for the purpose.

These things are in a sense conceded by Vedāntism itself, although it has not done so quite consistently or clearly. When the universe of our experience is not explained by the absolute alone, it is evident that there is something else beside the absolute. When further *ajñāna* or *māyā* is described as consisting of three elements of different character (*trigunātmikā*), and is also supposed to admit of the distinction of whole (*Samaṣṭi*) and parts (*Vyaṣṭi*) we get the impression that *ajñāna* is taken as a real entity similar to the Prakṛti (matter) of the Sāṅkhyas. The elaborate description in Vedāntic literature of how the different things of the world have been evolved out of *ajñāna* helps only to confirm this impression. But this means that absolute non-dualism (*advaitism*) has to be given up. It is said that the non-duality of the absolute is not affected by the being of *ajñāna*, because the being of *ajñāna* is not of the same status (*Samasattāka*) as that of the absolute. But since there cannot be any differentiation of degree or kind in being as such,\* if *ajñāna* is once granted to be there, it cannot but affect the non-duality of the absolute. The being of *ajñāna* can be supposed to be less than that of the absolute only in the sense that it is less persistent. *Ajñāna* is supposed to come to an end on the rise of right knowledge, whereas *Brahma* or the absolute continues for all time. But so long at least as *ajñāna* is there, the non-duality of the absolute cannot but be disturbed. Moreover it is even doubtful whether *ajñāna* does ever come to an end. Even when the Vedāntic mystic has got the intuition of the absolute (*Brahma Sākṣātkāra*), which is supposed to effect his freedom from the world, he does not cease to see the world or to be affected by any bodily feelings. It is contended that he has these experiences as the result of his past deeds which have begun to take effect (*Prārabdha Karma*). But since all deeds and their results are the work of *ajñāna*, if *ajñāna* really ceases with the rise of knowledge, all deeds with their results should disappear. The fact that they do not cease to have their effect even on the enlightened Vedāntist shows that *ajñāna* is not in fact cancelled by knowledge.

\* See my paper on 'Bradley and Sankara' in the *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, Vol. 3.

Thus we see that Vedāntism, which is not strictly compatible with theism, can support the theistic attitude of the popular mind only by sacrificing its main principles.

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# THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

BY

R. D. DESAI, AMALNER

The aim of this paper is to see whether we can base our belief in Immortality on any solid scientific or metaphysical theory. If such theories do not find room for such a belief, we shall try finally to ascertain on what grounds we can maintain such a belief, and to see what implications it may have in connection with our attitude to life.

At the outset we shall see in how many different ways the idea of immortality is understood.

## MEANINGS OF IMMORTALITY.

1. Immortality often means to a set of people who are mad after longevity. eternal life in this body. Instead of immortality of soul, they mean immortality of this physical organism. They, who flee from death, would ever like to be immortal in this very corporeal body. But flesh is heir to decay and change ; and such an idea is absurd from the scientific stand-point.

2. Immortality may mean, as is generally meant in Indian Philosophical systems, freedom from *Samsāra* the cycle of births and deaths in this illusory world. They mean by immortality an Eternal rest.

3. The third view of immortality implies that there is something that survives or persists after bodily death. Now this something that persists after bodily death may be variously meant according as we may have different conceptions of the persisting agent.

- (1) According to some the persisting agent is a spiritual substance, pure and simple, called soul.

- (2) While to others this substance is nothing but a myth, a chimera of human brain. To them there is nothing substantial surviving bodily death of an individual, save an impersonal influence or meaning conserved by the race, *e.g.*, Plato, Napoleon, Christ, Sankara live in the minds of men.
- (3) The third view of the persisting agent is that the unity of thinking, feeling, willing centre of self-consciousness survives bodily death, *i.e.*, the personality of the individual will not cease to exist though the body will. The human self is not a thing or a substance but a life with a purpose, a meaning.

It is believed that the essence of selfhood is subjectivity, and hence attempts are made to conceive it as pure subject. But such a thing is a logical impossibility. We can never at any time divorce the subject from the object. We may distinguish between them, but cannot separate them completely. For us, the essence of the self does not consist only in its pure subjectivity : its essence also consists in its striving, willing also. So there are two aspects of the self (1) the existential aspect, and (2) the moral aspect as an ethical person, taking note of ideals, and seeking them. The self is a person. So our persisting agent is an ethical person, and not an abstract myth called substance. And the sort of immortality that is consistent with this view of the persisting agent is personal Immortality, that we want.

We will not be satisfied with corporate immortality which means that the thoughts and values of a man's personality will persist after man's death as an influence in the corporate life of people, *e.g.*, the master may be immortal in his pupil or circle of pupils, etc.

Nor do we want the conditional immortality of Lotze, according to whom, a soul is immortal so far as he lives and reacts as a meaning to the growing and changing universe. When he ceases to be a meaning, he ceases to be. For, to Lotze Reality or

being consists in that which a thing does, acts and is reacted upon. Such a make-shift will also not satisfy us.

The former does not satisfy us because it lacks personality and memory ; the latter both for the absence of personal consciousness, and the limited lease of life. Nor would the idea of the persisting substance satisfy us. According to Dr. McTaggart souls are substances, and they were pre-existing as such, and survive after death also. Not only that, but they undergo births and assume bodies. Now, such a barren substance without memory and personal consciousness of memory cannot intelligibly be called a person and loss of personality means extinction of self. " Even though I may be born a king of China," as Leibnitz would say, " what is that to me who do not know that it is I who am so born? It is like saying that on the event of my death there was the creation of a king of China." These are two discrete events quite unconnected.

Let us see what science has to say as regards immortality in our sense of the word.

The materialists and biologists say that mind is dependent for its genesis and existence on body. The mind is the product of brain cells. It is an epiphenomenon, a spark ground out of the brain-processes. Again the physiologists would support them saying that consciousness is dependent on brain by showing that certain mental functions are localised in some special parts of the brain ; and if that part be injured mind would cease to function.

But then more sober scientific researches show that " the leap from the physiological to the psychical is the most important factor in the evolution of mind." Mind might have emerged in the process of evolution in time, as the brain and our organism became more complex. But therefore it does not mean that the newly emerged life can be described completely in terms of the physical. The whole controversy between mechanism and vitalism has proved that the psychical cannot be reduced to the physical. Henri Bergson, and Prof. S. Alexander have proved that what emerges at each new level is unique in its own way and cannot be resolved into what had emerged before. The process of Evolution is creative or emergent. We can say from the study of mind in its present stage of evolution that it gradually dominates



body and tries to be autonomous. The birth of moral will and reason reverses the scales in favour of mind, and mind throws off the yoke of the flesh. Will can dominate nervous system, and in man, mind gets its emancipation from flesh. The mind has the power to heal diseases by auto-suggestion because it can rule the nervous system.

Again to-day the researches of the Psychical Society have proved so far that thought-transference—Telepathy—is possible. This means that mind can act on another mind without using the ordinary channels of bodily senses.

But still these facts do not prove that mind will survive the disintegration of brain, the growing tendency of mind to be autonomous leads us to conjecture that it may be able to exist independently of this our present body in some higher etherealised body. The brain is considered by some as only a transmitting apparatus of thought and not a generating apparatus. So consciousness—the individualised ego may be able to persist even after death. This is not impossible in principle as unscientific; though it is not probable to-day. Still it is a hypothesis.

Now we shall see if metaphysical theories have to say anything.

The concept of experience resolves itself into the relationship of subject and object. Pure experience without reference to any subject, whose experience it is, is a fictional idea. Experience unqualified is an unmeaning term. It must have an experiencer; it cannot hang in the air. The subject of experience signifies one to whom various objects are consciously present. The subject is not only the knower, but it feels as well as wills. It is believed that the essence of self-hood is subjectivity; and hence attempts are made to conceive it as pure subject without any reference to any object. But such a thing is a logical impossibility. We cannot at any time divorce the subject from the object. We may distinguish them, but cannot separate them completely. For us the essence of the self does not consist only in its pure subjectivity, its essence consists in its striving, willing also. So there are two aspects of the self (1) the existential aspect and (2) the moral aspect as an ethical person taking note of ideals and seeking them. In both of these aspects the subject-object relation is present. From the standpoint of the subject as the knower I am; but from the

standpoint of values or ideals, I was, I am becoming, I am still to become. So our view of the self includes the notion of the subject as a knower, plus the subject who feels and wills. He is a person. Person is a social and ethical self. So the self in metaphysics involves the relation of subject and object, "not in intellectual terms merely," but in terms of feeling and will as well. Social, æsthetic, intellectual and religious ideals are the portion of a man as the possessor of personality.

We claim immortality or persistence for such a self, and not for an abstract myth. But from the nature of such person we cannot derive logically that it will persist after the bodily death. So our idea of immortality cannot be accepted as an established creed on either scientific or metaphysical grounds.

But then, they do not disprove it either. They would rather substantiate our belief in immortality if we can have sufficient foundations for that in our experience.

Now we shall shift our emphasis from scientific and metaphysical inquiries to ethical ones in order to discover a sure foundation for our belief. We saw that it is not a creed acceptable on scientific or metaphysical grounds, but it is a belief. Let us see if it is a rational belief.

Some may even go to the extent of declaring that belief in immortality is instinctive but it is too much to say that. If we say that, every human being, who has some sense of aspiration and striving for moral values in this world, will appreciate this belief. A moral individual always finds that his moral ideals—moral values are too immense to be achieved in the short span of four score years; and the idea that its achievement will remain unfulfilled will generate in him the idea of future personal life, if he is allowed to live. So the fulfilment of the moral, the intellectual and æsthetic values will drive him to entertain such a strong love for his personality, for they mean nothing apart from his personal experience, and they are absolutely real for him. I, for one, believe that death is not full of horror because it is something so ugly and terrible in its appearance but because it seems to cut off our conscious selves for ever from objects on which we have already set our hearts, and which are of eternal value to us. It is the uncertainty of our personal existence that lands us in fear. To come to the point, it is

in the consciousness of moral values so far unrealised, that we find the *terra firma*—the firm foundation of our belief in immortality. It is the demand or vaticination of our conscience, or practical Reason that we desire to persist after death as persons—Why? To win new glories and to complete what is left incomplete here below. This is the logical demand and logical conclusion arising from the nature of the self that we have adopted in this paper. The moral aspect of our self has an appreciative sense. It appreciates a world of ideals to be achieved by it and then, the will starts to achieve them. This appreciative, hungering and active side of our self is a fact of everyone's experience. To every one of us the discrepancy between our ideals, and the means at our command to achieve them in this finite life, is quite glaringly evident. There is a clear disproportion between man's ethical ideals and the short span of earthly life. We can never reach them here below in their entirety, and as they are absolutely valuable to us, we cannot but believe that we shall be able to achieve them after this life. We are even haunted by a feeling of shortcoming, and we are lured to something higher before us. Now let us ask. Are we as moral beings illusions? Are our moral values illusions. Is that appreciative part of the self an illusion? No. This moral aspect of our self is a stubborn reality that we face, and without any hesitation we can base our belief in immortality on it. Our belief rests on the practical demand of our practical self. It directs our theoretical reason to seek it in this direction. For me there is no other foundation on which I can mount my belief in immortality. We need not invoke belief in God, and found our belief in immortality on it. This is founding one belief on another which itself requires a foundation. On the contrary belief in God can be reached if we press the problem of morality further. To an atheist, God may not be, but morality is, invaluable; for, it is the vital part of his experience.

Now we come to the last point of discussion whether the Belief in Immortality can have any practical influence on our attitude to life. In other words, what are the practical implications of our belief?

To the pessimists according to whom there is an over-balance of misery over happiness, this idea of immortality will

stretch a vista of eternal struggle of striving without any rest. For to a moral agent the ideal is never fulfilled and hence such a vast stretch of time with struggle will be unbearable. They would like to sing songs of death beyond which they think there is rest, but such a pessimism is the outcome of defective thinking and can only be cured by right sort of thinking. For, ills of half thinking can only be cured by more thinking and not by suppressing it. But if they be temperamental, we do not know what to do with them.

On the contrary, to an optimist absence of Immortality would be the cause of pessimism and lethargy in this world. For, however he may be convinced of the truth of moral values, the sudden close of all progress at the grave would always dishearten him in his healthy attitude to life. To him the absolute Idealism which shatters all notions of moral values and personality would come as a bolt from the blue, and all his energy for further progress would be paralysed.

Some would go to the extent of declaring that all morality would vanish if the belief in Immortality were taken away. But that is too much. For the categorical imperative is unconditional; it does not rest on any condition. Without the belief in Immortality morality can survive, it cannot be utterly undermined; but its foundations may shake if not be shattered. For it enriches the idea of morality by giving hopes of future life, in which the person can realise himself. I would compare the Belief in Immortality to the cement that fills up the gaps between the foundation-stones of morality, and thus strengthens and coops them together. But it can never be called the postulate of morality, rather morality is the postulate of this Belief as we saw above.

But, then, there are disadvantages of the belief in Immortality, unless understood in a proper sense. As for instance, occupied with the things which *shall be*, men would be diverted too much from the things which *are*. This will bring men to the idea of other-worldliness. People would be too much engrossed with what would happen in the life beyond, to look after things here below. Immortality should mean for us the present experience of life's values, and the conviction of their ever-lasting continuance in some form or other. Immortality is not something

that begins after death ; it is here in the making, for the more perfect you are here, the fitter will you be for the life beyond.

And lastly, Belief in Immortality will take away the sting from death. For it is the idea of uncertainty beyond death that terrifies us so much. If at all we take death to be a necessary occurrence, as the opening of a portal to a richer life beyond this life that is awaiting us, death would appear quite welcome to us. And we know of saints and mystics who with their clear ideas of life here, of life beyond, and their moral continuity, have been exultant in their hours of death.

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# DOES DEATH ANNIHILATE PERSONALITY?

BY

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The first hypothesis that is suggested about death is that the dead totally cease to be. On what grounds is this hypothesis suggested? Does it satisfactorily explain the fact of death in relation to other facts and demands of life? The only evidence that supports this hypothesis is that we do not perceive with any of our physical senses the existence of the dead person. The body is no longer alive and active ; it has begun to be decomposed and rotten ; and if not buried or cremated, it will vanish into the elements through natural forces acting upon it, for there no longer exists in it the unifying and resisting force that kept it alive formerly. Now, there can be no denying the fact that the body is dissolved, and nothing else is perceived of the personality. But from this fact it does not follow that the personality no longer exists, unless it is established that the body, and nothing beyond that, is the personality, and also that nothing can be said to exist which is not perceived by us. The man who thinks that the dead cease to be, therefore, assumes that a person is nothing more than the physical body, and that only the sensible is the existent. The first of these presuppositions is either based on the second, as the belief that personality is nothing more than the body is due to our perceiving nothing more than the body with our senses and believing that nothing could exist which is not perceived ; or there is a confusion in the mind of one who thinks like that between a mere condition of manifestation and a cause of production ; for it has also been argued in favour of this hypothesis that all the phenomena which are said to constitute the personality over and above the physical body are caused by, or are produced out of the body and the brain which is a part of the body, forgetting the other possibility that the body or the brain might be merely the condition of the manifestation of these phenomena.

This argument, we may point out, is like the one that there is no other cause and source of the broad-cast music beyond the receiving instrument. There was a personality as long as there was a sound body; now there is no body, therefore, there is no personality; is is as good as arguing that as long as my electric bulb was all right, there existed an electric current in the world, but now, when my bulb is spoiled or broken, there cannot be any current, and so no other bulb can be lighted in this place. Evidently, such arguments are absurd. The absurdity here is really due to the presupposition that the sensible, nay, that which is actually revealed to the physical senses, is existent, and nothing else. There is no necessity of dilating upon the untenability of this belief. We cannot limit existence to that alone which is perceptible to the physical senses. Even modern science is convincing us that the perceived universe is very little in comparison with that which is not perceived ordinarily by the physical senses. If we look within us, we shall find that the unperceived is immensely more in existence than the perceived portion of the entire experience. When we cease to be *en rapport* with the external world with our physical senses, an inner world is opened to us in what we call a dream-experience. A careful study of dream is very necessary for the proper understanding of the personality and the mystery of human life. There is sense-perception in the dream, but the physical senses are closed and are at rest. There is a body active in dream, but the physical body is at rest; it is free from all that the dream-body is busy about. There is a world full of things and persons for the dreamer, but those things and persons are not exactly the same as the contents of the waking world. Does all this not show that the sphere of the existent and being experienced is much wider than that of what is perceived by the physical and external senses. The hypothesis, therefore, that the personality of the dead does not exist anywhere after the dissolution of the physical body is not sound. What we are really sure of in the case of death is not the non-existence of the personality of the dead anywhere, but of the non-manifestation of it through the physical body which is now spoilt like an electric bulb. This, however, is an evident fact that requires no proof.

A refutation of the opposite, however, is not a positive proof of anything. Are, then, there any positive grounds on which it might be definitely said that the personality of the dead one continues after the dissolution of the physical body? There can be two convincing proofs of the continuity after death: either the person who is now dead physically but continues to exist somewhere, in some or other way, should inform us with sufficiently convincing evidence amenable to reasonable tests, that he has not ceased to be with the dissolution of the physical body; or, one may himself remember his having survived the dissolution of his previous physical body. It is apparent that both these proofs are difficult to be got, and difficult also to be correctly estimated, although people are busy in finding out such evidences. We need not here enter into the difficulties of judging the validity or genuineness of these kinds of evidences. There are great scientists who have considered these difficulties in a truly scientific spirit, and yet have declared that "the hypothesis of surviving intelligence and personality,—not only surviving but anxious and able with difficulty to communicate,—is the simplest and most straightforward, and the only one that fits all the facts." (Oliver Lodge: *The Survival of Man*, p. 221.) Recently Mr. Kekai Nandan Sahai of Bareilly has collected a number of cases (*vide* his pamphlet: *Reincarnation*) in which the memory of the previous physical existence is to a great extent retained and verified. In the face of such facts and of our previously reached conclusion it is merely dogmatic to say that a personality ceases to exist with physical death, we are led to think that our existence does not end with the end of the physical body.

This hypothesis is very much strengthened when we study other aspects of our experience, the dream and the sleep states. "The study of dream," says Dr. Du Prel rightly, "frees us much more thoroughly from that physiological prejudice than can the investigation of psychical functions in the waking life." (Du Prel: *The Philosophy of Mysticism*, Vol. I, p. 54.) While a man is asleep his psychical activity sinks for the time being below the threshold of consciousness. But the activity of their inner personality, in all its aspects,—intellectual, emotional and volitional,—is very much heightened, as is evident from the dream-expe-



rience of ours, and from the activity displayed by a somnambulist and by a hypnotised or an entranced person. Dr. Du Prel's study of sleep has convinced him that "the more the threshold of sensibility is displaced the more the positive side of sleep would become apparent, producing always new psychical reactions" (*Ibid*, p. 147). It means, in other words, that the more we are free from the bodily consciousness, the more clearly we experience another state of existence. And, it may, therefore, be that when we are totally free from the body and the physical senses, we may continue to experience and exist in a world the like of which our dreams daily show us, however vaguely it may be. Vaguely, probably because some link ties us with the physical body even when we are very much free from it in dreams.

Thus, to deny existence after physical death is dogmatic; there is some actual evidence in its favour, and it is very much probable that it may be so. Nay, it is also necessary, if the constitution of the world is not irrational. For, it is irrational that our efforts and desires should evaporate into nothing, and should not be satisfied in the long run. It is irrational and absurd that a moral, gentle and noble personality is evolved and built here under hardships and struggles and with tears, only to be split suddenly on the rock of death. Are all our aspirations for perfection, omnipotence, omniscience and absolute bliss nothing more than illusion and mockery? Are Christs, Neros and Washingtons all to be levelled by death? Are the martyrs and condemned murderers sailing in the same boat only to be dashed into nothingness? "Should Kant and Goethe, Buddha and Christ, have laboured and suffered for the race, without thereby at the same time advancing a transcendental subject of theirs, nature would be in the highest degree wasteful" (*Ibid*, Vol. II, pp. 223-224). It cannot be so if the world is rational. And, unless reason rules the world, science, philosophy, morality and religion are absurdities. Suicide, in that case, would be the best course of action for a suffering man. But we think the universe is rational, simply because reason is one of the manifested forms of the Reality in man. Reality may, therefore, be more than rational, but it cannot be less or otherwise.

# THE UNIQUE EXPERIENCES OF SAINT MĀNIKKA VĀCHAGAR.

BY

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## *Introductory.*

The original experiences of a great man to whom Religion was not a mere habit or tradition, but a living passion, have an immense personal charm, and are of unique philosophical worth.

We are not concerned here with their psychological explanation, or pathological origins, but with their spiritual value—as the inner revelation of deep-seated longings and passionate yearning for the Divine.

W. James gives the following *characteristics of Saintliness* ; \* and they all apply to Mānikka Vāchagar—

(1) “ A feeling of being in a wider life than that of this world's selfish little interests ; and the conviction, both intellectual and sensible, of the existence of an Ideal Power ”—with Mānikka Vāchagar, this Power is the Lord Śiva.

(2) “ A sense of the friendly continuity of the Ideal Power with our own life, and a willing self-surrender to its control ”—this we find throughout the life-history of Mānikka Vāchagar, and find passionate expression in his songs.

\* *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 272.

(3) "An immense elation and freedom, as the outlines of the confining self-hood melt down"—or, as the Upanishads have it,

मिथिले हृदयचन्दिनिहृदले सर्वसंगताः ।

कीदृशे वास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ॥

Mānikka Vāchagar had 'seen' the Supreme Being in Perum durai; and all doubts of the soul, all shackles of Karma, and the heart's invisible attachments to the things of flesh had broken and fallen asunder from that instant.

(4) "These inner conditions have their typical practical consequences—*asceticism*—the self-surrender may become so passionate as to turn into self-immolation—the saint finds positive pleasure in sacrifice and asceticism, expressing thereby his loyalty to the higher Power."—

Mānikka Vāchagar left home and family, resigned power and office, and retired to Chidambaram to spend the remainder of his days on earth in ascetic devotion to the Lord.

The Saint, Mānikka Vāchagar, is unique in history as making frequent references to his extraordinary, and what we may call, miraculous experiences, in the course of his songs. Religious history is everywhere copious in miraculous incidents; and in India especially, legend and miracle very soon rally round a man who has had any pretence to holiness or wisdom. But, where have we such passionate, sincere, and forceful expression of the sense of the Supreme Presence and its ways in a Saint's authentic works, as we have in Mānikka Vāchagar's case? We have a good deal of legend and Purāṇa about him, as we have of any other religious teacher or Āchārya. But, disregarding them all, if we turn to his own works, we are struck by his remarkable testimony to the Super-

natural and the Supersensible, and the singular ways in which his Lord chose to deal with him.

To make this plain, I will give a brief outline of his life, and recount the chief incidents in his career, as narrated or alluded to in his own works.

### *Outline of Mānikka Vāchagar's Life.*

We have no authentic account of his life, of any historic value. His date is uncertain. It is a disputed point whether he lived prior or subsequent to the authors of the *Tevāram*. But it is certain that he lived before the 10th century A. D., when his works, along with those of the other great Śaiva saints, were included in the Tamil Canon, under the authority of King Rajaraja the Great. We do not know even his personal name. "*Mānikka Vāchagar*" or "*The Jewel-tongued*," was a title, it is said, bestowed on him by the Lord of Chidambaram; and the other name by which he is known in Tamil works, '*Vāḍavūrar*,' or '*Vāḍavūradigal*,' is only a place-name, and not a personal one. It is certain he was a Brāhman of high standing and great learning, and was the chief minister to a Pandyan king of unknown age, known in the *Purāṇas* as Arimardana. This was the heyday of his worldly prosperity and greatness. But his mind was not in his work or of this world—it was distracted by a spiritual longing and restlessness. He clearly saw the limitations of his environment, and aspired for a higher freedom through special revelation in which he firmly believed. Many of his poems, especially the *Tīru-Chatakam*, are full of this spiritual discontent with existing things, and eagerness to seek deliverance from them.\*

\* *Tiruvāchagam*, V, 25-53 (the translations in this paper are from Pope); the same sentiments will be found also in V, 5; 12-14; 27; 40; 45; and X, 10.

In all this is a good deal to remind one of St. Augustine's confessions. Mānikka Vāchagar was still in his early youth, the prime minister and favourite of the great Pandyan king, the virtual ruler of the kingdom.

One day, the king orders Mānikka Vāchagar to go to Perumdurai, a sea-port in the Chola country, where he heard that a large consignment of foreign horses had arrived; and he asks his minister to purchase for him a number of them, for which he entrusts the latter with a large amount of money.

Mānikka Vāchagar sets out with a good escort; and while he encamps in the outskirts of the sea-port town, he hears the hum of religious music from the neighbouring woods. He sends a messenger to ascertain its nature; and finds that a great teacher was seated beneath a tree instructing a large assembly of Chelas. As soon as Mānikka Vāchagar sees him, he knows that the Guru is none other than the Lord Śiva himself with his hosts. He reverently approaches, is initiated and instructed in Divine knowledge by Śiva himself. Henceforth, Mānikka Vāchagar has become a regenerate being, a *Jivan-mukta*. He straightway renounces the world, and assumes the garb of the ascetic outwardly and in spirit—this is Mānikka Vāchagar's conversion; and he refers to it in almost every one of his poems, pouring forth in soul-stirring terms his unworthiness of the election or choice by the Great God himself, who deigned to come down from Kailāsa to seek him out of millions of far worthier souls in waiting.\*

In these and others of his songs, Mānikka Vāchagar regards Śiva as "his Guru, the friend, almost the familiar companion; and he addresses him often with a mixture of awe and of simple affection that has a peculiar effect.

\* *Tiruvāchagam*, I, 56-61; III, 146-150.

Through all Mānikka Vāchagar's poems, this personal relation of God as manifested Guru to his devotees or disciples is most prominent"—(Pope).

Mānikka Vāchagar has become a new man, a *saint*. Being no longer of this world, he forgets the king's business on which he has come; stays on in Perumdurai, having rendered the king's treasures to his new Master. News of the defalcation soon reaches the king, who immediately orders his minister's return. Mānikka Vāchagar returns to Madura; and gives some lame excuses for his conduct which do not satisfy the king. He is arrested and imprisoned.

But one day the king hears that a large contingent of foreign horses have been brought. He relents, confesses his mistake in disbelieving in Mānikka Vāchagar's word, and orders his release. The latter sees the hand of the Great God in this; and recognises him in the leading Greek who has brought the horses. The king orders for the proper care of his purchases, and retires for the night, only to be disturbed by wild howls of jackals—for, the horses were not real horses, but jackals magically turned into horses. They make the night hideous, frighten the citizens, and escape into the woods. If miracle there was, this story so familiar to South Indians, is certainly one. But it is not a mere tradition or legend that has grown round the Saint in the course of ages,—for, Mānikka Vāchagar himself refers to it often.\*

The king becomes indignant at the trick played on him; and submits Mānikka Vāchagar to torture. In answer to the latter's prayers, Śiva sends a tremendous flood down the Vaigai which threatens the Pandyan capital. Mānikka Vāchagar is released, and restored to power once more; and under his supervision, protective works are undertaken to

\* : *Tiruvāchagam*, II, 25-45 ; XXXVI, 1-2 ; XXXVIII, 1; L. 7.

save the city from destruction. The Great God himself does "coolie" work in answer to the prayer of an humble old woman who has no one to do her share of forced labour, eating her rice-cakes for his wages. He is slack in his work, is reprimanded, and beaten. The whole world trembles at the audacity of the king, who immediately recognises his mistake, and acknowledges the greatness of his minister.

Mānikka Vāchagar refers to this miracle as follows:—\*

The king now wants to retain Mānikka Vāchagar's services,—even to hand over his kingdom to him. But the latter has done with the world and its ways, renounces all pomp and wealth, and returns to his Master in Perum-durai. After sometime, Śiva, his task of converting and initiating Mānikka Vāchagar accomplished, return to Kailāsa.

His hosts remain with the Saint for a time; and then, one day, they disappear in a flame that suddenly appears in the temple tank.

His sorrow at the departure of the Lord and His hosts, his anguish at the separation, and his passionate longing for reunion, form the theme of many of his most beautiful lyrics.†

Mānikka Vāchagar is far more personal than the authors of the *Tevāram*; and his poems have the peculiar charm of showing forth a mighty soul's travails, longings, and joys.

The miraculous incidents of his life are no mere tradition in his case; but essential incidents of his spiritual history, as real to him as the ways of his Lord. His poems read as though he has come in intimate contact with his God, and personally experienced the mysterious and miraculous modes in which that God chose to deal with him.

\* *Tiruvāchagam*, II, 46-47; VIII, 8; XIII, 16; XXX, 2.  
*Tiruvāchagam*, V, 19, 23; XXIV, 1; XXXII, 1; L, 2.

Though left behind on this earth, and eager to rejoin his Lord, Mānikka Vāchagar has a mission to fulfil. He has to preach the Gospel of Śiva to mankind, and re-establish His faith in this world.

He visits a number of Śaivite shrines. Finally he settles down in Chidambaram, and sings in praise of the Lord there. In his later songs, there is no longer any note of sadness and longing; but they are full of joy and triumph. Mānikka Vāchagar has at last found that abiding peace of spirit which he has been seeking all along.

It was in Chidambaram that he argued with, and won over a number of leading Buddhists that had come from Ceylon with their king. He alludes to this in *Tiruvāchagam*, XV, 6; and in Chidambaram, he attained his final beatitude.

The *Tiruvāchagam*, as the collection of his works has come to be called, belongs to the highest class of devotional poetry; and there is a note of sincerity and seriousness in it that is impossible to brush aside. It is commonly said that "he whose heart does not melt by the *Tiruvāchagam* must have a stony heart." In the words of a Christian admirer of the Saint, "No one can read the Saint's verses without profound emotion. Scarcely ever has the longing of the human soul for purity and peace and divine fellowship found worthier expression"—(Pope).

One can realise the truth of this either as one reads the original for himself, or as one listens to the songs as they are chanted daily in the South Indian temples.

Almost every line of Mānikka Vāchagar's compositions rings with his soul's real and realised experiences. One cannot help concluding that, in them we have the revelation of a wonderful personality, who has come in intimate contact



with the Divine, and gone through supersensual and supernatural experiences.

His meeting with Śiva on earth as a Guru, come down to instruct him, may perhaps be explained in an ordinary way.

Speaking of sudden conversion, W. James \* says, "It is natural that those who personally have traversed such an experience should carry away a feeling of its being a miracle, rather than a natural process. Voices are often heard; lights seen; or visions witnessed—and it always seems, after the surrender of the personal will, as if an extraneous higher power had flooded in and taken possession."

But, how can one explain such obviously miraculous incidents as jackals being turned into horses, except on the supposition that they are stories that have gathered round the Saint, as they often do, round the world's great religious teachers? The fact that Mānikka Vāchagar himself so frequently refers to these seemingly legendary incidents, and the fact that the *Tiruvāchagam* cannot be brushed aside as the spurious product of a later age, make his *experiences* *unique* in the history of Religion.

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\* *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 228

## SECTION OF ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY



## RĀMĀNUJA ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

BY

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“ Am I free? ” is a question which has been ever challenging human reason because of its deep personal interest. It is a question the answer to which shapes a man's outlook on life. Am I to submit passively to everything with folded hands and wait saying in the words of the astronomer-poet of Persia :—

“ The moving finger writes and having writ,  
Moves on; nor all thy piety nor wit,  
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line,  
Nor all thy tears wash out a word of it.”

Am I not the master of my fate, the captain of my soul in Henley's famous phrase? Is not our destiny in a large measure in our hands? Is not the zest of living, the sense of creative choice the source of morals? Is this conviction so ancient, so genuine and so universal, after all, a myth? The importance of this problem can be seen in the galaxy of terms in every language dealing with notions of freedom, agency, destiny, *Karma*, *Vāsanā*, *Swātantrya*, etc., and in the fact that no great thinker of the world has ignored this problem. The object of this paper is to examine the answer to this perplexing question given by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahmasūtras*, particularly as interpreted by Rāmānuja who is regarded as a more faithful exponent of the *Sūtras* than Śaṅkara.

The Kartrādhikaraṇa and the Parāyattādhikaraṇa of Chapter II, Part 3, of the *Brahma Sūtras* deal with the question of freedom and moral responsibility. Has the individual soul agency? If so, what kind of agency is it? What is the source of such agency?

The first Sūtra Kartā sāstrārthavatvāt declares the agency of the soul. Bādarāyaṇa concludes that we are the authors of our acts, because it is a necessary implication of our ethical consciousness. What we call the moral life loses its meaning, if freedom is not vindicated. If it cannot be held, in some sense, that we are the authors of our deeds, that these acts are in a sense our own, not wholly forced on us from outside, it is meaningless to praise or blame any one of us for what we do. Existing codes of law and morality imply at least this much. The term Śāstra is derived from *Śās* ('to command,') to impel, to act by giving rise to a conception in the mind of the individual to whom it is addressed. Without freedom, scriptural injunctions and prohibitions become purportless. Unless the individuals are centres of intelligent activity, self-acting centres, unless they can enter on action or refrain from it according to their thought and will, they cannot be directed to do this or that. To be free and to be responsible for what one does are one and the same thing. To say a man ought to do a thing carries with it the assumption that he is free and is responsible for his choice. "Ought" implies "can," as Kant puts it. The fact of punishment implies freedom. The author of *Śrutaprakāśikā* says:—*Ataḥ kṛtyākaraṇākṛtyakaraṇeshu cha ichchhā nivāraṇakṣhamo'pi pratyavāyānādareṇa svēchchham na nivārayati ityēsha eva jīvasya dandyaṭce hetuḥ.*

Rāmānuja recognizes the personality of the individual. Though the individual is never outside Brahman, he enjoys a separate personal existence and remains a personality for ever. Rāmānuja defends with vigour freedom in the sense of genuine choice in interpreting Sūtra 39, *Yathācha takshobhayatā*. The analogy of the carpenter is pressed into service. A carpenter, although having instruments ready at hand, may choose to work or may not choose to work, as he pleases. The self also provided with the instruments of action acts when it *wishes* to do so and does not act if it does not choose to do so. The action of the soul depends on its volition.

What is it that is meant to be illustrated by this analogy? Evidently it is freedom of choice. The *Śrutaprakāśikā* defines *Swātantrya* "*Ichchhāśaktimattre'pi anivāryatvam.*" One who has

the desire and power to do a thing and who is not interfered with by another is said to be free or self-dependent. The individual is given, along with other individuals, mind, organs of sense, power of these organs, etc., and the environment, by God in virtue of His being the Universal Cause. The real agent in an action is the individual who like the carpenter works or not, as he pleases. God is *Udāsīna*, a disinterested looker-on in *prathamapravṛtti*. The *Jeera* is the agent and he has inherent in him *Vāsanā* which in all Vedantic schools is accepted as *Anādi* or beginningless. It is like the question of the sprout and the seed. This *Vāsanā* combined with the environment produces desires in the mind of the *Jeera* (*Bhogādṛṣṭa upanītārthasvabhāvat vāsanānvītaḥ ichchhāder manasotpattāvuktā udāsīnatā vibhoḥ*). Man may go whatever way he likes and he is free.

It may be objected here that God as Universal Cause, as the initiator of all things, as the giver of the faculties, etc., to the individual is alone responsible for any misuse of the faculties. The way in which God forms the self must account for any abuse of the faculties. How can He have the impertinence of punishing the individual? The answer is this action of God is not a motivated action as in the case of a man who brought a light to trace a missing pot but who incidentally facilitated another in stealing a cloth, with the help of the light. Whether the latter was benefited or not was no concern of the one who brought the light. The desire of the man to steal the cloth is completely his own.

Still one may ask, "is it in keeping with God-head not to ward off his creatures from evil deeds?" If it is God's business to ward off his creatures from evil deeds, moral responsibility and individual freedom on the part of man would be undermined. As for the divine attribute of mercy it may be pointed out that it consists not in preventing the possibility of evil on the part of His creatures but in excusing many faults for a single good deed, however small it may be. Says the *Śrutaprakāśikā* :—*Alpānukūlyena vipulāparādhasaḥatvāt dayādiguṇānām savishayatvam*.

Then a difficulty arises as to how to reconcile this view of individual freedom and God's *Udāsīnatvam* with the Upanishadic passage :—*Esha hyēvainam sādhu karma kārayati tam yaman-*

*vānunēshatyēsha evainamasādhu karma kārayati tam yamebhyo lokebhyonunutsate* (Kaush. Upd.). "For, He makes him whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed according to the tendencies created by his past *karmas* and He makes him whom He wishes to hurl down from these worlds do a bad deed according to bad tendencies generated by his past *karmas*." God becomes the sole agent and every act of man is really done under the will of the Supreme Being. But this world of God is not the expression of caprice or lawlessness. The man who has done good deeds in the past is encouraged to do better deeds in this life and rise higher, by the Lord, who creates a taste in him for such desires. *Īśvara* is a *pravartaka* through the generation of desires. When the *Jeeva* does a good deed, He creates a taste for good deeds. In the case of *Jeevas*, who do evil deeds, desires for bad things are generated. This wish of the Lord has always regard to the *karma* of the individual soul. Different fruits are produced by different trees as the result of the differences of seeds. Rain is the general exciting cause of the growth of the various trees. Without rain there will be no trees; without seeds also, no trees. Corresponding to rain the Lord is the general exciting cause of the activity of the *Jeevas* but the specific causes are the acts of the individual. The Lord is an *Anumantā* by furnishing the *Jeeva* with ideas of things to be done. In some cases he is a director or *Prayojayitā*, as well.

The old difficulty stares us again in the face. Does not God become the agent by being the *Anumantā*? No. This is simply a reward for the first action. God is the moral governor of the universe. He has to dispense the fruits of earlier action.

This leads to an examination of the theory of *karma*. Why is one born a cripple, another blind and a third bereaved? Why is one born to privilege and wealth, while another to misery and poverty? Rain falls upon the just and the unjust; indeed it would appear that the just often miss it and the unjust find it without much effort. The righteous seem to be afflicted most and the wicked flourish like the green bay tree. Are we not the victims of a capricious God who bestows character and environment with an unequal hand? There is so much inequality in the distribution

of happiness and misery in the present life. The Hindu answer to this perplexing question is that happiness and misery are due to *pūrva karma*, not present *karma*, that suffering is the reward for misdeeds in former births. A man's condition results from his own deeds. We accuse God when we ourselves by our folly bring misfortunes upon ourselves. Sin and suffering, like sowing and reaping, go hand in hand. Past history is a fact of the utmost importance in spiritual life as in the physical world, where the modern scientist says that the history of a simple electron is important. The individual carries with himself the legacy of his own past. The thoughts, words and deeds of a man are causes which must work out their corresponding effects. The effects of action rebound on the author. The individual makes himself. This doctrine is of great ethical value since it emphasizes human responsibility and teaches there is no such thing as a cruel fate or unjust God and that it is foolish to rail at misfortune as if it is undeserved. This doctrine of moral causation is just, logical and perfectly reasonable.

The objection that this doctrine is essentially fatalistic is a gross misrepresentation. *Karma* is not an irremediable handicap telling heavily against all future efforts. It is also a preserver of human endeavour. Individual effort is not stifled as will be seen from the *Yogavāśiṣṭha*. Destiny and individual effort are not incompatible. *Karma* does not shut out all hope. Past effort is destiny; present effort is exertion and it is possible to conquer past effort with present effort. We must get rid of the false notion that fate is driving us. Just as all present was in the past, the future is in the present.

One more question remains : what becomes of God's sovereignty, if man's freedom is a fact? The Government of God and the responsibility of man, God's freedom and man's freedom involve a dilemma. Either man's freedom is illusory and abolished by the Supreme Being or the Supreme Being is no longer Supreme, His Supremacy being limited by man's freedom. God's freedom is absolute and man's freedom is limited and the freedom of both is real. The *Śrutaprakāśikā* states :—*Amātyasya svatantratve rājñastannāpahīyate evamēva parasyāpi jīvasvātantryadāyinaḥ na*



*svātantryam parādhīnasvarūpāt prachyutam bhavēt svātantrya-dāyīnā pumsā tatpracṛtyanirāraṇāt.* A king's freedom does not suffer from his delegation of powers to his ministers. In the exercise of their powers the ministers are independent. Theirs is freedom by delegation while that of the king is his own and both are free. God's freedom and man's freedom do not conflict. God's freedom is absolute while the finite reals have freedom by delegation.

Before concluding we may note in passing that Sankara's treatment of this question of individual freedom or agency is not ethically as satisfying as Rāmānuja's. The former regards the agency of the soul as unreal, an agency by super-imposition. But the analogy of the carpenter in the Brahma Sūtras in this context gives him trouble. How is the carpenter not a real agent? Rāmānuja has not to experience such a difficulty since he accepts genuine choice, real agency.

Rāmānuja with an abiding faith in the existence of a real moral order has an indubitable conviction that men are free. Keenly alive to the facts of human responsibility and freedom he points out that it is possible to gain a rational and an ethically satisfactory view of human life which "neither blinks its tragic aspects nor denies the joy and adventure which it contains," that it is also possible to reconcile God's sovereignty and man's freedom and to justify the ways of God to man.

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# PROBLEM OF COMPARATIVE VALUE

BY

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The problem of generic value is to determine the meaning of good, evil or valuable. The problem of comparative value is to define the meaning of Better, Best or more or less valuable. If values are functions of interests, as Perry holds, how are we to compare them?

'We have not to answer the question, what is most valuable?—because, we have first to understand the meaning of most valuable.

We have not to find out an object we most desire, because such an effort is founded first, on a wrong assumption that there is a preference which is common to all and is also supreme; now this is not true to facts. Secondly, the object of such a preference is supposed to be the Best; now right or wrong, this supposition has already begged the question.

The problem of comparative value like that of generic value cannot be solved by an appeal to a personal bias. "I like more" is not a relevant answer to the question what is the meaning of Better? If it is taken as relevant, it only repeats the question, since we have still to find out the meaning of "liking more or less."

"I prefer X to Y"—if this means that X is *better* than Y then it is a *judgment* the truth of which depends on the evidence given by the meaning of Better. Now, if "I prefer X to Y" means that I *like* X more than Y, then it is a "Motor-affective" fact which may serve as an evidence for proving that X is better than Y, if being assumed that comparative liking constitutes the

meaning of better. As a judgment "I prefer X to Y" is quite impersonal and objective. As the description of a motor-affective fact, it refers to a state or relation of a comparative interest to an object, and as such it has no judging power. It can serve only as an evidence for the truth of comparisons.

Preference is nearer to liking than to an impersonal judgment and hence should be thus understood. Like the words "appreciation" or "valuation" preference also is sometimes loosely used and no discrimination is made between interest and judgment, thus making a false claim to objectivity or infallibility. Preference, like the interest of the simpler type is grounded in cognition. When I prefer X to Y my preference is mediated by cognition. There is a *judgment* of comparison operative—when X and Y are seen and either of them is preferred to the other. But it should be noted that preference, like interest, is fallible, since the objects among which preference is made may not be correctly perceived. Act of comparison is cognitive but the objects compared may not be always well-cognised.

What is, then, the characteristic condition of an object which renders it Better than another? What makes a thing the Best among several others?

The characteristic condition of objects judged as Better is that it must be quantitative in some sense of the term. \* It must be some kind of magnitude. The conception of quantity need not be limited to the series of numbers. The comparative form in grammar, according to Russell, is *prima facie* evidence of quantity. There are different kinds of magnitude.

Secondly, the *Better* object must be better in respect of the same condition which renders it good. It has not only to be more or less, but more or less *valuable*. Value consists in the relation which an object sustains to favourable or unfavourable interest, and if an object is better or worse, it must be the *relation* of the object to the interest, which must have determined that character. It is the interest which confers value on the object, and the interest alone is entitled to determine the amount of value conferred. If Good is pleasure—the Better is determined by the greater amount of pleasure. If Good is Whole, the less whole the worse. If Good

is Universal Love, the more of universal love, the better. The generic value may be defined in any way—for example, pleasure, whole, universal love, etc., the comparative value will depend upon the same definition.

Thirdly, if interest is a quantity, then every interest is commensurable, that is, it must be greater or less in some respect than some other interest. But it does not follow that two interests which are commensurable in *some* respects are commensurable in *all* respects, or all interests are commensurable in *any* respect. Two interests may be commensurable in one respect but not in another; two interests like two sensations, may be commensurable in duration without being so in intensity. An interest X may be commensurable with interest Y, and incommensurable with interest Z, just as a distance from one point is commensurable with a second distance from the same point but incommensurable with a third distance from a different point. The range of commensurability is a question of fact and hence it should be ascertained by an examination of the kinds of magnitude which interests possess. Whether these kinds of magnitude are reducible to one by summation or multiplication is not pre-determined by the general assumption that interests are quantities.

There are four notions which Perry has accepted as principles of comparing values—Correctness, Intensity, Preference and Inclusiveness. It is in these four respects that interests are quantitatively verifiable and comparable.

We have accepted one category of value and we must attach ourselves to that category even while studying the problem of comparative value. Estimate of value is to be effected by a comparison of quantifiable natures of interests. All the four principles mentioned above, *qualify* interest which is constitutive of value. Secondly, they preserve the generic character of value among the elements so compared and again they do not introduce any fresh conception of value not comprehended within that generic character.

All the four principles agree in one respect. They enable us to judge value without compromising it. The principle of correct-

ness is a non-quantitative principle, and hence does not yield a judgment of comparative value.

That principle is expressed in the judgments like "this value is founded on truth," "that value is founded on error." Values founded on error are none the less values for being thus founded. Mistaken interests give to objects values which are as real as those given by correct interests. Of course, values founded on erroneous interests are *less stable* than the values founded on correct interests. Instability of values varies with the degree of knowledge. Values are elliptically qualified as correct or mistaken values. What is correct or mistaken is the perception of objects and their inter-relations. Values themselves cannot be correct or incorrect. They simply are or not. The object of a correct interest is not, *ipso facto*, better than the object of an incorrect interest. For Better, like Good depends upon what happens to interest itself; and it is from interest, and not from the mediating judgments that the object derives its value. Within the narrower fields of human fact mistaken interests are very much transitory, but in broader fields of religion, politics, and social sciences, mistaken interests continue for long, and they create values which last for centuries.

The three remaining principles—Intensity, Preference and Inclusiveness, correspond closely to Intensive, Distensive and Extensive magnitudes respectively which W. E. Johnson propounds in his Logic. The three principles define the quantities of interest and hence they provide standards of comparative value by which to determine better and worse, best and worse, the most and the least valuable.

An object X is better than Y if (1) the interest in X is more intense than the interest in Y; (2) if X is preferred to Y and (3) if the interest in X is more inclusive than the interest in Y.

Order of Preference is distinct from the scale of intensities. I *prefer* X to Y means, X is more to my taste than Y, which is different from my taste for X is stronger or more intense than Y.

The difference between 'intenser' and 'prefer to' is also confirmed by their independent variability—the interest in X may rise to any intensity but it may still remain least in the order of preference.

We may have two or more interests in the same object. These two interests are distinct in the sense that they are functionally independent. Satisfaction of one interest from an object does not imply the satisfaction of another. Thus the value of such an object of united interests is Better than that of an object of a single interest.—Better in the sense of being Inclusive, not in the sense of being preferred or in the sense of being more intensely desired.

It does not follow from the general fact of comparative value that there is any one absolute Best or any absolute Worst that is to say there is no one supreme superlative. The only sense of Best which can be ascertained is that in which it is applied to one among three or more than three terms.

If X is better than Y and also better than Z, then X is the best among X, Y and Z. That X is "the best Possible" in the sense, that there can be nothing better than it, does not follow; nor does it follow, that because there is a definable sense in which X is the best of the group X, Y, Z, this sense will yield the term P than which no other term is better.

There is a sense in which unity may be said to be the maximum of the series of fractions, inasmuch as, no fraction in the strict sense can be greater than unity. But it does not follow that there is any such limit to the increase of value, any more than there is any greatest number. In the case of unity, it should be noted that we have waived the difficulty that unity is not in this sense a fraction at all but only a limit to the series of fractions having a character that is altogether distinct from the series of fractions which it limits. A similar difficulty appears in the well-known Philosophical conception of a Perfection that transcends the quality perfected. We can never assume that there is any perfect object than which nothing can be better. In fact, it will be difficult to give any meaning to such a conception of perfection except one which will be either religious or emotional.

So no one superlative value is logically available for us. There are superlative *values* real in their own sphere, and ascertained by their corresponding interests. It is philosophically impossible to arrive at a Value-Absolute. There may be eternal

*values* of Münsterberg—there may be ultimate, objective, or intrinsic values, but there cannot be *one* eternal, ultimate, objective, or intrinsic value. This is a conclusion which we cannot hope to escape if we view values as objects of interest. We as personalities start with a definite number of interests and hence, we are bound up with a corresponding number of values. We cannot be said to have one single interest, though, this does not preclude the possibility of one single harmonious system of interests. The interests with which we start as human beings are capable of harmonious development and it is this which gives us the required unity.

There are two methods of comparing values. One the Corrective and the other the Quantitative. Both the methods are useful—the Corrective in the cognitive aspect and the Quantitative in the motor-affective aspect of our life. Values studied by these two methods can be *compared* and *harmonised* but no one Value-Absolute can be had.

Both Philosophy and commonsense have recognised all the four principles in some shape or other. The Corrective principle is used in intellectual spheres and in the various sciences. The Hedonistic School or the Cult of feeling employs the intensive principle. The preferential principle is accepted by humanists and by the cult of rationality and taste where the level or quality of interest is accounted more significant than either their intensity or number. The principle of inclusiveness is emphasised by religions and by moral rigorism—whether in the exaltation of the Self above its transitory and partial appetites or in the exaltation of the group above its constituent members or in the exaltation of Humanity above any smaller groups.

The three quantitative principles—Intensity, Preference and Inclusiveness, are independent of one another and must all be accepted by any theory which attempts to define comparative value of all objects in all respects. They are independent in the sense that they cannot be reduced to one another both in their meaning and their causal variations. Intensity is not a function of preference nor preference of intensity, nor inclusiveness of either these two. These three principles bear a peculiar relation to one another.

They cannot be divided or multiplied into one another, since we have no equal units which will be necessary to render them commensurable. A maximum of interest, judged by all three standards or a Best on the whole, can be defined only by *raising interests* to their *maximum* in turn and in a certain order. Intensification precludes the exercise of preference and preference precludes integration. A system of interests which shall be greatest in all three senses can be achieved only by *first* achieving a harmonious integration of all interests, component interests being so compounded as to realise the greatest inclusiveness. The resultant interests may be exercised as Preference each choosing its best and having so chosen each interest may then be brought to its maximum of intensity. It is in some such sense that values may be said to be commensurable.

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## SOME SUGGESTIONS TOWARD A NEW ETHIC

BY

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This ambitious title concerns very modest proposals to alter our present conceptions of the subject-matter of ethical science itself, its problem and its scope. Three years ago, in my papers\* on "The Theory of 'Moral Goods,'" I endeavoured to show how our whole present-day ethical position has been steeped in self-contradiction and insoluble sphinx-riddles, owing to a fundamental mis-conception of the very problem of ethics. Subsequent reflection has but confirmed my suspicions, and I shall, in the course of this paper, briefly set down the implications of the new point of view which I propose that ethics should adopt.

The new point of view is this. Ethics should no longer be considered as an independent science, as a general science of Human Welfare. This tradition of looking upon ethics as the redeemer of humanity—safe-guarding man's interests in every direction—was started by the Greeks, especially Aristotle, in the conception of *eudæmonia* as the goal of ethics, and is now being perpetuated by every school of modern ethical thought. The primary question of ethics should no longer be: What is the *summum bonum*, the highest possible good of human beings? Put in this form, the problem of ethics is too broad and seems to be encroaching on the legitimate spheres of other sciences such as economics, politics, æsthetics, hygienics, and even the positive sciences themselves. I shall illustrate my meaning. What is the highest good of man? The *highest* good cannot possibly be one single thing—it cannot be *one* good or two. Rashdall† asks:

\* Read before the first session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, held in Calcutta, 1925.

† The Theory of Good and Evil, chapter on Rational utilitarianism.

“Is our conception of the *summum bonum*, for a rational being limited to these two elements?” (Virtue and Pleasure); and he presently answers the question in the negative and adds that the realisation of the highest ideal of human life would mean the inclusion, not only of *virtue* and *pleasure*, but of letters, arts, learning, the contemplation of beauty, etc. “Goods”—i.e., things or states which are good in themselves, are various and numerous: knowledge is a good, beauty is a good, power is a good, wealth is a good, health is a good, a good position in life is a good, political freedom is a good, seeking truth is a good, family happiness is a good, religion is a good, and, finally, perhaps, virtue is also a good. This list is by no means exhaustive, but it will suffice to show that if we are after good things, they can be had in every department of human existence, and if enjoyment of all these goods is the goal of our endeavour—as it is held to be by all the present-day schools of ethics, disregarding, of course, for our purpose, differences of ways and means—we shall be engaged in an eternally incomplete task of appropriating as many goods for ourselves as possible, and, that too, each in the highest degree, and the numerous troubles and turmoils that follow in the wake of this race for goods—the difficulty of choosing between one good and another (where both are equally good, but both cannot be had) and between one lower and another higher good, the incompatibility that sometimes exists between various goods which may represent the minimum requisites of a happy life, the clash of interests, the competition and rivalry amongst individuals to secure the maximum of these goods both in number and in quality—, and, after all, the inevitable incompleteness and imperfection of a life which has not been able to secure and enjoy all the goods—these troubles and turmoils (sketched in my former paper) have been receiving ample illustration in the hurry and worry, the passion and restlessness, the struggle and striving, and the final futility and failure of modern life everywhere. The pursuit may, for aught I know, be very bracing—“tonical”—and highly delectable, but I am afraid it is hardly ethical—I mean, it is not the fulfilment of our moral needs that we are seeking in such a life. A life full of the richest contents—realising all the possible goods of the universe—develop-

ing all the good capacities of our nature to their highest extent—self-realisation in this sense of the term—, a full life, in short, a free life, and a happy life in every sense of the term—this is our *summum bonum*, and we have seen where this leads us. It is not morality that is the problem here, but fulness and happiness of life. Consequently it is not ethics that we are investigating, but economics, politics, sociology, hygienics, etc.

The question, how best to lead a full life, is a question which must be answered partly by economics, partly by politics, partly by hygienics, etc., for these sciences tell us how to secure the "goods" available in every one of them. I realise that it can partly be answered by ethics also, for it is generally admitted that virtue is one of the "goods" of such a blessed life, but it is only one of an untold number, and where an individual happens to possess virtue in abundance and the other goods in an insignificant measure, his morality is very inferior indeed. Where, on the other hand, a person possesses abundant wealth, robust health, a cultivated intellect, a keen aesthetic sense, etc., but little morality, he must ethically rank very high indeed for he has realised the majority of the goods available. Morality, then, is only part of an ethical life so that no one is completely moral unless, in addition to being moral, he or she, is a scientist, an artist, a philosopher, a plutocrat, a keen sportsman, a statesman, a happy husband or wife, a beloved parent, etc. Unfortunately what happens very often is that, in trying to acquire all these goods, so much time and energy are taken up that the individual has little of either left to acquire that other good, morality; and, besides,—this is a trade secret—the acquisition of this last good is so often found to be in the way of acquiring the others that it is inconvenient really to begin with it in life; this is perhaps the reason why so many people are generally found to develop morality and spirituality only after retirement—from active life, I mean, by which time they will have amassed, each in his own measure, all the other goods so indispensable to a fully moral life. .

Thus it follows that the more we develop our wants and try to supply them, the more we realise all the conveniences and

comforts of life in short, the wider and deeper our interests in life, the more and more are we developing ethically. Morality increases *pari passu* with our civilisation and status in life. And, if we press the argument further, a charity of a hundred rupees is more moral than one of ten rupees only; to do a great right we must do a little wrong; to obtain a great material good, a small moral good may be sacrificed—for we are here concerned with the ethics of consequences, of producing and obtaining better and still better “goods.” The end justifies the means, all is fair in love and in war, nay, all is well that ends well.

The above is a fair sample, then, of the *reductio ad absurdum* of the modern ethics of the *summum bonum*, supreme ends, and highest ideals. Where can we have possibly erred? Obviously, in our conception of the very problem or subject-matter of ethics itself. On this point let me quote here some words from what I wrote in my earlier paper: “ Criticisms and criticisms could be urged against such a system of ethics, but we have examined sufficiently certain of its features to be convinced that there must be something fundamentally wrong with the whole position..... I have attempted to examine.....all systems which base themselves on the principle that good.....denotes an objective value, absolute in itself, that there are things in the world which are ‘ goods-in-themselves ’.....and that the moral ideal consists in living a life full of the richest concrete contents, that only such a life can be said to be perfectly ‘ good ’.....The truth is that we are not having here any system of ethics, properly so-called, but a complex study, a conglomeration of various sciences which we may designate by the general name ‘ The Science of Human Life.’ It is not morality that is properly the subject-matter of ethics, but “ the good,” or all the possible goods, and goods as we know, are to be found in every field, in economics, in politics, in the arts, in the sciences, etc., although unfortunately even the totality of all the goods there are is insufficient for the proper distribution and consumption of mankind. This confusion of ethics with the larger science of human well-being—which may possibly include the ethical point of view also, but which certainly cannot be comprehended by it—is inexplicable exact in the assumption that the spirit

of possessiveness, as B. Russell calls it, is "the dominant spirit in the whole life of the west."

This, then, is my first point, *viz.*, that ethics should not be considered as an independent science, as a science of Human Life, and Human Welfare. Its problem, therefore, cannot be the problem of the Highest Good. It cannot be an ethics of values or consequences. Morality is not a question of things, goods, entities, or quiddities. This entity-fallacy in philosophy has too long been reigning unchecked in most of its branches. Morality is a matter of settled states of mind, of character, of character appearing in conduct. It is an established habit or tendency, a definite attitude of mind, colouring and influencing one's course of action; in short, it is concerned pre-eminently with motives, with the question of virtues, and virtues are nothing but settled tendencies of acting in particular approved directions.

Let me adumbrate the implications of the new point of view which I am proposing. Morality is, primarily, a question of motives resulting in action. It is thinking, rather willing, and *doing*, not creating or producing, or realising or appropriating. Morality, consequently, can only be a *means* to an end, and never an end or an effect in itself. Let me hasten to add that I am not trying to re-introduce the ethics of ends in an indirect manner. What I wish to maintain is this. Morality—the sphere of willing and doing—is in the nature of a condition, so that whoever wants a definite result must needs fulfil this primary condition. This is my second suggestion. Let us suppose that an individual wants to attain *jīvanmukti* or obtain salvation. Well, the primary and the most indispensable condition for realising such a result is that he should have attained an extra-ordinarily high level of moral development in all its aspects. Or happening to be an atheist, or at any rate, not particularly religious-minded, he is content to serve society and promote its happiness. Even then a high degree of moral development is requisite in the individual. Religion and Social Service—these are the only two spheres, I believe, in which morality operates as a condition, as a qualification, necessary to undertake certain tasks. It may be said that this is only another way of saying that religion and social service are the two possible

ends of ethical conduct. If so, I wish to submit that they are ends external to, and very different from, morality itself. In the nature of things, morality could not have any end in itself for it is only in the nature of a qualification, a certain fitness to be acquired, a certain condition to be fulfilled, to enable one to undertake certain tasks. So that it necessarily follows that those who do not want to undertake these tasks need not acquire this qualification, fulfil this condition. It is the nature of the task which determines the nature of the qualification or condition and not *vice versa*. Religion and society are not moral because morality is what it is; on the other hand, morality is what it is because religion and society are what they are.

The morality of a people then, will attain to higher and yet higher altitudes as nobler and yet nobler ideas of religion and social living unfold themselves in their mind. This is my third suggestion. This explains the phenomenon of moral diversity amongst mankind. It thus admits and accounts for dynamism in morality. To say, as idealists in morals do say, that I am moral because morality is the essence of my nature, is the law of my being, is to say absolutely nothing: it simply means, I am moral because I am moral. It is the old ethics of conscience and intuition and moral sense which is everywhere contradicted by the diversity of moral opinion and practice amongst mankind.

Morality, therefore, is not commensurate with human perfection or the perfection of our capacities, however desirable this latter may be from the standpoint of human welfare. It detracts nothing from the moral perfection of a person if he does not happen to be a scientist, an artist, a poet, a man of competency, a politician or even literate or cultured. Virtue and happiness need not go together. 'Civilisation in danger,' 'Culture knocked on the head' may become the war-cries against such a system of ethics, but let me hasten to the assurance that culture and civilisation will never have to suffer in the least by being separated from morality. There are certain instincts and innate impulses in man, such as the artistic instinct, the instinct of discovery, of creation and of possession, the desire for fame and ambition, etc., which will some-

how manage to get self-expression irrespective of the question whether or not the individual, in realising them, feels that he is creating 'goods' in the world or developing ethically. This is my fourth suggestion. The 'contents' of life—those things which make life worth living—shall develop even apart from morality, as, alas, they have been doing to a greater and greater extent in modern life. Our only concern should be to see that morality also develops *pari passu* with culture and civilisation. At present it is assumed, with a certain amount of naïveté, perhaps, that cultural development *means* moral progress. It is this fallacious track of thought that has been responsible for all the blunders in moral theory and practice, and against which I am mainly contending. A primitive tribe of people may be moral according to their own lights, just as a highly civilised nation is moral according to *its* lights. And it is possible that neither may be moral, for aught we know, in the given circumstances. Morality is not a necessary accompaniment of cultural advancement.

In short, morality is always in the nature of the form of life, the spirit of existence. It is, as I have put it, an attitude of mind, a mental concomitant of our actions, whose presence is not inevitable but depends on the character of a people's religious beliefs and the exigencies of their social circumstances. The contents of life are supplied by the various instincts, impulses, desires and feelings which together constitute the complex whole called human nature. These impulses, desires, etc., will find expression, nay, will force self-expression of their own accord. Otherwise individual existence would itself be annihilated. Even apart from morality, the "goods" of life are bound to be produced according to the life-impulses of each individual. Morality is only the form which these contents are to be enveloped, the spirit, the attitude of mind, which should accompany our actions tending to produce these "goods." It is clear therefore that while, from this new point of view, renunciation of the world is not a necessary condition of moral life, and—this is the fifth implication—moral life is compatible with a life 'full of the richest contents,' we can discard the suggestion of scientific and artistic and economic utilities as having a bearing on morality as such.



If morality is thus merely a formal, conditional element of life, what help, one may ask, does it render the individual in the matter of choice of actions? How is the individual to know what actions or kinds of actions he has to perform and what to avoid? To answer this question requires space far larger than I am at present able to devote in this short paper, but let me suggest (which is my sixth suggestion) here that the actions of the individual should always have a reference to two things: (1) the realisation of the nature and characteristics of self-hood; (2) the promotion of others' moral and material well-being. I must state here that while the first is purely metaphysical or religious in its nature, the second is directly dependent upon the first (in what sense I have no space to explain just now), in such wise that it disappears with the disappearance of the first. The objective standpoint of ethics is dependent upon the subjective which must necessarily be metaphysical or religious. So that ethics finds its completion, not in politics, as Aristotle said, but in religion or metaphysics. By itself a merely ethical life is an incomplete, imperfect life; a merely social ethics is only a half-truth. A great Bengalee thinker has expressed this truth in these forceful words: "The modern mind is just now the European mind, such as it has become after having abandoned not only the philosophic idealism of the highest Graeco-Roman culture from which it started, but the Christian devotionalism of the middle ages; there it has been replaced by... a practical idealism and social, patriotic, and philanthropic devotion. It has got rid of God...and erected in His place man as its deity and society as its visible idol. At its best it is practical, ethical, social, pragmatic, altruistic, humanitarian. Now all these things are good, are especially needed at the present day... But the point here is that the modern mind has exiled from its practical motive-power the two essential things, God or the Eternal and spirituality or the God-state. Our insistence on the human point of view in life, in literature, in science, in philosophy—in everything, our tender affection for human foibles and weaknesses more than for human virtues and strength, sadly betray the readiness with which we are prepared to barter our divine for our human heritage. When this divine heritage has been realised,

the qualification, which was in the first instance found to be indispensable for realising it, ceases to operate *as a qualification*, so that while the individual was, to begin with, non-moral, in this stage, he becomes super-moral; a state sometimes described as 'beyond good and evil.' '' This is another implication of the 'new point of view.'

From the point of view of morality, therefore, there is no such thing as an absolute good, there are no things which are intrinsically good or good-in-themselves, there is no distinction between good-as-means and good-as-end. Everything is good, *i.e.*, moral only as a means to an end external to itself and ultimately the only two ends that we should recognise as being the ends for (and not of) morality are religion and society.

The details of this scheme are to be worked out later on; for the present let me conclude, by anticipating two possible criticisms against the 'new ethic,' which I have been developing in these pages. Firstly, it may be said that the conception of morality here adumbrated is too narrow in scope, to which my reply is that the value of a conception is to be judged, not by narrowness or width, but by its ability to explain facts and seeming contradictions. Secondly, it may be objected that one can be moral without being metaphysical or religious: and I reply that one can be a good patriot or politician without having heard of any ethical or metaphysical theory of the state, one can be a good eater without knowing how dietary is connected with hygienics and physiology.

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## PLEASURE AS CONSTITUTIVE IN JUDGMENTS OF VALUE

BY

CHARU CHANDRA SINHA.

Pleasure is the thing of absolute worth and everything else has value only so far as it conduces to pleasure. If there were no feelings of satisfaction and their opposites, there would be no distinction of value. Good and bad would be meaningless and we should never use them. Those actions that lead to pain are to be avoided by the wise and those that bring in happiness are to be served by the Pandits versed in the *Sāstras*.

दुःखदाणि च कार्यानि त्वान्यानि दूरतो बुधैः ।

ःखदाने च खेयानि शास्त्रतत्त्वविशारदैः ॥—देवीभागवतम् ॥

Whatever is the object of appetite and desire is good and the object of hate and aversion, evil. That which is agreeable constitutes happiness and that which is disagreeable constitutes misery. All virtuous actions follow from the sentiments that by these I shall obtain happiness and keep off misery.

यद्यप्रियं यस्य सुखं तदा . क्षादेव दुःखं प्रवदन्मानेष्टः ।

इष्टञ्च मे क्षादेत्तच्च न स्यादेतत्कृते कर्मविधिः प्रवृत्तः ॥

शा. प. । २०१।१०॥

How can the assertion that pleasure is the thing of absolute worth be proved? Only by showing that human beings actually prize it as such. Here the function of the moralist is that of an interpreter

of nature. And as a matter of fact all hedonists assert that all men invariably and universally strive after pleasure.

नाकामः कामवत्यर्थं नाकामो धर्ममिच्छति ।  
 नाकामः कामयानोऽस्ति तस्मात्कामो विशिष्यते ॥  
 कामेन युक्ता ऋषयस्तपस्येव समाहिताः ।  
 पलाशफलं लाघा वायुभक्षाः सुसंयताः ॥  
 वेदपेटिष्वपि युक्ताः स्वाध्यायपारगाः ।  
 आक्षयश्चाक्रेयायां तथा दानप्रतिग्रहे ॥  
 वणिजः कर्षका गोपाः कारवः शिल्पिनस्तथा ।  
 देवकर्मकृतस्यैव युक्ताः कामेन कर्मसु ॥  
 समुद्रं वा विशन्त्यन्ये पराः कामेन संयुताः ।  
 कामो हि विविधाकारः सर्वं कामेन सन्ततम् ॥  
 नास्ति नासीन्नाभविष्यद् भूतं कामात्मकात्परम् ।  
 एतत्सारं महाराज धर्मार्थावसंस्थितौ ॥  
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नाकामतो विविधा लोकचेष्टा तस्मात्कामः प्राक् त्रिवर्गस्य दृष्टः ॥

The aspirations of men are concerned with the acquisition of the agreeable, which bring misery. There is nothing more important than pleasure among the fruits or consequences of the triple aggregate. Pleasure is the only thing which is desired absolutely and all other things are desired not for their own sake, but as a means to the attainment of pleasure or freedom from pain. Both virtue and profit are sought for the sake of pleasure.

न ह्यतः त्रिवर्गफलं विशिष्टतरमस्ति  
 स एव काम्यो गुणविशेषो धर्मार्थगुणारम्भ-  
 स्तद्वेतुरस्योत्पत्तिः सुखप्रयोजनार्थ आरम्भः ॥ शा. प. १२८.१८॥

Pleasure may be regarded as a feeling of value, but it is not a measure or standard of value. Although it accompanies all experience of value it does not express their distinctive nature or enable

us to discriminate their differences. It attaches itself to value of every kind, instead of being one kind amongst others. Moral judgment is a discrimination between pleasure and pleasure. It is only a special kind of pleasure that can be identified with moral approval. Every pleasing sentiment has not the function or nature of moral approval. Pleasure is of three kinds

सुखं त्विदानीं त्रिविधं शृणु मे भरतर्षभ ॥ भौ. प. १४३।३६॥

the sensual, the intellectual and the emotional. The satisfaction that arises from the attainment of appropriate objects of each of the five senses, of the intellect, and of the heart is called pleasure and is to be regarded as one of the best fruits of our actions.

इन्द्रियाणाञ्च पञ्चानां मनसो हृदयस्य च ।

विषये वर्त्तमानानां या प्रीतिरुपजायते ।

स काम इति मे बुद्धिः कर्मणां फलसुत्तमम् ॥ व. प. १३३।३६॥

But how are we to determine the superiority of one pleasure over another? How are we to measure the validity of moral approval? How are we to measure or otherwise appraise it?

If there be a conflict between two pleasures then all we can do is to compare the two pleasures as pleasures and the only course would seem to be to give the preference to the stronger or greater. Pleasures may be compared and classified from different points of views, the principal of which are purity, nearness, certainty, duration, etc. :

यद्य दुःखेन सम्भितं न च यस्तमनन्तरम् ।

अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत्सुखं स्वःपदाश्रयम् ॥ सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी ।

अक्षे चेच्छु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत् ।

इष्टस्वार्थस्य संसिद्धौ को विद्वान्प्रमादयति ॥

सांख्यप्रवचनसूत्रम् ॥८॥ १८॥

यो ध्रुवाणि परित्यज्य अध्रुवाणि निवेवते ।

ध्रुवाणि तस्य नश्यन्ति अध्रुवं नष्टमेव च ॥ गरुडपुराणे ।

तत्सुखं द्विविधं प्रोक्तं नित्यानित्यप्रमेदतः ।

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नाशालोकान्तु तत्त्वान्यं वेदशास्त्रार्थचिन्तकैः ॥

देवीभागवतम् । स्क. पु. । अ. १५ ॥

But this art is purely empirical and does not rise for an instant above the level of a merely subjective philosophy. A little consideration will show that these "dimensions" are open to the objection that what is enjoyable in the highest degree to one may not be at all so to another, nay, it may be a source of discomfort or positive injury to him.

स्वल्पत्वं विस्तरत्वञ्चाप्यपर्याप्तमपेक्षया ।

यत्तु स्वल्पमहं याचे परापेक्षं तु तद् बहु ॥

बृहद्दर्शनपुराणम् । मध्यखंडम् ।

And, again, the quantity of pleasure cannot supply the place of a standard, for, strength and value are opposed: the sensuous pleasure overpowers the spiritual, the immediate, the permanent, the selfish, the social. There is a distinction between lower and higher pleasure.....between bodily and mental pleasures.

तत्सुखं द्विविधं सुखसुख्यते शारीरं मानसञ्च ॥ शा. प. १२७।८ ॥

Human happiness is not of the same order as the happiness of the animals, because it is derived from more elevated faculties. But are not those objects of senses which men are concerned with the same with which other living creatures are concerned? Yet how vast is the difference that exists between man and other creatures on account of the fact that man is a rational being and has the knowledge of the soul whereas other creatures are irrational, are guided by feelings, and have no knowledge of the soul!

Whatever may be the nature of the moral quality, it is, however, accepted by all that the good admits of degrees—that we

draw a distinction between good, better and best—high, higher and highest. Thus we regard 'mind' as superior to the 'senses,' understanding to the 'mind,' 'Soul' to the 'understanding' and the 'supreme' or 'Great' to the 'Soul.' For the conduct of the affairs of the world, human acts also have been classified as superior in point of merit.

इन्द्रियेभ्यो मनः पूर्वं बुद्धिः परतरा ततः ।

बुद्धेः परतरं ज्ञानं ज्ञानात्परतरं महत् ॥ शा. प. ११०१२०६॥

अपि ह्युक्तानि धर्मग्राणि व्यवस्थस्युत्तरावरे ।

लोकयात्रार्थमेवेह धर्मस्य नियमः कृतः ॥ शा. प. १४१२५८॥

There is thus a principle of appreciation apart from pleasure; and things differ in excellence, even before they differ as to the pleasure which they cause us. Good is not then pleasure as such but pleasure in so far as it is noble or refined. The hedonist philosopher has commonly preferred the goods of the mind—not because he could prove them to be more pleasant but—because he held them to be more noble.

The admission of differences of quality among pleasures renders the hedonistic calculus hopelessly impossible. If it is asked: what is the test of the quality of pleasure the reply would be that it is decided by the verdict of the competent critics, the judgment of persons who have experienced the different kinds of pleasure and who give their decisions impartially. But it is really very difficult to get a competent critic who will be able to help us in deciding which pleasure is desirable and which is not. For even persons whom we regard as superior in all respects are found to give way to joy and indulge in grief as men like ourselves. Like other creatures the senses of such persons have their functions and objects.

नैव स्वागी न सन्तुष्टो नाशोको न निरामयः ।

नानिर्विधिस्तो नादृष्टो पापदृष्टोऽस्ति कश्चन ॥



भवन्तोऽपि च हृष्यन्ति शोचन्ति चायथा वयम् ।

इन्द्रियार्थाश्च भवतां समानाः सर्वजन्तुषु ॥

शा. प. १२६८॥४६१८८ ॥

It may, however, be pointed out that there are persons who after enjoying the subjects of the senses, set themselves to the practice of the austere penances, and even again withdraw themselves from such penances. But even such persons also cannot be regarded as competent critics. For, certainly it should be admitted on all hands that they cannot have experience of different kinds of pleasure under the same circumstances and during the same stage of their lives.

प्राप्न्याद् विषयान् कश्चित् पुनश्चोग्रं तपश्चरेत् ।

संक्षिपेच्च पुनस्तात सूर्यस्तेजोगुणानिव ॥ शा. प. १२७।३०० ॥

Human nature is so constituted that a certain object tends persistently to call forth a feeling of approval whereas the contrary sort of thing calls upon a feeling of disapproval. This attitude of approval is really a state of feeling.

यस्मिन् कर्मण्यन्तरात्मा क्रियमाणे प्रसीदति ।

तदेव कर्म कर्त्तव्यं विपरीतं न च क्वचित् ॥ स्कन्दपुराणम् ॥

But the immediate sense of approval is no guarantee for the objectivity of the moral judgment, for, feeling is, after all, subjective. It is purely mental and never physical. It can be enjoyed but can never be seen.

द्रव्यार्थस्पर्शसंयोगे या प्रीतिरुपजायते ।

सकामचित्तसंकल्पः शरीरं नास्य दृश्यते ॥ व. प. १२८।३३ ॥

The objectivity of a moral judgment does not lie in the recognition that a feeling is but in the relation of an object to a feeling which it tends to evoke. Different kinds of objects tend to evoke different

kinds of feelings. Thus pleasure may arise from the knowledge of the self, from the contact of the senses, and from sleep, indolence, and stupidity.

- (i) आत्मबुद्धिप्रसादजम् । भौ. प. १४२।३७॥
- (ii) लिङ्गलिङ्गसंयोगात् । भौ. प. १४२।३८॥
- (iii) निद्रालसप्रसादोत्थम् । भौ. प. १४२।३८॥

The judgment that a thing is good pre-supposes that it will satisfy our desire, which rests not on my approval merely but on the nature of things as well. Food, for instance, will not give us pleasure unless we desire it and desire it we will not unless we feel hungry.

क्षुधस्य तस्य भुक्तेऽने तस्मिन्निर्वाहणं जायते ।

न मे क्षुधाभवत्तृप्तिः कस्मात्प्रां परिपृच्छसि ॥

विष्णुपुराणम् । २५ अ० ॥

Thus approval is a peculiar kind of feeling—it is a sort of register of general consonance with the trend of our inclination and desires. Feeling, therefore, is a function of human constitution with all its settled characteristics. It is not a question what feelings we shall choose to prefer but it is a question what things our feelings will let us prefer. Thus we are not left with mere arbitrary feelings. Feelings of pleasure arise only on the presentation of suitable objects. When any of our six senses finds its appropriate object, a desire springs up in our mind to enjoy that object.

षडिन्द्रियाणि विषयं समागच्छन्ति वै यदा ।

तदा प्रादुर्भवत्येवं पूर्वसंकल्पजं मनः ॥ व. प. १४२।१७॥

मनो यस्वेन्द्रियस्वेह विषयान् याति सेवितुम् ।

तस्यौरसुकं सम्भवति प्रवृत्तिर्योपजायते ॥ व. प. १२।१८॥

This objective background acts as a steadier and corrector of opinion. Now “ wherein lies the ethical danger of such an account

of the matter? ” “ Is it in the fact that an important aspect of the world is supposed to attach to the capacity in things for having an effect on human feelings? ” It is not an argument but an assumption based on prejudice. We cannot minimise the importance of pleasure in human life, for

**सुखं तु जगतामेव काम्यं धर्मेण जायते ॥ इति न्यायमते ॥**

What is true is this that there is nothing in feeling which gives infallibility to the ethical judgment, for, this infallibility we cannot find in objects, for the same object may give rise to different feelings to different persons and to the same person under different circumstances.

**वस्तुवैकमेव दुःखाय सुखायैर्धोऽज्ञवाय च ।**

**कोपाय च यतस्तस्माद् वस्तु वस्तुत्वान्न कुतः ॥**

**तदेव प्रीतये भूत्वा पुनर्दुःखाय जायते ।**

**तदेव कोपाय ततः प्रसादाय च जायते ॥**

**तस्माद्दुःखात्मकं नास्ति न च किञ्चित्सुखात्मकम् ।**

**मनसः परिचामोऽयं सुखदुःखादिलक्षणः ॥**

**विष्णु पु. १२।४३-४५ ।**

Therefore ethical judgment is bound to be vitiated by being tied up to feelings, for feelings are liable to change and therefore with them opinions as to what is good and bad. Evidently then the ideals become personal and the judgments are bound to be our judgments. Morality is thus rendered democratic and not an aristocratic or an autocratic concern. That which is agreeable to me constitutes my happiness and that which is disagreeable to me constitute my misery

**यद्यतिप्रियं यस्य सुखस्तदाहुस्तदेव दुःखं प्रवदन्वनिष्ठम् ॥ व. प. ॥**

If a man finds his good in something which appeals to me as harmful and abhorrent, I may have a tendency to condemn this as immoral but am I justified in pronouncing the judgment “ he ought not to desire the thing he does not desire? ” It is unintelligible

to say that everybody ought to feel in the same way as I do. Men are differently constituted and consequently have got different capacities in them for feeling,

सखं रजस्तम इति गुणाः प्रकृतिसम्भवाः ॥ गीता ॥

and so notion of the good remains permanently discordant. But would not this be to deny universality, and leave moral judgments uncertain? In a sense it would. Yet even "when there is genuine disagreement there need not be hopeless disparity in our judgments of value. When an ascetic condemns all pleasures, he may do so, not because he takes them to be vile, but because, he regards them as dangerous or enervating or at least as never so good as other things which, as he thinks, should be chosen in place of them. This is not really to contradict his opponent, but to offer a further consideration also defended by a judgment of value."

रागद्वेषादियुक्तानां न सुखं कुत्रचिद् द्विज ।  
विचार्य खलु पश्यामि तत् सुखं यत्र निर्वृतिः ।  
यत्र खेदो भयं तत्र खेदो दुःखस्य भाजनम् ।  
खेदमूलानि दुःखानि तस्मिंस्त्यक्ते महत् सुखम् ॥

इति गार्हो ॥११॥

And moreover there is a good deal in common to different men and therefore a good deal in common in what men want and in what they approve and condemn. What all men want without exception, we have already seen, is pleasure, and this is what constitutes a substantial identity of moral judgments. The generality of moral approval is a necessary characteristic of it. Our approval of an action is not our private feeling. It claims validity for any act similar to the one approved, and for *any* judge who is similarly constituted. Our constitution is such that most of us have them, and it should not be supposed that the effects of like causes on unlike persons must necessarily be the same. Knowledge, action,

and agent are each of three kinds according to the difference of qualities, and consequently pleasure also is of three kinds.

ज्ञानं कम च कर्ता च त्रिधैव गुणभेदतः ।

\* \* \*

सुखं त्विदानीं चिद्विधं शृणु मे भरतर्षभ ॥ भो. प. । अ. ४२ ॥

Differences in nature impose different duties on different men, but behind these differences there is an identity in pleasure which takes different forms in different men

कामो हि विविधाकारः ॥ शा. प. । १६७:३७ ॥

These pleasures really seem to differ in quality, although all are pleasures. They seem to differ just as much as colours do ; and although red, green, etc., are certainly colours, they are just as certainly different. There is nothing illogical in maintaining that pleasure is the only good, but that some varieties of pleasures are preferable to others.

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## THE NEW ETHICS OF SELF-CREATION

BY

T. V. SESHAGIRI ROW NAIDU, M.A., ANANTAPUR.

On account of the contradictions involved in man's moral activity, man seems to be doomed from his cradle to hopeless disappointment and failure. The end must be capable of attainment in individual's life. And yet, as a moral being man can never exist without some unreached ideal to serve as a spur to his activity.\*

If we have Aristotle's 'blissful activity,'† transcending time and change, as our ideal, we find that in the first place it is an infinitely remote ideal; and secondly that even if it can be realised, our lot then is far from being satisfying. This motionless perfection of the Aristotelian ideal, as it is the "very haven of quietism," does not complete but stultifies the moral endeavour. When we take up the modern ideal of Nietzsche where man is considered as "something that must be overcome or as a bridge and path to the overman," we have for our object a perfect commonwealth.‡ Here too there is the anti-thesis between the desirable and the attainable. If the member of that commonwealth has an ethical end, then his ideal is never ultimately reached. If on the other hand he has no unsatisfied longings or unfulfilled ideals, then we must pronounce him not a man at all or if a man, an unhappy man.

Bradley points out that "individual perfection" is a contradiction in terms. "Nothing is ultimately perfect except the

\* Compare F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddles of Sphinx*, pp. 120-122.

† Compare F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*, Essay XI on Activity and Substance.

‡ Compare F. C. S. Schiller's ideal of 'Perfect individuals in a Perfect Society,' *Riddles of Sphinx*, pp. 233-235.

universe of being as a whole, and you cannot therefore be perfect except in some sense in which you are more than a finite individual. So if moral experience is to be raised above the level of the anti-thesis and contradictions which beset it as mere morality, it needs to be transformed into religious experience, an experience of a type which transcends the temporal character of moral experience in virtue of which ideal and achievement inevitably fall apart. The ultimate satisfaction arises from the conviction that our lives are as functions of the universe already perfect and that we are ourselves in some implicit way the 'perfect universe.''' (F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*.)

Principal Caird says that we are somehow already in "possession" of the infinite inheritance. And Professor Caird says that the moral ideal is "realised already." Thus both the Cairds try to maintain that moral experience is not swallowed up but is conserved in religious experience. But as Boyce Gibson points out in his "God with us," it is not easy to see how or under what forms the virtues of the moral life persist within the religious life of fruition. He further points out that the representation of either of the Cairds of the ideal involves the "stultification of our moral freedom" or "demoralisation." Hegel and Śāṅkara expressed the same thing as the Cairds when they say that the consummation of the infinite consists merely in removing the illusion (*māyā* or *aridyā*) which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. Thus these views reduce moral struggle to a struggle with illusion. And so the struggle in the religious sphere, where the illusion disappears, reduces itself to a struggle with nothing.

This is a real difficulty, and Boyce Gibson tries to meet it.\* His conclusion is that realisation of fruition is not revelation of the external extinction of evil, but only a sacred intimacy between man and God, in which the worthlessness and vulnerability of all that is not of God is so impressed upon the soul that the conflict with evil becomes for the sincere a spiritual necessity, and the conquest of it an achievement of which he is always capable. Such

\* Boyce Gibson, *God With Us*, pp. 81-202.

fruition cannot spirit away evil. On the contrary it can only intensify our sensitiveness to the curse of it. And it can supply us with the whole armoury of faith, and give to the conflict with evil a religious inspiration. But here also there is a contradiction. If fruition cannot spirit away evil, then we have to say that evil has a real existence and is "not of God." So the fight between God and Evil is a fight between two finites. And what religious inspiration or ethical encouragement can be had from such a solution of the difficulty involved in the moral life of a human being?

But Eucken seems to show the way towards a satisfactory solution. "The Eternal is the active fruition of all true spiritual labour, and can be sustained anywhere and everywhere by rightly directed force of will." The spiritual life is just "the revelation of the Eternal *in and through* Time, and may be justly characterised as a progressive harmonising of fruition and action." We thus find our satisfaction in and through our work (compare Nishkāma karma of Bhagavadgītā, V. 10-13) and all that is implied in the ideal of realised fact, the joy of attainment, the peace of possession, fruition, playful composure and grace (compare *leelā*) is for Eucken vested in the very struggle through which we strive inwardly towards what is deepest in ourselves.

The spiritual life for Henry Bergson is the life in Duration which is almost the same as what Eucken calls the life of the "Heart," the concentration centre of our full personal experience in which life of fruition action has its roots, "The spiritual home to which our life incessantly returns for its revivification." The past pent up in the individual is the birth-place of free acts that fall as "ripened fruits." In doing a free act we contract with a painful effort our whole being in order to thrust it forward. Every such voluntary act that manifests or expresses the growing self brings something new to the world; and hence our free act is a *creation* and our *free spiritual life is creative*.

This creative activity may be best conceived, as my revered professor the Rev. Dr. A. G. Hogg of the Madras Christian College used to conceive it, *viz.*, as, "Artistic creation." The novelty of creation, the facility and ease of self-expression, the



simplicity of execution, and the joy and satisfaction involved in the production of a work of art are in such an activity. Such an activity is permanently contenting because self-perpetuating and above all self-creating.

No rules or patterns are ever sufficient for art or creation. "The right or morally valuable act is like an art, the creation of just that way of acting in a concrete situation which gives free expression to the living individuality of the total endeavouring self, by providing a synthesis of as much as possible of the manifold volitional attitudes and loyalties by which it is animated, and no rules can ever be sufficient for art or creation." "Valuation is more thorough and more valid (*i.e.*, an act is more thoroughly moral and valid) in proportion as there is holding together and synthesising of more and more of the total wealth of endeavour or creative impulse which the self is, so that the volitional attitude adopted towards the means or the end which is being valued may be an expression of his totality and not a mere phase of endeavour momentarily in the ascendant and the way to ensure this thoroughness is to rethink (or to rehearse in the mind) the older valuation processes and their conditions in the light of the present; in short to carry out the kind of mental *dramatic rehearsal* of which Dewey and Tufts speak." (Unpublished notes of Dr. Hogg, 1917.)

Now, wherein lies the value of this theory? This view gets over all the metaphysical difficulties in which the effort to conceive an ultimate good involves the Ethics of Self-Realization. We escape these difficulties by defining moral endeavour, not as an endeavour to actualise a concept of the self, but the effort to devise or create modes of conduct which would be adequate to the totality of endeavour that is seeking expression.

This may be called the ethics of self-creation as contrasted with the ethics of self-realisation. The Ethics of self-realisation tends to conceive the Self as *drawn* onwards by a more or less determinate ideal in front of it, a standard of self-hood and achievement to which it endeavours to approximate; whereas we conceive the self in the way in which Prof. Stuart conceives it, *viz.*, as pushed onwards from behind or rather from within by a living impetus which may indeed employ ideals and standards to express itself,

but remoulds them freely in the service of its growing creative life. Morality can have no fixed standard which coerces human activity. Moral judgment is not a subsumption. It is a construction or invention or creation.

An effort to define the eternal value is thoroughly irrational. To lay down a rule as to what is good for ever in ignorance of the situations that arise, is to propose something irrational. Every moral act which expresses the total endeavour in self and which fits the situation is the moral ideal for that situation. It is a *free act* because it is the result of a *synthesis*, which is unique and which is incapable of repetition. It is always new, is something like artistic creation. Because it is an act which brings together into a new whole the elements of the past, it is really a creation. Thereby the self itself grows. This is what Bergson calls the creation of self by self.\* And also the ideal grows and becomes richer on account of the concreteness it gains. Such an act contributes something to the universe that endures.

Now let us consider whether this ethics of self-creation may be considered as normative in the sense that it can show that morality may be defined as rationality in conduct.

The Rev. Dr. Hogg in the constructive portion of his brochure on "A Method of Ethics" works out an argument containing certain conditions by which the kind of theory that might satisfy us most may be defended. On examination we shall find that these conditions are satisfied in the case of our present theory, *viz.*, moral activity is like artistic creation.

All rationality is a holding together of many in one. And so moral valuation is more thorough and therefore more valid in proportion as there is a holding together and synthesising of more and more of the total wealth of endeavour or creative impulsion which the self is, so that the volitional attitude adopted may be an expression of his totality. Mature moral judgment does not consist in the application of ready-made standards, for that would be to settle what one should do long before the situation has arisen

\* Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 7.

and long before the conditions under which one has to act are known.

Now what do we find in the case of art or artistic creation? Here also no rules can ever be sufficient. There is the unique synthesis of colours or sounds for the production of the picture or the song. There is first the mental rehearsal in the mind of the artist before the final execution of the work of art. And further the idea of the picture or the song gradually develops as it is being put on the canvas or as it is being sung, so much so that the picture as it actually appears on the canvas or the song as is actually sung is different from and is far richer than the idea with which the painter or the songster has begun. Thus it is quite clear that no mere rules or fixed patterns are ever sufficient for art or creation. In the same way, a free moral act, according to our theory, it can never be subsumption but is a construction of just that way of acting which fits the unique situation and which expresses the unique total endeavour in self by providing a unique synthesis of the manifold volitional attitudes and loyalties by which it is animated. It is on account of this uniqueness that we call the synthesis an invention or creation, just as on account of the uniqueness of the combination of diverse and varied elements in an artist's original work we call that work an artistic creation.

According to this theory then the moral self is autonomous. It is autonomous in the sense that it can accept no moral judgment but its own. From this it might appear that there may be no agreement at all between people in their moral judgments. And so this theory might be accused of subjectivity. No two artists can conceive the same thing in exactly the same way. And even in the case of the same artist no two original representations of the same idea can be equally beautiful to him. So also we should expect that no two persons will ever be able to hold the same action as the right thing to do in given circumstances, because no two persons can be exactly alike in their manifold volitional attitudes and loyalties. If so, how can they ever when thinking for themselves perfectly freely, come to approve of exactly the same way of meeting a given concrete situation? If not, then is not our

theory open to the criticism that it is subjective and that no normative ethics on these lines is possible?

The sufficient answer to this seems to be that there is such a thing as agreement in difference, that since what one man prescribes to himself he prescribes in the light of self-knowledge, it is quite possible for him to *approve* of the different imperative which another man will lay upon himself. In other words, though no two persons can decide on exactly the same way of acting in a certain situation, still it is possible for one of them to say that he could understand what the other did was the best that the other could do under the circumstances though he himself would have acted in a different manner. So judging is still possible and approbation also, though the personalities are different. Thus between these two persons there are both diversity and agreement. There is *diversity* in the moods of behaviour invented and followed. There is *agreement* in the approbation of these moods. This combination of diversity and agreement implies that the divergent personalities of different persons are only the manifestations of one and the same spiritual life. In the case of two different artists it is possible that one artist appreciates the work of another though their style and manner may be altogether different. This is possible because their minds are inspired by the same general artistic sense. The flowers on the same tree though never quite the same are yet manifestations of one and the same vegetable life. So also the divergent modes of behaviour invented and followed by different moral agents have some agreement because they are yet manifestations of one and the same spiritual life, at once harmonious and diversified. "It is only on such a supposition that we can account for the fact that out of free individual choices and judgments, there actually grow up widely respected moral standards and that even amid their noteworthy differences, the moral standards of widely separated peoples and ages reveal to careful analysis a striking degree of harmony."\*

Thus it gives a satisfaction to the individual by enabling him to assure himself that his moral judgment is not merely his own

\* Rev. A. G. Hogg, *A Method of Ethics*, p. 27.

opinion but is the expression in time of a spirit universal in humanity.

But even this does not satisfy us. It might be that the best actions of man may appear to be curious feats in the view of still higher beings. And so, if we wish to regard our moral life as something of really universal worth and validity we must interpret the universal spiritual life of our hypothesis as something more than a life universal to mankind. The universal spiritual life of our hypothesis must be a life which is the inspiring meaning of all Reality, and our moral choices and judgments must be "just Reality itself ceasing to be unconscious of itself and coming in our choices and judgments to a consciousness of its own true nature and value."\* On no narrower basis will it be possible to vindicate the independence and individuality of moral choice and judgment without violating the impersonal or super-personal validity of morality.

We do not however say that this universal spiritual life equally inspires all moral judgments. It is true that every moral judgment is a free judgment. It does not mean however that every free judgment is a moral judgment. There may be judgments which are free but not moral. Hence we find contradictions between judgments of different men and of the same man at different times. If they were all inspired by the same universal spiritual life they might be divergent but not thus contradictory. So we see that these judgments are therefore not *all* inspired by the same principle and are therefore not judgments that can be truly moral judgments.

This hypothesis of a universal spiritual life that ought to inspire every truly moral judgment enables us to conceive how it is possible for a finite consciousness to pass any valid judgments at all; how also it may be possible for us to acknowledge common moral standards. The moral maxims and principles have resulted from the presence in mankind of this universal spiritual life. And so they may serve a moral agent that entered on a deliberation process as reminders of attitudes and points of view that belong to

\* Dr. Hogg, *A Method of Ethics*.

this universal spiritual life, so that "by taking these attitudes and points of view in his deliberation he may ensure the awakening to activity in himself more and more completely of that universal spiritual life which will render his judgment and action truly moral."

And lastly we may note that it is the consciousness in our moral acts or moral judgments of something wider than our particular selves, the consciousness that these judgments are the expression of a universal spiritual life, that explains the authoritative-ness felt to characterise judgments about good and duty. This consciousness finds a natural and true expression in the conception that such judgments are the utterances of the voice of God within us. Perpetual creativity is the dominant feature of this universal spiritual life. In every domain, the triumph of life is creation. The creation of an artist or a philosopher cannot be pursued by all men. But human life has its goal in a creation which can be pursued by all men. "Creation of self by self, the growing of the personality by an effort which draws much from little, some thing from nothing and adds unceasingly to whatever wealth the world contains."\*

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\* Bergson, The Huxley Lecture delivered in the University of Birmingham, May 24. 1911.



## SECTION OF PSYCHOLOGY





PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS DELIVERED TO THE  
PSYCHOLOGICAL SECTION OF THE INDIAN PHILO-  
SOPHICAL CONGRESS, MADRAS

*(The Status of Psychology)*

BY

PROF. G. C. CHATTERJI, GOVERNMENT COLLEGE, LAHORE.

GENTLEMEN,

It has not been customary for Sectional Presidents in this Congress to deliver presidential addresses. It is, therefore, with considerable diffidence that I undertook the preparation of this address. The innovators of new practices are so easily suspected of self-conceit or self-advertisement, that it is not lightly that I join their ranks. But I am willing to run the risk of such suspicion, for I desire that what is with me an innovation, might become the regular practice in this Congress in its succeeding Sessions. I believe that this practice once established will add greatly to the value and attractiveness of these conferences, for to voice a feeling which I believe is shared by others, the Indian Philosophical Congress provides at present rather a meagre fare for those who have travelled such long distances to share in its deliberations. The introduction of compulsory Presidential Addresses in each Section of the Congress will help not only to swell our programme, but also to provide a point of contact between the general body of Congress members, and the small group of specialists who are interested in the work of any particular section.

There is another reason which has prompted me to undertake the task of addressing you. There has been in this Congress a

certain amount of discussion as to whether a Psychological Section has any place in its deliberations, and whether Psychology as a special Science is not already adequately represented in the Science Congress. There has been no unanimity of opinion on this point, and both views, I believe, have been freely expressed—one, that Psychology must continue to form one of our Sections in this Congress and the other, that we should discontinue our Section in Psychology, and leave the Science Congress alone to provide a forum for the discussion of Psychological problems, and for the advancement of Psychological research. I believe the Congress has no clear-cut policy on this issue and it has tried to shelter itself behind the Asquithian Formula of "Waiting and Seeing." A Psychological Section has remained in our programme, but the number of papers contributed to this Section has been negligible. I believe this half-hearted policy is indicative of a much deeper puzzle, *viz.*, the puzzle with regard to the status of Psychology and of its relation with Philosophy, on which most philosophers have no clear-cut views. Most of us were brought up on the tradition that Psychology was part and parcel of Philosophy, and apart from its position in that general body of knowledge which we call Philosophy, it had no separate existence. But the development of the experimental aspect of Psychology has proceeded at such a pace, and the number of specialised problems with which the Psychologist concerns himself, has assumed so wide a range, that most of us who are mainly engaged in the study or teaching of what is traditionally called Philosophy, feel completely lost when we enter the new lands which the Psychologist is exploring for us. The Experimental Psychologist in his Laboratory with his ergographs, and dynamometers, his spectrum charts and his colour wheels and perimeters, his delicate instruments for the measurement of infinitesimal intervals of time, and so on, follows a technique and speaks a language as foreign to our philosophic ears, as the Chemists' or the Physicists' technique and jargon. And even when he leaves these brass toys of the Laboratory alone, but delves deeply into primitive lore and custom, or probes in mysterious ways into the region of the sub-conscious, or measures the intelligence of school children by the standardisation of tests, or studies

the behaviour of chimpanzees in an improvised zoo, he is engaged on problems and following a technique so totally different from what is commonly regarded as philosophical, that the professional philosopher feels in quite an alien atmosphere. So remote are these regions from the philosophers' beaten tracks, so un-orthodox these methods of the Psychologist's pursuit, that the Philosopher would fain restrict and restrain the Psychologist's ardour, and face him back again to that straight and narrow road from which he has escaped. But the child who has escaped from the nurse's apron strings, has run too far afield to return again to her protecting care, even if he were willing and eager for that protection, far less so, when, like our modern Psychologist, he has tasted the joys of freedom and finds them to his liking. For just as the traditional Philosopher is keen to take Psychology back into the family fold, the psychologist is anxious to have the independent status of his new household fully acknowledged and his right to a free and untrammelled existence guaranteed before he is willing to re-establish his contact with the home of his birth.

Let me, then, address myself to the task before me. I propose to consider the relation between Philosophy and Psychology, and the status of Psychology in the general scheme of Philosophical studies. I propose to consider this partly because the situation has so altered during very recent times that Philosophers and Psychologists both need to reconsider this mutual attitude towards each other, and partly in order that our consideration may lead to the formulation of a clearer policy with regard to the status of Psychology in this conference.

"Philosophy," as McTaggart used to say to generations of succeeding undergraduates, as he perambulated the lecture rooms of Trinity College, Cambridge, "is the systematic study of the ultimate nature of Reality." It seemed a peculiarly dull and peculiarly adequate definition. It marks off the sphere of philosophy as distinct both from common sense and from science. Common sense is neither systematic, nor is it ultimate. Its dogmas about Reality are dictated by practical utility and many of these conflict with each other. Science, on the other hand, is systematic but is not ultimate. Every science in the first place,

selects a limited group of facts, an aspect of Reality, and studies the nature of these in isolation from facts of another order, or from other aspects of Reality. Physics selects one group of facts, Chemistry another, Biology still another, and so on. The Physicist examines phenomena from the point of view of their mass, energy, and motion. He neglects and entirely ignores their chemical characteristics. He does not deny that the facts that he is examining have also a chemical nature. But he is not interested in this aspect of those facts, and he leaves the examination of the chemical characteristics of things to the Chemist's care. The Scientist thus abstracts from the concrete manifold of Reality a certain group of things, or a certain aspect of things, and confines his attention to this group or aspect alone. The Philosopher, however, is concerned with Reality as a whole. It is his attempt to take impartial note not only of the facts with which Physics deals, but equally so of the facts with which Chemistry, Biology, Psychology and all the other Sciences deal. Within the group of facts which a Science selects for its study, it proceeds on a systematic basis. It attempts to analyse the complex facts into their constituents, and seeks for uniformities and causal relationships which subsist between the isolated facts. It tries to reduce to an order the multiplicity of facts within its own domain by subsuming them under general laws of their behaviour. But though systematic within the sphere of its interest it is not completely systematic because of the great variety of facts, or aspects, of facts which it excludes from within its scope. The explanations which a science seeks are also not ultimate, for in seeking for the laws which unite and reduce to an order the multiplicity of its data, it proceeds on certain postulates or assumptions, which it adopts without critical analysis. Thus, for example, physical science is based on the postulate of the uniformity of Nature, and of the Principle of Causation which is derived from it. Physiology rests on the postulate of Evolution and of continuity of Development from simple to more complex forms of life, and so on with the other sciences.

Philosophy is not a science alongside of the other sciences. There is not a special group of facts which the Philosopher selects

for his own attention. If there was a group of facts, or if there was a particular aspect of any group of facts which does not fall within the purview of any existing or known science, that would not provide Philosophy with a sphere for its own peculiar activity. If the study of those isolated facts is to be taken up, it can only be taken up by a new science and not by the Philosopher.

It is true in a certain historical sense that philosophy is the mother of all the sciences. It is true, because when man's theoretic interest was first aroused, it was his environment as a whole, which first engaged his attention. His discrimination of the world around him and within him had not proceeded far enough for him clearly to distinguish from each other those fundamental differences of character and behaviour which the different groups of facts with which the different sciences are now concerned, present to his matured consciousness. Man's first view of the world of his experience was like a first glimpse of a city seen from a distance, in which the houses, streets, parks and open spaces are all jumbled together into a hazy confusion. If we call this confused speculation about the world as a whole, Philosophy rather than Science, it is because science can only begin after the differences and likenesses between the manifold of Reality have advanced to a certain stage of development.

If there is no special group of facts which Philosophy studies, has it then no sphere left for its activity? Was the philosophic attitude possible only in the dim beginnings of human knowledge, when the discrimination of facts from each other had not advanced far enough for the sciences to undertake their selective but systematic study? I do not think so. If Philosophy was merely a rival to the Sciences, the development of new sciences would increasingly curtail its sphere, and ultimately completely abolish it. But the growth of the sciences does not, in my opinion, curtail the sphere of Philosophy but, on the contrary, widens it. For philosophy lies beyond and beneath science rather than alongside of it. Philosophy has a place and will continue to have a place amongst the highest intellectual pursuits of man because of the limitations which the very nature of science imposes upon it. The relation of Philosophy with science, as I conceive it, is two-fold, Philosophy

is concerned with what I may call, on the one hand, the roots of science, and, on the other, with its fruits. It is concerned with the roots of science, for every science builds on the basis of certain postulates which it accepts uncritically. It is the business of philosophy to analyse and critically examine those fundamental postulates of each of the several sciences. It is for Philosophy to examine and analyse the conceptions of cause, motion, evolution and development. I may be asked, why should not the scientist himself examine, analyse, and justify these postulates? My answer is that there certainly is no objection to the individual scientist himself analysing and examining the postulates of his science. But once he begins to do so his activity is no longer scientific but becomes philosophical. That this is so, is no doubt a matter of convention. But apart from convention all distinctions between the intellectual pursuits of man into science, philosophy and art, disappear. The accumulation of data and their analysis, and the discovery of general laws of agreement and disagreement between the data collected and analysed, is the type of activity we call Science. The examination of the postulates on which these data are discriminated from others, and the laws of their agreement and disagreement grounded, is activity of quite a different order, and we propose a different name for it, *viz.*, Philosophy.

The critical analysis and explanation of the postulates of science is, then, one concern of Philosophy. It is what I mean by saying that philosophy is concerned with the roots of science. This is what I may also call the Analytical Aspect of Philosophy.

The other function of philosophy appears to me to be synthetic. We have seen how each Science is partial, selecting for its study a "special group of facts, or a special aspect of reality." It pursues their study in exclusion from other related groups of facts, or other aspects of reality. As compared with this partiality of Science, Philosophy is the attempt to study the nature of Reality as a whole. We have seen how each Science aims at arriving at certain regulations or laws relating together the manifold of its data. But the laws or conclusions to which each science points are not always in conformity with, and at first sight

harmonious with, the laws and generalisations to which other sciences may lead. These laws or generalisations are what I have called the fruits of a science, and it is the business of Philosophy to bring these into harmony and consistency with one another. Philosophy, as the science of the whole, is a Synthetic study of the sciences seeking to build out of the sectional outline presented by each of the sciences an intelligible picture of the whole.

This programme of philosophy, it may be urged, theoretically excellent though it is, is practically impossible of execution. It may be urged that Reality is amenable to systematic study only in its partial aspects, and only on the basis of uncritical postulates. It is impossible, I may be told, to fashion a world-picture out of the fragmentary glimpses of Reality which each Science offers, and equally impossible to logically analyse and philosophically justify the uncritical postulates of science. That the programme of Philosophy I have outlined is extremely difficult, that the critical analysis of the postulates of science may never be final and the synthesis of the fruits of science never complete, I am entirely willing to admit. The Philosopher who is imbued with the spirit of this modern age, lacks wholly the dogmatic assurance of the great system-makers of the past. He builds not from the inner necessity of his reason, but bit by bit, putting one part with another, like a child slowly solving out his jigsaw puzzle. Something of the sceptics' doubt and hesitation are part of his essential make-up. But I am not prepared to accept the dogmatic condemnation of his activity as wholly fruitless effort and as a blind striving after a fading will-o'-the-wisp. How far his aim is capable of realisation is something to be found only after an attempt has been made to realise it, and not dogmatically by laying down *a priori* limits to the human intellect.

The sphere of Philosophy, as I have defined it, is thus distinct from that of science, but though distinct, it is at the same time continuous with and intimately related with it. In a sense Philosophy is only to be defined by the limitations of science. If Philosophy is only the critical analysis and examination of the postulates of science, and the attempt to synthesise the conclusions of one Science with those of another, it is no longer possible to



philosophize independently of science. It is from the sciences that the philosopher must enquire what their postulates are, and what the great laws or generalisations to which scientific evidence points. The only philosophy of the future is scientific philosophy. Let me make my meaning clear by considering a concrete example. Philosophers are constantly formulating a general theory of physical Nature. In forming these theories they consider such problems as the nature of matter, of space and time, substance and property, cause and effect. Now my point is, that Philosophy can only analyse and criticise these conceptions by taking into account the latest Scientific conceptions of matter, space, time, cause and effect. It is no more possible to begin with abstract definitions of what matter is, or what cause is, by any *apriori* method. To know what matter is we must go to the Physicist and study the structure of the atom. To know what cause and effect are, we must examine the concrete causal laws which the Physicist actually formulates. Nothing is so utterly worthless as the speculative analysis of such conceptions as those of matter, space, or time, and causation, on the traditional method of rationalistic philosophy. To take an example, the Philosopher still takes his conception of matter from the mechanical Physics of Descartes' day. When he talks of matter as inert extension and speaks of it as *real* or *illusory*, he is talking a language utterly discredited in the Physicists' world. To the modern Physicist matter is no more the inert extended stuff of Descartes' day than it is the spiritual monads of Leibnitz's fertile imagination. The philosopher of Nature must, in my opinion, be in the most intimate contact with, and have inside knowledge of the postulates, and the general laws of the physical sciences. Natural Philosophy, though distinct from Natural science, is thus continuous with it, and cannot be carried on without an intimate knowledge of it.

My plea, thus, is that the philosopher of the future must also be a man of science, and to essay the task of synthesising all the different sciences into a philosophic system, must indeed possess an encyclopædic knowledge of all the sciences. The metaphor of the spider spinning its own web will no longer suffice to describe his activity. He is more like the architect who designs the whole

mansion of knowledge, and understands not merely the structure and functions of any one of the materials to be employed in its construction, but the nature and functions of all alike and can fashion them into an organic whole.

The limitations of human intelligence and human industry, and the vastness of that body of knowledge, which we call science, and its daily and almost hourly growth, would of course make such an intimate knowledge of all the sciences practically impossible for any individual philosopher, however great a genius he may be. Practically speaking, then, it is utterly impossible, or, at any rate, highly improbable, that a complete philosophy of the Universe as a whole can ever be developed by a single individual. But though the Philosopher may not possess an omnivorous knowledge of all individual sciences, it is at any rate imperative that he should possess an intimate knowledge of a certain group of sciences, or, at least, of one of them. If philosophy begins where science ends, it is at any rate necessary that in order to philosophise at all, the philosopher must know intimately and from the inside at least one of the sciences. In other words my plea is, that the philosopher must first be a man of science, before he can be a philosopher at all. In putting forward this plea I am not making any very extravagant proposition. I am making a proposition for which there is very good historical warrant. In the History of Modern Philosophy, with the exception of Spinoza and Hegel, all the philosophers of the first rank were also great men of science. The doctrine that philosophy can be carried on in exclusion from the sciences is in fact a heresy only of recent date, and I regard it as one of the worst legacies left behind to the philosophic world by Hegel.

To sum up, then, on the relation of science and philosophy, my view is that the sphere of each is distinct. Science is the systematic study of a selected group of facts, whereas philosophy is the systematic study of the ultimate nature of Reality as a whole. But though distinct from science, philosophy is, in a certain sense, continuous with and even posterior to science, in that the only Philosophy which in my opinion has a future is a Philosophy not carried on in abstraction from and independently of the sciences,

but is a Philosophy of any particular science or group of sciences, or of the whole body of scientific knowledge as such. Its function is two-fold, one, analytic, the other, synthetic. As analytical, Philosophy examines the postulates of any individual science and attempts to give a philosophic interpretation of them. As Synthetic, Philosophy attempts to bring into an organic unity of knowledge, the diverse and often conflicting generalizations about Reality in its partial aspects as examined by the several sciences.

I am afraid most of you are under the impression that I have long forgotten the specific task I set myself at the beginning of this address, *viz.*, the discussion of the relation of Philosophy with Psychology. But I have, from my own point of view, not lost sight of it for a single moment, for my own view of the relation of Philosophy to Psychology is entirely derived from my views with regard to the relation of Philosophy with science. The relation of Philosophy with Psychology is in fact only one instance of the relation of Philosophy with science. Now, while many would be willing to accept my views on the general problem of the relation of Philosophy with science, most of them, I am afraid, will not be prepared to accept them with regard to the relation of Philosophy with Psychology. The grounds on which this discrimination will be based, will, I imagine, be two. The first ground that many would urge, will be that Psychology is not a science in the same sense, and to the same extent to which the Physical sciences are. Thus many would be inclined to reject the claims of Psychology to the status of a science. The second ground on which my view may be challenged by others would be, that it is true that Psychology is concerned with facts, and with facts of a particular order, but that these facts have some kind of peculiar connection with Philosophy, a kind of connection with it which Physical facts, and Biological facts do not possess. From both these points of view it may, therefore, be urged that the relation of Philosophy with Psychology is quite peculiar and far more intimate than its relation with any other science. Both these views appear to me entirely mistaken and beside the point, and I propose to demonstrate this with regard to each of them.

Let us first take the view that Psychology does not truly enjoy the status of a science, and therefore this pretended science is not a scientific discipline at all, but a philosophic one. I may be told, that surely no one to-day holds this view, and that in trying to discuss it seriously I am merely setting up a man of straw, and fantastically attempting to demolish him with mountain battery and long-range guns. But though seldom expressed in that bold and uncompromising manner in which I have stated it, I am inclined to think that by far the vast majority of Philosophers do in point of fact hold this view, and that it determines, though perhaps very largely unconsciously, their attitude towards Psychology. It is this view which often finds expression in the statement that Psychology is not an accomplished science, but rather the hope of a science of the future. It is this attitude which takes delight in pointing out the diversity of opinion on fundamental issues, the multitude of explanatory principles, and the paucity and vagueness of Psychological laws, which have created a chaotic disorder in the modern Psychologists' world. One Psychologist defines his science as the science of conscious states of experience, another confines his attention to behaviour, and others still more vaguely talk of the science of mental life. Some pursue the methods of introspective analysis, others of experimental and quantitative measurement, still others of statistical collection of data and so on. Some invoke the aid of teleology, others of mechanism. Some enumerate the Faculties of the Mind, others rely on the instincts, still others on conditioned reflexes, or semi-mysterious entities called patterns, or on unconscious sexuality, and so on and so forth.

But neither the lack of unanimity in the programme of Psychology, nor the multiplicity of principles of explanations, nor the lack of universally accepted and widely applicable laws within its sphere, in my opinion, affects in the very least the relation of Psychology with Philosophy. It does not justify the view that Philosophy is more intimately connected with Psychology than with any of the other sciences. I am perfectly willing to accept the view that Psychology is not a single science, but a whole group of sciences, the study of which has not yet sufficiently advanced

to constitute them into so many separate and distinct sciences. I am perfectly willing to concede that Psychology is not an accomplished science, but rather the hope or promise of a science of the future. But does this affect its relation with Philosophy? Why should it? Is a fully developed and highly organised science, because of its developed and organised character differently related to Philosophy, than a science which is less developed and not so fully organised? Will the organisation of Psychology into a single developed science, or its differentiation into well-marked groups of sciences, be in any measure furthered by a philosophic method of approach? I do not think so. For, after all, what can the philosopher do for the Psychologist? He can only analyse and examine the Postulates that the Psychologists assume, and he can only work out a rational synthesis of their principles of explanation, either within the sphere of Psychology itself, or on the wider sphere of Psychology on the one hand, and the remaining sciences on the other. It does appear to me to be true that in both these directions Psychology offers a wider field of activity to the Philosopher than the other sciences do. It does so because of its undeveloped character. Psychologists are inclined to adopt a larger number of fundamental postulates than the other more developed sciences. The same state of things leads to the diversity of the Psychologists' explanatory principles, which it may be possible for the philosopher by a logical analysis to reduce to a smaller number of more fundamental principles. Thus, though Psychology may provide a greater amount of work for the philosopher to do, it does not and cannot provide any different kind of work than the other sciences do.

To turn now to the other objection, *viz.*, that though Psychology is concerned with facts and a particular group or groups of facts, these facts are of such a kind that they require a philosophical rather than a scientific treatment, and by their very nature, bind Psychology more intimately to Philosophy than any of the other sciences. This view perhaps prevailed more widely when Psychology was purely introspective rather than now when it is adopting so many objective, and technical methods for the accumulation of its data and for the formulation of its general laws. But even if Psychology is confined to the introspective observation,

classification, and explanation of subjective facts of experience, I fail to see how this connects Psychology with Philosophy any more intimately than any of the other sciences whose data are objective or impersonal. That they appear to be so connected to many minds, is due to the mere accident that in the past the only individual who could be found to be sufficiently interested to engage themselves with these facts, happened also to be Philosophers. But a Ward or a William James when describing to us the events which occur in the flux of his consciousness as he gets angry with his cook for having spoilt his breakfast, or struggles with his "will" to induce him out of bed on a cold and wintry morning, is engaged upon a task utterly different from the one on which he is engaged when he sits down to write his "Realm of Ends," or to project his essays on "Radical Empiricism." The nature of the facts does not in the least affect our attitude of scientific enquiry about them. Thus neither the view that Psychology is an undeveloped science, nor the view that its facts are of a peculiar kind, affects in the least its relation with Philosophy. It is related to Philosophy in the same way in which the other Sciences are related to it.

Now the relation of Philosophy with science in the view which I have put before you, is in all conscience intimate enough. Thus I have maintained the view that Philosophy though distinct from Science is nevertheless continuous with it, and, in point of fact, can only be carried on in the most intimate relation with it. It is not that I have severed Psychology from Philosophy, but, on the contrary, I have attempted to bring Philosophy nearer to all the sciences. In a word the only Philosophy of the future, as I have said before is a Philosophy of science or of the sciences, but not a philosophy independent of the sciences.

Thus in the view which I am adopting, theoretically this Congress should have a section not only in the Philosophy of Psychology, but equally so in the Philosophy of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and all the other special Sciences. This does not in the least mean that we should arrogate to ourselves the functions of the Science Congress. For what I advocate are not Sections in the Sciences, but in the Philosophy of the

Science, which are altogether different things. But though theoretically desirable, we are unfortunately bereft of any hope of such expansion in the near future. We are so bereft, for none of our metaphysicians is equipped with the proper knowledge of Physics, or Chemistry, or Mathematics, or the other positive sciences so as to engage himself upon the Philosophical problems to which each of them severally, as well as in their mutual relations to one another give rise. The most constructive work in Philosophy which is being done in England to-day is being done by Mathematical Physicists who have turned philosophers. Equally important and suggestive is the work of such Philosophers as Lloyd Morgan and Alexander who have approached Philosophy from the humaner Sciences of Psychology and Ethics. When the complaint is made that India is producing so little in the way of original constructive work in Philosophy, this sterility to my mind is not due to the inebriating effect of modern culture but to the lack of proper scientific equipment on the part of Indian Philosophers.

Now it is in this hopeless *impasse*, due to the lack of scientific equipment on the part of the average philosopher, that his knowledge of Psychology may save him from despair. If he knows something of Psychology and of the social sciences, it is still possible for him to be a scientific philosopher instead of merely becoming a super-annuated oracle of ancient and effete learning. Thus the Psychological Section of this Congress, provided it does not arrogate to itself the functions of Scientific Psychology, is to my mind the one channel through which this Congress may help to furnish to a world weary of antiquated shibboleths, the solid substance of Scientific Philosophy.

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## PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

BY

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Psychology shares with other sciences the common task of explaining a series of natural events. Yet, Psychologists, even within their own ranks, are unanimous neither about the character of these 'natural events' nor about the method of explanation. In fact, the term 'psychological explanation' though very much in vogue in popular speech as well as in the forum of psychology, has hardly ever received more than a passing attention. The consequence is that to many, a psychological explanation is nothing more than an idle speculation. For, the multitude of meanings which psychologists have given to the term, and its wide popular use, have served alike to render the conception of psychological explanation exceedingly indefinite.

Psychology emerged from a mere descriptive stage when it began to avow its relation to physiology. Mental states, when taken by themselves, could only be described; their explanation could be found in their physiological correlates. Thus arose the idea that psychological explanation means a correlation of the mental with the physical.\* At first this relation was regarded merely as an empirical fact; it was the only observable link that mental life had with the world. Thus, physiological explanation of mind came to be accepted because it was the only explanation that could be discovered. But gradually this method came to be viewed as logical necessity.† The mental states, it is argued, are dead as soon as they are born; they arise, change and pass away.

\* Cf. Natorp, *Philosophie : ihrer Problem und Probleme*, Ch. V.

† Cf. Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, Ch. IV.



Hence, a mental fact cannot be explained by another mental fact which does not exist. The body subsists as a relatively durable substratum with a definite relation to the mind. We must, therefore, explain a mental event in terms of an antecedent or synchronous physiological state.

A second approach to the question was opened by Sensationalism in Epistemology. Since all mental states can be traced to sensations, the explanation of mental life would consist in its analysis into elementary constituents. Psychological explanation is in its essence a constitutive explanation rather than a casual one. This view had a set-back in the doctrines which emphasised the unity of mind and personality, notably, all purposive views of consciousness. But it was later revived, as we shall see, in the doctrines of structural Psychology.

A third mode of psychological explanation was adopted by the psycho-physics of Weber and Fechner. Psychological explanation is really a correlation of two variables, the stimulus and the psychosis. Since the stimulus is known with respect both to its quality and quantity, psychological explanation signifies the relation of mental states with their corresponding stimulus-values. This doctrine naturally led to the acceptance of a form of sensationalism or psychological atomism. For, stimuli can be definitely related only to sensory states. Hence, mental life, if it is to be explained in terms of stimuli, must necessarily be sensory at its basis. The doctrine of elements in vogue to-day, is really a type of sensationalism. For, even the affectional element is regarded by Münsterberg\* and Stumpf† as 'feeling-sensations' and by Titchener as 'undeveloped sensation.'‡ All complex mental states arise only through the combination of elements. For the explanation of combinations, however, mere stimuli do not suffice. A central factor of some type, apperception, association, inhibition or active attitude, has to be assumed. Hence arises the need of a physiological explanation of the process of combination. But a

\* Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, p. 100f.

† Stumpf, *Psychologie*.

‡ Titchener, *Psychology of Feelings and Attention*.

central physiology has necessarily to be prefaced by a peripheral physiology. Thus, the explanation of mental states means their correlation with the stimuli on the one hand and with their physiological basis, peripheral and central, on the other. This is the programme of structural Psychology, as we know it to-day. It adopts, therefore, a double method of explanation, constitutive and causal.

The fourth method of explanation which finds a place in the psychological thought of the day, is the purposive view in its various forms. All mental states are to be treated as indivisible wholes which fulfil certain antecedent purposes. These purposes are sometimes regarded as conscious in their character, as we find in desires and other forms of conation; they are also regarded as unconscious drives seeking realisation, as we find in the psycho-analytic theory and its different emendations; and purposes may be thought of as biological urges which do not arise on the psychic plane but effectively determine the course of psychic life.\* Explanation in these instances signifies the discovery of the purpose and the way it unfolds itself.

Let us pass on to a critique of these methods of explanation. The constitutive explanation, if it survives the polemic of the *Gestalt* school, is possible only when mental states are observed with a '*process attitude*' as distinct from the '*meaning attitude*.' The validity of *constitutive explanation*, therefore, depends upon the validity of the process attitude; its value as a method also depends upon the possibility on the part of the observer to assume the process attitude. But even when all is said and done, this method leaves a large lacuna in the scheme of mental life. For, it fails to show how the part processes combine and how the character specific to the concrete and whole mental state, arises. Yet, the analysis of mental state into its possible constituents is a necessary step to scientific investigation. It would be an error to regard it in itself as a scheme of psychology; it is a prelude to

\* Cf. Spencer's *Teleological Theory of Pleasure-Pain*.

causal explanation, that is to say, explanation in terms of invariably antecedent factors.

The different methods of such causal explanation which we have already discussed, fail to offer a satisfactory account of psychic phenomena. For, each of them works with variable factors far smaller in number than those which actually operate on the stream of consciousness. The physiological explanation of the older days invoked the aid of associative factors in the central nervous system which fell but little short of myths. Ziehen's doctrine of memory cells, the theory of neural habit, and that of anaphylaxis, Robertson's hypothesis of autocatalytic oxidation and Rignano's application of the conception of storage batteries for the explanation of the phenomenon of memory, testify to the fact that mere physiological hypotheses have proved to be of little value in this most important phase of psychic life. The same thing may be said of the doctrine of the *Mneme* which appears to be all the rage at the present moment. The mythical character of the physiological hypothesis concerning the space-configurations has been duly exposed by the energetic apostles of the Gestalt-school and they have set up their own myths in the place of the old ones. It is not necessary to adduce further illustrations. MacDougall has been striving for the last twenty years to this end and no one has met with greater success. And it is not necessarily a condemnation of the method of Physiological psychology. Still it shows the limitation of the method which has resulted in running away from one unsatisfactory theory to another formulated largely as speculative endeavours.

The same thing has to be said of the stimulus hypotheses. The simple stimuli of psycho-physics had to be soon replaced by the notion of stimulus-complexes and later on by that of *stimulus-situation*, as we find in the system of James and even of many behaviorists. Yet the idea of the *situation* inevitably leads us to the mental state. Moreover, the integrated series of stimuli can never successfully account for the phenomenon of psychic integration; for the inner connection of mental states is not merely the connection by way of spatial and temporal association as the

functional psychologists and all psychologists from the time of Wünderlich have felt.

The other mode of approach in terms of *Hermes*, conscious and unconscious (as represented by functional psychology, psychoanalysis and other systems), is logically bound to insist upon the greatest importance of the impulse and meaning factors to the detriment of the external stimuli, although some sort of place is usually found for them (*e.g.*, the stimuli are supposed to fulfil the inner drive). The sensory and perceptual states, the phenomena which depend upon the intensity of the stimuli, as also the eidetic imagery, the great importance of which has so vigorously been pressed by Janesch and others, demonstrate the impossibility of lightly passing over the factor of external stimuli. In the same way, the experiments of Mayer, Schmidt Triplett as also of Allport and others, have conclusively shown that the *social environment* as a causal determinant of the mental states must be seriously taken into account for any explanation of psychic life.

A more comprehensive scheme of psychological explanation must, thus, be formulated. I suggest that the older notion that there are two types of psychological explanation, causal and constitutive, should be accepted as a working programme. Whether one or the other is basal to psychology, would depend upon the general philosophical predilection of the psychologist. The nature of constituents may for the present be left in the same way; for, no one has yet come to the decision in regard to the status of such states as *Bewusstseinslage* or *Einstellung*. The empirical success of the analysis of mental states, however, entitles it to be recognised as a distinct mode of psychological explanation.

In regard to the causal explanation, I suggest that every mental state should be regarded as a function of four classes of variable factors. The first of these is the past history of the individual, conscious and unconscious; second, the bodily constitution; third, the physical stimulus; and lastly, the social environment. The last mentioned deserves a separate category in as much as it always presupposes some kind of *conscious representation* for its operation. Any mental state, therefore, would be said

to be explained only when it can be correlated with all of these four classes of variable factors.

We can see from this perspective the significance of the several approaches to psychological explanation. Psycho-analysis, functional psychology, and Hormic psychologies of all shades, are attempting an explanation in terms of the psychic antecedents, while physiological psychology as well as behaviorism, the correlation of mental states with bodily antecedents and concomitants. In the same manner, psycho-physics of Weber and Fechner explains mental life in terms of physical stimuli, while Social Psychology interprets it in terms of the group-factors. A question has been pointedly raised by Miss Calkins whether the self as a concrete experience-content should not be regarded as a special determinant of all mental states. The answer to this would depend upon the constitution of the self-experience. If we agree with James and others that self so far as it is experienced is a group of experiences on a par with other experiences, there is no particular point in setting it up as a special determinant. But if it is to be regarded as a unique experience, we should provide for five types of determinants of mental life instead of four as proposed above. The consequence of accepting the position will be that we shall have a number of special methods of approach to mental life. Mental life should, therefore, be explained in terms of constituents and in terms of their causal antecedents. The functional and the physiological systems, social Psychology and psycho-physics,—would all be co-ordinate modes of psychological explanation. At the same time, psychological questions would have their solutions only in experiments and observations.

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# THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE NIRVĀNA

BY

J. K. SARKAR, MUZZAFFARPUR.

## *Introduction.*

The *Nirvāna* is the vehicle of sublimation or uplifting of the individual. There is no term so hopelessly misinterpreted, no notion so completely distorted as the *Nirvāna* is. The confused mass of misconceptions and ambiguities arises from various sources, *viz.*, the long litany of synonyms negative, contradictory and apparently inconceivable, indefinite definitions, etc. The confusion between “*Nivṛti*” and “*Nirvāna*,” the two-fold meaning of the word “*Nirvāna*, *viz.*, cooling and extinguishing, are but the most prolific source of errors. To us the *Nirvāna* is shrouded in mystery and with regard to its meaning our imagination has its full play, as the reality is unknown. But inspite of its numberless negative contents and descriptions it has succeeded in attracting so many human beings during so many centuries and in so many climes. It has been the perennial source of hope and solace to the populations that have made out of it their spiritual food. What is done by the prophets in Judea, Lao-tse in China, the mystic religion in Greece, is also done by Buddhism or the birth of *Nirvāna* in India and in the greater part of Asia. Buddhism with its celebrated doctrine of the *Nirvāna* is, like all other higher religions, a sort of assurance against the death and the terrors and miseries following from it. So the *Nirvāna* can never be the annihilation in itself.

*The negative contents of Nirvāna leading on to its positive significance.*—*Buddhaghosa* remarks : “ The Nirvāna is one, but its names founded on its contraries are numerous.” The variants of these contraries or negatives are—cessation, destruction, detachment, the nothingness, the negation of the *Prapancha* or the *Samsāra* ; the end of desire, aversion and blindness ; the deliverance from suffering, birth, evil and death. The Nirvāna is destruction, the Buddha is the destructor. The *Samsāra* is *Vatta*, the turn of wheel, the Nirvāna is *Vivatta* and the Buddha is the *Venāyaka*. Verily the Tathāgata says, “ I am the king of the Law, born in the world in order to be the destructor of existence.” In *Mahāvagga* (IV, 31, 4-7) the great teacher, while preaching to the *Seeha* the doctrine of abstinence from all evil actions of body, speech and thought, says that he wishes others to destroy desire, hatred and blindness. In fact, the cessation of *Samsāra* without, and of *tanhā* within, is made possible as much by the total annihilation as by one eternity of happy existence. The suppression of the individual existence and supreme felicity arising out of the appeasement of thirst (corresponding to the two imports of the Nirvāna, viz., extinction and cooling down)—the negative and positive bliss affirmed of the Nirvāna—do not exclude each other. On the other hand, the Nirvāna is positive bliss because it is annihilation. This can be easily inferred from the nature of the Nirvāna, from the teaching of the Buddha.

*The nature of the Nirvāna and its different forms.*—The Nirvāna is one. It does not admit of degrees. It is, or it is not, just as a flame, as much as it burns, is not extinguished. So Nirvāna could not be more or less complete. It is without relation to what may be other than itself. It receives nothing from some other cause. It is called the *Anupādeya-nirvāna* (*Mādhyamika Vṛtti*, XXV). It is above all time and space. There is no place where the Nirvāna is. And yet the Nirvāna is, and he who conducts his life properly, knows or realises it. It is like the fire : the fire is, and yet the fire is not in some part or position (*Milindā Panho*). The distinction between *Parinirvāna* and *Nirvāna* is emotive, and not logical. The Nirvāna is the concept, pure and simple, the idea of achievement that evokes *Parinirvāna* and calls

into play the feelings of those who understand it. One can be *Parinirvṛta*, and can continue to act in the world (*Mādhyamika-vṛtti*). Again, the *Nirvāna* is put under different categories by the Buddhistic teachers according to the different characters of the individuals that obtain it, viz., *Sanditthika* (immediate) *Nirvāna*, *Ditthe va Dhamme* (*Nirvāna* in the present life), *Sopādhisesa-Nirvāna*, *nirupādhisesa-nirvāna*, *apratisthita-nirvāna* (*Nirvāna* without attachment). There are other classifications of the *Nirvāna* in the *Nettipiṭṭak* that concern the *anagamins* only. (1) The *Sanditthika-nirvāna* is indicative of the fruit obtained immediately by a *Bhikkhu* or an individual freed from passion, aversion and blindness. Having obtained it, he no more knows or feels the affliction caused by evil. In it he finds immediately the result of his work, i.e., the realization of the moral and spiritual conditions of the supreme appeasement (*Anguttara-Nikāya*, III, 55). (2) Again, in the *Sutta-Nipāṭa* we read that *Nirvāna* can be obtained in the present life (*ditthe va dhamme*). The *nirvāna* is an incomparable island for those who are plunged into the waters, carried away by the terrible current and preyed upon by old age and death. So it is the destroyer of old age and death. Those who have a full knowledge of it are extinguished in this very life and escape the power of *Māra*. In the *Dighā-Nikāya* and other scriptures this *nirvāna* is not the sole monopoly of the *Bhikkhus*. "A Kshatriya, a Vaishya or a Brahman who has control over body, speech and thought has realised the favourable condition of *nirvāna* and is extinguished in this very life." (3) The *Sopādhisesa-nirvāna* is the *nirvāna* with a residue of substratum, a residue of the phenomenal life. (4) When the *Karman* is extinguished and there are no aggregates, the *nirvāna* is the *Nirupādhisesa-nirvāna*. The *Kleśas* (ignorance, passion, etc.), are like the robbers that plunder a village. People chase them, and they conceal themselves; but the village is always there. It is the *Nirvāna* with *Upādhi*. In the *Nirvāna* without *Upādhi*, there are neither robbers nor any village (*Mādhyamika Vṛtti*). (5) The *apratisthita-nirvāna*, the *nirvāna* without attachment, is held by the *Mādhyamika* and *Yogācāra* schools. The *pratisthā* is the base or point of attachment for some object. The *apratisthā*



*thita-nirvāna* is an ultraphenomenal state having an exceptional character of transcendence. In it there is neither particularisation, nor *nimitta* and the causal nexus, but there is the possession of knowledge without duality or polarity of subject and object, or without differentiation (*Panchakrama*, VI-24-25). In such a state the common function of the sexual abstinence becomes with the Buddha a source of infinite virtues, and the knowledge procured by the intellect is wholly free from erroneous ideas (*Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra* of Asanga). Having obtained their *nirvāna*, the *Tāyins* are in the *Samsāra*, but do not suffer any injury from the contact with the world (*Bodhicharyā-vatāra* of Śāntideva). Thus the *apratisthita-nirvāna* and the *Samsāra* are not exclusive of each other. Now it is evident that the *nirvāna* can be attained even in this very life. It is supreme felicity as it is extinction or freedom from passion, hatred, Karmaphala, etc. The different orders of the *nirvāna* are built by the different schools, just suiting the different temperaments of the individuals. The different classes of *nirvāna* are but the different steps towards the sublimation of the individual temperaments. The temperaments, though they may be starved, cannot be destroyed altogether but sublimated or directed and uplifted towards a higher, healthier mental state. This temperamental purification is a stepping-stone to the next ultimate step, viz., the absolute *nirvāna*. The difference between the absolute *nirvāna* and the other forms of *nirvāna* is that the former excludes the *Samsāra* while the latter do not.

*The doctrine of the Buddha as the greatest conqueror of the human hearts.*—The Buddha has succeeded in conquering the greatest number of human hearts, as his doctrine is plastic enough for furnishing to all the religious food that is suitable for them. (i) To the devout laymen the paradisaical felicity is offered by him as their reward, though threatened with the fear of dethronement and of rebirth and death. The constructions of different heavens (*Svarga*, *Buddha-Kshetras*, etc.), by the Buddhist monks, as rightly pointed out by Poussin, are simply meant to suit various temperaments of the people. Nevertheless, the absolute *nirvāna* though it is eternal bliss, is not the paradise. In the eyes of the

*Bodhisattva* the abode in the heaven is not a reward. The joys of the heaven are nothing in comparison with the pure beatitude of the being that has been liberated. The fruit of the entrance into the stream (*Sotāpatti*) is infinitely superior to the empire of the earth, abode in heaven, and dominion of the entire world (*Dhammapada*). The entrance into the *Sotāpatti* is the first step towards the conquest of one good that is imperishable. The *svarga* is not the abode of *nirvāna*, but rather opposed to it. Nor is the *Buddha-kshetra* the place of the *nirvāna*, but a stage for reaching it.

(ii) To those who are tired of this world in which all are beginning and changing, in which there are birth and death, is offered by the Buddha the ideal of sanctity which is identified with *Nirvāna*. Sanctity, regarded by *Sāriputra* as the extinction of desire, aversion and blindness, rescues them from all forms of existence limited and decayed by old age, etc. When one aspires to this form of the *nirvāna*, the new birth with the subsequent fear of death is considered as damnation (*Nettiprakarana*). Whatever may be the conception of *Nirvāna*, whatever may be the ideal of bliss, millions of people put their faith and hope in the salvation which Buddha held out to them. The perspective to enjoy the profound peace consoled and tranquillised them. "The Bhiksu attaches himself to nothing, as the sensations are perishable. Without having any attachment he fears nothing. Because he fears nothing, he has the *nirvāna* (*Majjhima-Nikāya*). Hence the *nirvāna* consists in the liberation from the fear to die. So, though the *nirvāna* is annihilation, it is not death, but the abolition of death. It is immortality, *Amṛta*." In *Mahāvagga* we read: "Open the door of the immortality....." In *Sutta-Nipāta* we read—"with him who has left all attachment for name and form, there is no more infection through which he can fall a victim to the power of death." The sage who, in realising *nirvāna*, has banished from his heart all fears, lives from the very moment in full security (*Yogakṣema*). The greatest terror or suffering of man is his fear of death, and the *nirvāna* consists above all in liberating one from this fear. If the mission of all great religions is to extirpate it, Buddhism with its doctrine of the *nirvāna* has not failed in this mission. As it is impossible to kill the fear of

death by uprooting it, Buddhism tried to transform and sublimate it by different methods, both subjective and objective, with its sterilizing principle of the *nirvāna*. In *Sutta-nipāta* and *Majjhima-Nikāya* it is said that a man in order to be free from the terror of death should consider the world under the aspect of the empty. To cling to anything, however supreme or sublime it may be, is to court the fear of death. In rejecting the idea of the soul, one triumphs over death. The *nirvāna* is one joy intense and divine at the moment of death. In preventing the death from projecting its umbra on the life, the *nirvāna* starts into life itself. Here the Buddha's pessimistic attitude towards the human body is more than compensated by his optimistic attitude of the human life and mind as purified and strengthened by the *nirvāna*.

*The Nirvāna, positive or definite.*—The *nirvāna*, called positive or definite, coincides with the death of the *Arhat*. Now death is a dissolution for saints and common individuals alike—a dissolution of the aggregates, consciousness, *skandhas*, etc. What then is the difference between the death of the *Arhat*, called the *nirvāna*? The difference is that the death of the common man does not extinguish the residues of the existence which act in some way or other as a centre of materialisation, as a new complex for a new existence. The saint does not drag after him the germs of individualisation which are productive of all sufferings. His death puts an end to the individual continuity and precludes all possibilities of survival. It destroys the phenomenal and individualised existence. The *nirvāna*, as the cause of cessation of all becoming, concerns itself with the world of birth and death, but in itself it belongs to one other system than the phenomenon. To this system no measure can be applied. "Does the consciousness exist in a being who has disappeared? Is he, or is he no more?" asked the venerable *Upasiva*. The Buddha replied, "To him who has disappeared, no measure can be applied. He disappears like a flame blown off by a gust of wind (*Atthan gātassa na pramānam atthi*) (*Sutta Nipāta*). Thus *nirvāna* puts all individuals above all dialectic categories, outside of all contingency. It is something that is neither born, nor made, nor perfected. If there had not been that something it would have been impossible to escape from

what is born, etc. Thus *nirvāna* forms a separate system of reality by itself.

*The Nirvāna as a different system of reality.*—But now the question is : how can we form an idea of, or define, *nirvāna*, as all ideas and words are related to the distinguishing characters of things of the *Samsāra*? In fact *nirvāna* has no characters. It is impossible to say what it is. It is a region in which there is neither earth, nor water, nor perception. In it there is neither coming, nor going, neither birth, nor death. It does not grow, has no point of support. In it there is neither *Upādhi* nor *Upādhāna*, neither *Skandha*, nor *Samskāra* and *Vijñāna*. It is like the *Avidyā* of the Vedantins. All these negations are only for the *Vijñāna*, as the *Vijñāna* knows only the phenomenal world. But it (*Nirvāna*) is an ultraphenomenal knowledge. “By the ultramundane knowledge, I shall open to all creatures the gate of the blissful destiny of *nirvāna* (*Sikṣāsamuchchaya* of Śāntideva). This ultra-phenomenal knowledge has a definite value attached to it. For the *Yogācāra*, the *nirvāna* is a thing religious and of excellence. Asanga states a number of qualities that are not suppressed by the entry into the *nirvāna*, such as sovereignty, *aiśvaryya* of the Bodhisattva, the *pāramita* (*Mahāyāna-Sutrālaṅkāra* of Asanga). If so much of Dharma remains intact in the *nirvāna*, it can never be an absolute destruction in itself. In some respects it may resemble the vacuity, as both deny the phenomenon, (cf. *Mādhyamikas* and *Vedāntins*). Yet it is the supreme reality, the unique truth, as opposed to the *Samskāras* which are untruths. Again, the *nirvāna* is the extinction of *Bhāva* and *Prapancha*. It is the supreme felicity, because it is the extinction. But how can it be the supreme felicity when there is no sensation or perception in it? It is precisely the perfect felicity as there is no sensation or perception in it. All sensation supposes duality, implies limitation, and limitation is suffering.

Though it may be admitted that *nirvāna* is the annihilation as well as the eternal felicity, yet it appears to be nothing in the absence of a permanent principle or soul. But in fact *nirvāna* changes nothing except that it suppresses evil and suffering. It does not annihilate life but lifts it up. It is the life, and not

*nirvāna*, that kills life. The life, and not *nirvāna* is one incessant destroying (according to the law of momentariness of things and of conditional birth). If anywhere the absence of soul is felt, it is in the life and not in *nirvāna*.

But how can it be the life and soul, if the continuity of life, perception, consciousness and all others will disappear for it. It is then really nothing. But though it eliminates all, it is a reality in itself. It creates a new state on the suppression of the *Samsāra*. So with the Buddhists the *Samsāra* is not the only imaginable form of existence. But the existence of a state preserved in the *nirvāna* is neither phenomenal nor individual. It is rather away from both, or suppresses both at the same time. Its negative contents carry us so far to its positive reality.

*Conclusion.*—(a) In fine, it may be said here that Buddhism has put before people two ideas or one in two, *viz.*, the removal of suffering and the attainment of *nirvāna* or absolute rest, or one by the other. The first is more moralistic and religious, while the second is more theosophic. The first is more open and plain and faithful to the thought of the founder, and the method to realise it is more simple, *viz.*, purification of conduct, purging of intelligence and training of will. The second ideal, as it is more theosophic, is rooted in the traditional doctrines of the Upanishads following as the corollaries of the doctrine of the Being, *viz.*, impermanence of all things, rebirths of painful existence, impossibility to escape from *Karmaphala*, assertion of the possible cure and of a permanent bliss in the absolute rest. The method to realise this second idea is more or less the intuitive one, *viz.*, the method of meditation and illumination. So two undercurrents flow beneath the heart of Buddhism. But they are made to flow towards the same end—the creation of the great man, *Mahāpurusha* or *Arhat* who has the heart freed (*Samyutta Nikāya*).

(b) Buddhism has numerous points of contact with the Brahmanic speculation and other philosophical and religious systems of India. The end and the method are the same in all—the end being the pursuit of salvation by the annihilation of the limited and miserable existence, and the method being the introspective one described as 'a luminous appearance.' The theory of

the *Jhāna* and the *Samāpatti* is Yogic in its essential parts. The advance towards the Bodhi by the method of concentration with *Samādhi* and *Samatha*, with *Prajñā* and *Vipasyanā*, the advance towards the Bodhi by the method of ecstatic contemplation with the *Karmasthānas*, *Dhyāna* and *Samāpatti* are essentially Yogic in character. Even the conception of the Bodhi is partly Vedāntic—Bodhi the thought of which opens, blooms, expands, even in sleep and in which the Bhikshu with his heart appeased finds himself everywhere and identifies himself with everything. Again, the *nirvāna* has the characters of Brahman or the universal soul. The *nirvāna* is, “It alone is one, one.”

But in spite of its agreement with other systems Buddhism has distinguishing features of its own, without which it could not have justified its great fortune. The favourable circumstances, the great power of adaptability and organisation of the community, the propaganda and, above all, the chance element can never solely account for the expansion and grandeur of Buddhism. To survive for a long time and with so much of vigour and strength it owes to its inner principle and not to its outward proceedings. It is the internal, integral religion, the Dharma that rules all and acts as the unique principle of cohesion and development. It matters little whether the contents of the religion are new or borrowed. But with the Buddhist they all acquire a religious significance, as Buddhism utilises these gifts for explaining the origin of suffering and discovering the path of the ultimate recovery, *i.e.*, *nirvāna*. To acquire verity by the individual himself and to conduct others to it are the chief preaching of the Buddha and the keystone of Buddhism.

(c) But to attain to the ultimate truth the purification and sublimation of the will is absolutely necessary. So, out of the seven factors constitutive of the ‘illumination,’ the will with its reserves of energy is one that really leads to the concentration of thought. And in the moral life of the individual it is the will or tendency, *Āśaya* that acts on the *Āśraya*, the psychic state at a given moment, and manifests itself in the *Karman* on which depends the ultimate destiny of the individual. With the help of this sublimated will the individual can pass through the eight steps

of the *Jhāna* and the ninth *Samāpatti* and can acquire power and equilibrium of the mind and, at last, the ultimate truth. If so much preparation and training are necessary for the attainment of *nirvāna*, *nirvāna* cannot be a negative and empty thing.

(d) The attainment of *nirvāna* is thus solely made possible by the exertion of one's own self to conquer the fear of death. The will is the beast of burden which carries the *Bhikshu* to his ultimate goal. But the ordinary man in his miserable and helpless condition, creates God in his own image. He casts his burden upon the Lord. His God is the repository of his highest hopes, the confidant of his deepest trouble. His God is the God of justice, love and misery. So God always stands for what is felt to be in the interests of troubled humanity. But the Buddha could see with his prophetic vision that man can never be freed from suffering or death by any kind of dependence whatsoever. His salvation lies in his own exertion. His ultimate end or *nirvāna* is perfect freedom (even from God or soul).

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## THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SALVATION

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The psychological basis of a belief in immortality is, roughly speaking, threefold, namely, Imagination, Desire and Experience.

Primitive thought and some forms of pagan belief imagined the persistence of the recent dead in some tree or some secluded spot near about the homestead or in the tomb, and arranged for their comfort in the next world by burying or burning tools, weapons, food-stuff and even slaves and wives, and sometimes by symbolic gifts like paintings on mummy chests. When contemplated with fear, these became ghosts and malignant spirits, and propitiatory offerings were made at some stated intervals to keep them in health and good humour so that they might not return to life or disturb the living. When reverently regarded, they came to be looked upon as gods, and ancestor-worship was instituted. The recent dead continued in the imagination as distinct personalities and tombs were regarded as their abodes; but with the decay of imagination the dead of past ages simply became the fathers or *manes*, and the separate graves were consolidated together to form a common charnel-house and became a land of shades, as, for example, the Hades and Sheol. In some beliefs the mortal age continued to cling to the dead in after-life, and in others the occupations of this life were transferred to the other world and even the relationships of this earth were supposed to persist beyond the grave. When the moral sense of mankind was quickened, separate abodes were provided for the righteous and the vicious, heavens and hells corresponding to gradations of merit and demerit were constructed, and methods of weighing different degrees of



moral equipment were imagined. An association with heavenly bodies as also probably the custom of cremation suggested an empyrean composition of Heaven where the good go, and the declining march of the sun was equated with the ebbing life, and a western (or southern) location of Heaven or the land of the blessed was imagined. Conversely, hells were located in the dark underground and characterised by fiery ordeals and dire punishments. Gradation in merit was correlated with height, so that the seat of God (who is the Most High) was located in the highest heaven and, on earth, in the highest hills and the Arch-sinner was condemned to punishment in the lowest hell. The majesty of temporal power was supposed to have its heavenly analogue, and angels, jinns and lesser divinities were introduced to keep up the dignity of the heavenly court, and the duties and occupations of heavenly denizens were to some extent modelled on those of the retinue of earthly potentates, singing of hallelujahs, for instance, taking the place of court panegyrics. In some oriental beliefs, for those deserving neither heaven nor hell for ever, a temporary residence in heaven, followed by a return to earthly existence, or else a direct transmigration to another body with the help of an ethereal or astral body was proposed, and the Psychical Research movement initiated in Christian countries a belief in spatial persistence in an attenuated form without the additional faith in transmigration.

The element of human desire either invested Heaven with negative attributes like painlessness, changelessness, timelessness, etc., or positively characterised it as eternal and blissful. When materially conceived, it was supposed to be free from spatial and temporal limitations, filled with joyous spirits of youthful age and either with no occupation or only with those of beatific vision and singing of hymns to the glory of God—something like a perpetual church service. When grossly conceived, it was constructed of gold and precious stones, filled with trees that rained fruits for the mere wish, with plenty of manna, nectar and ambrosia to satisfy hunger without labour, and with cool rivers of honey, milk, wine, oil, water, etc., to quench thirst. In some creeds provision was made even for sexual satisfaction, but to obviate family cares the

birth of children was not even hinted at. In Heaven space contracts according to desire and spiritual affinity, and there is no law of gravitation. The instinct of self-preservation has generally dictated personal survival in some form but details are neither clear nor uniform. The social instinct, when narrow and clannish, has insisted on a social sanctification of the corpse by due burial or cremation as a condition precedent of admission to heaven, constructed sectarian heavens, or barred the adherents of other faiths out of heaven altogether. In all cases heaven has been supposed to be filled with a crowd so that the customary social contact may not be missed after death.

The element of personal experience may be either that of human weakness or that of personal exaltation. The first introduces the conception of a mediator who intercedes on behalf of weak mortals and may also suffer for their iniquity personally; it softens the rigour of an eternal hell by providing for the ultimate liberation of all sinners; it also provides for the operation of Divine Grace out of all proportion to human deserts. A stricter sense of justice either leaves the sinner to his fate for ever, or requires him to work out his own salvation by personal endeavour through ever recurrent cycles of existence, or makes provision for purgation, moral progress or gradual liberation in a realm intermediate between heaven and earth. A sense of personal transcendence in ecstasy and hysteric fit may sanctify on earth such debased means as sexual orgy and addiction to narcotics and at its best lead to cataleptic fits by dance, music and concentration. The sense of exaltation may prompt the equation of salvation with divine or angelic status. The negative sense of world-weariness, no less than the positive one of unity, peace and harmony with the world, may prompt the pantheistic conception of absorption in the Infinite as the final destiny, and into the latter element an unconscious identification with the mother, as in ante-natal condition, may enter as a factor. The sense of an overpowering presence, of mystic devotion, of expanding cosmopolitanism and the converse processes of negating personal differences and withdrawal from the world and its struggles may all conspire to bring about a feeling of personal nothingness and a notion of impersonal survival in the

Absolute. In extreme forms they introduce the conception of Nirvāna or annihilation of existence like the blowing out of a lamp. The dissolution of the body as a necessary condition of attaining the next world suggests its mortification here on earth, and celibacy and asceticism, as negations of bodily pleasure and even religious suicide dominate religious practice, especially in those systems which do not believe in spatial heaven; while those that believe in bodily resurrection provide for the direct translation or ascension to heaven of the most holy and believe in the resurrection of the rest (with this or another spiritual body) on the Judgment Day at the sound of the angelic trumpet to meet their merited doom. When the spiritual element is emphasised, the rare moments of mental calm and peace and joy are regarded as inklings of what lies beyond death. But most often such feelings are not conceived to prove the existence of a spatial heaven; they are supposed to give that state of mind which is equivalent to salvation here on earth—the state of the *jīvanmukta* (liberated in life) according to Hindu thought. Hegel's doctrine of Absolute Consciousness and the Indian theory of a fourth state of mind (*Turiya*) beyond the empiric modes of waking, sleep and dreamless sleep are practically identical, and according to both, the kingdom of heaven is within the mind and not placed in space beyond the stars.

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## OUR PSYCHIC PROCESS—AN ADVAITIC INTERPRETATION

BY

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What we call our consciousness, here called the Psychic Process, was described by Prof. James as a stream, a flow. But its "whence" and "whither" have remained a baffling psychological mystery—apart, of course, from the self-satisfaction of some recent psychologists that they explained the mental behaviour when they treated it as part of a psycho-physical mechanism forgetting that the whole machine itself required an explanation for its being! Every student of philosophy knows that there are explanations and explanations, what is explanation for physical scientist remaining itself to be explained for the philosopher—a difference in categories as they say. Do we not hear even now of such biological "explanations" as, for example, that *somehow* (the Eternal somehow for the "scientist") a structure that we now call the eye came into existence in evolution and *then* it *somehow* began to see? Have the evolutionists yet realised the necessity of postulating a Cosmic "Psychology," as it were, like Plato's world of Ideas, which, acting as the original creative Plan, produced the structures that we call organism and not *vice versa*, "Science" representing to such "Psychology" the mechanism of the work so turned out as "facts?"

Let us try to study the stream as our psychological fact by introspection since there is no other direct approach to it. Any observer can easily notice that in spite of his apparent wakefulness to his surroundings—which itself is not continuous, but rhythmic or wave-like—there is a ceaseless flow of ideas going on in his mind.

whose beginning or ending is not known, which off and on enters into the sensory continuum and into which the sensory continuum enters both modifying each other, and which constitutes his "real" psychic being, himself! Some of these complicated products seem to be acted out while the rest simply pass on and fade away. There seems to be no moment of rest in this flow, not even in sleep. "We individually seem to remain as mere onlookers with no *real* power to interfere with it, much less to stop it. A small example will clearly show our utter *passivity* in relation to it, and how little it becomes us to use the active voice in the situation. When we have a problem to solve, or when we want to recollect something we simply put a question to an apparently unknown "X," and seem to *wait* for an answer. If the answer comes, it is in the form of an idea drifting into "our mind." But we at once jump up and say "I have discovered the solution" or "I have remembered the point." How little this egotism is justified by the actual experience we rarely reflect! Have we, any one of us, a logical or moral right to use the active voice to claim as our own what so comes into our mind? How ridiculous does the modern civilization of commercialised conceptions look to one who has understood this passive character of our mental existence? Do not monopolies and patents become mere spiritual burglaries when in reality we seem to live in one common Element of life and Intelligence? Does not this also raise the problem how far we are each of us an "I," and what is our real place in his scheme of things? What are we as we are, and what is going to become of us hereafter?

Trying to understand how this process of experience is going on for each of us as we observe ourselves, we can say that our so-called waking consciousness is like the opening of the shutter of a cinema machine that is continuously working on throwing its picture-series on the screen of this three-dimensioned world mixing up with and mixed up by the objects already there. It appears almost as though each of us is ushered into the world with a ready-made cinema outfit of his own which willy-nilly he must work out as his (*Karmic*) allotment and "learn" whatever he might thereby, not as something *personal*, but as a course of cosmic training. We are not the least conscious that we either made the "inner

series " or the " outer objects." Nor do we see our way why or how some ideas seem to be acted out leaving the rest to fade away. To add to this already existing confusion and " masterlessness " there is our physical body with its own pedigree and make-up of training, which we have not ourselves made, or by any moral law that we can know, are called on to control, though for unknown reasons we are caught in it as in a net. We further notice that if we should fall into a sort of brown study or reverie in our so-called wakeful moments, we only find ourselves more fully drawn to mind the subjective flow, the inner cinema show, even for a time to enjoy a day-dream like that of Alnascar's and into which even passing external objects like a cry in the street, or the sound of a motor horn, or a stray remark by one near us might enter, altering its nature or changing its drift. Is it not but a step more from this to understand how and why we dream and what their stuff, when being more fully withdrawn from the external sense-activity we seem to be more fully subjective in existence face to face with " our " panorama. One can easily observe oneself falling into a dream when the subjective process becomes more and more vivid until it seems to exist like reality. Do not then the psychic processes from highest poetic, artistic and scientific thought (whence are these?) down to the ravings of a maniac or a hypochondriac become merely fragments of this apparently perennial psychic process? If men can only realise that they are physically mere " brain-posts " catching like our wireless messages various items of various wave-lengths, they will have very little reason to praise or blame one another with any degree of egotism. It might appear that this view infringes our sacred rights of Individuality. Let us remember that individuality is not egotism and see if such individuality for any one could be anything absolute. Can two absolutes co-exist in one world? If one be a real individual he would be God himself, completely self-sufficient whose activity is creative, ever-giving but never " passive " or receiving! It is possible that we are, as some say, Gods in the making, that in the cosmic process externally and the psychic process internally are the two important aspects of experience to turn us into such independent beings and that consequently to the apparent pleasure and pains of this experi-

ence-process we should attach no personal value but take them as mere experience. It may be that the cosmic mills of God working slowly but surely intend to turn us into real being from an original state of non-existence !

The world interpreted as above can give us a clue to understand a way out of our logical and ethical enigmas. For example, they raise a problem as to how a psychic process in the individual (including even the most "scientific" theories) is at the same time a knowing process, something objective, or how an apparent self-seeking individual is also to act as an "other" to himself—forgetting to define the limits of their selfish self ! The way out is that there is no such subjectivism anywhere. It is a delusion to think of such separativeness. We are like so many electric bulbs meant to experience what flows into each of us from the great current of cosmic life and consciousness in which we literally live, move and have our being, albeit we are *not yet constituted* to have direct consciousness of the Unity that alone is really Individual. We now simply watch, wait and learn. We must realise that from the beginning ; both the logical processes and the "moral" impulses are "outside" us even as our physical bodies are not our own make. That these processes are *objective* is not, therefore, the problem. The problem is rather, epistemologically or morally that we are misled towards error. Error and Evil are what require to be explained. We may say that there is neither absolute error nor absolute evil. In the great cosmic process of Evolution of the Individual they are only Truth and Goodness *in the making*. Only when one understands the delusion of one's individuality as we now take it to be, one gets over both error and evil. And the way to be disillusioned is found in the "whence and whither" of our psychic process.

We might even consider ourselves like so many flowers and fruits of the mighty tree of Evolution, living its life and sharing its sap. The evil done by any one like the good of any other is ultimately ours, *our own* ; the great intellectual victory or achievement of one and the foolish phantom of another are equally *our own* ! The physicists say that there is ultimately one matter and one energy—or even that there is only One Energy. Let philo-

sophers also say that there is only Life and one consciousness, and that they are again one, the One Life only. The broken, the isolated, the temporal is alone mortal—*i.e.*, really non-existent; the united, the continuous, the eternal is the Immortal. There cannot be a so-called pre-existent immortality as souls or spirits, since, if so, it should give the lie direct to the whole story of Evolution. We are to *become* souls, eternal or immortal by knowing that we are part and parcel of the Utterly One, as having evolved into individuality in that One,—since “outside” it is Death or non-existence. It may not be long in the history of modern Thought that Life and Energy are also found out as but one, and there is no place for any dualism. How are we to understand and correlate these two—Life and Energy? If we look at a certain school of Hindu Thought they speak of *Śakti* and *Śiva*, Energy and Life or *Jīva*, not as two but one, and the highest result of “mystic training” is to realise their Union in one’s self in ‘the 1000-petalled seat,’ the brain or ‘*Sahasrāra*.’ What else is this conception but the factualisation of the Unity of all in the Eternal two-in-one, the positive and the negative of being that are ever one. The individual is conceived as *Śakti* and the ultimate fundamental One, the parent-head, as *Śiva*, and when they meet and merge there is eternity, one-self becoming One-self—a conception analogous to the Christian mystic consummation of the Son becoming one with the Father. It is such consciousness realised as fact that is described as the Eternal or the Immortal existence; and whatever remains at the temporal or piecemeal level is but mortal. There may be ranges of existence in the realisation of this unity, like the stories of our hierarchies of Gods and angels; but the beginnings are to be established in the man-form which seems to be the culmination of the Evolution of Form—the meaning of God making man in His image. We are as it were, now merely as fleeting images of a dream, a subjective existence and are to become objective and real hereafter. Until then we have also no reason to call ourselves “souls.” Our present existence is like the intra-uterine existence in the great womb of Nature and only when we are born into reality in the fulness of time do our “souls” enter into us who are now mere tabernacles, with the



first breath that we take of the Real Life of the Real World—not a world that is somewhere far-off as a faint breath, a super-nirvanic state but the yet-to-become *physical* world of the Future, the original conception becoming the Great Fact. Each of us will be a "soul" there and then, since as a focal point he becomes conscious that he is one with the Great Life which is the only Eternal I for all.

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## WHAT PSYCHOLOGY IS

BY

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The question that has been seriously agitating the minds of psychologists and philosophers alike for sometime past is whether psychology should be completely severed from philosophy and treated as an independent natural science like physics or biology. It is perhaps something more than a matter of personal equation or individual temperament that among both psychologists and philosophers of a standing reputation there are some who would fain make a physical science of psychology, while others would condemn the attempt as overbold and reckless. In a conference of philosophers it was earnestly suggested by some important members to transfer psychology to the list of natural sciences like physics and chemistry, and have nothing to do with it under philosophy. That psychology is a science is not seriously disputed by anybody at the present day. But it is a veritable bone of contention among different sections of the philosophical world whether psychology as a science should be classed with the purely physical sciences or it should be kept distinct from them all as having a peculiar character of its own. It is the aim of this short paper to determine, as precisely as possible, the status of psychology. That is, we propose to consider the questions : In what sense psychology is a science? and, how far this science can be treated as a specimen of natural science?

The transition from a philosophical to a natural-scientific standpoint in psychology is very slow and gradual. Psychology

began as a science of the soul and played the second fiddle to philosophy all through its infancy. The concept of the soul was of course different in different metaphysics. In some it was vague, crude and materialistic, while in others it was more definite, refined and spiritualistic. But the metaphysical standpoint dominated psychological theories from the days of Empedocles down to the advent of the great German thinkers like Kant and Fichte, if not further still. It is more or less true of this school of psychology that all conscious phenomena were explained as the manifestations of a soul or as the modes of activity of a permanent self in the same way in which the physical sciences of the time treated physical phenomena as properties or manifestations of a permanent substance called matter. In this respect the Kantian 'unity of apperception' and the Fichtean 'ego' are epistemological versions of the more realistic conceptions of self as are illustrated by Plato's soul-substance, Augustine's incorporeal substance, Spinoza's substantial modes and Leibnitz's spiritual monads.

It was Descartes who gave a new turn to psychological studies by his epoch-making discovery of thought as the most fundamental facts of reality. Under the influence of the traditional philosophy, however, Descartes grafted, with questionable consistency, this fundamental fact on to the soul as owner or substance of the attribute of consciousness. But the effects of this discovery on the future course of psychology were as far-reaching as they were momentous. While the rationalistic school of psychology, represented by Wolff, Reid, Stewart, Royer-Collard, Jouffroy and others, continued the Cartesian idea of consciousness as the essential attribute of the soul, the empiricism of Locke and Hume was steadily making for a psychological study of thought or consciousness apart from any supposition of the 'I' or the 'ego' that is to think. With the further development of this line of study consciousness as a unified field of all experiences became the established subject-matter of psychology. The traditional view of psychology as the science of the soul was found unacceptable. Nor could the old concept of consciousness as an independent entity or essential property of a mystical soul-substance hold its own against the growing interest of the progressive sciences in actual facts of

experience. For all the illustrious representatives of the scientific spirit in modern psychology, such as Mill, Bain, Spencer, Sully, Wünder and James, consciousness is neither an entity nor the power of reflection upon our internal actions. It is only a collective term denoting all mental events or experiences. By consciousness is meant the totality of mental occurrences, such as sensations, perceptions, images, ideas, thoughts, feelings, emotions, desires and volitions. As Hugo Münsterberg very well puts it : " Consciousness is nothing which can be added to the existing mental facts, but it indicates just the existence of the psychical phenomena." Consciousness in this sense is the subject-matter of psychology. Henceforward psychology becomes the science of consciousness as an empirical concept.

Modern scientific psychology branches off into the two schools of structuralism and functionalism. The former concerns itself more with the static parts of consciousness, while the latter is solely interested in the transitive parts. The one looks to mental states or contents, the other to mental processes or functions. Hence while for both consciousness is the subject-matter of study, the structuralism of Wünder, Yerkes, Münsterberg and Titchener looks upon psychology as the science of mental states ; and the functionalism of Angell, Judd and others defines psychology as the science of mental processes. In truth, however, structuralism and functionalism are complementary schools of psychology. States and processes, contents and functions are relative conceptions. When applied to mental life these denote respectively the relatively fixed and fluent parts of our conscious life, just as eddies and currents are parts of the same stream. A comprehensive science of mind cannot ignore either a study of its make-up and composition or an account of its working and functions.

In functionalism as a school of psychology we have the germs for the development of two great schools of contemporary psychology that differ markedly in their outlooks, methods and objectives. I mean the schools of self-psychology and behaviorism. For functionalism mental processes are forms of psycho-physical reaction to the environment. This view of mental function has, as

J. S. Moore points out, obvious affiliation with mentalism, on the one hand, and the biological sciences, on the other. It insists that mind does make a difference to the organic reactions which psychology is to describe and explain. Hence, while rejecting the concept of the self as wholly unscientific, functionalism recognises the fact of mentation or consciousness as influencing organic adjustments to the environment. The psycho-physical character of mental functions, however, admits of two opposed constructions through a difference in the distribution of emphasis. Self-psychology and Behaviorism are such developments of functionalism in opposite directions. In the self-psychology of Calkins, Ward, Stout, Royce and others, the inwardness of experience is emphasised and the reference of all psychoses to a conscious self is taken as the basal fact of psychology. Consciousness is awareness of something by some one, *i.e.*, by a self. Psychology as the study of consciousness is to be treated as the science of the self, because all consciousness is equivalent to self-consciousness. Thus while functionalism is limited to the study of bare experience as a system of psycho-physical reactions to the environment, self-psychology construes experience as self-experience and advances to the study of consciousness *cum* self. But the introduction of the self into the field of psychology is more a matter of philosophical interpretation than that of scientific study of observed facts. The self as the subject of experience may be a better interpretation of the unity and continuity of our experience than a finer atom or a spiritual substance. But they all represent different degrees of perfection of philosophical thought with regard to the same subject-matter. In this sense self-psychology is a development of functionalism in the direction of a metaphysical psychology.

Behaviorism is a parallel development from functionalism, but in the opposite direction. If self-psychology is indicative of the psychologist's leanings towards metaphysics, behaviorism professes to be a move towards the natural-scientific standpoint in psychology. It ignores or minimises the importance of the mental factor in organic reaction to the influences of the environment. The hypnotic spell of the biological sciences with their striking developments in the nineteenth century was felt no less in psycho-

logy than in any other humanistics. In their zeal to make psychology thoroughly scientific and provide it with a matter of biological standing and sanctity, behaviorists like Watson, Frost, Holt, Bode and others find mind or consciousness to be as badly suited to scientific study as the soul or the self. So also the method of introspection is judged utterly inadequate for purposes of a scientific psychology. Psychology thus becomes a science of animal behaviour. The methods of psychology like those of any other objective or physical science are observation and experiment, and the stimulus-response formula is taken as the magic key to all problems of psychology. Dr. Watson says: "Psychology, as the behaviorist views it, is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behaviour," without any reference to consciousness.

With behaviorism we reach the purely natural-scientific standpoint in psychology. It is by no means true to say that that standpoint is either a new discovery or a monopoly of the behaviorists. The mechanistic standpoint in psychology is as old as the materialism of Democritus and Epicurus. It has also its modern representatives in Hobbes, Gassendi, Büchner, Jäger and others. The tendency towards mechanisation and naturalistic explanation that is so marked a feature of the eighteenth century enlightenment modified the range and character of subsequent European thought almost in all its departments, although with varying success and different degrees of completeness. In the 19th century the material sciences like physics, chemistry, geology, biology, etc., are generally the most thorough-going and social sciences the least, in respect of the application of mechanistic principles to their respective data. In the field of psychology as a mental science the same principles now find growing recognition and a vigorous attempt is being made to naturalise psychology to the extent of physics and biology. The experimentalists join hands with the behaviorists and claim the proud title of 'science' exclusively for their laboratory psychology. For them it is scientific psychology when the data are objective and open to public observation, and when mental phenomena can be subjected to exact quantitative determination or rendered in terms of arithmetical

figures. Physiological psychologists do use the terms 'mind' and 'mental' to denote facts that are recognised to be different and distinct from physical as well as physiological processes. But a scientific psychology, they also will insist, is a description and explanation of psychoses in terms of neuroses. Behaviorists take a bold step in the same direction when they drop mind or consciousness and make psychology a purely objective study of physical facts, namely, behaviour, by means of the methods of external or public observation and laboratory experiments as approved by the physical sciences.

Now the question we propose to discuss here is this: Can psychology be legitimately treated as a natural science of the same order as physics and biology? An answer to this question requires an explanation of what science in general and natural science in particular mean. Science may be defined as an orderly and consistent account of an indefinite number of facts or experiences of the same order. The account of facts as given by any science is partly descriptive and partly explanatory. Description consists in analysis and enumeration of all of our experiences of an object. To describe a thing is to relate our experiences with regard to it and regarded as qualities of it. A physical thing is described when we depict its sensory qualities just as these are perceived by us and referred to the thing as its constituent parts or factors. To describe a feeling or a perception is to analyse it into its simpler constituent states and represent the form of their combination as an integral whole. As to scientific explanation, we are to say that it consists in general statements as *how* things come to be *what* they are. Such statements are universal propositions embodying the conditions under which, and the antecedents following which, the things to be explained uniformly appear. They are arrived at by observation and experiment as to the ways in which things of the same order are uniformly related to each other as antecedents and consequents. These propositions, when once established, become the laws according to which things and events are said to be caused or produced. Hence to explain anything scientifically is to state the cause or conditions which usher it into the order of actual existence. Causation being another name for

the uniformity and unconditionality of a thing's relation to certain antecedents, we may very well say that any scientific explanation consists in subsumption of a fact under a law or a general rule. A physical event like the eclipse of the sun or the moon is explained when we have a general statement about that relative position of planets which is uniformly followed by the phenomenon in question. Likewise a mental event, say a percept or an image, is explained when its uniform physical, physiological and psychical antecedents are stated.

By natural sciences I mean the physical sciences like physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, etc. A natural science has the following main characteristics. It deals with the objects of our common experience. There is no privacy with regard to the objects of a physical science. They may be observed in almost the same way by each of us. These are open to our 'public observation' and 'joint inspection.' In this sense the datum of physical science is objective. Secondly, physical science deals with material forces that are amenable to exact quantitative determination. We can measure them, *i.e.*, add and subtract, multiply and divide physical forces just as we please provided we have the necessary apparatus therefor. Hence experiments are most useful and successful in the field of the physical sciences. Experiment being a study of facts under conditions that can be controlled and prepared according to our needs and desires, without prejudice to the facts themselves, is the most fertile source of our knowledge of the physical world. Lastly, physical sciences lead to the control and prediction of physical events. This follows from the fact that physical forces can be measured and calculated: From the fall of an unsupported body to the eclipse of the sun, all physical events can be calculated with complete accuracy. Metabolic changes in a living body can be both controlled and premeditated if we have full knowledge of its chemical conditions. Given then physical forces as causes and the laws of their operation, certain events which are their effects must follow as a matter of necessity. Hence a natural science is an objective experimental study of facts that can be explained in terms of matter and motion, and can therefore be controlled and predicted with a high degree of certainty.



Those who propose to treat psychology as a natural science proceed either by identifying conscious processes with neural processes or by discarding the mind altogether and allowing the body completely to take its place. In their craze for naturalisation some have omitted the mental side of our life as it does not conveniently lend itself to a mechanistic treatment and restricted psychology to a study of behaviour, *i.e.*, of bodily reactions to external stimulations. These people forget that to exclude consciousness from the field of psychology in order to make it a branch of natural science is to naturalise it out of existence. "The science," says Alexander, "which systematises mental propositions is psychology." To define psychology therefore as the 'science of behaviour' is to transform its character beyond recognition. That definition may very well hold good of a natural science like physiology or praxiology, but not of psychology. Psychology as the science, not of mind, but of behaviour is like the play of Hamlet with Hamlet's part left out.

As for experiments and physiological studies in the domain of psychology, we are to say that within certain limits these are valuable assets for any school of psychology. The subject-matter of psychology is mental life in its actual concrete setting in a body. The basal fact for psychology is neither a bodiless mind nor a mindless body, but a body-mind or the 'psycho-somatic' organism. Hence a study of the bodily correlates of psychical functions or a system of psycho-physical experiments is rightly calculated to promote the understanding of mental life. So far we admit the importance of physiological and experimental psychology. But they are certainly in error who think that psychology can only be physiological or experimental. It should suffice here only to point out that both physiology and experiments are limited to the bodily side of that complex whole which is partly body and partly mind. Experimental psychology is in a sense physiology. Experiments on different psychoses,—thought, emotion, will, etc.—and the numerals attached to them are really conversant with the changes of nervous matter correlated to them. Consciousness can neither be measured by a tape nor weighed in a balance. "The phenomena of the mind," says Guido Villa, "form a group by them-

selves which cannot be reduced to the laws of quantity.' To measure consciousness, if that is at all possible, is to have a particular kind of consciousness which is no measurement at all. If experiments in psychology throw any light on the working of the mind it is only in the light of some previous knowledge gained by immediate experience or introspection of it. Hence physiological and experimental studies are aids to psychology and not psychology itself just as a microscope is an aid to seeing and is not itself the act of seeing.

Finally, the natural scientific standpoint in psychology rests on certain unscientific assumptions regarding the mind. That there are mental facts in the world just as there are physical facts, that experiences and their objects are distinct units of reality and that 'cognising' and 'being cognised' are clearly different elements of experience must be admitted by all of us. The existence of mind or of mental acts is too hard a matter of fact to be easily suppressed or summarily dismissed. For each of us, such mental acts apprehended in immediate experience to which different writers give the different names of 'introspection,' 'reflection,' 'self-observation,' 'inspection' and 'enjoyment.' When the results of immediate experience of mental processes in each of us severally and all of us collectively are systematised, we have psychology as a science of mind. Psychology, then, is the science of immediate experience. The naturalistic standpoint in psychology is the result of a confusion between fact and theory. That the mind has no real existence or that consciousness is a quality of neural activity is not a fact of direct experience, but is the construction of experience in the direction of a philosophical theory. Consciousness is never perceived as a quality of any neural process in the same way in which the colour 'red' is perceived as a quality of the rose. To say that consciousness is a quality of the body is as much a matter of speculative theory as to say that it is an attribute of the soul-substance. Hence when the attempt is made to naturalise psychology by denying the reality of mind or by making it a quality of the body, what happens is that the scientific character of psychology is vitiated by its commixture with some sort of philosophy. It is indicative not so much of the scientists'

regard for actual facts of experience as of a bias for some particular science or system of philosophy. To be faithful to the facts of experience we conclude that psychology is an empirical science of immediate experience, which is alike different from metaphysics, on the one hand, and the natural sciences, on the other.

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# THE CONCEPT OF UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL PROCESSES

BY

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Though the concept of unconscious mental processes is not a new idea in Psychology, it has never been so extensively worked up as recently by Freud of Vienna. He claims that a scientific enquiry into certain mental disorders and, certain states like dream and hypnotism must necessarily lead to the supposition of unconscious mental processes. A belief in the existence of such processes is bound to be of far-reaching significance for Psychology as well as for Philosophy. It would affect not only our general view of life and morals but also the theory of knowledge. To General Psychology it offers a challenge to maintain its standpoint of mere structural analysis and neural explanation. On the other hand, it wants to widen the conception of mind and thereby to enlarge the scope of Psychology. General Psychologists, however, have not yet given that careful consideration to the concept which it seems to deserve. There are, of course, references to it in recent literature on general Psychology, but these are more like grudging concessions or uncritical rejections.

I would refer here to some of the reasons for this attitude of indifference on the part of General Psychologists.

(1) In the first place, the materials on which the hypothesis of unconscious mental processes is based are peculiar and unfamiliar to many of us. As we have no direct acquaintance with them we may not feel the same need for the concept as those constantly dealing with them do. We naïvely regard them as exceptional phenomena. Some of us even think that even if the concept of the unconscious be required for the explanation of such phenomena,

it is useless for understanding those of the normal mind with which General Psychology has to do. But it seems that such a position is untenable. A mind in disorder may be different from the mind in health, but it is mind all the same. And the principles that determine its disordered functions must be intimately related to the principles of the normal mind.

(2) In the second place, the terminology used by the Psychologists of the unconscious is not always unambiguous. Not only new terms have been coined but old terms have been used with new meanings, not always definitely enunciated. Perhaps this is partly unavoidable with the introduction of a new stand-point of analysis. Being primarily interested in the relief of human distress, the psycho-analysts had to draw freely from the common use of terms and to care more for vivid exposition suitable to the imagination of ordinary minds than for scientific precision.

(3) In the third place, Traditional Psychology has proceeded on the false assumption that since mental phenomena can be most conveniently observed in the self-conscious mind of adults it is the only mind that psychology need mainly care about. It has more or less neglected mental functions outside self-conscious experience. In the study of this experience, again, it has mainly stuck to the aim of phenomenological description, introspective discrimination being regarded as the sole method and main business of psychology. It has avoided the more important task of explanation, and when need for an explanation has arisen it has referred us to the mystery of neurology. For these reasons, a concept that presumes to explain in terms of mental processes outside the region of conscious experience has not received much consideration from Psychologists. But Psychology as a science should not only describe and analyse but also explain and if possible predict.

(4) In the fourth place, we should remember that like old customs, old ideas die hard. The concept of the unconscious coming from an alien source, appears to antagonise many of our long cherished beliefs about mind. Some of these beliefs, *e.g.*, Beliefs in Soul, Free will, etc., are not only very old but are deep-rooted in the universal and natural ego-centricism of the human mind. The resistance of these beliefs against the new concept

seems to have expressed itself in the form of apathy. But what is needed is that we should go to facts and judge in the light of the facts which of the rival ideas serve the purpose of explanation better.

Anyhow the present relation between General and Abnormal Psychology is not what it should be. They are in watertight compartments as it were. There is no mutual sympathy nor even an effort for mutual understanding. We seem to have lost sight of the evident truth that though some of us may be directly and primarily interested in the study of special kinds of mental functions, the science of Psychology is a unified and systematic view of mind as a whole and in all its aspects and that all of us as psychologists have ultimately the same ideal of understanding the working of the mind as developed and developing, as normal and abnormal.

I would next proceed to consider the objections that are usually advanced against the hypothesis of unconscious mental processes.

Existence of unconscious mental processes is inferred by an argument which, as Broad puts it, is "logically of the same type as those which led Adams and Leverrier to postulate the hitherto unperceived planet Neptune" (*Mind and its place in Nature*). Certain modifications and irregularities of behaviour and ideas can be explained if we assume certain unperceived desires and ideas conflicting with other desires and ideas which are perceived and are openly active. In some cases existence of these assumed mental processes can be verified by technical methods of analysis. One may hope that with a more suitable method similar verification may be obtained in other cases also. But as the unperceived conflicting processes are not conscious at the time they are active we should call them, according to psycho-analysts, unconscious mental processes.

A. The first objection against this argument is that unconscious mental processes are inconceivable. The hypothesis involves self-contradiction. We cannot think of processes—mental and unconscious at the same time. Consciousness, in other words, is the very essence of mind.

But are mental and conscious really identical? Can we not give instances of mental processes of which we are not conscious?

It is a well-known fact that the phenomenal description of a mental process varies to a great extent with the direction of attention and the general attitude in which the experimental situation is experienced.

As Broad says, it is only by parts that we are conscious of a total mass of admittedly conscious experiences. He takes the example of any prolonged conative activity and says that during the period of the activity our consciousness is occupied mostly with the means and yet no one can deny that the unperceived mental process of the desire itself remains the principal determinant of the whole train of activity. Psychiatric literature gives many examples of later recovery by hypnosis or Free Association of experiences unperceived at the time of their first occurrence. Thus we are led to think of mental processes which may have been acquired unperceived or unconsciously and which may also act unconsciously. It is possible to conceive that though some of these processes may be recovered in consciousness under suitable conditions, there may be others that cannot be so recovered under the known conditions of experience. I may also add, here, that just as in Physical sciences one must suppose, in the interests of explanation and necessary systematisation of knowledge, material structures and functions outside the range of perception, so also in Psychology the same need for explanation and systematisation may require suppositions of unperceived mental processes. To reject them only because they cannot be experienced would amount to reducing psychology to phenomenology in the most literal sense of the term.

Academic Psychology has not really been able to completely identify the mental and the conscious. For, it has felt the need of recognising a peculiar kind of mental processes, known as the subconscious. The subconscious is a quantitative idea and comprises all sub-threshold degrees of consciousness. We can think of mental processes ranging from 0 degree of excitation to the just sub-threshold degree of it. Now as regards the chance of recovery in consciousness, the processes with very low values of excitation are exactly like unconscious mental processes of the Psychoanalysts. The question then is, not whether unconscious mental processes are inadmissible, but whether there is any necessity

of recognising two separate kinds of unconscious processes—the subconscious and the unconscious. The Psycho-analysts claim that their materials justify this distinction and that phenomena of post-hypnotic suggestion, analysis of dreams, hysterical symptoms, etc., warrant the assumption of the unconscious in addition to the subconscious.

B. The second objection against the hypothesis of the unconscious is that it is unnecessary and redundant. The hypothesis of neural connections and excitations is sufficient to explain all mental phenomena, both normal and abnormal. Some of the investigators into abnormal mind have tried to show that neurology gives an easier explanation. Some have also complained that the concept of the unconscious mystifies the subject and is therefore scientifically reprehensible.

But is the neurological explanation better than the explanation by the unconscious? Does neurology really explain?

When we find the mental and the neural so vitally related as in the higher organisms, we must, of course, suppose that neural changes take place along with mental functions. But in the present state of our knowledge we cannot assert more than the existence of such a relation. We know little about the exact nature of this relation. Can we think that explanation of all and sundry mental functions is accomplished by a mere reference to it? In fact, much of what we know about the functional relations of the brain are largely derived from Psychological analysis.

On the other hand, a blind faith in the sufficiency of neurological explanation would render needless, not only the supposition of the unconscious but also psychology itself as an independent science. Mind would be reduced to an epiphenomenon, to mere explosions of cells about which we know so little. Mental events would be shed of their meanings and laws and the stable basis of knowledge and thinking would be shaken; for, logic and all our knowledge being products of unknown cells would be tenable only 'as it were.'

The bias for neurological explanation in Psychology arises from taking the body-mind relation one way only. But why should it not be taken both ways? If neural processes must occur when



mental processes take place, why not mental processes be supposed to occur when neural changes take place? As we can conceive of grades of neural activity, so also we can easily think of levels or kinds of processes or function within the mind, the conscious being only one of such levels. Thus both the concept of the unconscious and the hypotheses of neurology can exist side by side, the difference between them being one of standpoints of explanation.

From the practical point of view, however, the concept of the unconscious appears to be more advantageous than the neural hypothesis. It has suggested new problems, started new lines of investigation and has led to the restatement of many old problems from a new point of view. It may be further claimed that the concept has constituted the basis of practical methods of bringing the working of the human mind under partial control and thereby has added to the conquests of man over Nature. In view of so many advantages, the Psychologists of the unconscious may, no doubt, say that their hypothesis has better claims for consideration than the alternative hypotheses of neural excitation or the soul, either of which in the long span of its life in the history of Psychology has proved rather barren for psychological advancement.

To conclude, I would say that neither the reasons for the indifference of academic Psychology to the hypothesis of the unconscious are fundamental nor the usual objections against it conclusive. It seems that it has proved itself useful and should therefore be more seriously considered and examined than at present.

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# SYMPOSIA

ON

(1) UNIVERSALS.

(2) THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS.



## THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSALS

BY

J. A. CHADWICK.

Man is a generalizing animal. Human thought cannot easily or for long be deflected from its search after the general principle embodied in this, that and the other special case, after the reconciling common nature hidden beneath diverse and various masks of particularity. Some, following Plato, will see in this a re-ascent of the soul to its own native region, a manifestation of man's homing instinct. Others may prefer a different diagnosis; they may speak of a curious restlessness, a kind of inverted homesickness that draws the mind out of itself towards the unfamiliar and the difficult. All are agreed, no doubt, as to the need for controlling this expansive tendency of our nature; the experimental technique and inductive methods of natural science are devised for no other end. For the proper tending of the tree of knowledge severe pruning of certain of its more exuberant shoots will be required. But the sacrifice of one shoot is always made to encourage the growth of others of a better quality or in a more favourable position. And for this to happen the roots must flourish and strike deep.

The expansive, universalizing tendency is one root for the life of our knowledge. In his "Principles of Logic" Bradley vividly depicts a certain process of thought lying at the base of all our reasoning. "On its positive side," he says, "you may state it as 'I must so because I will *some how*.' The striving for perfection, the desire of the mind for an infinite totality, is indeed the impulse which moves our intellect to appropriate everything from which it is not forced off."

Now to speak of an expansive, generalizing tendency might seem to suggest a starting point wholly narrowed down and confined to the particular. However, such a supposition would not be justifiable. We only grasp the universal in virtue of having all along possessed it—in some shape or other. Let us consider, for a moment, the more primitive levels of experience. Even at these rudimentary stages, experience—in its cognitive aspect—is a Unity in Duality—presented object plus affected subject; for, as Ward has put the matter, “To be a subject at all is to be confronted by an Other as object.” Moreover, in order of temporal development, the complete act of knowing is fundamental and is prior to any relatively separate consideration of mere concepts isolated by analysis from a concrete context (or, as modern logical treatises commonly express it, the concept is a secondary product and what has to be treated first is the judgment—where “judging” must be supposed to mean, not just holding an opinion, but really knowing some fact, or actually apprehending some truth). What we are here discussing is important, not merely from the point of view of genetic psychology, but also from an epistemological standpoint. And we have to recognize that some sort of contact with an objective reality (however obscurely it may be present, and in however rudimentary a form) is implicit from the earliest stages. At every stage there is the feeling of “something *there*,” a bit of existence which is no bare, abstractly conceived entity, but an actual concrete objective existence. What would otherwise have been an empty colourless entity (possessing nothing over and above the mere *form* of existence) is filled and clothed and coloured by various specific and determinate characteristics; the further we drop down the scale in the direction of the more primitive levels of experience, the more vaguely and imperfectly will these characteristics be apprehended and mutually distinguished. But from modern mathematicians we have learnt that successive approximations towards zero (or any other limit) can be taken, and that all the same we may never reach zero itself however far we proceed. So, in this case, we may suppose that, if we could retrace the steps of our mental evolution and observe “shades of the prison-house begin to close” upon our dwindling mind, we should find the

light of the universal losing its clearness as we receded into the past ; we should find continually diminishing brightness ; but we could never actually arrive at a final stage from which the light had altogether departed. No such final stage could be conceived as belonging to the actual process of our mental development ; rather it would correspond to the Absolute Zero of the Physicist, since it would involve complete cessation from psychical development and cognitive activity.

Having, then, agreed that " To be a subject at all is to be confronted by an Other as object," we can further determine what it is that we mean by an " object " in this connection. Far from being a bare isolated particular and nothing further, an object is a genuine sample of concrete Actuality ; it is a fully rounded-out chunk hewn from the solid rock of Objective Fact. So, instead of talking about the experient self as aware of an object, it may be better to describe the self as being aware that so-and-so is the case (where what is the case will sometimes be given the name of ' a truth apprehended by the mind,' but will in other cases be more naturally designated ' a fact immediately concerned about the existent ').

At any of the less advanced stages in experience the knowing subject will only be vaguely and imperfectly grasping the universal aspect of its object. So much can be gathered from Bradley's warning to the effect that : " Thought follows the line of the least resistance ; but it knows nothing of resistance and nothing of other lines, and it does not know that it is even thinking. . . . What is certain is that at the beginning of progress the intellect is subordinate, and that afterwards it becomes at least partially free. From the first it is a function of undeveloped inference which enlarges the given by ideal suggestions. The selection of these suggestions begins with being practical. There is, so to speak, no attention but appetite. But gradually the interest becomes more remote. It is held to appetite by a longer chain of links. And it possesses at last, not a mere activity, but an end of its own. When this is accomplished the reason is emancipated ; and the history of the intellect would recount the setting free of that ideal function which was present from the first. . . . Universals are

what operate in the very lowest minds. We may say the line of least resistance is too narrow for facts, and that in passing they are stripped and thinned down to generals. But, however we phrase it, the result remains that from the first what works is the universal."

The words of Bradley, which have just been quoted, also indicate the part played by selection on the part of the experient or self. Out of the totality of the universal aspects in material that is available as a possible 'object,' the self only selects a few partial elements; and at first such selection will be determined almost wholly by immediate practical needs, though at more advanced stages of development remoter intellectual interests and curiosities become more prominent. The self may of course be more or less explicitly aware that additional elements could be added to the object under consideration, that the object of which there is awareness, here and now, is merely a fragment torn from a wider context. At the same time the *unity* of the object that the self is aware of, on any given occasion, should not be lost sight of. Though it is true that we have all along possessed the universal in some shape or other, this does not mean that at any stage there are two separate items—first the universal in all its purity and aloofness; secondly, a something else which is not the universal and which can be treated of quite separately under the title of "the particular." All that we ever have is the particularized universal. The universal is to be found nowhere except as informing this, that, and the other particular. Nor is it any more possible to come upon a mere particular in isolation from the universal; we might say that the particular is never found dark and opaque, but always as a translucent vessel containing the glow of the universal and only visible to us because of the light of the universal shining through.

At all costs we must avoid severing this peculiarly intimate union of Universal and Particular, as together forming a Two-in-One. The all-important point is this: that the actual concrete fact consists in the universal being embodied in the particular, in the particular being permeated through and through by the universal. In our anxiety to stress the intimacy of their mutual

connection we may lapse into language which suggests some third entity or link falling outside both and binding the two together. But that would commit us to an endless regress, since we should then have to introduce fresh links between the first link and the two terms it was originally trying to unite, and so on *ad infinitum*.

So, though the actual concrete fact is essentially just this peculiarly close union of particular and universal, the unitedness of the two is not to be regarded as somehow making a third constituent factor alongside the other two. Just as two semi-circles by being fitted together make up exactly one complete circle, so the particular and the universal, by each completing the other, make up the fully rounded-out actuality. And the way in which their union is effected is altogether unique and peculiar to themselves.

It is just this uniqueness that makes it so difficult to express in intelligible language what is the true state of the case (or what may be supposed, on one possible view, to be the state of the case). Another difficulty perhaps arises out of the extreme pervasiveness of the subject under discussion—it is so ubiquitous, one can never, so to speak, get away from it and compare its presence with its absence; for it enters into every thought, every act of knowing. And a third difficulty is created by our habit of thinking with spatial images, of translating into spatial metaphors whatever our intellect has to deal with. Thus we are apt to picture the universal and the particular as two solid volumes placed in contact with one another or the one enclosing the other like a box. And this is misleading in at least two respects.

In the first place, two solids will both belong to a single homogeneous *kind* of being, or (in other words) will come within the same general category. Universal and Particular, on the other hand, are markedly heterogeneous; indeed it might even be said that, just because of their peculiar disparateness, they are capable of entering as reciprocally complementary factors into the unity of concrete fact.

In the second place, even apart from the entire sameness in nature of two solid volumes, the spatial relation which subsists between them and joins them together may turn out to be a highly unsatisfactory standard of comparison when we have to consider



the universal in regard to the particular and the particular in regard to the universal. For in the latter case a single concrete unity is, on analysis, observed to diverge in two directions—that of the universal and that of the particular. But in the case of two spatial volumes there is rather a synthesis out of pre-existing parts which were (comparatively speaking) complete and mutually independent of one another ; or, at all events, the situation is quite as legitimately described in terms of synthesis as in terms of analysis.

Concrete fact, we have said, discloses itself under the two-fold guise of Universal and Particular. Universal and Particular are the reciprocally complementary factors which analysis yields ; each of these may be said to complete itself by union with the other to constitute the fully actual fact. The next question to be asked will be : “ What are the respective functions of the universal and the particular within the structural unity of the fact, how exactly do they complete one another ? ” As a reply to this question, one can bring forward Kant’s well-known saying “ Percepts without concepts are blind, concepts without percepts are empty.” Of course, this sort of mutual inter-dependence is apt to make any attempt at explanation seem circular ; for example, in connection with perception on the one side and Kant’s “ categories of the understanding ” on the other, Caird remarks that :—“ The categories, which are conceptions of objects in general, are declared to be referred to objects only through perception, while it is just these very conceptions which make us conceive perceptions as objective, *i.e.*, as representative of a reality more permanent than themselves.”

While emphasizing the close inward unity (one might almost say inter-penetration and fusion) of universal and particular as going to make up the concrete fact, we must not forget that the one is not the other. Thus Croce has said : “ The concept is the universal in relation to the representations, and is not exhausted in any one of them ; but since the world of knowledge is the world of representations, the concept, if it were not in the representations, would not be anywhere : it would be in *another* world, which cannot be thought, and therefore is not. Its transcendence, there-

fore, is also immanence." Further, Croce is careful to point out that "There is no middle term between the individual and the universal: either there is the single or there is the whole, into which that single enters with all the singles."

However, in this last sentence of Croce's a very doubtful assumption is apparently being made. For it seems to be taken for granted that what is a single universal must, from its very nature, be manifested in a plurality of particulars. Now what is there to prevent a universal from being particularized once only, and never again or elsewhere? Whether this ever actually happens or not will, no doubt, be a question to be answered on empirical grounds; but surely this is not a point which can simply be settled *a priori*. In the second volume of his work entitled "Statement and Inference" Cook Wilson has recorded his considered verdict as follows:—

"What we call the universal is something of such a nature that because of this nature it can be in a variety of particulars. It is not necessary that it should be in more than one, and its nature is not constituted by being in a plurality. It is what it is not because it is in a plurality; it can be in a plurality because it is what it is."

Our treatment of universals so far has mainly dealt with their capacity for being made the basis of a classification. Man is a classifying animal; hence we need not waste time in defending this method of approaching the topic. But we may also have to recognize that man is a time-defeating animal and that he is a progressively social animal; that man is, furthermore, a meta-physical animal; and, lastly, that he is an animal inspired by ideals. Before touching on these further aspects of our question we shall do well to consider rather closely the assertion so often met with that the universal is in each one of its particulars but is not exhausted in any one of them. If this means no more than that the universal is not identical with any one particular or any set of particulars, then the assertion is an undeniable, though a somewhat trivial, truth. For clearly the entire totality of particulars embodying a given universal will not be that universal; still less

will any single one of those particulars. Yet one can hold that, in another sense, the universal *will be* exhausted in each single one of its particulars. For, however few or however many of these particulars we have, each one has got to be a particularization of that universal; the nature of the general, of the universal, is to be present undivided in each particularization. To some thinkers this talk about a single undivided entity which (in so far as it is in space and time at all) is capable of being at many times and many places, and even at many places simultaneously, has sounded altogether absurd. Perhaps it was partly as a means of escaping this apparent absurdity that many writers were led to distinguish 'red of such-and-such a shade' (to take a definite example) from what they called 'particular instances of that shade;' these 'particular instances of such-and-such a shade of red' being described as qualities inhering in the red-coloured particulars in question. The outcome of this line of thought is as follows: Let there be several specimens of a flower, all exactly the same in colour—a red colour, we will suppose. Then these several specimens will be held to supply, not only several distinct particulars having red as a colour-quality, but also as many distinct 'particular instances of this shade of red;' for each 'particular instance' of the shade is held to be a quality inhering in one and only one particular. Thus, if A and B are two of these particulars and are admittedly of precisely the same determinate shade of red, we shall be told that "the redness of A" is one quality, which does not belong to B, while there is another quality—"the redness of B"—which does not belong to A.

Any proper criticism of this assumption of 'particular instances' would involve a lengthy and intricate discussion. Let us therefore content ourselves with one observation. The difficulty or supposed difficulty, arose out of the relation of the *one* universal to spatial and temporal *multiplicity*. The assumption that, over and above the universal as such and the particulars as such, there are 'particular instances of the universal' leaves each such 'particular instance' connected or associated with one single corresponding place and time; and the universal as such will presumably be said to be nowhere and at no time. But 'Occam's razor' discourages

the introduction of a third intermediary over and above the particular as such and the universal as such. Moreover, the relation between the universal as such (for example, such-and-such a determinate shade of red) and a 'particular instance' of that universal is left full of obscurities and difficulties. And lastly, is it not preferable to keep our universal fully occupied with the duty of being in many places and at many times, so that it may not be tempted to wander away to heaven and become hypostasized as a self-sufficing Platonic Idea or Form? After all, a failure to be in two or more places simultaneously may be a disability peculiar to particulars. And further, one can distinguish the direct immediate way in which a particular is 'at' a place and time from the less direct, less primary way in which a universal is 'at' a place and a time—a universal's relation to space and time being mediated by the particulars it happens to be embodied in.

In the sense that it is not so closely imprisoned in time and space and that it may involve itself in many different places and dates, a universal is aptly styled "eternal and immutable." For it does, in the manner that has just been indicated, transcend mere temporal passage and the narrow bounds of the entire spatio-temporal system. Nor is this feature in the universal of concern only to the poet or religious mystic. Rather it may be said to be of fundamental importance in our everyday life, both in regard to our individual personalities and in regard to our common social life; the second of these two points can be placed under the heading "Man is a progressively social animal," while the first may perhaps be included under the summary "Man is a time-defeating animal."

To begin with the first point, the psychologist will remind us that the recurrence of like situations is essential to any advance in experience. Repeated cycles of similar occurrences form the basis for our attitudes of expectation, our habitual anticipation of the future. Indeed, one definition of 'the specious present' (due to A. N. Whitehead) is "The vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation." On memory itself, its importance for our conscious sense of personal identity, and its dependence on Laws of Association it is needless to dwell; the fundamental rôle played by resem-

blance and contrast, by completing a whole context *similar* to one previously experienced, will be sufficiently obvious.

And the other point, involving communication and co-operation with other human beings, will also stand out clearly without much further explanation. It is frequently assumed that, when you look at a cloud and I look at that same cloud at the same time, the particular entering into the fact of which you are immediately and primarily aware in the first instance is private to you and to your experience; thus I shall have a corresponding particular which will not be numerically one and the same as your particular, though (under normal circumstances) it will be qualitatively similar. Introspection may provide a still more convincing example; it seems fairly certain that one person's mental acts, states of feeling, etc., will not be identical with any other person's mental acts, states of feeling, etc. Thus it would be impossible for us to interpret one another's thoughts and feelings and motives if we did not proceed on the basis of analogy with our own subjective mental history. But to employ analogy with our own private experience must mean that we discriminate within the concrete reality of our experience an aspect which not merely has the nature of a universal but which is, further, a universal held to be particularized in the experience of other people also.

Moreover, you can make up a narrative that will be intelligible to another person, you can describe your experiences to him, only by resorting to general terms. The Universal is the pass-word admitting us into a common social life. Now the extent to which our knowledge of an objective order of reality depends on our being, not isolated individuals, but members of a wider society will not be seriously challenged at the present day. A private individual left entirely to his own devices (growing up, let us suppose, in isolation on a desert island) would only attain to a very meagre, fragmentary and incoherent view of the world. In modern philosophy the importance of mutual intercourse between human beings has received very full and explicit recognition. Thus Ward, in his book "The Realm of Ends," maintains that the individual members of society "by intersubjective intercourse attain to the trans-subjective or truly objective, both in knowledge and in ac-

tion." But in the previous sentences Ward has been expounding the doctrine of an 'Objective Mind'; he has been considering the view that "Through this objective mind pervading all its members, and not through any infusion from without, each one in being social becomes human." This same view is actually accepted by Bosanquet, who declares that "What really thinks is something more than any thinking act of ours." This view, then, is not content with maintaining that there is a common objective reality known by all men; it further insists that what knows this common objective reality likewise transcends the merely private subjective limitations of finite individual minds. And, no doubt, for a Theory of Knowledge which requires the knowing subject to be ultimately identical with the object known, no other final view is possible. Yet by some of the rival, alternative epistemological theories this whole notion of 'Objective Mind' will be sharply challenged.

Without entering into this controversy we may note that the existence of some sort of "Social Whole" is no more open to question than is the existence of a Self which somehow binds into a unity its various fleeting perceptions, feelings, volitions, etc. It is, of course, merely the detailed characteristics of the Social Whole or of the Self that are subject to controversy. One view as to their precise nature is that they are 'Concrete Universals.'

As applied to the Social Whole this view (or one form of this view) can be expressed in such statements as:—"To society belongs the objective mind that is at once immanent in, and dominant over its several members, who thereby attain to self-consciousness and think and act as rational persons." That the Social Whole is regarded as *immanent in* each of its individual members will undoubtedly be one feature suggesting certain analogies to the universal (understood in the sense in which we have hitherto been using that term). But (in the more developed and differentiated societies, at any rate) the Social Whole is most emphatically *not immanent in the same sense in each member* (in executive officials and judicial officials, let us say, or manual worker and abstract thinker). On the other hand we have found no conclusive reason for regarding such-and-such a determinate shade of red as imma-

ment in its various particulars in a correspondingly various number of ways ; all the distinctness required seems to come from the side of the particulars themselves, the redness being the same in each.

Again, if we turn to the Self we unquestionably find that in some sense it is a One, while the various successive phases of its mental history constitute a Many. We further find that the phases in its history are limited to definite portions of time and arise and pass away, whereas the Self in some sense transcends the passage of time and the mutations that take place in time. But no more than in the case of the Social Whole can we regard the One which is the Self as immanent in each of its successive phases in the same sense (alike in childhood and in maturity, say). In order to describe either a Self or a Social Whole we seem to require the notion of an ' Organism ' ; and by an ' Organism ' we must here understand a system of parts which manifests, as a whole, a unity which none of the parts could manifest separately. Now, quite irrespective of our various and conflicting views, we might all agree to use the phrase " Concrete Universal " as a synonym for ' Organism,' interpreted in the above sense. But why should writers who make use of this notion of the Concrete Universal suppose that those who have to deal with the ' abstract universal ' are under some strange misapprehension, and are, in a sadly muddled and mistaken way, trying to turn a lock which is only fitted by the Concrete Universal?

A partial answer perhaps can be found in Aristotle's doctrine that the soul is the Form of the body. In the live flesh-and-blood man Aristotle distinguished the particular and the universal, identifying the former with the merely passive and receptive material structure, while regarding the active functioning of the structure as Form or Universal. Hence, in a general way, one might expect a tendency among subsequent philosophers to equate the Soul or Self with a universal. But, more specifically, there are two other features of the Aristotelian " Form," which are inextricably intertwined with its strictly logical status of universal. In the first place, ' Man is a metaphysical animal,' and Aristotle's ' Form,' like Plato's ' Idea,' approximates towards a noumenal status, thereby degrading the particular to the rank of mere phenomenal appearance. In the second place, ' Man is an animal inspired by

ideals,' and the Aristotelian 'Form,' like the Platonic 'Idea,' to some extent, assumes the rôle of an end not yet fully attained and incapable of perfectly complete realization on earth. Let us look at each of these two features a little more closely.

Man has a metaphysical craving for some fully actual and substantial cause, something essential and unvarying which nevertheless provides the ground for, and actively determines the fluctuating unstable world of sense. Some such function seems to have been ascribed by Plato to his supersensible world of Ideas; and, again, by Aristotle, to his Form as something not simply potential or inert but fully actualized and endowed with formative activity. In this vein we find Bosanquet saying: "Rose in the abstract does not exist. But it is a concrete universal which has power, in the context of the real world to which we refer it, to dictate the epoch, place and quantity of its individual embodiment." Yet Spinoza refused to accept the Form or Universal whiteness (say) as an actual causal explanation of this or that white object; he makes the following uncompromising assertion:—"Will in general differs from this or that particular volition in the same way as whiteness differs from this or that white object, or humanity from this or that man. It is, therefore, as impossible to conceive that will is the cause of a given volition, as to conceive that humanity is the cause of Peter and Paul."

The other feature in the Aristotelian 'Form' was, as we saw, connected with Value and Purpose. The more and more complete expression of Form in its material medium, the increasing dominance of Form over Matter was *ipso facto* regarded as a realization of the Good.

Here again we seem to find a philosophical conception which has played a considerable part in determining the content of that complex product, the Concrete Universal. Some critics of the Concrete Universal will question the legitimacy of thus blending together so many conceptions which may in fact turn out to be mutually incompatible. Why, for example, should a more effectively organized social group necessarily be endowed with a higher degree of Intrinsic Value? Is there not a danger here of



confounding together the "What is" and the "What ought to be?"

Again, is it by any means certain that teleological conceptions are applicable in all situations? The following passage from Bosanquet at least suggests that there may be cases where the embodiment of a universal has nothing to do with the achievement of an End :—

"The purpose or final cause for which we make a microscopic lens is to combine magnifying power with light and definition, and from this purpose by help of further judgments dealing with optical and mechanical truths the physical attributes of a good lens may be constructed. But in dealing with things not made for a known purpose we must fall back on the idea that the thing discharges an actual function, or at least looks as if it had a function, which must be taken as immanent and identified with the thing in its concreteness."

At least where we are dealing with the 'Abstract Universal' the assumption of some deep-seated connection with Ends and Intrinsic Values will have to undergo a careful and critical examination. Similarly we have suggested that the antithesis Universal-Particular should not rashly be linked up with the antithesis of underlying reality to phenomenal appearance. And we have tried to indicate the fundamental logical status of the Particular and the Universal, purified as far as possible from interesting but more dubious accretions.

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## UNIVERSALS

BY

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An analysis of experience would seem to reveal two aspects as constitutive of it, that of *existentiality*, consisting for us, ordinary human beings, in a spatial and temporal manifestation, and that of *content*, which goes beyond such manifestation, and is often considered irrespective of such manifestation. Experience that is full and rich comes in a *here* and *now*, but also passes beyond the *here* and *now*. If the former aspect were absent, experience would be abstract: if the latter were absent, it would be limited and narrow. Properly speaking, there could be no experience limited to a point of space or time any more than there can be one which has no space-time bearings at all. One could in a rough way identify the two aspects with the *that* and the *what* of experience, to adopt a distinction made famous by Bradley. These are distinguishable but not separate aspects, for either without the other is inconceivable and unmeaning.

It has to be recognised, however, that the two aspects do not come to us fully reconciled in finite experience. Each tends to out-run and exceed the other. What does exist is not as meaningful or beautiful or worthy as it might be. On the other hand, our ideals tend to remain but ideals realised in a very imperfect degree in concrete experience. Existence does not always coincide with value, however value may be conceived—whether as Truth or Beauty or Goodness. The ideals are universal but they seem to gain their universality at the expense of concreteness, while what exists, though concrete in a measure, yet lacks the width and the richness of the universal.

The problem is even more clearly presented in the notion of the class-concept and the particular. The former, it is now recog-

nised, has not less intensional content than the latter, though that content may be less definite ; but its extension, though wider than that of the particular, yet relates only to *possibles*, not to *actuals* ; and actuality is an important aspect of concrete experience. The bare particular without any content is a myth. If we try to narrow down the content without excluding it altogether we get to a stage when we have a minimum of content, but with that we have lost the aspects of width and richness. To use the illustration of Dr. Norman Smith, we have a concept like the " New Model Ford Car " which suggests only endless re-duplications of type. Such a concept may have its practical advantages in certain contexts, but it inevitably misses all richness of content.

The problem, thus, is to grasp that richness together with the other. This is impossible so long as existentiality seems confined to the bare particular, and content to the bare universal. It is evident on the simplest analysis that the two aspects are mutually dependent ; but to assert such dependence is not to make it intelligible. Similes such as that of the light and the translucent globe through which it shines, are not of much real help. If the globe itself be not of the nature of light, how does it come to share the nature of something foreign to itself? Why does it not cut off the light as any opaque substance would? If it is partly of the nature of light, how does that part happen to subsist with another part of a contradictory nature and yet constitute one thing? It might be simpler (would it not?) to say that everything that is at all (and not merely an illusory appearance) is, in the words of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, but Brahman, is but light? Would it not at least be more honest to say that the problem defies a perfectly intelligible solution?

To those to whom the thorough-going scepticism of the last alternative is impossible for any reason, the only solution would seem to lie in identifying, in the end, the *that* with the *what*, the particular with the universal, in a final harmony of existence and content called the Absolute. That there is such an ultimate (not temporally ultimate) harmony is an inevitable pre-supposition of thought, as otherwise, the Absolutist Philosopher at least, can see nothing in thought but an endless process of self-stulti-

fication. It may be objected that if the *that* and the *what* are reconciled in the Absolute, the thinking process which seeks to reconcile them would be futile. While it must be confessed that we do not know how the supra-temporal reconciliation yet allows of the temporal attempts at reconciliation, it should also be recognised that in the absence of such a reconciliation in the Absolute, thinking would be not merely futile but impossible. The Absolutist is still a sceptic, though he refuses to be content with bare scepticism.

The Absolute exists, though not in Space and Time, for Space and Time are conceived as appearances thereof. Its universality is gained not by abstracting from the *here* and *now* but by including and transcending them. It is universal in that nothing falls outside of it. It is concrete in that its content is eternally realised and that its realisation has not to be sought outside of it. It is individual in that it supervenes on, and controls all else. Individuality does not signify, primarily, repellent uniqueness; it signifies rather dominance over all other elements and impulses. In so far as the dominance is complete, there can be no disruption from within. The absence of alien disrupting elements constitutes uniqueness; such an individual cannot be duplicated from without. Popular usage identifies the individual with the particular, but this does violence to its own realisation of the essential nature of individuality. The Absolute is thus both the True Individual and the Concrete Universal.

To this Concrete Universal there are many imperfect approximations in finite experience. These are our universals (in the plural), the defective appearance of the one Universal—the self-identical subject which reveals itself in the particulars of our experience. The so-called abstract universal, *e.g.*, the class-concept, is one of the universals just mentioned; being an imperfect appearance it is endowed with a degree of reality though it is not wholly real. It is not helpful to recognise, as Dr. Norman Smith does, two classes—the identical and the recurrent types of universals. He himself notes that one of these is the more fundamental of the two. When, further, it appears that the identical may be erroneously, *i.e.*, inadequately conceived as the barely

recurrent, the former would seem to be in a position to account both for itself and the other alleged type. That being the case, the recognition of the recurrent type of universal is ruled out by the law of parsimony. The other possibility of the recurrent being the only type of universal will not bear investigation, for the derivation of the identical from the recurrent is less feasible of explanation.

The matter may be illustrated with reference to the class-concept "humanity." Does this include French-manity too, the intension being rather vague, or does it exclude the various specifications, and content itself with signifying the property of being a rational biped? The Absolutist with his notion of the universal as concrete, as revealing itself in a multiplicity of particular forms, would adopt the former view. Dr. Norman Smith would have it that the universal is an abstract type, the particular, in each case, being cognised *as of that type*. The type is a relational schema. From this notion of a schema which qualifies every particular, the notion of a subject identical in the midst of differences could never be evolved. Each particular, on this view, is the abstract universal, *plus* something; if the addition makes any difference at all, each particular must be different from every other; and each particular moment of the self would also be different from every other. But if there is any such thing as identity of the self, it cannot be a somewhat added on to, or qualifying the particular moments, but a whole manifesting itself in particular ways at particular times. While such a notion cannot be evolved out of that of the abstract universal, the latter may well be derived by abstraction from the notion of a self-identical whole. We have only to forget the full implications of the universal,—a process which is easy because of the vagueness of the implications of the class-concept—and we have a relational schema left. It is not possible therefore to maintain that the universal considered as a relational system is more fundamental than the self-identical universal.

Nor is it possible to explain the genesis of the abstract universal, as conceived by Dr. Norman Smith. The process of abstraction consisting in discarding certain qualities as unessential is

neither as easy nor as intelligible as it looks. What are the qualities to be discarded in any case? Any attempt to distinguish essential from accidental qualities is misleading in the case of the class-concept. 'Having red hair' may be an accidental attribute of A or B or C, but in the case of a human being, it is not accidental in the same sense. If possessing 'hair' is a necessary property of human beings, possessing 'red hair' is also a necessary property, though not in the same degree. Humanity does not mean for us possession of hair without any colour, but possession of hair which may be any one of a number of different colours—red or black or gray or gold. Lack of definiteness as to the colour is no justification for leaving it out. And the higher we go, the less the justification for discarding any qualities as non-essential. In the last resort, everything is an attribute of the fully concrete universal—the Absolute. Hence it is that the Absolute is said to create, sustain and destroy the universe.

If we try to get at the Universal by a process of abstraction how do we begin and where do we stop? We may stop short with the particular, not starting on the process at all; or if we do start discarding any qualities, we shall have to stop only at the Absolute, negatively conceived as not this, not that. To say that we discard whatever we are not interested in at the moment, would be frankly to adopt Nominalism. If the universal is to be endowed with any higher degree of reality than is conceded to it by the Nominalists, we start on a process which cannot stop short of the negative conception of the Absolute. To attempt to get at the abstract universal in any other way involves a process of begging the question, as is well pointed out by the *Khaṇḍanakāra* in the discussion of the category of *sāmānya*; for, we cannot limit the process of abstraction except in the light of what we want to limit it to; and this implies a prior knowledge of the very universal we are trying to arrive at.

Nor can the abstract universal serve any purpose. It is not what is identical in time (that being another type of universal, according to Dr. Norman Smith); and it is not an event in time. Being out of time, how is it realised as the *recurrent*? Has it any existence beyond the *as-suchness* with which the particular is

cognised? The abstract universal thus conceived is neither useful nor adequate. Of the Absolute at least it may be said that though not in time, Time is within it. The same claim cannot be made for a plurality of abstract universals.

The difficulties in the way of Absolutism are real enough. Though it requires nothing less than omniscience to declare what the Absolute can or cannot do, yet, in the light of reason, it is possible and legitimate to declare that this relational world of particulars cannot as such be Absolute. Relationship and particularity have, in the last resort, to be confessed to be appearances. The doctrine that they are manifestations of the Concrete Universal possesses a high degree of truth, a far higher degree than any pluralistic hypothesis. But the Absolute proper transcends even this. In the words of Saṅkara : “ *Tatra kiñcit pariṇāminītyam yasmin vikriyamāṇe’pi tadeva idam iti buddhir na vīhanyate, yathā pṛthivyādi jagannityatra-cādinām, yathā ca Sāṅkhyānām guṇāh....Idam tu pāramārthikam, kūṭasthanītyam, vyomavat sarvavyāpi, sarvavikriyārahitam, nityatṛiptam, niravayavam, svayamjyotiḥśrābhāvam.*” (Comm. I, 1, 4.)

It cannot be said that since from this ultimate point of view the Concrete Universal too is but an appearance, the doctrine pertaining thereto has no higher claim to truth. For, within the relative realm there are degrees of truth; and Reality being one, the doctrine of unity even in the Concrete Universal is higher than any doctrine of plurality. Without a realisation of unity, at least as the Concrete Universal, there cannot come about the realisation of the Absolute. Hence it is that *pariṇāmavāda* has been held to be a guide to the *vivartavāda*. The doctrine of the Concrete Universal leads us to the Absolute that is neither Individual nor Universal, neither Concrete nor Abstract because it transcends all such distinctions, not because it falls below or outside of them :

*Vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhumih*

*Vedāntavāde pariṇāmavādāḥ ।*

*Vyavasthite’smin pariṇāmavāde*

*Svayam samāyāti vivartavādāḥ ॥*

## ON THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS

BY

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In appearing in the rôle of a critic of the opener of the symposium on the concept of Progress I have had to enter the lists at a two-fold disadvantage. First, owing to some alteration in the Congress programme I have had to undo all that I had written out as my view on progress as the pre-arranged opener of the debate ; and secondly, I have had to make impromptu observations on what the actual opener has expressed as his own theory of progress. Reminding my audience of these two drawbacks in my position, I now enter upon my criticism of the opener's proposition.

But before doing so it is of the utmost importance for me also to remind my hearers that a great many of our concepts have suffered from ambiguity resulting from confusion between a question of fact and a question of interpretation, between things and events in their nude actuality and the unbridled subjective colouring which is thrown over them by our habits of traditional thoughts, imagination and temperament. On the one side, there is the tendency of our mind to cling to our old and convenient ways of thinking and glibly to talk about things which require no serious searching into matters of fact,; on the other, there is a perceptible growth of an alleged sceptical survey of facts ready to face the unpleasantness against conservative ways of thinking. And thanks to the genius of William James who has, for the first time, successfully warned the philosophic world against those ' tender-minded ' absolutists who palm off the universe as a rounded whole, no matter whatever the glaring facts of the empirical world



reveal to the contrary. And such a warning has opened up an outlook, sceptical you may call it, but not without real philosophical importance.

A careful student of the modern currents of philosophy will observe that they can be broadly classed under two heads : some coming under the head of Scientific Philosophy, others under that of Religious Philosophy. Those philosophers may be said to belong to the School of Religious Philosophy who start with God, in some form or other, as the ultimate principle of the Universe, evolving, sustaining and developing everything from the minutest atom to the enormous mountain, every phenomenon natural, social and psychical with a purpose of his own, thus making up a system of the Universe where every thing and event is in its proper place and function. There are, however, others who belong to the school of Scientific Philosophy and emphasise, on the other side, the facts of the empirical world and endeavour to read them aright in their proper worth with a strictly scientific and logical outlook even at the risk of contradicting, or presenting a diametrically opposite picture to what the absolutists give of their ' block universe.' If one commits oneself to the Religious School of Philosophy, therefore, one is hypnotised into the belief that the whole system of things has been tending towards the fulfilment of the purpose of an intelligent divine principle which so shapes its contents and adjusts its movements as always to make a right move towards the progressive realisation of its own purpose. To him every thing would be in its proper place and function and an all-round progress a reality ; and if there were any thing evil it will be but a disguised good, for the ultimate principle to whose ever progressive life the whole system of things is thought to be tagged on, being in itself good, no evil can proceed from it ; evils are more apparent than real and the world of ours is the best of all possible worlds.

Apparently with predilections in favour of this Religious School of Philosophy outlined above, the opener of the debate has pinned his optimistic faith on the possibility of an all-round progress into which our world has so long run and will continue running for all time to come. His philosophy of progress is based

on the assumption of an ultimate reality which he calls spiritual and divine. Such a reality he describes as creative in the sense that every higher form is a creation by that reality of a situation out of the lower as compared with which it is new and different. He further makes his ultimate principle to be the synthesis of the values or ideals of truth, beauty and goodness, and states that the whole cosmic process is tending towards the realisation of these ideals ; and still further such an ultimate reality is a dynamic principle which renders progress an accomplished fact and but for which progress would have been a fiction. And he concludes that " to be is to live and to live is to progress," and supports his conclusion by his reference to alleged evidences of progress in nature, history and society.

Now one of the many questions which one is tempted to ask, is whether in handling the concept of progress we are to begin from the end, as the opener of the debate has done, or with the beginning ; whether we are to begin with the assumption of an ultimate dynamic spiritual principle and proceed deductively from this assumed principle to the conclusion that the world as a part and parcel of that supposed progressive being is making a steady and continuous advance towards the good, or we are to start with the facts of our experience and then rise inductively to the view whether progress has at all been a reality? If we pledge ourselves to what we have called religious philosophy and begin with a speculative bias in favour of an ultimately synthetic principle in which all things and events are to receive a convenient harmony and synthesis, every movement of things and events whether forward or retrograde is bound to be interpreted as progress. But does not this mean a rehabilitation, in a somewhat modern garb, of the old scholastic theosophy which smells of God in everything? Nor is there sufficient warrant for the assumption of the objective unity of the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness in this alleged spiritual principle towards which the whole system of things is supposed to be endlessly progressing. To speak of the values or the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness as objectively real is to make an equally metaphysical assumption for which there seems to be no plausible justification. The values or value-judgments

can have significance only when they affect us or have relations to human valuers, by way of facilitating the needs of their very being. To give an objective complexion to the values out of relation to humanistic ends is to make them, as it were, so many placards fixed on the firmament which have no concern for the individual beings of this world below, who, however, are the actual evaluators. Values to be of real value for human beings must be the subjective evolutes of the individual centres of consciousness in their transaction with physical and social environment affecting them either for better or for worse. And to think that, as Plato did unwarrantably, values are eternal realities enjoying a transcendent existence but at the same time having some unaccountable relation with the world of experience is simply to hypostatise abstractions. If objectivity in any sense can be attached to values, it can only be done by way of reference to the interests of the individual selves in their intersubjective intercourse in a social whole. What is emphasised here is this that values instead of being objective and eternal categories are the results of action and reaction between individual and social mind and the world outside, by way of the promotion of their psycho-physical needs and interests. "All valuation," says Prof. H. D. Bhattacharyya of Dacca University, "is factual in relation to the self as a state of pleasure or composure but is at the same time projected on to existence as a tertiary quality." (The Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Bombay, p. 444).

It appears then from our point of view that values by reference to which an advance in any department of the universe from one stage to another is to be adjudged a distinct stage in progress are not absolute but only relative, not objective but subjective, subject to change with the change in needs and interests of the psycho-physical life of the self in its relation to not-self. In the light of the above account of the values therefore it is hazardous to pledge that the whole course of the universe has had a smooth and uninterrupted approximation to absolute and universal values as the religious school of philosophy does. The moment one commits oneself to a religious philosophy one is bound hand and foot against combating even illusions and unwarrantable beliefs. To such a

one teleology becomes the spectacles through which one is forced to visualise things despite overwhelming evidences of dysteleology, facts are idealised, and nature deified. A *process* of nature or of mind is read a *progress*,—empirical facts or phenomena which need not have any colouring of human feelings, but which science impartially regards as neutral events of natural history, are supposed to reveal a law of development towards good underlying the universe. Even evolutionism which claims to be a rigidly scientific doctrine formulated as a challenge against theistic philosophy by the acutest votaries of science, has not been spared from being exploited either in its cosmic or biological or social aspect by the Religious School of Philosophy.

The contention that the ultimate principle of the universe is not only dynamic but also creative is but an extension of the same Religious and Mystical Philosophy only in the Bergsonian line of thought. To admit progress as a fact is to have an implicit faith in the dynamic character of the underlying principle of the universe which working out its own realisation effects progress indeed. But since such a faith has the implication of prediction of the goal so that a certain stage in the progress is only an old thing already anticipated, the concept of 'creativeness' has been introduced just in the line of Bergson to indicate that every higher stage in the cosmic process is a new situation, richer in content and greater in complexity than its predecessor so that the higher stage is something new and different from the lower; and it is held in this way that all possible stages of development through which the world of ours has come to be what it is, and those through which it is going to approximate its ever receding destiny, are all linked together into the synthesis or unity of the creative principle. Now it is apparent that in this conception of creative synthesis a compromise is attempted to be made between the absolute idea of Hegel and the *élan vital* of Bergson. But it needs hardly be pointed out that this unnecessary patch-work, this gratuitous introduction of the Bergsonian concept of 'creativeness' into the idea of the ultimate spiritual principle, stands self-condemned in view of the fact that Bergson is a pledged enemy of unity or synthesis, and of the attribute of intelligence in the

ultimate principle, which characterises the Absolute of Religious philosophy. Differentiation or disintegration and not synthesis or unity is, according to him, the law which guides the creative impulse of Duration, which is his ultimate reality. Besides, a careful sifting of facts and phenomena of the world would incline an impartial thinker not so much to the glib and cheap absolutism which presents an all-bright picture of the universe without any hitch or jar, retrogression or declivity, degeneration or pitfall, as to the view of a real throbbing world with all its good and evil, truth and falsity, advance and regress, lapse and regeneration, of a world as it factually is and not as ideally it is rounded to be. We do not, of course, encourage either the Bergsonian or the absolutist view of the universe ; what we encourage we shall try to formulate in the sequel.

In the meanwhile we must urge that the assumption of an absolute creative spiritual principle makes an easy room for its necessary corollary that progress is the very law of the universe. To admit *a priori* that the wheel of the cosmic process is the part of a supposed intelligent creative principle whose nature is progress, is but another way of assuming that progress is the law of the universe, and an attempt has been made to support this affirmation by adding that " if progress is not the law of the universe the concept of progress is simply a fiction with no objective basis," as if a disproof or inadequate proof of progress from facts of experience as far as attainable would be an end to all philosophic speculation, so that a pathetic appeal to the biased and the prejudiced in favour of progress remains to be the only makeshift to fall back upon. But if the basic principle has been found not to bear scrutiny its corollary is bound to meet the same fate. And we can, on this ground, pass over without bestowing much of our thought on it, the law of social progress formulated by Kant, Hegel, Comte and others as a purely mechanical formula for the description of a living, free process of social life which knows no stereotyped and inflexible course to follow. After all that has been said with regard to the general course of the cosmic process, there hardly remains any further necessity of showing that progress is not necessarily the law of life ; and the expression ' to be is to live

and to live is to progress ' sounds like a meaningless platitude without grounding in facts.

Our next point will be to show by reference to the stern facts of the world of science, history, politics, philosophy and religion that the idea of so-called progress, despite overwhelming evidences against it, has worked like a nightmare over the credulous minds of the modern age. Our main concern will be here to refer to those alleged instances of progress with a view to indicating that in themselves they are not sufficient to make one conclude that there has been an uninterrupted advancement, that progress is the very law of existence, that progress is not an accident but a necessity. There might be picked up stray instances here and there at random which might be interpreted from particular angles of vision as indications of progress, but a more careful observer who takes stock of the entire course of events will not be astonished to find that every apparent instance of alleged progress is yoked with a corresponding running down, or as Dr. Freeman puts it, " In history every step in advance has also been a step backwards," or in the language of Dean Inge, " the fruit of the tree of knowledge always draws man from some paradise or other." But the superstition of progress has had such a strong hold upon sophisticated minds that even the historian, the scientist, the philosopher, the political scientist and the theologian, who are expected to have an impartial regard for truth as revealed from the march of events, have all alike been unable to disabuse their minds of this nightmare. Open any authentic work of history written by the nineteenth century historian, and you will find that the burden of his story is that there has been a continuous flow of progress through the Dark Ages up to the present day. If a nation or a religion or a school of art dies, the historian exclaims, " why, it was not worthy to live." The political philosopher, obsessed with the bias for progress is found to declare invariably that what form of government is coming must be right. But every one knows how many forms of government came and went and with what tangible and lasting benefit to the governed except perhaps giving them jealousy, class-war and aggrandisement of the party in power for the time being. So

a student of history who is familiar with cyclical changes and long swings of pendulum will certainly be very cautious in his view of the present state of political affairs. In the language of Dean Inge, "the votaries of progress mistake the flowing tide for the river of eternity, and when the tide turns they are likely to be left stranded like the cork and scraps of sea-weed which mark the high waterline." And it is no wonder, therefore, that democracy which promised relief from autocracy has degenerated into ignorance, low taste and lack of discipline. And are not the nations really governed by some mysterious caucus rather than by the people themselves? Is Socialism, with all its promises for equidistribution of land and wealth, a sufficient improvement upon its rivals in the field of politics and society? Has it really been, and will it ever be, successful to equalise economic, intellectual and social disparities amongst the human kind? And thank God that it has not, to the utter disaster in the social, political and intellectual life of man by its encouragement of sloth, indifference and smothering of the genius, as its inevitable consequences! The economic situation of the present generation is the most appalling of all problems. The proportion between the income and expenditure of the modern man has become so alarmingly discrepant owing to a false standard of living that it has become almost impossible for the present-day middle class man to live a decent, healthy and respectable life with moderate livelihood. And the root of all this economic stress is traceable to exploitation of labour by capitalists, monopoly of traders, competition amongst co-traders, foolish fascination for finery and a craze for false respectability of living even beyond means.

The influence of the superstition of progress on man's philosophical speculation is no less remarkable. The oracle of Hegel, that both the worlds of mind and reality proceed dialectically, so that in the world of thought and philosophy there has been, and will be a continuous synthesis or development as an approximation to, or a realisation of, an infinite self-conscious being, is no longer believed by the philosophic world, and his critics have accused him of teaching that his Absolute first attained full self-consciousness at Berlin in the nineteenth century. Comte with his curious theory

of "the three stages" failed to give us any tangible connexion of his philosophy with the real progress in the thought-world. Apart from this triviality of the Hegelian and Comtean theories of the progress of thought, one would pause to pass a verdict of advancement on the recent tendencies of philosophical speculation seeing that, while there has been a marked accuracy and refinement in the interpretation of the problems of the universe in terms of physics and mathematics and in the absorbing of materials obtained by empirical method, there has grown on the other side a distaste for all that is revealed by intuition. Further many of the most recent standpoints in philosophy are either rehabilitation or distortion of the old ways of thinking.

Nor is it easy to establish in any satisfactory way that there has been real progress in the religion of mankind. Are we prepared to admit that the religious views of the present-day Indians are decidedly superior to ancient types of religion, say, Vedic worship or ancient Buddhism or Jainism? Can we with our hands laid on our heart aver that in the matter of religious purity and sincerity we are a jot better than our so-called barbaric ancestors? Can any Christian or Mahomedan of the present day affirm on oath that he has really advanced in his religious life from the stage in which any of his sincere co-religionists of the past found himself? Coming to the bodily and mental sides of human existence the votaries of progress will find themselves worse off. A steady decline in the physical features, strength and longevity of man can be shown with mathematical exactitude to hold an inverse ratio with the march of time. Let Eugenics, though infant in its career yet bold in its clamours, fancy all possible vagaries of utopian regeneration of human type, but the hard facts of human degeneracy as compared with those of the past generation of human existence will unmistakably point rather to regress than to progress on the physical side. As Dean Inge puts it "On biological grounds there is no reason to expect it. No selection in favour of superior types is now going on; on the contrary civilisation tends now, as always, to weeding out of the best . . . the best hope of stopping this progressive degeneration is in the science of eugenics. But this science is still too



tentative to be made the basis of legislation and we are not yet agreed what we should breed for." The same remarks hold good of the intellectual side of man. Who can make bold to assert that the modern average man is superior to any of the bye-gone days in point of intensity or depth of comprehension, though of course it may be true that the present generation surpasses the past ones only in extensity or breadth of knowledge? Is there anybody amongst us of the present day prepared to assert that he is intellectually superior to Plato or Saṅkara except that he is only an heir to the heritage of accumulated knowledge of his predecessors? And the task of establishing uninterrupted progress seems far harder in the sphere of moral life. Here we can at once press the question whether the modern civilised man behaves better under the same circumstances than his so-called uncivilised ancestors. Was an Athenian of the Socratic ideal less moral than any modern civilised European? Or were the Buddha and his followers lower in the scale of moral rectitude than any person to-day? Sometimes absence of temptation in a particular generation may produce an idea in our mind that it is morally superior to its predecessors, but that only illustrates an old saying "that the devil has a clever trick of pretending to be dead." Think of the lowest depths of atrocities, bloodthirstiness and treachery to which the European nations stooped during the last World War, and consider the opinion of Lord Bryce's commission that the cruelties that the Germans perpetrated in Belgium and France have no counterpart in history within the past three hundred years; and to talk of the League of Nations as a sufficient guarantee against any re-enactment of the atrocious scenes in future is the height of folly, and betrays hopeless ignorance of the cannibalism which lies latent in the so-called civilised nations of the present-day Europe waiting for proper time and place for its hideous orgies.

The nineteenth century Europe marks indeed a marvellous period of scientific discovery and progress contributing to the material comforts of human existence especially by its mechanical inventions. But while, on the one hand, mechanical improvement replaced manual labour, economised time, and brought all possible material comforts within easy reach of man, it has not been without

its drawbacks which have far outbalanced its advantages. A man who would in the past fain undergo the fatigue of walking several miles, has grown in this mechanical age so loath to fatigue that he would even scramble into a tramcar to cover the distance of a mile. The twentieth century man is too impatient of the necessarily late output of manual labour to look into its consequential harms both to himself and to community. We cannot get a better picture of the evil effects of the present mechanical civilisation on man than what is portrayed by the following words of Dr. Freeman: "Mechanism by its reactions on man and his environment is antagonistic to human welfare. It has destroyed industry and replaced it by mere labour; it has degraded and vulgarised the workshopman; it has destroyed social unity and replaced it by social disintegration and class antagonism to an extent which directly threatens civilisation; it has injuriously affected the structural type of society by developing its organisation at the expense of the individual; it has endowed the inferior man with political power which he employs to the common disadvantage by creating political institutions of a socially destructive type; and finally by its reactions on the activities of war it constitutes an agent for the wholesale physical destruction of man and his works and the extinction of human culture. It is thus strictly analogous to those anti-bodies by which the existence of aggregates of the lower organisms is brought to an end." And we supplement his remarks by adding that the worst consequences of mechanised life are that it has been giving us more emissaries of death than heralds of healthy regeneration, nurturing the germs of deadly diseases unknown to humanity and incurable by medical science, and creating unemployment, discontent and unrest to the extent of shaking the very foundation of modern civilisation. And this is perhaps the most intricate dilemma before the world to-day.

It has been claimed that progress always means development from the simpler to the more complex but it remains to be seen whether that is really the case. There are spheres of growth and development which mark decided improvement upon what has gone before, not due to complication but rather to simplification. The old Spencerian conception of evolution that it is always from

homogeneity to heterogeneity has long been exploded by the researches of modern scholars. The truth seems to be that it is not so much complexity as simplicity that marks in most cases real evolution and development, and as Dr. Taylor puts it, in "*Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*," "irrelevant complexity is a mark of imperfect adaptation and its absence may be an indication of a relatively late stage in the evolutionary process." Thus complexity may be regarded as irrelevant and secondary in many cases. In the sphere of biology it is noticed that one of the regular characteristics of the adaptive process in the development of vertebrate skeleton is the reduction of complexity where the complexity would stand in the way of complete adaptation. As an illustration of this we might cite the way in which the original pattern of the five-toed foot has been reduced to greater simplicity in the case of the species like the horse, the ox, birds, etc., where the five-toed foot will be ill adapted to the creature's life. Many rudimentary vestiges of organs which still linger in the human frame indicate how they are on the way to falling off without prejudice to the more and more delicate adaptation of the human organism to the environment required by the ever-increasing needs of life. Social customs, religious rites, fashions of dress and forms of speech have tended more and more to simplification so as to be adapted to the changing walks of civilised life. It needs no elaboration to indicate how the present-day man of society either in the East or in the West has outgrown the cumbrous and uncouth manners of greeting, conversation, etc. The Protestant Christian shrugs his shoulder at the elaborate paraphernalia of the Catholic mode of worship. The modern Hindu has long discarded the superannuated appendages of the old form of religious worship. The manner of dress of to-day shows how foolishly costly and superfluous the garments of the past had been, so that 'back to nature' has already been the cry of the fashionable world. The philologists will corroborate this 'evolution by degeneration' when they state that many of the modern languages of the civilised world are on the way to simplification; for it is held that complexity of language is more a hindrance than a help to the precise expression of thought. And

as a consequence there have been instituted in various parts of the world boards of experts to devise ways and means to effecting simplicity and rational pruning of much that is unnecessary either in spelling or in idioms or in inflexions with a view to increasing facility of retention, reproduction and creating more lasting phonetic effect. The modern English language has emerged from the inflexional Latin and Greek languages after purging of many of the appendages of its parent languages, and has a decided advantage over its cousin modern German which is encumbered with elaborate case system still retained for the noun. America has far out-distanced the United Kingdom in its elision of apparently superfluous letters from most English words. The Bengali language of to-day furnishes the brightest example of the principle of development by degeneration in the linguistic sphere. The recent attempts in Turkey not only to substitute Roman characters in place of her own but also to trim her native language to keep pace with the modern civilised languages in simplicity, supply another instance in point.

After all that we have already stated as to the metaphysical assumption underlying the theory of progress, and dogmatic deductions therefrom of the details, such as the problem of evil sublated in good, of the optimistic interpretation of all natural phenomena, of the objective existence of values and their unity and embodiment in the divine life which is creative and synthetic, drifting the whole universe along the path of continuous felicity ; and also after all that we have stated by a disinterested appeal to facts of empirical existence which speak more cogently about the ethico-emotional neutrality of natural phenomena than of an all-round progressive world, we need hardly adduce any more elaborate grounds for the conviction of my audience as to what my opinion on the problem of progress will be. My method, I repeat, is empirical and inductive rising from particulars of empirical facts to an idea of progress, if it is at all attainable. Deduction in philosophy has done the worst of mischiefs not unknown to students of philosophy. If a logical and scientific approach is to be preferred to a blind, dogmatic one, Idealism or better Religious Idealism with its unwarrantable assumptions and utopian extravagances is but a delu-

sion of the mind which the mind may like to live in, but which runs every moment the risk of dispersion. Even within the fold of Religious Idealists who are professed Progressivists there has been a noticeable flutter of reactionary suspicion as to a universal progress; and Idealists like Pringle-Pattison rest contented with the view that progress is confined to the empirical and temporal world and has no significance as applied to the universe as a whole. He remarks, "From an ultimate metaphysical point of view, it appears to me, our conclusion must be that progress is predicable only of the part which can interact with other parts, and, in such interaction has the nature of the whole to draw upon. It is unintelligible as applied to the whole." (*Idea of God*, p. 383). Dean Inge who confesses that he is "unable to distinguish between philosophy and religion" has the frankness to admit that "the arrogance and absurdity of arguing from the historical progress of humanity—assuming that this can be proved—to progress as a law of the whole universe and of its Maker become more apparent the more we think about them." He goes on to suggest in the same strain the questions: "Is the idea of a *progressus ad infinitum* either thinkable or consoling? How can there be progress in an infinite whole?" "This bastard philosophy," he adds, "so naively anthropocentric and so incompatible with any scientific view of the universe, is intelligible as a by-product of what has been called the age of complacency." (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, pp. 199 to 200).

Now, from our impartial account of the facts of the world of experience and from our review of the Religious Idealism of the advocates of progress, not unrelieved by notes of dissent amongst even some of their own camp, we are in a position to formulate our own opinion on the problem of progress, though of course we are not unaware that progress is one of those ultimate problems in dealing with which one is in constant danger of falling into what Plato called "a bottomless pit of nonsense." A study of facts of our empirical world has sufficiently taught us that every step in advance in any department is counter-balanced by a retrograde step in another, that progress has never been continuous but only *per saltum*. It is not the law of existence either. To be able to

predicate the concept of progress of the universe as a whole presupposes infinity of knowledge on the part of man, which is impossible. Progress, therefore, can always mean an advancement in some spheres of existence with very great limitations. Further the application of the concept of progress within these limited spheres again involves evaluation by the individual or collective mind by its own standards or values which again are subject to constant revision. To take progress as the law of the universe or as rooted in it or as a necessary consequence of an assumed spiritual creative principle is evidently going beyond what human mind can claim to know, and we need hardly repeat that the facts of nature on which progress must be based, must be judged by human standards of value; but unfortunately a great majority of empirical facts do not lend themselves to an interpretation favouring progress. Hence by elimination we are left with an irreducible *minimum* which may be, and in fact is interpretable as evidences of a very limited progress. What we mean to emphasise is this that excepting in the matter of accumulating the intellectual bequests of our predecessors and of the implements and appliances conducive to the promotion of creature comforts, it will be foolhardiness to generalise that there has been a uniform progress. Besides as already pointed out, the standards or values by reference to which progress is to be judged are subject to constant change, being in themselves the emergents out of interaction between self-conscious centres and their external environment always tending to promote or hinder the psycho-physical needs and interests of man. So what might have appeared in some age as a distinct advance upon the other previous to it may be, and in fact has been, appraised as a miserable deterioration from the point of view of another generation with a different standard of judgment. In this way we find in history approbation and rejoice in one particular turn of events side by side with disapprobation and disappointment in another course of happenings. This, of course, should not give any tinge of pessimism to our view-point for we have no incurable bias against what is good and beautiful in nature and society; nor are we anxious to be accredited optimists, pledged to a rosy view of things. Our approach to the problem of progress,

based as it is on the hard facts of nature, has all through been kept clean from the contamination of feeling, as all scientific and philosophical study should be. And such an approach cannot but compel us to remain content with stating, in the light of facts, that there is the mental world and the world of extramental reality, each independent of the other but at the same time entering into a relation of reciprocity to each other so that the mental series goes on along with the extramental series, each having an empirically real relation of interaction with the other, and that the mental series in its interaction with the extramental, adjusts itself with the extramental according to its needs and interests which also emerge from such interaction. And those adjustments of the mental series with the extramental will be interpreted as progress which are most conducive to the promotion of the so emerging needs and interests of the self-conscious centres. To indulge in more than this would be to introduce mysticism whose aim is not to face facts in their true empirical light but always to project over them a supramundane halo too dazzling to the unbiased eye.

It is interesting to note that the trend along which the civilisation of the world has been moving, viz., that it is precipitating from bad to worse conditions of life, replacing sincerity of purpose by sham and hypocrisy, undermining the old solidarity of social relations by engrafting those that are injurious to the social life as a whole, by reducing religion to a mere matter of personal idiosyncrasy, making material prosperity to be the criterion of real aristocracy—all this was anticipated by the Hindu sages in their conception of *Kaliyuga*. And the remedy proposed by them was the development of a cult of *Vakti to Krishna*, i.e., the development of a Theistic Idealism which was expected by them to transform Indian life and to reconstruct the society and religion on a new basis. Such a pious hope has also been entertained by some of the Western Meliorists like William James, James Ward, Dean Inge and others. Dean Inge, for instance, after a note of despair as to the present state of civilisation, has thrown out to us a pious hope by adding that “the time seems ripe for a new birth of religious and spiritual life which may remould society as no less potent force would have the strength to do.” (*Outspoken Essays*,.

Second Series, p. 253). Professor Radhakrishnan in his latest work “*Kalki or the Future of Civilisation*” has re-echoed with his marvellous powers of expression and brilliancy of exposition the same melioristic strain and emphasised that “Religious Idealism seems to be the most hopeful political instrument for peace which the world has ever seen. We cannot reconcile men’s conflicting interests and hopes so long as we take our stand on duties and rights.” And he concludes that the present shortcomings will be removed by the process of increasing dominion of the spirit which has lost its hold upon human mind under the triumphs of scientific progress that has almost completely killed religion. All this is very good so far as it goes; hope is the only prop in the present state of our civilisation for the falling spirit of man. Hope endures life, and is the potent spur to action, and utter lack of hope is the spiritual ruin of man. And here lies the very cornerstone of optimistic Idealism. But even here will not one be allowed the freedom to think that in the last resort hope is but a will-o’-the-wisp receding as one approaches it? Was not this optimistic faith working all through the course of civilisation, and despite its hopeful beckonings has not the world tended to a steady regress until it has found itself in its present condition? Reminding once more my audience that I am no pledged pessimist I would like to add that let this hope in the religious reconstruction continue to be clung to, but perhaps without any tangible effect on that to which the world is really tending.

We cannot conclude our observations on progress without suggesting in more definite terms where the motive force of the limited progress we have spoken of lies. It lies not in immanent universal spiritual reality as the Religious Philosophy assumes but rather in the *human impulse* which goads him to activities favourable to his betterment and felicity. We can name that impulse as constructive in so far as it constructs or creates and does not stop before creating something which is promotive of the psycho-physical needs and interests of man either personal or social. The scientist, for example, confined within the four walls of his laboratory goes on from experiment to experiment even for his whole life with a view to discovering a new theory, not so much because he



consciously realises a full-fledged plan of his work, as because of a vague but constructive impulse of the nature of appetite which goads him to his pursuit which he cannot but make and the result of his constructive impulse is the wondrous discovery. Such has also been the motive force for the painter, for the discoverer of a new continent, for the scientific inventor, and for the religious reformer alike. This is true not only of the individual mind but equally of the group-mind. Not one man but many men at a time or even a race may dedicate their lives to this vague constructive impulse leading to something ameliorating not only to themselves but to the world at large. Such a race we call civilised or progressive. We are led to this view of the motive force of progress by a psychological analysis and not a mystical assumption in which every change or phenomenon is attempted to be explained by a principle of the unseen having no concern for humanity and the concrete everyday world of ours. It is thus the human effort or striving and not the divine intervention that is at the root of all advancement, and this is the psychology of progress. And the instances of human activities destructive of civilisation are also accountable by reference to the human impulse, not constructive or creative in this case, but only destructive. So it is man in his active relations to the world, either constructive or destructive, that has determined, and will determine the movement and direction of civilisation.

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## THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS.

BY

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Progress, as ordinarily understood, means a change from the worse for the better. In other words, it is an advance in a desirable direction. Thus it presupposes change and there can be no change unless temporal process is real. Further the passage from the earlier to the later stages can be judged as progress only with reference to a standard. The advance consists in a greater approximation to some end or ideal taken as desirable. Therefore the Concept of Progress implies change and temporal process and also an end or ideal towards which the movement is directed.

A purely mechanical process cannot be conceived as progressing as the later stages are simply the necessary resultants of the earlier ones. There is no evolution of the higher from the lower. So anything that changes in a mechanical manner cannot be said to be progressing. Some kind of teleology or pursuit of an end is a necessary implication. Nothing is capable of progressing unless the different stages are determined with reference to the end that is to be achieved.

Further, progress is a progress for the thing that changes only if the end is desirable for itself. An organism that is not conscious of the end cannot be said to be aware of its progress, though to an onlooker who desires that it should reach a particular end, its march onwards, prompted by its unconscious impulse may seem to constitute progress. In other words, unless there is the consciousness of the end towards which the movement is directed there is no awareness of the fact of progress on the part of the organism which acts. Even an entity that is capable of anticipating ends and acting in pursuance of them cannot be said to progress in the true sense, if the end which it pursues, is not of its own choice, *i.e.*, regarded as desirable for itself. Thus a slave who may be doing the work imposed on him by compulsion does not feel that he is progressing towards the realisation of his end. Rather he

feels the bondage all the more in that he is made a tool for the satisfaction of others' ends. But sometimes he may feel that he is progressing even when he is doing what he is bidden to do by his master. In that case the end that he is thinking of is not the master's end, *viz.*, finishing the task, but the end of pleasing his master by carrying out his command. So the realisation of the master's end is not the realisation of the slave's own end, but the former is a means to the latter. This shows that in order that progress may be progress for oneself, the end sought must be one's own.

Therefore true progress is possible only for conscious beings, and even for them only when the ends pursued are of their own choice. It must also be noted that the realisation of the end must be, to some extent at least, by one's own efforts. If a child desires something, and some one else works for giving it the desired object, the process of achieving it does not mark any progress on the part of the child. In short, progress implies a conscious striving for an end that is self-chosen, and the degree of progress attained consists in the approximation towards the realisation of the end.

Progress may refer to the pursuit of an end involved in a particular act which may bring about its complete realisation or it may refer to the pursuit of an ideal which cannot be realised, except through a series of acts and, even then, can never be realised completely. If it is of the former kind, the process ceases with the realisation of the end. In the latter case the progress consists in the gradual realisation of the ideal which can never be completely realised. But the two are not really different inasmuch as any concrete end which is capable of 'catastrophic' attainment may be shown to be valuable as an end only with reference to an ideal which can never be completely realised. If there are ideals which can be only progressively realised and never completely, progress is never-ending.

Thus a process can be described as progress only if there is an approximation to an end or ideal. Unless there is some kind of teleology involved in it, it is not progress at all. So a purely mechanical process determined by blind necessity and involving no evolution of the higher from the lower does not reveal progress.

Nor is there any genuine progress if there is no consciousness of the end and the end is not one's own. If the different stages are foreordained with reference to an end which is wholly external to the organisms that act, then also the acting organisms cannot be said to be progressing in the true sense of the word. Progress involves an evolution of the higher from the lower, a 'creative synthesis,' and it cannot be the outcome of physical factors alone.

In the light of the foregoing analysis let us see whether the Concept can be applied to Reality as a whole. The problem of progress as hitherto understood, has meant only social progress. Various attempts have been made in the past to determine whether there is social progress and if so what its nature and goal are. Some thinkers have also formulated certain laws of Social Progress. An historical survey of the same cannot be undertaken here owing to the exigencies of space and time, but I shall make a cursory examination of some of the attempts in order to bring out the fact that the problem of Social Progress cannot be solved without reference to metaphysical principles. The problem of social progress ultimately depends on the nature of Reality.

So long as man believed in 'a golden age' of the past and a subsequent degeneration, the idea of social progress could not dawn upon him. Nor is the idea reconcilable with a facile optimism which has been well expressed in the saying "God is in his heaven, all is right with the world." Only with the decline of the belief in an all-wise and all-powerful Providence which constantly interferes with the world, the conception of Social Progress came to have any significance. It is only with the advance in human knowledge that the larger question regarding the nature of social life engaged the minds of men in the past. As Dr. Bury says, "The spectacular results of the advance of science and mechanical technique brought home to the mind of the average man the conception of an indefinite increase of man's power over nature as his brain penetrated her secrets." This hope in an infinite progress in human knowledge gave rise to the idea of infinite progress in human life as a whole.

It took a long time before the problem of social progress began to engage the attention of thinkers, for social life or civilisation

was construed as entirely fore-ordained by an all-knowing Providence, or it was understood as following a line of periodic cycles. Thus Plato conceived the world as perfect when created by God and as susceptible to decay being mortal. The Greeks generally believed in an ideal state of absolute order brought into being by a deliberate and immediate act of the Deity rather than as attainable by gradual changes and adaptations and they held that once in 72,000 years God wound the world-clock and set it going. The theory of periodic cycles empties the world of its significance and value, for it implies a monotonous iteration rather than a gradual progress by man's efforts. In the Middle Ages the doctrine of Providence held complete sway over the minds of men. The belief in an original fall and the subsequent march towards the Kingdom of God aided by Divine Grace was not congenial to the recognition of progress by human efforts. But the Cartesian Philosophy hastened the dawn of the idea of progress in the minds of men. The names that deserve notice in this connection are Roger and Francis Bacon, Malebranche, Fontanelle and Targot. Voltaire sought the guarantee of progress in the nature of human reason. The French Encyclopædists laid down an *a priori* theory of progress which they said is possible through the indefinite mutability of human nature by education and institutions. The French economists believed in the future progress of humanity through increase of wealth which according to them depended on the growth of justice and liberty. On the other hand, Rousseau, though an optimist in regard to human nature, was a pessimist in regard to civilisation.

Amongst philosophers, Leibnitz deserves to be noticed. He realised that the present is pregnant with the future but his doctrine of Pre-established Harmony degrades cosmic process to a mechanism that simply unfolds what is already contained in it. There can be no evolution of the higher from the lower if all that is to be is already in that which is.

Among German thinkers, Herder emphasised the nature of history as continuous development and Lessing viewed the whole human history as the education of the Human Race and he regarded its goal as the full comprehension of God. Though these two

thinkers emphasised the progressive nature of history of the Human Race, they did not give any valid basis for the same. It was more a postulate rather than a reasoned theory with them. Kant regarded the moral amelioration of Man as the motive of civilisation, but his theory is vitiated by the assumption of an invariable law according to which the cosmic process is worked out. Further his theory of progress depends on the hypothesis of Final Causes. Thus it does not differ essentially from the Leibnitzian doctrine of Pre-established Harmony. Fichte had a great deal to say about Social Progress. He regarded full realisation of 'freedom,' which according to him always recedes, as the goal of progress. The progress of the world consisted in passing from blind instinct to self-conscious reason. Hegel's theory is only an *a priori* deduction from his own metaphysical principles. The whole universe is nothing but a dialectical evolution in which the Absolute explicates itself. But in so far as the actual development is a necessary sequence it does not differ from a mechanical process as there is no scope for human freedom and choice. Further he regards the goal as already attained in the Germanic state and in his own philosophy, as against Fichte's unattainable ideal. It will not be wrong to say that according to Hegel 'Whatever is, is right' in so far as the stages in the cosmic process are simply the unfoldment in a concrete form of the dialectical process.

With this brief survey of the German thinkers let us pass on to some others. Saint Simon said "that the Golden Age is not behind us, but in front of us" and he formulated the law of Progress saying that epochs of organisation or construction and epochs of criticism or revolution succeed each other alternately. He sought to find the goal in human happiness for the attainment of which the immediate step necessary was the amelioration of the working classes. Comte's Law of 'Three Stages' is too well-known to need any exposition here. Besides many errors in his interpretation of facts and neglect of several important epochs in human history, his theory also gives us only a closed system like Hegel's.

Herbert Spencer's view of progress as aiming at a final equilibration by adaptation to the environment makes the physical aspect of things the only fundamental and complete factor. He ignores

altogether the direction of the lower by the higher. Further development, according to him, obeys what he calls the law of beneficial necessity. The universe for him is, as some writer puts it, a vast egg which hatches out perfectly by virtue of its own inner necessity. Thus Herbert Spencer, though he may be called the philosopher of Evolution, regarded progress only as a closed system brought about by the inherent law of necessity. The economic determinism of Karl Marx overlooks the importance of the higher values of life and does not do full justice to the share of the mind of man in the progress of civilisation. The latest attempt is that of Ostwald Spengler who holds that there is no continuous progress, but only a series of cultures that succeed one after another.

This rapid survey of the views on the problem of social progress held by some of the important thinkers brings out the fact that neither *a priori* deduction from the logical categories as in Hegel, nor empirical generalisation from the facts of human history as in Saint Simon and Comte taken by itself is sufficient to establish the reality of progress and to determine its nature and goal. The sociologist is right in confining his attention to actual evidences furnished by the history of Man. But these evidences do not conclusively establish that the progress which we discern in history will be maintained throughout. Human history has progressed through so many vicissitudes that no one can say that the present state of society is necessarily progressive in all its aspects as compared with certain periods in the past. Periods of progress and regress have alternated. Empirical evidences relating to social life alone therefore cannot furnish an adequate ground for any categorical certainty about the future, and the utmost that the sociologist is warranted in doing is to express a pious hope that progress may continue. So an examination of the nature of the whole Reality is necessary to vindicate that progress is real and permanent.

But before we take up the question whether the nature of Reality discloses any valid ground for progress as an ultimate fact, let us note as to what constitutes Social Progress. Social Progress and civilisation are often taken as synonyms and various definitions

have been given of the same. Two important considerations emerge from these definitions. Progress is understood to consist in the increasing control on the part of Man over the forces of nature and in his advancement in various aspects of social life, such as moral, intellectual, æsthetic and spiritual. Ultimately we may define social progress as consisting in the acquisition of the highest values of life which may be expressed in three concepts—Truth, Beauty and Goodness. The degree of progress attained in a certain epoch may be said to depend upon the acquisition of these fundamental values. In order that Social endeavour to realise these ideals may be truly progress, these ideals must be valid in the ultimate scheme of Reality and that there may be the possibility of continued progress in the future, the nature of the environment in which social life is passed must be suitable to the pursuit of these ideals. So the concept of progress can be considered valid, only if values have an objective basis and if the nature of Reality permits the realisation of these. These we seek to establish by showing that the Reality is spiritual in its nature through and through.

If the mechanical principle of rigid determinism runs throughout, and if the whole universe is a machine which, according to certain fixed and uniform laws, goes on changing, then, there is no room for progress at all. If naturalism is true, if what we ordinarily understand as matter is the dominant factor then in the cosmic process there is neither ascent nor descent. It is simply changing. At the beginning of Modern Philosophy, as a result of the rapid advance of the science of mechanics and mathematics a mechanistic theory of the universe came to be formulated. The ideal of philosophical knowledge was conceived in the form of a certain set of axioms about Reality, from which by a strict logical process of reasoning the nature of everything in heaven and earth can be deduced and rationally demonstrated. But the very progress in scientific knowledge especially in the biological realm has undermined this view.

Even if matter and its changes could be explained in terms of mechanical causation still there are facts of experience which do not come under them. The nature of life and mind shows that



there is a different order of Reality in which purposive striving and consciousness are the chief characteristics to which there is nothing analogous in the physico-chemical world as the scientist understands it. So we are forced to recognise that there are two realms, the realm of Nature and the realm of Value.

But if we stop with showing that what we regard as the inorganic part of the world is not the whole of Reality and that there is also a world in which psychical factor rules supreme, it will not be enough to vindicate the reality of progress. Because, whatever may be the nature of the spirit that strives after Ideals, it is condemned to work in an environment which is indifferent to the Values of Life. The physical world "is to us both the environment, scene or stage upon which we act our lives" and "after all it depends upon the constitution of Nature what is the ultimate fate of all of our efforts, what is the fate of all these values the realisation of which alone makes life worth living" (Hoernlé, *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, p. 50). That the danger from the environment taken as a realm which is entirely divorced from the realm of values is real is evident from the grim predictions of certain scientists that all this world will come to an end after a few millenniums when the Earth will cease to be fit for habitation of life. I would quote as an illustration what a philosopher himself says on this point. Lord Balfour says "after a period, the energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, lifeless and inert will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude" (*Foundations of Belief*, p. 33). Another writer does not go to that extent but draws hope from ignorance. He says, "What that residual cosmos which looms beyond the border of knowledge shall in time bring forth, no man that has yet been born can say. . . It is as consistent with rigorous thought to greet it as a promise of salvation, as to dread it as a portent of doom" (R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 347). Of course one may point out the incompleteness of data for the prediction of the extinction of the world and seek refuge in ignorance as the latter writer does. But disputing the evidence is at most only a negative defence. We want more than that, and so we should enquire

whether there is any positive assurance of the reality of progress. Does the nature of things themselves show that it is ultimately real? This is the question that confronts us.

If we posit two principles, one spiritual and the other material in the universe, then there cannot be any such positive assurance forthcoming unless we recognise the former as the more dominant one. To say that the spiritual principle is the master is to subordinate the other, and, even then, the question will arise as to why the spiritual principle should be hampered, though not absolutely, by a counter-principle. So rather than posit a Manichaean dualism it will be more satisfactory to think of one principle and reduce spirit and matter to merely different aspects of it. In contemporary science and philosophy there are ample signs of the recognition of such a unitary principle.

Before we pass on to the positive evidences of such a unitary principle let us turn to some of the objections that may be raised against it. First of all, it may be said that the principle of mechanism in Nature is inconsistent with the admission of a principle, one of whose aspects is spiritual, as the ruling factor in it. In other words, the age-long conflict between mechanism and teleology may be urged against it. But an analysis of the true meaning of causation will convince any one that mechanical causation is not self-explanatory. As W. Temple says "when in tracing any causal nexus we reach the activity of a will fulfilling a purpose with which we ourselves sympathise, we are in fact satisfied" (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, p. 415) and we add, not till then. Mechanism is not inconsistent with teleology. "Relations of cause and effect may also be interpreted as relations of means to ends." As Dr. Hoernlé puts it "teleology is compatible with. . . mechanism. Even the realm of Nature may be interpreted in such a way as to admit the teleological causation by which I do not imply that in the processes of Nature there is the activity of a scheming or designing intelligence. . . . A transition can be made from 'efficient' to 'final' causes by the simple reminder that a nexus of cause and effect can also be taken as a relation of means and end whenever the effect has value. . . . Whenever broadly speaking, the facts challenge us to say, not

merely that B is the effect of A but that B is the reason why, or that *for the sake of which*, A exists or occurs then we have the immanent purposiveness of living things. To introduce here the analogy of human purposes, *i.e.*, to suppose the existence of (physical conditions). . . to have been preceded by a desire for their existence or occurrence, or by a conscious design, plan, scheme, first thought out, and then realised by the manipulation of means would be misleading and irrelevant" (Hoernlé, *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, pp. 158-9).

The physical laws that the scientist lays down do not negative the possibility of an immanent teleology even in inorganic Nature. For, these laws do not give the *Causa Essendi* of things but only describe the nature of things. They are descriptive rather than explanatory. The law that oxygen and hydrogen, combined in a due proportion, will result in what is known as water simply gives us the nature or 'what' rather than the 'why' of those things. The scientist is concerned only with the nature of the physical world, and so he is right in ignoring the teleological relation between the physical and organic worlds. But if he claims to have given a final explanation then we may reply that he has done nothing of the sort, and it is not his business to do so.

It may further be urged that physical laws in so far as they enable us to predict future events imply a uniformity in nature which will not be permissible if we take it as an aspect of a principle which is also spiritual.

This objection is grounded on a misinterpretation of the principle of uniformity in nature. A Law enables us to predict only that under identical conditions identical results will follow. But that identical conditions should prevail throughout, we have no ground to suppose, and from what we know of the history of the earth it is not true. If nature had gone on merely repeating itself then there could have been no cosmic genesis from the nebular state or chemical transmutation of substances. Of course conditions do recur but not always and not all of them. There can be genuine change even according to the laws themselves.

The hypothesis of a single principle which manifests itself both in the physical and the organic world may be questioned

because of the difficulty of conceiving interaction between matter and spirit. But, as Mr. Russell points out, matter has grown aggressively less material, while mind has grown progressively less mental. Professor Whitehead's book on the Concept of Nature proves that the old view of the physical system as consisting of separate substances has been as completely abandoned in physical science as in Idealistic philosophy. I crave your indulgence to quote some passages from the writings of the scientists of the day. Prof. J. A. Thompson observes as follows:—"It must be noted that matter and mind are both abstract aspects of reality. (1) Matter is a fact caught in a net whose meshes are specially adjusted to let the mind slip through. (2) There is a long inclined plane in the expression of mind in the realm of organisms. (3) There is another very gradual expression in individual development. In man, how imperceptible—like the opening of a flower—is the entrance of mind from unrecognised implicitness! (4) Moreover if living organisms evolved from the non-living then there must have been in the not-living the promise and the potentiality of mind as well as life. The statement that all came from the electrons and protons that made the primitive nebulae must be supplemented by the older doctrine 'in the beginning was mind' " (*Contemporary British Philosophy*; Second Series, pp. 325-26). "The empty shell of physics," as Prof. Eddington calls it, "concerns knowledge utmost of structural form while through all the physical world runs that unknown content which must really be the stuff of consciousness" (*Space, Time, and Gravitation*, p. 163). Among the present-day philosophers the neo-realists show how the apparently mental and the apparently material could be regarded as different manifestations of the same stuff.

It is true that the homogeneous character of the world-principle is not a new discovery. The idealistic philosophers of the past as well as of the present have been emphasising the same point though on epistemological and *a priori* grounds. But, as one who believes in a Realistic theory of knowledge, I feel it necessary to take into account empirical facts of experience, and that is the reason why I have cited the views of scientists to bear out my point. If philosophy aims at a synoptic view of Reality it must

make use of facts furnished by different sciences rather than build up a theory solely on the basis of rationalism.

Scientific facts themselves, therefore, suggest that the difficulty in believing in an interaction between matter and mind is due to a dualistic theory of substances which has no warrant in reality. To the objection that the doctrine of the conservation of energy is inconsistent with the theory of interaction, it is enough to say "if we recognise that the doctrine simply means that there is a certain equivalence between the potentialities of movement at different times, there seems no reason why this equivalence should not be found in movements connected with conscious choice as well as those that belong only to the sphere of mechanical transformation" (J. S. Mackenzie, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 241).

Having answered some of the objections that might be urged against the view that the principle of the universe is a comprehensive one of which what we ordinarily call matter and mind are only different aspects, now let us pass on to consider whether the manifestations of such a principle in the past constitute progress and would continue to do so in the future. When we view the whole course of the world we find it epigenetic "*natura naturans*," further "creative synthesis" emerging from the *natura naturata* previously achieved. "We call this synthesis creative because the whole has now new qualities and relations, and is thus always more than the sum of its parts" (Ward, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 50). The history of the cosmic process as known to us shows clearly how inorganic matter tended to become suitable to organic life and how organic life tended to evolve mind in an explicit form and how in all these there has not been merely an unfoldment of what is already contained in the earlier stages, but a real evolution of the higher from the lower, *i.e.*, a creative synthesis. Though the physical events run in a four-dimensional space-time frame, there is absolute continuity between the organic and the inorganic world. Science has not been able to draw the dividing line between the two. As Lloyd Morgan says "there are no physical events that are not also psychical events and

integral psychical systems. There is one evolution in both attributes distinguishable but nowise separable. There is not some stage of physical evolution at which correlation begins; there is no stage of physical evolution at which correlation is absent. Hence there are not two worlds—a physical world and a psychical world—but one world, physico-psychical from top to bottom'' (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, p. 278). If that be so, then the cosmic genesis and the subsequent changes become intelligible only when viewed as a preparation for life. That in the cosmic process the stages which follow the earlier ones have not been mere mechanical resultants, may be established by the evidences of contingency or novelty in Nature.

When we pass to organic evolution we find that here too there has not been mere unfoldment, *i.e.*, higher organisms evolving out of the lower by a rigid law of necessity. Darwin, the father of the theory of evolution could not explain the origin of 'variations' which have been responsible more than anything else for the march onwards. Neither heredity nor environment is sufficient to explain these. "The shuffling of the hereditary cards. . . does not do justice to the creativeness that is characteristic of living organisms" (A. Thompson, p. 325). Mendel must be supplemented by Bergson. Variations may be looked upon as experiments in self-expression on the part of implicit organisms, the germ-cells. Thus there is something akin to voluntary activity involving choice and freedom even in the earlier stages, but instead of the term 'choice,' we may say that the method of trial and error has been operative. Thus the evolution of the higher from the lower that we discern may be described as emergent, and what we called 'creative synthesis' of 'correlation' may be viewed as corresponding to conscious choice on the part of man. We know how in the case of man's voluntary activity no knowledge of his nature, however thorough, can enable us to predict what he will do under particular circumstances. The motives may incline him to do an act but cannot absolutely determine his choice. So the freedom which is self-determination corresponds to the element of contingency in Nature and his act of choice may be looked upon as an act of creation. Thus we may say that the 'creative syn-

thesis ' that we find in organic life below man and in the inorganic world marks progress. " The term progress is no doubt bound up with man's ideals, but there is something analogous to it in organic evolution, something that must be called the advancement of life. There have been blind alleys, wanderings in a circle and actual retrogressions, but the large fact is something like Progress" (J. A. Thomson, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 325). The manifestations of the world-principle thus disclose its progressive nature and so it will not be too much of a presumption on our part to believe that its nature is to progress. Nothing can counteract this tendency as there is nothing else but itself. If we posit a counter-principle then there will be room for conflict, but as there are no evidences to show that there is any such counter-principle we may lay it down as the nature of Reality to progress. That which is at the root of all existence is pregnant with life and consciousness in various forms. Though physico-psychical unity pervades all the cosmos, it is manifested in varying degrees. Nothing we know in nature as absolutely dead. Hence the world as a whole must be taken as living and as an inter-related system. Now " the living being is a structure whose parts so behave as to maintain the whole which sustains them " (L. T. Hobhouse, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 170). Hence self-maintenance by constant correlations is the characteristic of life and reality must likewise be interpreted as self-sustaining. It goes on acting freely as there is nothing to check its onward flow except its own nature. Being free it does not obey any pre-established harmony, or is mechanised to fulfil any external end. The nature of unity that is implied I refrain from defining more precisely as I do not want to commit myself at this stage to any particular solution of the problem of the One and the Many. The whole may be conceived as a system of pluralism, if you like, but the many cannot co-exist without forming a unity and implying inter-relations. So I am content to leave it at that.

The world-principle is manifested in all forms of life, and a certain measure of freedom must be conceded to what we consider as finite individuals, as otherwise our highest experiences will lack significance and value. It may be said that it reveals itself







